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“Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.”
George Santayana
In the 1920s a distinct Reformed philosophy arose in the Netherlands. It 
was not specifically planned, in the sense that its appearing answered to 
a clearly defined goal. There was a melange of factors that accompanied 
its emergence, some personal and some related to the intellectual milieu. 
Two brothers-in-law, Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven (1892-1978) 
and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), entered into discussions with 
each other, with the intention of gaining a more ‘Calvinist’ understand-
ing of matters intellectual, especially as concerns worldview and the foun-
dations and methodology of the sciences. The aim of pursuing a Calvin-
ist/Reformed understanding reflects their neo-Calvinist context, though 
they were critical of that context as well. Other influences, particularly 
those of the broader intellectual environment, relate to the dominance of 
neo-Idealism on the Dutch scene at the time. These influences were more 
problematic. The brothers-in-law never came to complete agreement as 
to the proper critical distance to take, nor how that distance was best 
formulated. This disagreement affected the understanding of Reformed 
philosophy itself. It resulted in its having two founders, as each acknowl-
edged.1 This entails, despite their agreement on many points of detail, 
that neither should be approached nor understood primarily through 
the other. We wish to take a close and critical look at the emergence of 
Reformed philosophy, with particular attention being given to the part 
played by Vollenhoven. 
 This study is not the first to turn to the decade of the 1920s and 
investigate Reformed philosophical thought in its burgeoning years. 
There is valuable and informative research available, though the overall 
1   D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, in Vollenhoven 1953p: 112, speaks of “the fathers” of 
Calvinistic philosophy, in a context in which he discusses the differences between his own 
and Dooyeweerd’s thought. H. Dooyeweerd refers to Vollenhoven as the “cofounder of 
the reformational philosophical trend of thought”; Dooyeweerd 1973: 5. Biographical in-
formation is provided throughout this study but in particular at the beginning of chapters 
1, 2, 3 and section III of chapter 3. Vollenhoven was married to Dooyeweerd’s older sister, 
Hermina Maria Dooyeweerd (1892-1973). 
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understanding is neither complete nor satisfactory. The early thought of 
Vollenhoven has been analysed by John H. Kok in his Vollenhoven: His 
Early Development (cf. Kok 1992) in detail. He was the first to subject 
early material to a thorough study. However, most of the attention went 
to the work that was prior to what Vollenhoven himself considered repre-
sentative of his Reformed position, hence the recognition as to the con-
nection—to whatever degree that there is one—between that early work 
and the Reformed position was left somewhat in abeyance. Also Kok 
explicitly refrained from bringing Dooyeweerd into his discussion.2
 The early thought of Dooyeweerd received a prominent place in the 
Dooyeweerd biography of Marcel E. Verburg (cf. Verburg 1989). He in-
cluded in his discussion essential and characteristic passages from unpub-
lished work of the early Dooyeweerd, thereby showing that Dooyeweerd’s 
thought definitely passed through a learning phase. But in his discus-
sion of these early years there is no mention of Vollenhoven. The author 
brings him into the picture only at the point where the brothers-in-law 
accept their simultaneous appointments to their academic chairs at the 
Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam in 1926;3 Vollenhoven in the faculty of 
arts and philosophy and Dooyeweerd in the faculty of law. We will have 
something to say about this neglect in chapter 3 and how this affects 
Verburg’s interpretation of Dooyeweerd’s work prior to 1926. Then there 
is also Roger D. Henderson’s dissertation study of Dooyeweerd’s early 
thought, his Illuminating Law: The Construction of Herman Dooyeweerd’s 
Philosophy 1918-1928 (cf. Henderson 1994). Henderson focussed on 
Dooyeweerd’s wrestling with the neo-Kantian context prevalent in the 
philosophy of law. He describes Dooyeweerd’s development in the main 
in terms of the increasing distance he takes from that context, at the same 
time that the significance of Calvinism grows on him. Henderson recog-
nizes the presence of Vollenhoven in this development, but he is not able 
to indicate its importance: “Vollenhoven played a role of some signifi-
cance in the development of [Dooyeweerd’s] early systematic thought. 
However, it is difficult to say exactly what role this was” (Henderson 
1994: 27). We hope to be more successful in this respect through a close 
reading of the documentary evidence.
2   Cf. Kok 1992: 4, 292. 
3   Cf. Verburg 1989: 87 ff. It is a longstanding practice, to which I shall adhere, 
to refer to this university in the context of English discourse as “Free University”. We 
add that Vollenhoven’s appointment to the chair of philosophy included lecturing on 
theoretical psychology and its history, taken at the time to be branch of philosophy. In 
1958 the main areas associated with his chair were specified as: philosophy, its history and 
philosophical anthropology. Cf. Klapwijk 1980: 559.
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 There are further informative and supplementing sources in the 
work of the late Johan Stellingwerff and in the volume, The Legacy of 
Herman Dooyeweerd, ed. by C.T. McIntire (cf. McIntire 1985). In his 
“History of Reformational Philosophy”,4 Stellingwerff offers a biographi-
cal description of the interaction between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd 
in the crucial formative years. But what must be counted as a lack is 
the failure to grasp the theistic context of Vollenhoven’s initial thought, 
as laid down in his dissertation of 1918. Here, and in other work of 
Stellingwerff,5 his emphasis is on the first appearance of characteristic fea-
tures of the later position. Then, in the volume edited by McIntire, there 
is the opening chapter on Dooyeweerd’s intellectual milieu by Albert M. 
Wolters (cf. Wolters 1985). This offers a very readable description of the 
neo-Idealist context in which the early Dooyeweerd moved. Wolters em-
phasized Vollenhoven’s independent work in philosophy prior to Dooye-
weerd’s entrance into philosophy. He adds the intriguing remark that on 
the basis of Vollenhoven’s early work, “a good case can be made for the 
thesis that he in some significant ways shaped the developing systematic 
philosophy of Dooyeweerd, especially in relation to the themes of the 
neo-Calvinist worldview” (Wolters 1985: 16). I don’t know if Wolters 
has in the meantime himself substantiated the case. But I believe that 
the present work comes close to making the case in point, at least to the 
extent that this is feasible.
 So we may conclude that, to date, it is not redundant to pay more 
attention to Vollenhoven’s own systematic position, both within the 
context of his own development and in interaction with Dooyeweerd, 
as regards the emergence of Reformed philosophy. We should add that 
knowledge of Vollenhoven’s historical work fares better, at least the work 
associated with the so-called “consequential problem-historical method” 
that he initiated in the mid-1940s. In this connection we call attention 
to the effort and works of K.A. Bril. He has made virtually all of Vol-
lenhoven problem-historical material available, as well as offering an in-
troduction to the method.6 In the current study this problem-historical 
4   Cf. Stellingwerff 2006: 32-45. 
5   Cf. also Stellingwerff 1990 and 1992.
6   There is K.A. Bril’s dissertation (in Dutch), viz. Bril 1986, and his introduction 
to Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method (in English), cf. Bril 2005. Bril’s edition of 
Vollenhoven’s “Schematic charts” (cf. Vollenhoven 2000) includes a plethora of historical 
remarks related to western intellectual history. He has also edited Vollenhoven’s articles 
for the Oosthoeks Encyclopedie, in which Vollenhoven makes full use of his method; cf. 
Vollenhoven 2005c. There is also the compilation of Vollenhoven’s own articles on or 
related to this method, edited by Bril: Vollenhoven 2005a; and the English translation 
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work, being of later date, will not be addressed directly, though we will 
have occasion to refer to it when assessing Vollenhoven’s own (late) char-
acterization of his early work.
The present study wishes to fill in the stated gap in the understanding of 
the part played by Vollenhoven in the emergence of Reformed philoso-
phy. It (the present study) started as the project of editing Vollenhoven’s 
chief contribution to systematic philosophy, viz. the text that was used 
as syllabus for the introductory course in philosophy at the Free Univer-
sity. This introduction to philosophy, indicated as such with the classical 
title, Isagôgè Philosophiae, consists of carefully crafted notes that invite 
the reader to enter into doing philosophy. As it turned out, Vollenhoven 
kept returning to the text, from the time he was appointed to the chair of 
philosophy, in 1926, till 1945. In that time span, about a dozen different 
versions came into circulation, the first complete version stemming from 
1930. The initial challenge was to select the most trustworthy version of 
the text.
 Vollenhoven’s own copy, and the notes and changes he wrote in the 
margins, as finalized in 1945, proved to be the ‘best’ copy. That copy was 
used for the bilingual edition of the text, that appeared in 2005.7 The 
other versions were thereby definitely ‘superseded’. But they still present 
an interesting window on Vollenhoven’s work. The more significant dif-
ferences between the versions could be traced to three important changes 
in the set-up of the text. In other words, between 1930 and 1945 there 
were four ‘stages’ in the development of the text. This reflects changes 
in Vollenhoven’s own development. All these versions were subsequently 
edited and arranged in one text-critical edition. In that way the differ-
ences between the versions became more apparent, and the question as to 
their significance could now be addressed and studied. This text-critical 
edition is scheduled to appear simultaneously with the current study.8 
 In the general introduction to the text-critical edition of Isagôgè Phi-
of these articles: Vollenhoven 2005b. As to other relevant work, there is an introductory 
review by John H. Kok of the history and systematics of philosophy, in the spirit of Vol-
lenhoven; cf. Kok 1998. Bennie Van der Walt has done much, over the years, to promote 
Vollenhoven’s thought in South Africa; cf. Van der Walt 2006. In Tol 1993 there is a 
discussion of Vollenhoven’s historiographical work against the background of his late 
systematic thought. 
7   The bilingual edition is Vollenhoven 2005d, the separately published English 
only version is Vollenhoven 2005e. 
8   Cf. Vollenhoven 2010. This text is entirely in Dutch, including the editor’s gen-
eral introduction, in which inter alia the ‘stages’ are discussed, and the account of the 
editing of the text. 
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losophiae, as initially planned, it seemed appropriate to include an indica-
tion of Vollenhoven’s course of thought prior and up to the composition 
of the syllabus text. From the start it was not the intention merely to 
indicate when the main features of the text were selected or characteristic 
notions first appeared. That assumes that the final text, being the ‘known 
outcome’, is a sufficient end. In fact, this is not so. Vollenhoven’s thought 
continued to evolve, and numerous important changes took place in the 
later years of his career. In other words, the text is ‘provisional’ (as he 
himself insists).9 Thus, to understand it philosophically and not just ver-
bally, one needs to understand the problems that sustain it. It is in con-
nection with such problems that a change of thought signals a solution 
to, or at least a lessening of, a problem’s urgency. 
 But Vollenhoven was not always inclined to do his thinking overtly, 
as readers of his work soon discover (though in the earlier work there 
tends to be more discussion). The problems that underlie the introduc-
tion to philosophy are not always evident. This is another reason why the 
option was pursued of tracing the context of Vollenhoven’s thought, by 
including research of the earlier work, for this makes his choices more 
evident. Work that is, in a superficial sense, taken as having been sur-
passed, does not cease to have significance if it includes the more general 
schemata of problems that find continuation in a changed constellation 
of details. The significance towards understanding remains relevant, even 
though the implementation of such schemata involves critique of for-
mer use and changes of paths pursued. As this strategy was applied, the 
confirmation of its significance, and especially the manner in which this 
proved to be the case, led to surprising results.
 The results were such as to invite and require proper discussion in 
their own right. This led to the introduction’s expanding into a volume 
that could no longer answer to its subsidiary role, as originally planned. 
A more measured introduction was then written for the text-critical edi-
tion of Isagôgè Philosophiae, and this enabled the current text to become 
an independent volume.
9   Vollenhoven 2005d, 4. References to the Isagôgè Philosophae will in general be to 
the bilingual edition and its 224 sections, i.e. Vollenhoven 2005d, whereby the English 
half is identical to Vollenhoven 2005e. (A standard reference is then often combined: 
‘Vollenhoven 2005d/e’, followed by a section number in bold.) References to specific 
versions will be through the test-critical edition, Vollenhoven 2010. (The section refer-
ences in the text-critical edition and the bilingual edition are identical.) For Vollenhoven’s 
late admission that Isagôgè Philosophiae needed reworking, cf. the foreword to the 1967 
reprint; Vollenhoven 2010: 71. (Note that section numbers in bold are separated from the 
year code by a comma, page numbers are separated by a colon.) 
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In this independent study, due attention could be given to novel features 
disclosed through the research of the early material of both Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd. The more significant of the novel features are the fol-
lowing.
 i. In Vollenhoven’s dissertation on the philosophy of mathematics 
from a theistic standpoint (cf. Vollenhoven 1918a), one is able to discern, 
at least in outline, a ‘philosophical position’. The theistic standpoint, 
which is a variant of ‘theistic intuitionism’, is predicated on the scholastic 
theme of the harmony between two orders of rationality. One order is 
that of ‘objective rationality’, that holds of the nature of things, as secured 
in ideas of distinctive being, and the other order is that of ‘subjective 
rationality’ in the human being, who attempts to make its conceptual un-
derstanding more adequate by increasing the harmony of that conceptual 
understanding with the objective order. But Vollenhoven qualifies this 
scholastic use of concept and idea. He takes the criterion of the harmony 
between the two orders to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
of knowledge. As necessary criterion, the harmony is warranted by the 
(divine) Logos, which ‘disposes’ subject and object to come together. But 
this theistic criterion needs the supplement of the (human) intuition, 
rooted in the Self, in the sense that knowledge, as maintained, calls for 
a warranted conviction of certainty supporting fundamental ‘synthetic 
a priori’ judgments. The discussions on the foundations and method-
ology of mathematics, on epistemology and metaphysics and also the 
explication of theism, all hang together in Vollenhoven’s initial ‘qualified 
scholasticism’. This scholasticism will soon (in the course of 1923) be 
targeted as needing to be overcome. In the meantime there is the motive, 
expressed in late 1920, to be more consciously Reformed. 
 ii. Thus, evoking “Christian realism”, Vollenhoven first underscores 
(in Vollenhoven 1921c) the dualistic use of ‘concept and idea’ so as to 
sharpen the opposition to the neo-Kantian use. In the latter, the idea is 
predominantly a directing or limiting concept, in being the regulative 
idea of the metalogical sphere, which harbours the growth of scientific 
knowledge. (The metalogical sphere is the ‘Encyclopedia of the sciences’, 
i.e. methodologically organized domains of scientific knowledge.) Here 
concept and idea are both aligned to the metalogical sphere, the sphere in 
which scientific knowledge accrues as organized according to the idea (as 
limiting concept). But, for Vollenhoven, the growth of the metalogical 
sphere is controlled by the adequate concept, as ‘sighted’ by the metalogi-
cal intuition, leaving the idea free for its role as principle of distinctive 
being, with its own supporting metaphysical intuition. For, the metalogi-
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cal intuition of an adequate conceptual ideal is distinct from the meta-
physical intuition, which is aligned to the reality of the cosmos and its 
‘thought foreign’ ideas of being. Hence, (adequate) concept and idea (of 
distinctive being) are distinct; viz. the adequate concept controls subjec-
tive rationality, in that it represents the ideal of the complete knowledge 
of the idea, which in turn secures the essence of objective rationality. 
Within the metalogical sphere there are distinct domains of validity. This 
latter point has similarities with Freiburg neo-Kantianism. The metalogi-
cal sphere and its distinct domains of validity together form the take-off 
point for the development of the modal order.
 iii. Dooyeweerd who, since 1919, has been studying neo-Kantian 
works in the philosophy of law, accepts Vollenhoven’s framework of 
Christian realism, calling it “critical realism” (sometimes “transcendental 
realism”). A close reading of his early work, especially of 1922, confirms 
the background in Vollenhoven. Metalogical notions, such as region cat-
egory and modality, are appropriated from neo-Kantian writers and in-
corporated into the context of critical realism. At this time Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd are in close contact in developing their realist position. 
But in October of 1922 Dooyeweerd becomes deputy director of the 
Kuyper Foundation. This, in turn, no longer allows the contact between 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd to be as intense as it had been. 
 iv. In or about the summer of 1922 there is reportedly a “find” that 
would appear to revolve around the realization that knowing resorts under 
being. This has implications at various levels: metalogical, cosmological 
and theistic. The metalogical sphere of scientific knowledge, also called 
the Gegenstand-sphere, is now taken to be secured in how the cosmos is 
‘given for consciousness’, as assessed in a ‘modal viewing’. In line with 
this shift in how knowledge is secured, the Logos is looked on as the 
divine ‘giver’, in being the divine Word. In virtue of the Logos the cos-
mos is knowable. Thus the Logos is brought into closer rapport with the 
cosmos and its objective order of being. This ‘find’ evidences a tendency 
towards a more ‘Christo-centric cosmism’, that is now said to be an ex-
plicit motive (the Logos being ‘in Christ’). The context here is still that of 
critical realism, but it is ‘shifted’. 
 v. In November of 1922, the principal of an elementary school, An-
theunis Janse, with whom Vollenhoven corresponded since 1919, quite 
suddenly criticises the notion of the immortality of the soul, the anthro-
pological supplement to scholasticism. A main line of argument of Janse 
is that the notion of the immortality of the soul lacks proper biblical 
foundation. Vollenhoven is disconcerted and tries to ‘correct’ Janse. Vol-
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lenhoven, now in a very busy period, becomes overworked and in mid-
January of 1923 spirals downward in a psycho-somatic crisis from which 
he does not fully recuperate until December 1923.
 vi. With Vollenhoven out of reach, Janse proceeds to publish six 
(fairly short) articles in anthropology and on life attitude, in which he 
expresses his new ideas. These articles have never been referred to in Re-
formed circles. They invite careful scrutiny, all the more so since it is pri-
marily this material that persuaded Vollenhoven, upon reading it after his 
recovery, that Janse is essentially right. However, Vollenhoven did have 
criticism, and he assimilated the main new ideas in his own way.
 vii. At the same time—while Vollenhoven is still out of reach—
Dooyeweerd advances, in about mid-1923, his notion of the ‘law-idea’. It 
is, as cosmological principle, the ‘organon’ (instrument) by which a self-
contained worldview is effectuated. The Christian law-idea is formally 
the boundary between the creator and the creature, materially it under-
scores a providential world-plan, that flows from God’s wisdom and is 
known or accepted on faith. Dooyeweerd, moving intellectually in the 
context of (scholastic and shifted) critical realism, continues to use ‘idea’ 
in the metaphysical sense of principle of distinctive being. Thus, his law-
idea here focuses on the predestined future as secured in the main struc-
ture of the cosmos. The human acknowledgement of this idea, through 
faith, provides the key to the subjective order of knowledge. 
 viii. After Vollenhoven’s recovery, it is still about two years before 
he proceeds to publish. In correspondence at the time he indicates his 
rejection of the interpretation of the soul as being immortal, implying 
in fact a rejection of scholasticism as such. Between 1926 and 1931 his 
publications attest to a revised ‘theistic position’. The notion of the law 
as boundary between God and the cosmos is in central position, and it 
is interpreted in such a way as to make the scholastic use of ‘concept and 
idea’ entirely ineffectual. The former ‘subjective rationality’ is now itself 
a creaturely condition subject to the logical law-sphere. It does not seek 
harmony with ‘objective rationality’, i.e. the structure of the cosmos, for 
it is itself already a part of that structure. Anything ‘subjective’ is divested 
of a basis in itself—the effect formerly thought of as warranted by the 
immortality of the soul that supports the intuition. Subjectivity is now 
said to be ‘tasked’, i.e. to entail the human being’s standing in subjection 
to the laws that evince cosmic boundaries. The impingement of law calls 
for a realism of the cosmos in its response to law. This impingement and 
the response assume an ontological difference between law and cosmic 
functioning. This understanding contrasts with Dooyeweerd’s initial re-
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alist use of law-idea, viz. as cosmological principle—in its meaning as 
providential world-plan—for that use proceeds from the assumption of 
an ontological agreement between law and cosmos. For Vollenhoven, such 
an agreement undercuts the dynamics of standing in subjection—a dy-
namics on which the religious-moral struggle of good and evil (direction) 
is predicated—which is why Vollenhoven found the notion of ‘law-idea’ 
to be unsuitable from its first introduction. 
 ix. Dooyeweerd in turn, in about 1928 (cf. Dooyeweerd 1928b), 
begins to express himself in a way that is characteristic of De Wijsbegeerte 
der Wetsidee (1935-1936). He ontologizes meaning—“meaning is the be-
ing of all creaturely beings”10—making the acceptance of a reality that 
bears meaning redundant. This capitalizes on the (former) ‘metalogical 
sphere’ at the expense of the realism of the cosmos This calls for a re-
interpretation of the understanding of ‘law-idea’, which now, as ‘limit-
ing concept’, captures the presupposed coherence, totality and unity of 
meaning that is presupposed by thought. The Self is now taken as (tran-
scendent) spiritual centre, that is focussed on the totality of meaning by 
means of its participation in the supra-temporal ‘Archimedean point’, a 
vantage point from which to view the diversity and coherence of cosmic 
meaning without predilection. When interpreting this ‘move’ against the 
background of the foregoing years, Dooyeweerd’s new use of ‘concept 
and idea’ appears to be closer to a neo-Kantian use than ever before, and 
the themes he broaches in connection with the Self ’s spiritual centre—its 
intuitive experience and its involvement with time that is modalized in 
that experience—more than echo important traits of Vollenhoven’s ‘Self ’, 
as described in his dissertation but which in the meantime he had defi-
nitely abandoned (Vollenhoven 1918a).
 Thus, by the end of the 1920s Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have 
each found a way of ‘reforming’ philosophy in a way that is critical of 
traditional scholasticism, as prevalent in their immediate environment. 
Vollenhoven reforms it from the perspective of a ‘Trinitarian theistic 
position’. This position delineates the boundary within which philoso-
phy is practised, guaranteeing philosophy’s ‘intra-cosmic’ relevance and 
safeguarding it from speculation and antinomies. The Self, in Vollen-
hoven’s definitive view, no longer proceeds from a prior self-certainty of 
self-consciousness. Dooyeweerd, in turn, goes from ‘critical realism’ to 
a ‘transcendental criticism’. For him the Self, as transcendent spiritual 
principle of the human being, is the crucial factor. In its metalogical 
orientation regarding the diversity and coherence of meaning, as tempo-
10   Dooyeweerd 1935-1936 I: 6. 
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rally experienced, the Self ‘takes a critical stand’ in the light of the supra-
temporal totality and unity of meaning. The metaphysical intuition of 
cosmic reality is redundant. In the law-idea, as ‘transcendental ground-
idea’ of philosophy, the Self accounts for its grasp of meaning in the face 
of the Origin of meaning.
 Each of the brothers-in-law continued to develop his thinking, 
which naturally calls for description and study in its own right. But 
whichever ‘final’ formulation of the ‘definitive’ positions be deemed ad-
equate, a difference remained between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, a 
difference that cannot be assessed without taking serious stock of the 
early material this study attempts to elucidate and acknowledging Vol-
lenhoven’s role ‘from the beginning’. 
This study is organized in four chapters. The first chapter offers a discus-
sion of Vollenhoven’s program. Philosophy, being a practice, it cannot but 
be influenced by the main determinants of historical reality. By taking a 
standpoint in the light of an historical tradition one evinces conscious-
ness of this participation as well as being alive to the need for revisions 
in light of historical change. Through his upbringing in the Netherlands 
and affiliation with the Reformed tradition of that country, Vollenhoven 
aligns himself to the Christian religion, in its Reformed expression, and 
supports a neo-Calvinist (or Kuyperian) world view. Upon his becoming 
the first full-time appointee in philosophy at the Free University in 1926, 
Vollenhoven develops an understanding of philosophy, as academic dis-
cipline, that is constrained, meta-philosophically, by religious and world-
view features, and secured in an objective view of truth that presupposes 
a cosmic order of determinants of structural differences and connections.
 Vollenhoven’s introduction to philosophy, entitled Isagôgè Philoso-
phiae, is his main expression of systematic philosophy. It is a set of care-
fully crafted notes in which he lays down his nuanced view of philoso-
phy. A dominating thought is that scientific or academic disciplines need 
to proceed methodically. Vollenhoven needs no less than three methods 
to enable philosophy to be conducted responsibly: the thetical-critical 
method, the ‘method of knowledge organization’ (Vollenhoven himself 
nowhere names this method), and the method of resolution and com-
position. These three methods themselves determine the layout of the 
introductory text.
 Understanding Vollenhoven also calls for attention to the context of 
the Free University and the Reformed tradition it wished to defend and 
promote. In that tradition there is an element of scholasticism, expressed 
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in the assumption of a harmony between subjective and objective orders 
of rationality. By the time of his appointment to the chair of philosophy, 
Vollenhoven had rejected this assumption of scholasticism. He therefore 
felt challenged to set up a practice of Reformed philosophy in an alterna-
tive way. He underscored the distinct realities of the religious life, world-
view engagement and structured cosmic creatures, and culled from these 
realities the main delimiting features (conditions) of philosophy, thereby 
accounting for what he took to be the important but limited task and 
place of philosophy.
 The first chapter discusses these matters of text, context and prin-
ciples in an exploratory way.
 The second chapter discusses and analyses Vollenhoven’s early 
thought. His dissertation (Vollenhoven 1918a) is the main object of at-
tention here. It deals with the philosophy of mathematics from a theistic 
standpoint. Our discussion traces a path that begins with arithmetic and 
geometry, and ends with the theistic standpoint. On route the discussion 
touches on themes in the philosophy of science, on epistemology—espe-
cially the distinction between knowledge and intuition—, the use Vollen-
hoven made of Alexius Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie (which becomes the 
basis for the ‘metalogical Gegenstand sphere’ and thus the modal order) 
and matters metaphysical, especially the metaphysics of substance. The 
chapter also includes a section on ‘metalogic’, which emphasizes the ‘real-
ist’ use of idea, with the (adequate) concept being linked to a ‘metalogical 
intuition’. Finally, the whole discussion of the chapter is pulled together 
in a summarizing overview, which offers in outline the ‘philosophical 
conception’ Vollenhoven operates with in his early thought. Vollenhoven 
defends a qualified scholasticism at the time, whereby the assumption of 
a harmony between the subjective and objective orders of rationality is 
supplemented by the intuition, to warrant consciously experienced cer-
tainty. 
 The third chapter looks in detail at the two contacts Vollenhoven 
maintained, that were most consequential to him in the early years, 
namely with A. Janse and H. Dooyeweerd. The contact with Janse was 
instrumental in getting Vollenhoven to reconsider anthropology, in par-
ticular the theme of the immortality of the soul and its status as “sub-
stantia incompleta”. Janse also emphasized the importance of the ‘biblical 
understanding’ of the human condition and what this presupposes about 
the human being and the world. Vollenhoven turned the latter into a 
constraint on philosophy that “reckons with Scripture”. Vollenhoven’s 
responses to Janse’s challenges are discussed in the context of the ideas 
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raised by Janse.
 In the discussion of the contact with Dooyeweerd, all the attention 
is directed to describing the factual contact between Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven, and analysing the evidence of Dooyeweerd’s aligning him-
self to Vollenhoven as he (Dooyeweerd) works at the neo-Kantian writers 
in the philosophy of law. We then trace how Dooyeweerd begins to go 
his own way when he advanced the notion of ‘law-idea’ (in 1923) and 
transforms this from a critical realist notion into one of transcendental 
criticism.
 The fourth and final chapter discusses and analyses Vollenhoven’s 
initial definitive position, as evidenced by the writings of 1925 - 1931. 
We begin with a discussion of what Vollenhoven’s criticisms are with 
regard to what he had called his earlier ‘theistic position’. This puts the 
two notions of boundary and law in the limelight. Upon analysing their 
relevance, we come across Vollenhoven’s revised Trinitarian theistic posi-
tion, and how this leads to his cosmological ‘intersection principle’, a 
consequence of ‘knowing’s resorting under being’. This principle governs 
cosmology, understood realistically. The discussion is rounded off by a 
review of this initial definitive position and by looking ahead to impor-
tant later developments, viz. in anthropology and the view of law. An 
addendum on Vollenhoven’s own retrospective account of the early years 
ends the chapter.
The sources for this study are mainly in the Dutch language. Use is made 
of translations, when available; otherwise the translations are my own. 
References to sources are via their bibliographical code (author, year and 
page). I have tried to keep the references to unpublished material to a 
minimum. But there is important archival material that could not be 
passed by. All this archival material is in the “Historisch Documentatie-
centrum voor het Nederlands Protestantisme (1800-heden)” of the Free 
University. Here one may find e.g. the archives of Dooyeweerd (collec-
tion no. 77), Janse (collection no. 157) and Vollenhoven (collection no. 
405) referred to in this study. 
 I maintain a distinction in the use of single and double ‘quotation 
marks’. The double are used for quotations and titles, the single serve to 
denote words that are merely mentioned. 
 In the course of my inquiry, important archival material came to 
light. Each new piece raised the spectre of possibly refuting what was 
thought to be known of the context. Luckily, during this research the 
newly found material tended to fall quite readily into place in a way that 
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confirmed and nuanced my own prior understanding. This made it a joy 
to trace the contours of the emergence of Reformed philosophy, when 
subjected to a close reading. For the research seemed to go in the direc-
tion of illuminating a niche of cultural history that still has relevance and 
that we ought not to forget.
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VollenhoVen’s PrinciPled PrograM
“[T]he norm [of philosophy is] that philosophy 
do justice to any diversity. . . .” 
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1959)
I. IntroductIon
The present work is a study of the emergence of Reformed philosophy in 
the Netherlands, with particular attention to the role and contribution of 
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven. The constraints on that emergence were, in part 
at least, connected with Vollenhoven’s appointment to the chair of phi-
losophy at the Free University of Amsterdam in 1926. His was the first 
full-time appointment in philosophy since the university was founded 
in 1880. This brought with it the task of setting up a full program of 
studies in philosophy. There was also the requirement that all incoming 
students be confronted with philosophy. This included both an introduc-
tion to systematic philosophy and a broad survey of philosophy’s history. 
Vollenhoven seized on this requirement to develop his primary views in 
both areas in a way that reckoned with the Reformed tradition in which 
the Free University stood and which tradition the university wished to 
promote, as specified by its charter. This first chapter discusses the setting 
and the presuppositions of Vollenhoven’s philosophical endeavours. 
 Vollenhoven held that the meaning of philosophy cannot be di-
vorced from principles that illuminate our experience, underscore our 
responsibility and guide our endeavours. Such principles address the hu-
man condition and thus they figure in our awareness of it as we partici-
pate in it. In his or her own person, the philosopher provides the interface 
between the content of thought and the prevailing factors of the context, 
geographic-cultural, civic-societal, historical and religious. Through the 
fact of a human being’s participation in that context, the philosopher’s 
exercise of philosophy can never be neutral. He or she makes choices 
as to what is, what ought to be and what can be. For that very reason 
the fundamental choice of one’s principles is a factor of importance and 
should be made explicit, open to critical discussion. Vollenhoven was 
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aware of himself as a twentieth century Dutch-European, who held to a 
Protestant-historical world view and was committed to a Calvinist-Chris-
tian understanding of religion.1 He developed an account of philosophy 
and its presuppositions and principles that reckons with the normative 
context of the human condition. 
 Vollenhoven developed his thought in close dialogue with his broth-
er-in-law, Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). Both occupied, simulta-
neously, chairs at the Free University of Amsterdam,2 and from that base 
they initiated a movement, in the mid-1930s, that is now commonly 
referred to as ‘reformational philosophy’.3 Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd 
shared the ideals that call for ‘Christian philosophical thought’. But, 
while their respective contributions have many points of contact and 
overlap, the interpretation of their work cannot, and should not, ignore 
the distinct accounts each gave of their common ideals and the original-
ity each invested in his written work.4 Vollenhoven’s work has, to date, 
not nearly had the exposure that Dooyeweerd’s work enjoys. 
 One reason for the paucity of attention lies in the availability—
namely the lack of it—of Vollenhoven’s chief contribution to systematic 
philosophy: Isagôgè Philosophiae.5 Prior to its publication in 2005 (cf. 
Vollenhoven 2005d and 2005e) it was only available as syllabus for pri-
1   Vollenhoven distinguishes between religion and faith. He was critical of the most 
commonly accepted views as to ‘the relation between faith and thought’. He held that 
faith and thought are, at bottom, part of a functional order, but that religion is a norma-
tive condition which, as religiously enjoined, is governed by the love command.
2   Throughout their whole careers, Dooyeweerd occupied a chair in the faculty 
of law (1926-1965) while Vollenhoven held a chair in philosophy in the faculty of arts 
and philosophy (1926-1963). Philosophy was a section of the latter faculty. It became a 
faculty of its own in 1964, after a change, in 1963, in the Dutch Higher Education Act 
made this possible. In their inaugural addresses of 1926, each expressed with gratitude 
the other’s simultaneous appointment, thereby ensuring continued “fruitful contact”; cf. 
Dooyeweerd 1926d: 75-76, and Vollenhoven 1926a: 67. 
3   This term includes Vollenhoven’s preferred use of the expression “Calvinistic 
philosophy”. Given the near equivalence of ‘Calvinistic’ and ‘Reformed’, I shall also speak 
of ‘Reformed philosophy’ in connection with Vollenhoven. Initially Dooyeweerd also 
spoke of “Calvinistic philosophy”, together with his preferred phrase “Wijsbegeerte der 
Wetsidee” (Philosophy of the law-idea). Later Dooyeweerd dropped the term ‘Calvinistic’ 
in favour of ‘Christian’, used in an ecumenical sense; cf. Dooyeweerd 1966.
4   For two recent discussions that acknowledge difference, cf. Stellingwerff 2006 
and Friesen 2005. 
5   The category ‘systematic philosophy’ is not common in the English speaking 
world (as over against ‘systematic theology’). Systematic philosophy is the study the gen-
eral conditions that hold of philosophical inquiry, including the study of the connections 
between the chief disciplines of philosophy, viz. ontology, epistemology, anthropology, 
philosophy of science, etc. 
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vate study, in an unedited state. This text was itself revised many times. 
There is also a text-critical edition (cf. Vollenhoven 2010) in which all the 
prior versions that arose between 1930 and 1945 are now available. This 
edition provides a unique access to the development of Vollenhoven’s 
thought in the indicated time span, for the more important changes 
attest to the general development of his philosophical views. Another 
source of Vollenhoven’s writings, that has recently become available, are 
the articles Vollenhoven wrote for the Oosthoeks Encyclopedie, in particu-
lar the articles on important terms in philosophy.6 This supplements the 
articles of Vollenhoven’s later thought that were brought together in Vol-
lenhoven als wijsgeer (Vollenhoven as philosopher).7 Thus only recently 
has serious and representative study of Vollenhoven’s thought become a 
distinct possibility, even in his own native language. 
 There is also a practical reason that accounts, at least initially, for 
Vollenhoven’s lower profile. He was for many years the chairperson of 
the Association for Reformational Philosophy. He felt that a united front 
was in the best interest of the Association, an interest which he, as its 
chairman, had to promote and guard. Thus the discussion of internal 
differences was long kept under cover.8
 In the broad spectrum of Vollenhoven’s systematic work, the Isagôgè 
Philosophiae has pride of place. In our discussion below we will therefore 
focus on this text, though other titles will be referred to en route.
II. Isagôgè PhIlosoPhIae
Isagôgè Philosophiae arose (as we said) in the context of the author’s teach-
ing duties at the Free University of Amsterdam. Vollenhoven’s appoint-
ment in philosophy at the Free University, in 1926, was as ordinarius (full 
professor) in philosophy. Others before him, such as Ph.J. Hoedemaker, 
Jan Woltjer, Wilhelm Geesink, Herman Bavinck and Hendrik J. Pos, had 
an interest in philosophy, and some of these men had assigned teaching 
tasks in philosophy. Hoedemaker and Geesink (both former clergymen) 
were responsible for the introduction to philosophy, the history of phi-
6   Cf. Vollenhoven 2005c. 
7   Cf. Tol and Bril 1992. An internet search under “D.H.Th. Vollenhoven” reveals 
further possibilities of access to Vollenhoven’s work. 
8   This association was initially called “Association for Calvinistic Philosophy” (Ver-
eeniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte). Vollenhoven was its first chairman from 1935 
until 1963. In view of the importance of the unity of the Calvinistic movement, Vol-
lenhoven never discussed his differing views with Dooyeweerd in public until after he 
had resigned as chairman of the Association. Cf. Tol and Bril 1992: 170-171; cf. also my 
introduction to Vollenhoven 1953p, in Tol and Bril 1992: 107-111.
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losophy, logic and psychology (the latter being considered a philosophi-
cal discipline at the time). When Hoedemaker left the Free University in 
1887, the teaching of philosophy was temporarily in the hands of Woltjer 
(in classical languages), until Geesink was given the main responsibility 
for philosophy in 1894. His lectures in philosophy never rose above an 
elementary level. Bavinck (in theology) broached philosophical themes 
to support his work in theology, though he never had an assigned task in 
philosophy. In 1926 Vollenhoven became Geesink’s successor, and with 
his (full-time) appointment in philosophy a more integrated program of 
philosophy could be developed.9 
 Vollenhoven’s teaching duties included the teaching of an introduc-
tory course in philosophy and a survey course in the history of philoso-
phy, both of which were required courses for all first-year students.10 For 
many years both courses were the chief staple of the Monday mornings, 
with history of philosophy being taught from 9 to 11 a.m. and system-
atic philosophy from 11 a.m. to 12 p.m. These courses were found to 
be difficult, particularly in the early years when there was no supporting 
material. Vollenhoven recognized the problem, and he agreed to make 
his notes of both courses available for student use, in stencilled form, in 
separate syllabi. The notes for the introduction to philosophy he named 
Isagôgè Philosophiae, which means ‘Introduction to Philosophy’;11 those 
for the history of philosophy he called Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae 
(Survey of the history of philosophy). Because Vollenhoven kept revising 
the notes of these courses, two series of syllabi arose over the years. The 
9   Cf. Klapwijk 1980 for a review of philosophy at the Free University from the 
university’s inception in 1880. During its first fifty years (1880-1930) the Free University 
had only three faculties, namely, a Faculty of Theology, a Faculty of Law and a Faculty 
of Arts (and Philosophy). A medical faculty was begun in 1907 but had to be aborted in 
1925. As to H.J. Pos, who was a linguist, he left the Free University in 1932 to accept an 
appointment in philosophy at the municipal University of Amsterdam. Cf. also Vollen-
hoven 1948h (the original Dutch text is Vollenhoven 1948k: 5-6); cf. also Van Deursen 
2005: 105-115. 
10   For more information, cf. Stellingwerff 1992, chapter 6: “Vollenhoven als 
hoogleraar” (Vollenhoven as chaired professor), especially pp. 74-80. Some course work 
in philosophy had been mandatory for all incoming students long before Vollenhoven’s 
appointment; cf. Van Deursen 2005: 38. The Free University still requires that all stu-
dents, of whatever faculty, be confronted with philosophy, in the context of a program 
called “Wijsgerige Vorming” (Philosophical education), for more on which, cf. Tol 2004. 
11   The first complete set of these stencilled notes is dated “October 1930”; cf. Stel-
lingwerff 1992: 75-76. The title of this work echoes Porphyry’s famous Eisagogè, usually 
rendered in Latin as Isagoge, which is an introduction to Aristotle’s treatise, Categories; 
cf. Spade 1994: 1-19. More than a terminological agreement with the title of Porphyry’s 
work was not intended by Vollenhoven.
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series of the Isagoge12 texts is given attention in the current work. The 
historical series need not be specifically discussed here.13 Suffice it to say 
at this point that he warns against confusing the study of the history 
of philosophy with the actual practice of philosophy (cf. Vollenhoven 
2005d/e, 3; comment 1).
A. Experience and method
In the course of study, of which the Isagoge is the text, Vollenhoven takes 
upon himself to introduce the actual practice of philosophy, at least its 
fundamental part. For him the practice is not geared beforehand to a 
distinct discipline of philosophy. Philosophy is fundamental inquiry. It 
has a motive, and its chief characteristics are related to the methodical 
procedure of the inquiry.
 Philosophy is a fundamental inquiry, related, classically, to the striv-
ing for wisdom.14 Vollenhoven has no quarrel with the classical view of phi-
losophy proceeding from the experience of wonderment—“expectation, 
attuned to new surprises” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 15)—as emphasized by 
Plato and Aristotle.15 But he also allows for a more nuanced experience 
as well; e.g. he once listed in 1927: fascination upon perceiving the fine 
structure of a flower, curiosity as to what it means for someone to be 
colour blind, vexation over the question ‘what is knowledge?’, indigna-
tion at the injustice of social inequality, the affliction of sorrow, respect 
12   Vollenhoven himself referred to his text as the “Isagogie”, a word that may have 
been original with him. (However K.A. Bril informed me that the term was also in use 
within the university in Vollenhoven’s student days.) In Dutch reference works, such as 
De Kleine Oosthoek, one finds the form ‘Isagoge’ as available for Dutch use. However, that 
use is not common. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1958) gives the same word as 
available in English, meaning “an introduction, as to a subject of research”. We shall use 
this term—Isagoge (pronounced: isagoje)—as the abbreviated title of Isagôgè Philosophiae. 
References to the definitive version will be via its bibliographical code (i.e. Vollenhoven 
2005d/e) and the relevant number (in bold) of the section; references to specific prior 
versions will be via the text-critical edition, Vollenhoven 2010. 
13   Vollenhoven used this title for the historical series until 1948. From that date he 
switched to “Kort overzicht” (Short survey. The final text composed with this title is from 
1956: “Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte” (Short survey of the history 
of philosophy), stencilled edition by THEJA (August 1956). This text has recently been 
reprinted in Vollenhoven 2005a: 27-93; English translation in Vollenhoven 2005b: 21-
88. Vollenhoven’s lecture notes in the history of philosophy are, apart from the published 
text cited here, still virgin soil in Vollenhoven studies.
14   Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 1. 
15   Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 155d, in Plato 1961 and Aristotle, Metaphysics A 982b10 
ff., in Aristotle 1941. 
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for God’s majesty.16 From such challenges, or others comparable, philo-
sophical inquiry can begin for a person. But, whatever its beginning in 
human experience, the activity of inquiry that is set in motion would 
not be philosophical if it does not lead to insight, viz. to results capable 
of being expressed in a “complex of statements” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 
1). The statements should be true, and the complex organized, based on 
the coherence between the statements. This means that the ‘subjectivity’ 
(or the contingency) of the beginning of inquiry—whether in wonder or 
bewilderment—needs to be controlled by constraints that answer to the 
required ‘objectivity’ of the results. For Vollenhoven the controlling effi-
cacy is provided by method. To my knowledge Vollenhoven never defines 
‘method’ in a formal sense, though he does work with a variety of meth-
ods. A method, roughly, is an orderly procedure of treatment of specific 
content or material, chosen for purposes of investigation or instruction. 
It is neither merely ‘thought up’ by the one who wields the method, nor 
simply externally applied arbitrarily, for it needs to be suitably linked 
with the material treated so as to meaningfully process the latter. 
 Vollenhoven finds the need of no less than three methods to do phi-
losophy properly. Each method has its own order of procedure in con-
nection with which a certain insight can be attained. It is only together 
that the methods yield what might be called, generically, “philosophical 
insight”. But each has its own central feature. We first list them, and dis-
cuss them more thoroughly later.
 The first method combines criticism and assertion. One takes a 
stand in connection with a topic at hand, but not without the explicit 
critical sense of one’s choosing (or at least searching for) the best option, 
in the sense of the most meaningful one. At bottom, this method, which 
Vollenhoven calls “thetical-critical”, is intuitional. For it takes place in 
the face of the historical context in which philosophy is practiced, that 
affects how the problems at hand are dealt with and how the preferences 
of tradition and the current approach influence the position provisionally 
taken. 
 The second method has no name, but it follows up on ‘assertion’ of 
the thetical-critical method. To assert is to underscore truth, in the sense 
that a predicate is attributed to something. That underscoring is justi-
fied—is knowingly in order—only if the something can indeed be deter-
mined as the predication indicates. Thus, grasping truth entails seizing on 
what is or exists and acknowledging it as knowable, viz. determinable in 
a way that is expressed in a judgment. Such judgments may be elicited by 
16   This is drawn from archived course notes, cf. Vollenhoven 1927ms; section 8d. 
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perception, but they can also be information statements, accepted truths 
from others via news media, education, cultural tradition, etc. Very much 
of what we (claim to) know and act upon, is not specifically tested. That 
is the status of everyday knowledge (usually referred to as ‘opinion’). It 
is practised in what might generically be called ‘worldview’. Only when 
practice indicates that we go astray do we revise our opinion. Now as-
sertions can be very determinate and detailed, but also very general. Phi-
losophy involves the organization of our knowledge, thereby taking de-
terminate and indeterminate being as the extremes of organization. For 
Vollenhoven, the main areas of determinate being are heaven and earth. 
The most indeterminate being is what holds of everything, in the sense 
that it can receive every predication. Every self-critical philosophy seeks 
to discern this and orientate its thought around this most basic of truths. 
This organization is methodical, for it involves passing from what is most 
determinate to what is indeterminate, and back. A candidate name for it 
(that I shall adopt) might be “the method of knowledge organization”. 
 The third method of philosophy emphasizes the features of the logi-
cal or rational organization of philosophy as practiced in a properly aca-
demic sense. It is the method of resolution and composition. Here the 
challenge of thought is explicit, to the extent that this involves analysis 
(resolution) and synthesis (composition). For Vollenhoven academic (or 
‘scientific’) thought operates within a context of knowledge organization, 
in other words, it operates with certain acknowledged determinants of 
reality. (Prominent in Vollenhoven are the modal determinant—of quali-
fications of being—and the individual determinant—of distinct individ-
ual existences.) Problems of thought are formulated in terms of determi-
nants, and thought consists in elucidating (‘bringing to light’) a problem 
in terms of a careful indication of the factors involved (this is ‘resolu-
tion’), and acknowledging the relational of combinational features that 
holds the indicated factors together (this is ‘composition’). Each special 
science implements its own method(s) of resolution and composition. 
Philosophy applies this more generally—in other words, philosophy in 
the strict sense is also ‘scientific’—in aiming to discover the status of 
determinants at the point where they defy further analysis, and how the 
connections between these ‘rational primitives’ contribute towards a bet-
ter understanding of the whole.
 The foci of the three methods can be pulled together in the follow-
ing schema of ‘knowing’, that became standard in Vollenhoven (cf. Vol-
lenhoven 2005d/e, 9). 
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Knowing
      
Everyday knowing                 Scientific knowing
Personal          Worldview          Special          General
                scientific       scientific 
             (i.e. philosophy)
 Knowing, as such, has an implicit intuitional feature, of meaning-
ful awareness. In the thetical-critical method knowing is critically ascer-
tained. When explicitly contextualized in the concrete personal and com-
munal experience of everyday knowing, there is the added need for truth, 
extended as information. This gives the foothold for judgments that at-
test to the organization of our knowledge. Scientific knowing, in turn, 
calls for the additional function of distinguishing and connecting, when 
searching for truth via the method of resolution and composition. The 
determinants of reality provide the basis for this search. This scientific 
knowing takes place in a properly academic sense either in the context of 
the special sciences or as general inquiry, as in systematic philosophy.
 Vollenhoven’s practice of philosophy, to the extent that this is other 
than the critical appraisal of the thought of other thinkers, is doing ‘sys-
tematic philosophy’, understood as tracing the network of the determi-
nants that are fundamental for any understanding and explicit knowledge 
of the structure, nature and dynamics of reality. This is performed against 
the background of a practical knowing and intuitional awareness, both of 
which embody conditions. We can readily understand why Vollenhoven 
takes the norm of philosophy to be to “do justice to any diversity”.17 The 
awareness of diversity, of a difference that in some sense matters, is first 
of all intuited. It is known when a truth is ascertained with respect to 
it, in adducing relevant predications connected with the diversity. It is 
thought, i.e. understood, when placed in a relevant systematic context 
of determinants. Perhaps no trait is more characteristic of Vollenhoven’s 
endeavour than his respect for the abundance of reality, as attested to by 
its diversity.18 The role he allots to relationships does not undercut this; 
on the contrary, it allows diversity to be entertained and understand. 
17   Cf. Vollenhoven 2005b: 13. In Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 14, Vollenhoven speaks of 
“the law ... for philosophical knowing”.
18   One is reminded of William James’ application of “the scholastic adage that 
whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction”. This adage was not 
lost on Vollenhoven, who found that most problems evidence a lack in making relevant 
distinctions or having improperly drawn distinctions. Cf. James 1992: 38. 
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Unlike Hegel, he does not advance the dominating unity of a system. 
Vollenhoven’s program is pluralist and fundamentally anti-reductionist. 
B. Clarity, method and textual layout of Isagôgè Philosophiae
The reason for allotting method primary importance lies in philosophy’s 
being, at heart, a human practice. If this practice is not haphazard—what 
Vollenhoven would never condone—then it is a practice guided and con-
strained by method, and thus also by the rules that determine a method. 
But in the teaching context, one cannot begin with the third method 
without appealing to the other methods. Thus Vollenhoven appeals spe-
cifically to intuitional support when he expresses his teaching aim to be: 
“to indicate with words, as clearly as I can, the most important determi-
nants and diversity that I discern in the cosmos, so that others may also 
see them” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 18). 
 Teaching others to discern what, in a fundamental sense, there is to 
discern — this calls for participation on the part of those learning from 
Vollenhoven. Vollenhoven expects this of the readers of the Isagoge as 
well. On his part, he tries to be as clear as possible in describing what he 
‘sees’.19 Now clarity is sought not merely in the perspicuous style of the 
text but also through its organization. How clear is the Isagoge in these 
respects?
 Vollenhoven sought clarity of expression by being brief and succinct, 
in fact characteristically so. We must admit that this did not always help 
him to achieve his aim. After all, brevity and succinctness don’t always 
serve for clarity when there is need for explanation. (This naturally would 
have been provided orally in discussion sessions.) But on reading Vollen-
hoven, one soon realizes that his brevity of expression cloaks a complex 
process of thought. Seldom is one privy to that process. Usually one has 
19   Reporting clearly what one ‘sees’—i.e. discerns—has a general phenomenologi-
cal ring to it. In 1920, in discussing the work of Hans Driesch, Vollenhoven says: “there 
is not any objection to the method of phenomenology, of objective logic (in Husserl’s 
sense), as long as it proceeds in a purely descriptive way”; Vollenhoven 1920a: 12. Ed-
mund Husserl, the father of 20th century phenomenology, claims in his last major work, 
Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (written 
1935-1936): “I seek not to instruct but only to lead, to point out and describe what I 
see. I claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights [nach be-
stem Wissen und Gewissen], principally before myself but in the same manner also before 
others, as one who has lived in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence”; 
Husserl 1970a: 18. The pathos of Husserl’s self-description is striking. Vollenhoven is not 
lacking in pathos, but in him it concerns the richness of the being of creation, viz. “the 
presupposition that the wealth in that which is created will be much greater than has been 
ascertained to date”; Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 15. 
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to make do with the results alone. On the other hand, Vollenhoven’s 
succinctness evidences a talent for combining beguiling simplicity with 
deep subtlety, sweeping generalization with careful distinction. Here Vol-
lenhoven is at his best. He has an impressive grasp of details, but always 
with a view to the framework in which they fit. He challenges the reader 
to exercise careful thought and to avoid ingrown confusing generaliza-
tions.
 Brevity and succinctness can be a problem for someone expecting 
a ‘full’ account. Vollenhoven is aware of not giving a complete account 
(cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 18). But the lack of completeness, in turn, 
supports an experimental attitude, whereby results can be taken to be 
provisional, with room for improvement. Philosophy is, of course, no 
free-for-all. But in being the result of human effort, the insight gained, 
the interpretation accepted or the solution found is ineluctably subject 
to trial and error. Vollenhoven always took his results to be provisional, 
subject to possible improvement (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 3). The reader 
would misjudge Vollenhoven’s guidance and his manner of providing 
this, if the context of his own wrestling is not given its due. But that con-
text links his progress, which was not haphazard, to procedures that are 
methodical. This in fact leads to the second point about clarity, namely 
the clarity intended by means of the structure of the Isagoge. We find that 
the organization of the text is in step with the implementation of the 
three methods mentioned above.
 At first sight, the Isagoge appears to have a perspicuous structure. 
The text develops at two levels. There is the overall organization of the 
text, with its divisions into parts and the progressive subdivisions of these 
parts. The main divisions of the text are: Preface, Introduction, three 
main Parts and an Appendix. It could hardly be simpler.
 But there is also a second level, namely that of the content. The con-
tent unfolds in a sequence of consecutively numbered sections. Each sec-
tion has its own numbered section head. These sections of the text are not 
aphorisms. Sometimes a section consists of no more than a short solitary 
assertive sentence. In fact most lack a complete expression of thought. 
They are more like ‘planks in a platform’, if by ‘platform’ we mean the 
whole philosophical context that undergirds Vollenhoven’s work. Each 
plank (section) is a small contribution to the whole and offers its own 
egree of support.20 In that sense each section calls for reflection, and each 
20   The length of the sections varies from a short statement of six words to a disquisi-
tion of over 1700 words. On the whole, parts written later are longer than the earlier parts. 
E.g. the texts on the societal structures and on religion in the final version (of 1941/1945), 
the former of which is a newly composed text, while the latter is a rewritten text, come 
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needs to be understood in its own right. But its contribution to that 
whole depends on its link to the organized layout of the text. On more 
careful perusal, one finds that the above-mentioned methods play a lead-
ing role in the organization of the text, in that the main divisions are 
controlled by criteria of method.
 The layout of the text is as follows (the numbers in bold refer to 
the 224 sections of the text). On the left we indicate in brackets where 
a method is introduced. The distinction to its right is the scope of text 
controlled by the method in question. The schema is followed up imme-
diately with our commentary.
   Layout of Isagôgè Philosophiae 
Preface (1-4) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Isagoge
(thetical-critical method)             
    Principal Part I         [Principal Part II]
    (provisional   (provisional 
    positive results)  negative results)
Introduction (5-10) - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(preliminary question)     
             Being Knowing
             (Current main text) (Appendix; 141-224)
Introduction (11-18) - - - - - - - -
(‘method of knowledge  
 organization’)   
   Heavenly being     Earthly being
    (Their connection) 
Part I (19-21) - - - - - Heavenly cosmos  
      
Part II (22-136) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Earthly cosmos 
(method of resolution        
 and composition)   ‘thing and person’  ‘natural kingdom   
       and humankind’
Part III (137-140) - - - - - Connection of heaven and earth 
(The Appendix (141-224) concludes the text.)
 In the Preface Vollenhoven motivates the study of philosophy and 
indicates the chief difference in the result of philosophy inquiry, viz. in 
that result being either positive or negative. This difference is controlled 
by the thetical-critical method. This distinction in positive and negative 
closest to having a degree of completeness that nearly makes them self-supporting.
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result governs the whole of the Isagoge, in fact more than the whole. The 
“negative result” was initially the second principal part of the Isagoge dis-
cussion. It offers discussion of the major philosophical alternatives that 
are criticized, as being incompatible with the accepted result, formulated 
as a connected account in the first principal part, the “positive result”. 
That second principal part became redundant, as syllabus text, when 
it was published in Vollenhoven 1933.21 From that point in time, the 
Isagoge text only contains the “positive result”. But the thetical-critical 
method continues to mark the whole project of the Isagoge. 
 Next, the Introduction is announced as being about ‘the place and 
task of philosophy’. It treats this topic after the discussion of a ‘prelimi-
nary question’ about the distinction of knowing and being. The latter is 
a major and characteristic distinction in Vollenhoven, being governed by 
the assertion that knowing resorts under being. (It is given full attention 
in chapters 3 and 4 of this study.) For now we wish to point out that the 
discussion of this preliminary question about being and knowing itself 
motivates the primary division of the text (the whole of the ‘positive 
result’) in a main text and an appendix. For, the central topic of the ap-
pendix is the theory of knowledge,22 while that of the main text is being. 
In this setting, the nature (place and task) of philosophy is discussed in 
connection with philosophy’s restriction to cosmic being. In the last two 
sections (17 and 18) of the Introduction we find the occurrence of terms 
with a methodical import, such as “orientation point” and “route”, but 
without being given any leads as to how this works or proceeds. (The text 
is definitely too brief at this point!) However, we shall see that the second 
of the three methods is operational here. As we said, it lacks a name, but 
21   The “provisional negative result” was published as Chapter 3 of the systematic 
part of Vollenhoven’s major work of 1933. The chapter is entitled “De grondmotieven 
der onschriftuurlijke wijsbegeerte” (The groundmotives of non-scriptural philosophy); 
Vollenhoven 1933a: 49-67. In the text-critical edition (Vollenhoven 2010) this text is re-
printed in Appendix IIb. Vollenhoven continues to speak of positive and negative results 
in section 4, but without the textual follow-up of the two principal parts, although traces 
of this earlier arrangement remain (cf. sections 6 and 141); cf. also Vollenhoven 2005d/e. 
22   The appendix is entitled “A number of the more complicated questions of phi-
losophy”, and lists three in particular, viz. theory of knowledge, the theory of technology 
and the theory of art. The length of treatment of this material is very disproportionate, 
with theory of knowledge discussed in 66 sections (namely 141-206) and the other two 
in 9 sections each (207-215 and 216-224 respectively). The first setup of the Isagoge, in 
1930-1931, there was no appendix. The theory of knowledge is discussed as the main 
concluding Part of the ‘positive result’ (cf. Vollenhoven 2010, Appendix I). What justifies 
singling out theory of knowledge is its complete parallelism with the main distinctions of 
the main text. The discussion (as of 1932) of the theory of technology and theory of art 
is restricted to these theories’ contexts in two ‘law-spheres’. 
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we shall refer to it as “the method of knowledge organization”. 
 Finally, in the main body of the text we come across another, now 
third, discussion of method, one that is, in a textual sense, more explicit 
than the prior second method. This main body of the text is divided into 
three Parts, viz. on the heavenly cosmos, the earthly cosmos, and the con-
nection between heaven and earth, respectively.23 The first and third of 
these Parts are very brief texts, with all the attention being given to Part 
II, about the earthly cosmos. We notice that the third method pertains 
specifically to the second Part. In the description of this third method, 
there is mention of two characteristic routes: that of resolution (Vollen-
hoven 2005d/e, 23) and that of proceeding to “ever-greater complexity” 
(ibid.; i.e. composition). Here, too, method motivates the organization 
of the text of this Part II. Its main division implements the distinction 
between on the one hand individual things and human beings, whereby 
individuality and modality have to be acknowledged insofar as these defy 
further analysis, viz. as being ‘most resolved’, and on the other hand the 
natural kingdoms and humankind that are, relevant to ‘earthly existence’, 
the greatest ‘wholes’ of complexity (ibid., 26).
 So the step-wise introductions of the text touch on progressive re-
strictive divisions of the scope of the text.24 The unwary reader is not 
likely to notice this, mainly because Vollenhoven’s discussion of especially 
the second and the third methods is so casual, not to say nonchalant. 
But the importance of method is undeniable. Thus we shall pause to give 
separate attention to each of the three methods, so as to supplement their 
cursory discussion in the Isagoge.25 
23   We need to be clear as to the meanings of the terms ‘heaven’ and ‘earth’. ‘Heaven’ 
is not the starry sky but the abode of spiritual creatures; and ‘earth’ is not our home planet 
earth but, much broader, the created universe; cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 20. Naturally, as 
to the universe, the planet earth, and life on it, are known best. 
24   Vollenhoven follows the same procedure in his “History of Philosophy”, volume 
I (i.e. Vollenhoven 1950e). The entire historical project was planned to consist of nine 
volumes. The Preface addresses the whole project and introduces the problem of inquiry, 
the (problem-historical) method of approach and the main division of the field of study 
in three Books, viz. ancient, medieval and modern philosophy (or, in Vollenhoven’s word-
ing: prior to, during, and after the period of synthesis) (op. cit.: 11-21). The next intro-
duction is that of the First Book, the period prior to synthesis philosophy, and motivates 
the division into two Parts: ancient Greek philosophy and Hellenistic philosophy (op. cit.: 
23-29). The next introduction is directed to the First Part on ancient Greek philosophy 
and distinguishes two main Divisions, viz. the period prior to realism and the realist 
period (of Plato and Aristotle) (op. cit.: 31-34). Finally, there is the introduction to the 
First Main Division of ancient Greek philosophy prior to Plato. This last introduction is 
coterminous with the actual content of volume I (op. cit. : 35-39). 
25   It would appear that Vollenhoven in general eschewed procedural discussions in 
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C. Methodical procedures: the thetical-critical method
The thetical-critical method governs the entire practice of philosophy. 
It is predicated on the two main meanings of philosophy, mentioned 
in section 1, viz. its being both a (subjective) activity and an (objective) 
acquired result. The activity of philosophy factually begins when a person 
is moved by some problem or something that fascinates. This reflection 
necessarily involves taking a “point of view”, i.e. a certain understand-
ing relevant to the context in which the reflection takes place. Vollen-
hoven stresses initiative and contingency. Two points are essential here. 
(i) However unique one’s own ‘beginning’ of philosophy may be, one is 
not the first to philosophize. The whole history of philosophy attests to 
that. One should be prepared to learn from others, in taking stock of 
(relevant) results already available, but doing so critically and not in an 
attitude in which one lets others do one’s thinking. (The latter takes place 
when one claims to be a ‘Platonist’, ‘Aristotelian’, ‘Augustinian’, ‘Carte-
sian’, ‘Kantian’, etc.) But (ii) however much one may be enamoured by 
one’s ‘own standpoint’, it jeopardizes one’s learning when that standpoint 
is turned into a privileged position and the acquired results shielded from 
self-criticism. Human activity is never beyond critique, hence one must 
be willing also to submit one’s own results, and not just those of others, 
to criticism. A critical review of a result may, of course, reconfirm it, but 
it can also give rise to more explicit reasons to adjust or even reject it. 
(This assumes, of course, that the result is not merely a projection of the 
point of view, but also a reflection of data of reality considered.) Either 
way, the positive confirmation and the negative rejection remains provi-
sional, for this embodies the attitude of always being prepared to learn, 
reconsider and reassess. So one ought to treat one’s own results in a way 
that is no different from those of others (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 3). In 
other words, Vollenhoven’s proposal in this regard amounts to one’s do-
ing philosophy with an open historical mind. The thetical and the critical 
favour of the actual implementation of a procedure. E.g. he promoted his later “problem-
historical method”, not by dwelling on its setup but by pointing to the results obtained. 
“The utility of a method must be attested to by the results achieved with its help” (Vol-
lenhoven 1950e: 6). In a later article on the problem-historical method, the positive 
meaning of the results achieved figures prominently. The article includes a (perhaps tell-
ing) memory of his student days: “the lectures at that time . . . included methodological 
introductions which were far too extensive, as least as far as we students were concerned” 
(Vollenhoven 1961c; reprinted in 2005b: 96). Albert M. Wolters’ remark about Vol-
lenhoven’s work in connection with the problem-historical method may be generalized: 
“One of the exasperating things about that work is that Vollenhoven seems to have an 
aversion to discussing the methodological presuppositions implicit in his method” (Wolt-
ers 1979a: 231). 
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together warrant the expectation of philosophical advance. In a wording 
that was only superficially modified from 1930 on, Vollenhoven says:
It is by maintaining that which is tenable in one’s own position, by criti-
cally examining not only the result acquired by others but also the result of 
one’s own thinking at an earlier time, and by having the courage to accept 
the implications of one’s position, that one can make progress through 
struggle and attain a double profit: a reinforced position and a more defi-
nite rejection of whatever is inconsistent with it. (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 3)
 The thetical-critical method brings systematic reflection and his-
torical alternatives in direct contact with each other. It is true to say of 
Vollenhoven that he was always aware of the historical alternatives he 
rejected and those he accepted when making his decisions. (Regretfully, 
he did not always make these deliberations explicit.)26 He operates from 
out of an overall historical consciousness that is intuitively tuned to what 
there is to know and to think. One might be inclined to suspect a speci-
men of the Hegelian dialectic operative here. The thetical and the critical 
results do have something of a ‘thesis-antithesis’ opposition about them. 
But the crucial step is what, in Hegel, is the follow-up of ‘synthesis’. 
Whereas in Hegel’s dialectic one relativizes and overcomes the difference 
of two terms in opposition, in reference to an ‘identity in (the) differ-
ence’ as seen from a higher standpoint,27 Vollenhoven’s method involves 
undergoing difference and ascertaining the relationships that are relevant 
to the difference in question. Thus Vollenhoven’s ‘relationships’ are not 
like the syntheses of Hegel, that are (monistically) conceived to subjugate 
difference. Hegelian dialectics is one of dominance, Vollenhoven’s is that 
of release – to “do justice to any diversity”. Vollenhoven opposes a ubiq-
uitous ‘synthesis’ of reason in favour of the ‘a-synthetic’ (i.e. ‘analytic’ or 
26   He did make these deliberations explicit in his first work, the dissertation on the 
philosophy of mathematics (cf. Vollenhoven 1918a). He favours mathematical intuition-
ism, and sets this off against formalism on the one hand and empiricism on the other. The 
discussion of his choices includes the ‘lessons of history’ regarding these three schools of 
mathematics. Cf. chapter 2, footnote 37 for an overview of the content of this work. 
27   In Hegel, the ‘thetical’ is a posit of understanding, the ‘antithetical’ one of nega-
tive reason, the ‘synthetical’ that of positive reason. Because a synthesis involves a content 
that is more encompassing than that of the thetical and the antithetical alone, each step 
of synthesis yields a new posit of understanding, which in turn gets to be incorporated in 
a yet higher or more encompassing standpoint (of reason). In this way Hegel’s dialectical 
method displays the advance of reason that ends in the (holistic) acquisition of ‘absolute 
knowledge’. Cf. part VI “Logic further defined and divided” of “The science of logic” 
in Hegel’s Encyclopedia; Hegel 1975: 113-122. We add that the terminology of “thesis-
antithesis-synthesis” is what Fichte made popular, Hegel preferring “an sich – für sich 
– an-und-für sich”. 
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discerning) awareness of the richness of diversity.28
 One final remark on the thetical-critical method. Vollenhoven no-
where specifies the kind of criticism he has in mind when applying the 
thetical-critical method. There is no mention, say, of ‘transcendental 
criticism’, ‘epistemological criticism’, ‘ontological criticism’, ‘logical criti-
cism’, etc. I believe we can say that, for Vollenhoven, any criticism that 
enables us to learn from our mistakes or reconsiderations, that helps to 
see better what is the acceptable opinion over against the censurable one, 
what the better presupposition is, or what the real gist of a problem is, is 
welcome. The more important point is that criticism is not itself a viable 
‘point of view’ or ‘standpoint’. Such a standpoint would have to guard 
itself from the uncertainty of its own vulnerability, unless invulnerability 
is dogmatically maintained, which, either way, is to block the thetical-
critical method. There is no human thought that unerringly thinks only 
itself, nor is there a knowledge, as humanly entertained, that is itself be-
yond criticism. For neither thought nor knowledge is an end in itself. 
Thought and knowledge entail activity, and activity cannot ‘take place’ 
without some place, and hence also something historically contingent, 
being taken in. Only in that way is there a result to be critical of. One 
takes a place (or a stand) through the intuition. This is not an unassail-
able certainty, but the awareness of the challenge of one’s historical time 
and geographical place, which includes one’s own existence, and engages 
us intellectually to accept what makes the best sense. 
D. Methodical procedures: the method of knowledge organization
The Isagoge’s second method is more implicit than explicit. But by pulling 
all the evidence together, something of its relevance does come to view.
 The focus of the second method is on knowledge. Here too there is a 
subjective and objective moment. Vollenhoven understands this in such a 
way as to oppose the ‘split of subject and object’ in two independent re-
alities that Descartes saddles modern philosophy with. In chapters three 
and four Vollenhoven’s epistemology is discussed directly. Here the mere 
mention of characteristic features will have to suffice.
28   For a typical example of this, cf. Vollenhoven 1942l. This text, which has three 
parts, discusses truth in the philosophy of religion (godsdienst, literally “worship”). The 
first part proceeds thetically in first discussing truth in religion (pp. 113-117). The second 
part discusses truth in philosophy (pp. 117-121), which is, in fact, a confrontational dis-
cussion of views that are present in the history of philosophy. Its third and last part (pp. 
121-123) discusses the relation between truth in religion and truth in philosophy, with 
particular, critical attention to the ‘synthesis’ variants and how they muddle the unity of 
truth in religion and philosophy. 
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 The first characteristic feature is that the epistemological ‘object’ is 
not an independent reality, but is a feature of being to the extent that be-
ing is knowable. What there is to know is not present as ready knowledge 
(contrary to the copy theory of empiricism). But there are (knowable) 
data, that are knowingly gleaned and ‘worked’ into the possession that 
attests to ‘having knowledge’ (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 174).
 The second characteristic feature is that the human Self is not an 
intrinsic subject (contrary to idealism)—whether justified by appealing 
to the immortality of the soul or the evidence of a self-certain intuition—
but has the task of being a subject. The Self has an interest in knowing, 
linked to a duty. Thus when the knowledge situation is said to involve 
‘knowing the knowable’, the subjective and objective features implicit 
here are both contextualized, with the continued operational relevance of 
the thetical-critical method in the background. But this is not to deny the 
importance of distinguishing the two factors of the Self ’s knowing and 
being’s being knowable; indeed, this importance is evinced by Vollen-
hoven’s textual division of the main Parts of the Isagoge about ‘(cosmic) 
being’ and the Appendix about ‘human knowing’. 
 The third characteristic feature is that knowing and the knowable 
come together in the ascertainment of truth.29 Meeting the duty of know-
ing involves an appropriation of truth, in which the knowable is repre-
sented. To come to know is to have knowledge, which is to enjoy a state 
of rest.30 Such enjoyment contrasts with the opposite state of not know-
ing, which is in fact to stray. Truth is not come by merely through gaining 
content. Naturally, forming and gaining mental representations do take 
place. But this is psychical, or at least is psychically based. The factor of 
truth does not arise merely through representations.31 Truth, when ap-
propriated, and thus subsequently capable of being asserted, cannot be 
divorced from a normative factor in the epistemic situation. Truth cannot 
be asserted in a logical context when contradictions are not resolved (in 
accordance to logical norms). In a similar way, truth cannot be asserted 
in a social context unless one reckons with the norms that adjudicate 
between what is socially in order and not in order, or in a legal context, 
what is just and unjust, or in an ethical sense, with good and bad. The 
factor of truth in human knowledge calls for an awareness of an ‘ought’. 
29   Cf. Vollenhoven 1926b: 381; also Vollenhoven 1926d: 54 ff. 
30   Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 150. Only in the sources of 1926 does Vollenhoven speak 
of the direct appropriation of truth. In the early 1930s he settles for the state of mind that 
truth brings with it, namely rest. This topic is discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4.
31   Cf. Vollenhoven 1926a: 20-21; also, for the distinction between truth and ‘truth 
markers’, cf. Vollenhoven 1926d: 149. 
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Knowing entails responsibility.32
 Now in the epistemic ascertaining of truth, Vollenhoven distin-
guishes between truth being conveyed as given and truth being acquired 
in being sought. The latter, viz. the truth acquired through being sought 
and attained, calls for an active logical-analytical functioning of distin-
guishing and connecting. That falls directly within the scope of the third 
method. In the current context we need to concentrate on the first al-
ternative of truth conveyed. The case of truth conveyed is more typical 
of our everyday experience and knowing, and that falls within the scope 
of the second method. For when informed of events, or taught about 
situations, past and present, or when facts and norms are revealed, the 
recipient is in a position of acceptance. This is knowledge by communi-
cation, and there is something non-reductive about it. One cannot pos-
sibly doubt all communicated knowledge (as Descartes recommended) 
and rebuild it from self-asserted truth. But one may, of course, take any 
instance of knowledge that is conveyed and subject it to criticism. In 
that sense a ‘procedure’ can be set to work within the scope of conveyed 
knowledge. 
 One’s personal beginning in philosophy will yield neither a full de-
tailed knowledge nor a more abstract level of principles. This is itself 
telling. Our knowledge is in some sense always partial, capable of being 
made more determinate when considering details, or less determinate 
when taken generally. Pursuing these alternative courses is what makes 
for a methodical procedure in this connection. Vollenhoven takes deter-
minacy to involve predication. Being has the feature of being knowable, 
hence in experiential practice, when having knowledge about something, 
or having knowledge conveyed about something, a predicate (experi-
enced meaning) is attributed to something that is there, in such a way 
that this answers to truth. An important mark of truth is the effect of 
such knowledge. He speaks of ‘enjoying rest’ when knowledge proves in 
practice to be adequate, and of straying when not adequate (Vollenhoven 
2005d/e, 150, 173 ff.). This is obviously relevant as everyday knowledge. 
The ‘rest’ is not primarily passivity but the ease of conscience, of having 
determined something in way that is evidently in the ‘right way’. In that 
sense its accrual contributes significantly towards a more encompassing 
practice from a worldview standpoint.33
32   This responsibility is not incompatible with the “rest”, spoken of above; cf. im-
mediately below. 
33   One might be inclined to take this view of knowledge as a specimen of pragma-
tism. It agrees with pragmatism in emphasizing the context of activity and the practice of 
life. But for Vollenhoven, activity and practice are subject to norms, which prevents the 
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 Predication conditions the being of something.34 That being is not 
a bland feature. It is best to see it as a ‘to be’ of anything that exists. Ev-
ery predication in this sense, adds a conditioning determination on the 
existent something. When investigated (according to the third method) 
the different sciences will distinguish different kinds and types of deter-
mination. But philosophy pursues a more general interest. At the level of 
the second method, philosophy’s reflection can address the question as to 
what happens when ‘letting go’, so to speak, of determinations.
 One might, in a formal sense, anticipate ending up, after all, with a 
completely bland notion of being, in its most indeterminate sense. But 
this ‘formal sense’ would not do justice to the situation at hand, as under-
stood by Vollenhoven. Having knowledge involves taking a ‘standpoint’ 
(which is always already relevant in connection with the thetical-critical 
situation). As one courses on the route to greater indeterminacy, one 
does not form more abstract concepts—concept formation is relevant to 
the third method—but one’s predications become more indeterminate, 
meaning that one’s standpoint of insight becomes increasingly less spe-
cific. At the point where all determinations have been bracketed, one 
ends up with the minimal requirement of a standpoint as such, consistent 
with the conditions of knowledge (or being able to predicate what is).35
 This ‘point of greatest indeterminacy’ is what Vollenhoven calls 
the “point of orientation” of philosophy (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 17). As 
standpoint, this still assumes a stance in reality. One does not transcend 
the cosmic conditions of existence that are relevant to the practice of 
philosophy. Thus, the relevance and need of orientation at this point 
follows from the feature of responsibility inherent in knowledge. This 
feature is now (at the orientation point) relevant in its most bare essence, 
viz. as implicating the validity of an ‘ought’ as centred in a norm or, 
stated more generically, in law. We need also to realize that, because all 
determinations are relinquished in this most indeterminate of ‘positions’, 
one cannot interpret this orientation point as involving (say) representa-
tions, which would be a determination of consciousness, or the privileged 
‘human interest’, however real and relevant, from having the last word. Hence Vollen-
hoven does not share the pragmatists’ ‘instrumental view of knowledge’; cf. James 1992: 
42 ff. 
34   Archived lecture notes of 1927-1929 are an important source here. This material 
contains discussions not found elsewhere in Vollenhoven’s oeuvre. On determinacy and 
indeterminacy, cf. Vollenhoven 1927ms, section 19, also 1928ms, sections 25-27.
35   These ‘route descriptions’ are in the archived lecture notes, mentioned in the 
previous footnote. Sections 22-24 of Vollenhoven 1927ms are on predication and deter-
mination. 
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status of a social class, which would fundamentally bias the practice of 
philosophy, or a distinct spiritual condition, which would subject phi-
losophy to a determination of prized value of a higher order, or whatever 
other option one’s prejudice might fancy. There is the ‘ought’ of law, as 
principle of determination, that, at the point of orientation, can only be 
acknowledged in terms of its own primary obligating relevance.
 At the orientation point, one is invited to make one’s stand explicit. 
It calls for making explicit how ‘determination’ is understood, and how 
the things of existence (i.e. the cosmos) answer to determination. The 
very possibility of anything being knowable is at issue. The orientation 
point’s being the most indeterminate portrayal of existence as cosmic be-
ing, nothing of the latter can be taken to effect a determining role. But 
then one needs to presuppose an origin of law that is external to cosmic 
being. This origin cannot be a species of cosmic being. Here we find, 
almost uniquely in Vollenhoven’s work, an indication of why a divine 
being is called for. The divine being is the origin of law, and the divine 
being, in determining cosmic reality, has nothing in common with the 
latter. 
[W]hoever speaks of the being of God, without being conscious that this 
being is a being above the law and hence has nothing in common with 
being under the law [uses language lacking in meaning]. The one is the 
archè [= controlling principle] of the other, and whoever wants to sub-
sume them under a common denominator will transgress, consciously or 
unconsciously, the boundary that God has posited upon him as creature. 
(Vollenhoven 1927ms, section *8)
 Philosophy does not itself need to begin with the point of orienta-
tion. But philosophy that is self-critical cannot refrain from meeting the 
challenge of accounting for one’s standpoint, that is exposed at the point 
of greatest indeterminacy. But what remains when all content of deter-
mination has been ‘let go’? What is relevant here is the realization that 
one’s standpoint is the substrate of one’s philosophical practice, which 
entails regulation. Thus at the point of greatest indeterminacy there is 
the realization of ‘standing in subjection’ to rules or norms that regulate, 
without the latter being one or more quality or feature of the standing 
as such. Were the latter to be the case, then one will not have ‘let go’ 
completely to the point of greatest indeterminacy, and one would take 
as principle of archè whatever that feature implies; say, to be is to be con-
scious, or to be material, or to be extensive, or to be idea, or to be psychi-
cal, etc. In other words, one would be already ‘on the move’ in applying 
determinations (predications) without having considered the ‘point from 
which one moves’, or—in being properly accountable—taken stock of 
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the regulation entailed by any move. The orientation point succeeds in 
orienting only when norms are given their due, not when a determined 
feature, however general, is granted the status of first principle. In other 
words, the orientation point, in being relevant to philosophy as practice 
or activity, is not a construal of philosophy but is an orienting condition 
for philosophy.
 Philosophy that proceeds from the said orientation point has ac-
quired for itself a meaning of ‘origin’, ‘law’ and ‘cosmic reality’. It may 
now proceeds methodically towards the other pole of reality in its greatest 
determination. It will first formulate ‘judgments of assessment or dis-
cerning’ (cf. Vollenhoven 1926a: 10, 14), that express the most basic 
(modal) determinations of being of things, as intuited. From there, all 
further predication proceeds in an organized way, till it has included, 
knowingly and at the point of most complete determination, all things 
of heavenly and earthly cosmic reality. This suggests naming this (second) 
method the ‘method of knowledge organization’. It is within the context 
of this method that Vollenhoven now formulate what he takes the ‘place 
and task’ of philosophy to be, in a way that is consonant with his use of 
the orientation point.
 The ‘place’ of philosophy—in the sense of the scope of its discerning 
activity—is that of the whole cosmos (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 16). In its 
properly academic sense it is also limited to cosmic reality. The ‘task’ that 
philosophy accepts is, in a negative sense, “never deny or seek to push 
aside that which exists, not even to the smallest degree” (Vollenhoven 
2005d/e, 15a). The positive sense of the task is: to be sensitive to the 
richness of the cosmos (ibid, 15b). Together this yields the imperative of 
philosophy, viz. of ‘doing justice to every diversity’ in connection with 
cosmic reality.
E. Methodical procedures: the method of resolution and composition.
The third method is specifically attuned to thought. The two prior meth-
ods are presupposed by it. The practice of philosophy is never in disjunc-
tion from the historical reality of philosophy, nor does philosophy take 
place in a mental vacuum, bereft of all knowledge and orientation. Of 
course one can always select and isolate. But then one still presupposes 
the knowledge that is relevant to the selecting and isolating. Philosophy 
should not only not deny its ties to life, but also explicate such ties as 
one finds to be relevant conditions for doing philosophy. But when this 
is met, there is still need for a third method to characterize philosophy’s 
properly academic status as a ‘general scientific enterprise’.
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 This topic and the details of this third method are discussed more 
fully in the course of chapter 4, which focuses on Vollenhoven initial de-
finitive position. At this point a summary indication will have to suffice.
 For Vollenhoven, thought, in its primary sense, comes down to two 
very basic ‘moves’, viz. to distinguish what awareness reveals to be differ-
ent and to connect what fits together in relationships. Vollenhoven turns 
this into a methodological rule that he applies throughout his work at 
every turn. “In every case where two things are different, we can ask 
about the relationship between the two” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 10). The 
distinguishing and the connecting are ‘subjective’, in the sense that these 
need to be carried out (in terms of an ‘analysing functioning’). Were there 
no difference and relationship, then the distinguishing and connecting 
would be wilful and imposed (which is not necessarily wrong, so long 
as this is adequately motivated). Objectivity is evident when the distinc-
tions made and the connections laid are supported by difference and 
relationship in the affairs. Vollenhoven recognizes this at all levels: differ-
ence and relationship between subject and object, body and soul, good 
and evil, between this individual and that individual, between modes of 
being, etc.
 There is also a systematic togetherness of difference and relation-
ship.36 Specific differences and relationship are relevant to states of affairs. 
But specific differences and relations can also be included in more com-
plex expressions of difference and relationship. Vollenhoven speaks of a 
determinant (bepaaldheid) to indicate a fitting togetherness of difference 
and relationship. Determinants may be very minimal, e.g. the difference 
and relations between natural numbers, or very inclusive, as for example 
the difference and relationship between heaven and earth. Understand-
ing the structure of reality results from distinguishing and connecting the 
relevant determinants of reality. The main part of the Isagoge—viz. Part 
II—describes this structure as a cosmology—Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 27-
94. This cosmology is outlined in section IV of chapter 4 of this study. 
 Vollenhoven uses the methodological terminology of ‘resolution’ 
and ‘composition’ in the context of reality’s determinants. These terms 
denote the two ‘routes’ of thought, whereby the endpoint of the one is 
the beginning of the other (and vice versa). Vollenhoven speaks of “re-
solving” and “proceeding in the direction of ever-greater complexity” 
(Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 24).37 But, here too, Vollenhoven is not set on 
36   Cf. chapter 4, where this is described as falling under the ‘intersection principle’. 
37   Vollenhoven does not actually use the term ‘composition’ in the Isagoge. He 
speaks of “gecompliceerdheid” i.e. ‘complexity’, or ‘complicatedness’. But to speak of 
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terms. The important point is the identification of the ‘endpoints’ of the 
routes of resolution and composition. Resolution analyses until the de-
terminate diversity is such as to defy further analysis. Within cosmology 
this diversity is of three kinds: modal difference, that of the diversity 
between individual beings, and the diversity of good and evil. The route 
in the direction of increasing complexity (i.e. making more concrete) 
begins with the (abstract) forms of diversity that are ‘analytically simple’. 
When travelling along this route, the connections that can be posited 
in the diversity become explicit, in light of what fits in view of the de-
terminants involved. On this route one accounts for progressively more 
encompassing ‘wholes’ (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 23). The endpoint of the 
route of composition places us in the area of the natural kingdoms and 
kinds (ibid., 22). In a complete treatment, both routes would need to be 
investigated. For practical reasons Vollenhoven chooses to trace only one 
of the two routes, namely the route of composition (ibid., 24). That is 
why the discussion in the Isagoge begins with the most basic diversity, in 
a cosmological sense, and ends with the context of greatest connection, 
found in religion. Naturally, the reader is expected to fill in the alternative 
route of resolution for him/herself.
F. Lapses of method?
The Isagoge text is governed by method. The discerning reader will have 
noticed that this does not quite hold for the whole text. There are the 
(very brief ) first and third Parts of the main account of the cosmos that 
fall outside of the scope of the third method (of resolution and composi-
tion). That method appears to be geared exclusively to the earthly cos-
mos. Because the first Part is about the heavenly cosmos, and the third 
Part about the connection of heaven and earth, these topics address a 
reality that mostly falls outside of our normal human experiential range. 
Either these Parts require their own method, or their inclusion in a text 
of philosophy is contestable. How do things stand?
 There can be no doubt that Vollenhoven meant to include these 
topics, judging by the method of knowledge organization. At one pole of 
this method, the point of orientation, one is led to understand, that the 
a method of resolution and complication seems strained. Vollenhoven must have felt a 
difficulty in choosing the right terms here. In work of 1926 he referred to the two direc-
tions as “simplicating” (simplicerende—which is a Dutch neologism)] and “complicating” 
(Vollenhoven 1926d: 158 and 1926a: 58). This terminology is quite definitely strained. 
In the body of the Isagoge Vollenhoven uses the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ in reference 
to the two routes, in expressions such as ‘dispensing with abstraction’ and ‘making more 
concrete’; cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 49, 64, 70, 95, 115. 
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most general feature that may be asserted of the cosmos, is that it stands 
in subjection to a determination of law. At the opposite end there are 
the most specifically determined realities of the cosmos, these being the 
heavenly and the earthly realities. In virtue of determination, that reality 
is knowable, so this must include earthly reality and heavenly reality. So 
how is the discussion of heavenly reality broached? 
 We need to reckon with a factor that has not been mentioned as yet. 
When speaking of something being knowable, one needs to take into 
account how that capacity (of being knowable) is actualized in confronta-
tion with the knowing subject. In this connection Vollenhoven speaks of 
“means of knowing” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 173), these being—he states 
this very traditionally—‘Nature and Scripture’ (ibid.). Nature as a means 
of knowing is the context of the awareness of ourselves and the reali-
ties around us, an awareness that is relevant in virtue of our being alive 
and living on the earth. This is our ‘natural situation’, the environment 
in which our awareness becomes specific in perception and conception. 
This mediation of nature—our natural habitat—aids in enabling us to 
conduct our inquiry of earthly reality according to the third method. 
The Scriptures, as means of knowing, serves a similar purpose, except 
that it operates in a different way. Scripture is a ‘means that informs’, i.e. 
conveys truths about realities, truths the human being would not have 
surmised without speculation or adequate control. This may be in con-
nection with realities the human being is in touch with (e.g. earthly life, 
but in its ‘fallen state’) or realities beyond the scope of our ‘natural’ capac-
ity to know, such as heaven (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 173). In virtue of 
Scriptural revelation, God and the law are knowable, as are heaven and 
earth. Thus the first and third Parts of the main text of the Isagoge are 
‘constrained’ after all, if not by an actual method, then nevertheless by a 
definite means of knowing.38 
 This ‘double means approach’ is not without its problems. We must 
at least be aware that Scripture serves in various capacities in Vollenhoven. 
As a religious document it is part of religious life, giving substance to life-
attitudes and life-goals. The religious life, conducted biblically, involves 
covenant living, which address the human being in terms of responsi-
bilities and stewardship. This leads to the second role of Scripture, viz. 
namely with respect to worldview and the more specific neo-Calvinist 
Reformed tradition of ‘sphere sovereignty’. While there is always some-
38   There is, nevertheless, a certain reticence on Vollenhoven’s part. His discussions 
of these two Parts hardly rises above brief notes. No doubt there is the motive to avoid 
speculation. But in the third Part he speaks of an influence of heavenly beings on earthly 
life, but he does not offer an analysis of this effect (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 138). 
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thing of an ‘information side’ to these religious and worldview roles, the 
import of Scripture here is not to inform but to enjoin, to warn, to real-
ize the better sense, to pursue the good life. The role of the Scriptures in 
these two contexts (of religion and worldview) is, I believe, defensible.
 But the third role, as means of knowing in that it provides informa-
tion, is entirely focussed on informing about realities. One accepts the in-
formation ‘on faith’, but that cannot be the end of the matter. Even faith 
has need of opportunity and leeway for hermeneutical reflection, so as to 
come into focus with the intended and not the self-sought meaning. The 
question that Vollenhoven does not ask is whether the role of Scripture 
within the religious and worldview presuppositions of philosophy may 
not suffice (in the light of his aim) to delineate an understanding and 
practice of ‘scriptural philosophy’, without calling upon the Scripture as 
source of information.
 Behind the Scripture stands the ‘Logos revelation’, an essential com-
ponent of Vollenhoven’s ‘theistic position’. In his early work he pursues a 
‘theistic epistemic ideal’ (cf. chapter 2), in which Logos revelation is the 
warrant of knowledge. Vollenhoven thoroughly criticizes and revises this 
in the second half of the 1920s. But in retaining an epistemic element of 
information conveyance, the ‘theistic epistemic ideal’ may not be entirely 
rejected. We will return to this when discussing ‘Calvinistic philosophy’.
G. To round off
The Isagoge is a unique text. As collection of notes it leaves gaps that 
appear to fragment the text. Yet at the same time it evinces a unity of 
approach and conception that is subtle, nuanced and sweepingly broad. 
As an educational text, what it lacks in terms of being a finished product 
becomes a challenge to the interested reader. Vollenhoven guides without 
taking away all initiative from the student. The student and the reader 
need to think, and to think hard when following Vollenhoven.
 In general, we can say that Vollenhoven turned the challenge of in-
troducing philosophy to his own advantage. There is no simplification 
or popularization that merely pandered to the ignorance of a first-year 
student. For that reason the text serves as a valuable document in his own 
oeuvre. The handicap that remained for him was in having to decide what 
to include in an introductory text and what to pass over. That handicap 
needs to be seen in connection with the factor of obviousness. What was 
obvious to a first-year student at a Reformed bastion in the Dutch, ideo-
logically divided society in the 1930s and 1940s, is easily lost in a differ-
ent situation, certainly in that of the twenty-first century. Obviousness is 
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not a stable trans-contextual factor. Vollenhoven and most of his students 
were at home in the Dutch situation, at least in the first two decades of 
his career.39 In the Isagoge Vollenhoven made practically no comparisons 
with other traditions or assumptions in the practice of philosophy. In 
that sense, any reading of the Isagoge depends heavily, for its interpreta-
tion, on understanding the relevant internal connections between the 
main elements of the philosophical conception he elucidates and letting 
the attempted clarity of expression do the rest.
 The emphasis of this study is on Vollenhoven’s distinct philosophical 
contribution. To understand this, one needs to take careful stock of the 
presuppositions, and the themes associated with them, that Vollenhoven 
reckoned were relevant to philosophy, particularly those of religious and 
worldview character. However, the experience of these themes, in their 
actual religious and worldview settings, has a tendency to shift with time, 
as emphases change and interpretations are revised. We do not have to re-
turn to the 1930s and 1940s, or earlier, to appreciate whatever relevance 
these themes continue to have. But it is instructive to understand the past 
so as to be in the better position to responsibly filter out what inhibits 
and appreciate what is lasting for the future. We therefore first turn to 
take a closer look at the Dutch scene from about mid-nineteenth century 
on before looking more pointedly at Vollenhoven’s program.
iii. the academIc context
A. The neo-Calvinist commitment
Vollenhoven’s appointment in philosophy in 1926 had ideological con-
straints, besides meeting direct educational needs. The Free University 
of Amsterdam was founded by Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) in 1880. 
It was for many years a privately funded institute of higher learning, 
finding its main support among the working class of Calvinist convic-
tion. Kuyper had mobilized this group into a more active participation 
in Dutch national life. Sociologically this helped effect the emancipation 
of this class. But an ideological motive was no less relevant. Kuyper was 
adverse to the Enlightenment’s liberalism and rationalism, which were 
dominant in modern Dutch life in the nineteenth century. He sought 
39   There were few foreign students at the Free University prior to the second World 
War. This changed after the war. One of Vollenhoven’s first foreign students, the late Dr. 
Evan Runner, of Presbyterian background, from Philadelphia, U.S.A., remembered well 
the culture shock upon coming to the Netherlands in 1946. “As I went home and thought 
it all over, I began to realize that there was a broad spectrum of Reformed life, and that I 
had never experienced anything like this before. And I began to ask myself: Where did all 
this come from?” Van Dyke and Wolters 1979: 348. 
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to develop an alternative standard for national life based on a Reveil of 
the Calvinist-Reformational consciousness. The model for this Reveil was 
the ‘Calvinist conviction’ that had accompanied the birth of the Dutch 
nation in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. The men of 
learning, who were in step with Kuyper and committed to the Reveil, 
were intent on educating their public to critically evaluate the Enlighten-
ment’s revolutionary and humanistic influence on society and culture, 
while at the same time they took the lead in blazing an alternative path. 
Kuyper’s own voluminous writings, both popular and academic, had this 
dual purpose. Vollenhoven could identify with this striving. Educating 
students at the Free University was at the same time educating the future 
leaders of the church, the state and society.
 When appointed, Vollenhoven was expected to develop a philoso-
phy program that would accord with the spirit of the Free University 
as set down in its ‘foundation’ statement (or charter). (We look at this 
presently.) Vollenhoven, being of a critical and principled mind, could 
not align himself fully with any of the main schools of thought in his 
day—reinforced by what he judged to be the misguided influences upon 
his own initial work in philosophy (cf. chapter 2). Hence the conditions 
were ripe for him to strike out on his own. He took the opportunity pre-
sented by the compulsory philosophy introduction to formulate a ‘philo-
sophical conception’ that would accord with the Calvinian-Kuyperian 
commitment of his community and meet the needs of the Free Univer-
sity’s scientific endeavours.40 This commitment was also of influence in 
Vollenhoven’s choice of developing a systematic presentation of philoso-
phy from out of its most basic presuppositions, in a way that would be 
enlightening to all students of the university of whatever faculty, without 
any prior choice of disciplines within philosophy.
 The Free University obviously had to meet academic standards from 
the start.41 But it was more conscious, in the first half-century of its ex-
40   The Free University, long a fledgeling institute of only three faculties, was re-
quired by law to expand into a full university according to a set time-table when receiving 
accreditation of its degrees in 1905. By 1930 there had to be a fourth faculty. This became 
the faculty of mathematics and the natural sciences. For the history of the mathemati-
cal side of this faculty, later to become a distinct faculty of its own, and Vollenhoven’s 
influence on it in its early years, cf. Blauwendraat 2004; for Vollenhoven’s influence cf. 
especially chapter two of Blauwendraat 2004. For a history of the natural sciences within 
this faculty, cf. Flipse 2005. During the planning stage of this fourth faculty, Vollenhoven 
addressed the problem of its ‘foundation’; cf. Vollenhoven 1929d, in Rullmann 1929: 52-
64. All the students of this new faculty were required to take Vollenhoven’s introductory 
philosophy course once it opened its doors.
41   If necessary, prior to its accreditation (granted in 1905), students could be re-
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istence, of its place and importance in connection with Kuyper’s neo-
Calvinist movement. It was, as A.Th. van Deursen’s recent history of the 
Free University describes it, the ‘cornerstone’ of Kuyper’s national Reveil 
endeavour.42 Kuyper’s national reform program had already had success 
in an operational Calvinist-Christian press—a daily “De Standaard” and 
a weekly “De Heraut”—, in forming a Christian labour union and in 
establishing an “anti-revolutionary” political party with significant par-
liamentary representation. Kuyper had inherited the political ideal, along 
with the establishment of Christian schools free from State control, from 
his predecessor, Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876). Kuyper 
capped the Christian school movement with the establishment of the 
Free University.43
 In appealing to the Calvinistic roots of national life, the Reveil could 
be looked upon as a reactionary movement, which to some extent it no 
doubt was. But Kuyper had more than simply conservative-restorative 
motives. He accounted for his practical endeavours in terms of a world-
view that was relevant for, and that could meet the challenges of, contem-
porary life. This worldview account is that of ‘sphere sovereignty’, which 
is a religiously motivated view of society in which the ‘societal spheres’ of 
family, business, school, jurisprudence, state, church, and so on are each 
seen as divinely endowed with the responsibility of regulating its own 
affairs, without one sphere encroaching upon another. This fits in with 
the Christian-Calvinist confession of divine sovereignty having authority 
over all of life and calling for human responsibility in all of its walks. In 
its being relevant for its time, in fact in even being innovative in calling 
for democratic participation of the people in whatever sector of society, 
it is progressive and not reactionary, hence it may with good reason be 
considered ‘neo-Calvinist’.44
examined at a state university, which never presented problems for the students; cf. Van 
Deursen 2005: 39. 
42   The term occurs in the title of Van Deursen 2005. 
43   Establishing the Free University was not the last of Kuyper’s achievements. In 
1886 Kuyper mobilized the so-called ‘complainers’ within the State Reformed Church 
(Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk), in the movement called “de Doleantie”. This movement 
merged with the main sector of another group that had seceded from the State Reformed 
Church in 1834, to form the ‘Reformed Churches’ (Gereformeerde Kerken) in 1892. 
This new wing of Calvinistic churches was organized along congregationalist lines (hence 
the plural form). There was a very close practical affinity between it (the new wing) and 
the Free University; cf. Algra 1966, especially chap. 25, pp. 317-332. J. Koch’s recent 
biography of Kuyper gives a very full discussion and evaluation of Kuyper’s ideals and 
activities; cf. Koch 2006. 
44   The matter of Kuyper’s conservatism is discussed by George Harinck in the in-
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 Kuyper’s advocacy of this neo-Calvinism agreed with the modernis-
tic notion of the human subject having the right to regulate and improve 
its practical affairs. However, there was disagreement as to the provenance 
of this right—delegated or inborn?—and what form this origination 
takes—through embracing responsibility as a religious duty or discovered 
in the free use of reason? For Kuyper, sovereignty is the primary preroga-
tive of divinity, but a partial sovereignty is delegated to the human being 
in the context of Christian freedom.45 Humanism honours sovereignty 
as state sovereignty which, though secured in the rights of the state’s free 
citizens, dominates over all other human institutions. In practical terms 
this means that neo-Calvinism opposes all forms of totalitarianism on 
point of principle, while humanism could stem state totalitarianism only 
by counterbalancing it with liberalistic autonomous individual freedom. 
There is an uneasy, not to say conflicting, tension between individual 
freedom and state control, a tension that encouraged rather than hin-
dered the occurrence of the deep tragedies of the twentieth century.
 The opposition between neo-Calvinism and humanism was not just 
shadow boxing. Kuyper’s advocacy of sphere sovereignty was of practical 
effect in being instrumental in turning Dutch society into a “verzuilde 
maatschappij”—society as a columniation—i.e. a society in which dif-
ferent worldview orientations affect the operation of segments of society, 
such as education, labour, press, politics, etc., leading to distinct ‘parties’, 
troduction to the recent Dutch republication of Kuyper’s “Stone lectures” on Calvinism. 
The conservatism is due to the link between Kuyper’s worldview of sphere sovereignty 
and its late 16th and early 17th century Protestant-Reformed religious signature. It is in 
virtue of that signature that the worldview of sphere sovereignty opposes primary features 
of modernity as expressed in the latter’s humanism. But in the practical implementa-
tion of sphere sovereignty, Kuyper was innovative, for example in being among the first 
to implement the system of political parties in Dutch politics. In its practical outreach 
Kuyper’s program was in step and vied with modernity’s late phase of modernism. The 
term modernism, as used in this study, denotes the effectuation of practical progress in 
science, morality and art. This progress is motivated within modernism by the ideal of 
constructive rational perfectibility. As a late phase of modernity, modernism is clearly 
recognizable from the second half of the nineteenth century on. Modernism would ap-
pear to have exhausted itself—at least the uncritical acceptance of its own worth—in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, as signalled by ‘post-modernism’. This is not to say 
that modernity has come to an end. Now, while modernism’s practical humanism puts it 
at odds with the outreach of neo-Calvinism, there are nevertheless significant influences 
in the latter’s method and goal of meaning conferment. Kuyper, we wish to add, used the 
term ‘modernism’ as synonym for ‘modernity’, hence he lacks the distinction assumed 
here in the phases of modernity, phases that Vollenhoven referred to as “early and late 
rationalism”; cf. Kuyper 2002. For the view of modernity and its phases assumed here, cf. 
Tol 2005a. 
45   Cf. Kuyper 1930: 32. 
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not just in politics, but also in all the other areas of society. Thus each 
worldview orientation defines its own ‘column’ (or ‘pillar’ or “zuil”), as 
a cross-section of society. By the end of the nineteenth century, Dutch 
national life had four main orientations: Anti-Revolutionary (i.e. Protes-
tant-Reformed), Roman Catholic, Social-democrat and that of Liberal-
ism.46 This remained in effect till deep into the twentieth century.
 Hence, the rise of the Free University has to be understood within 
the context of a neo-Calvinist worldview and a Calvinist-Christian life 
orientation within Dutch society. This placed this academic institution 
under an obligation. As an alternative to State controlled institutions, it 
had to demonstrate that it was able to function as a mature university, ca-
pable of legitimating its practice. To that end, Kuyper had taken up into 
the charter of the Association, under whose auspices the Free University 
operated, a ‘foundation’ statement. The second article of the regulations 
of the Association read:
For all the education given in its schools, the Association is based entirely 
and exclusively on the foundation of the reformed principles, and it also 
acknowledges as foundation for education in Theology the three Forms of 
unity....47
 It comes as something of a surprise to find that these “reformed 
principles” were never spelled out. After all, the Christian-(neo-)Calvinist 
character of the education offered at the university was to be safeguarded 
through them. Initially there was, as is often attested, an intuitive consen-
sus as to what was meant. But towards the end of the nineteenth century 
questions were raised as to the nature and identity of the intended re-
formed principles. Because the role that philosophy was expected to play 
at the university is intimately connected with this whole problem, and 
would affect Vollenhoven when he was appointed in 1926, this matter of 
the reformed principles calls for some discussion.
B. “The way that leads to the knowledge of the Reformed principles”
In 1895 a practical conflict brought the problem of the reformed prin-
ciples to a head. A.F. de Savorin-Lohman, active in politics for Kuyper’s 
Anti-Revolutionary party, and also a professor of the Free University, had 
46   Koch 2006: 574-575. 
47   Quoted in Van Deursen 2005: 23. For completeness sake, we add that “the 
three Forms of unity”, normative for theology besides the Reformed principles, are the 
ecclesiastical documents: Heidelberg Catechism (1563), Belgic Confession (Nederlandse Gel-
oofsbelijdenis) (1566) and Canons of Dort (1619). In 1968 an ecumenical mission state-
ment was proposed and it soon came to replace the reference to the “foundation of the 
reformed principles” in Article 2. Cf. Van Deursen 2005: 272.
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clashed with Kuyper and was discharged from the university. A point of 
issue concerned the reformed principles. Everyone was agreed that the 
principles in question stood (in some sense) in relation to Scripture and 
the (Reformed) confessions. Lohman implemented this by adding that 
he could not be forced “to accept other principles as being Reformed 
than such as he could himself acknowledge.”48 In other words, he made 
it a sole matter of conscience as to what he could identify as being prop-
erly Reformed. Herman Bavinck, who advised the board of the univer-
sity in connection with this conflict, deemed Lohman to be mistaken. 
Conscience cannot be the last word. Between the time of the Scriptures 
and our own endeavours lies history. Calvinism arose in that period of 
history. Calvinism is more than just the work of John Calvin, for Calvin 
was engaged in a cause that was greater than himself, a cause believed to 
be led by the Holy Spirit. It is through historical study, in particular the 
study of the historical course of Calvinism, that one should be able to 
come to an identification and acknowledgement of the Reformed prin-
ciples.49
 The Senate of the Free University (i.e. the body of its professors) 
decided to seriously confront the issue. Kuyper, Woltjer and Fabius (rep-
resentatives of the three faculties of which the university consisted at the 
time: theology, classical languages and law respectively) put together a 
document, published in 1895, on the topic of the Reformed principles, 
entitled “Publication of the Senate of the Free University regarding the 
Investigation towards Determining the Way that Leads to the Knowl-
edge of the Reformed Principles.”50 The circumspect title is explained 
in the Foreword (signed by Woltjer and Kuyper). The cardinal question 
concerns the proper identification of the reformed principles. But this 
proper identification needs to be properly researched. Thus there is a 
prior methodological question concerning the route that is to lead to the 
identification of the said principles. The document only broaches this 
preliminary question, hoping that by helping to set the research in mo-
tion, the proper identification—the Senate report speaks of a “scientific 
truth”—of the principles would eventually be confirmed some time in 
the future (Woltjer and Kuyper 1895: 6). 
48   Van Deursen 2005: 63. 
49   Van Deursen 2005: 65. 
50   Woltjer and Kuyper 1895, i.e. Publicatie van den Senaat der Vrije Universiteit, 
in zake het onderzoek ter bepaling van den weg die tot de kennis der Gereformeerde begin-
selen leidt, with a foreword by J. Woltjer (Rector) and A. Kuyper (Abactis) (Amsterdam: 
Wormser, 1895), 16 pgs. It consists of 18 sections. For more about this document, cf. Van 
Deursen 2005: 64-65. 
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 A number of features stand out in this report. After stipulating that 
under “Reformed principles” is to be understood “principles of Calvin-
ism”, in virtue of the near synonymy of “Calvinism” and “Reformed” 
(section 1), we come to the gist of the matter in the second section. A 
distinction is make in the use of the term ‘principles’: “under ‘principles’ 
is not to be understood those starting points [uitgangspunten] which lie in 
the facts and in the essence of things, but such principles which, in con-
sciousness, control the world of thought” (Woltjer and Kuyper 1895: 8). 
This is not to say that the starting points in the facts and the essence of things 
are irrelevant for thought, but that they can “function in the foundation 
of education only after being expressed in the form of thoughts” (ibid.).
 The distinction in question comes down to recognizing two forms 
of rationality: objective rationality, which is the order inherent in the facts 
and the essence of things, and subjective rationality, the conscious order 
of thoughts. This distinction will play a leading (but problematic) role 
in the unfolding of Vollenhoven’s early work and in the emergence of 
Reformed philosophy. The distinction is a classical one of scholasticism, 
which furthermore postulates the harmony between the two orders. The 
‘harmony’ is implicit in the above statement of the Senate report, in that 
the investigation of the world of conscious thought is expected to lead 
to insight in, and formulations of, the thoughts that represent the prin-
ciples in the facts and the essence of things. But—the Senate report is 
cautious—the confirmation of the representation of the principles of the 
objective order can take place only when the time is right, after proper 
preparation. In the meantime the research is to be historical and directed 
to the ‘subjective thoughts’. This calls for researching historical Calvin-
ism, in its relevance for and control of the whole of human life (section 
3 and 4), so as to discover the leading thoughts. These leading thoughts 
are not the ‘product’ of persons, i.e. are not identical to what, say, John 
Calvin actually thought. But they are the thoughts that inspired him and 
transcend him in their fecundity (section 5). We get close to the heart 
of neo-Calvinism when the text asserts the divinely privileged status of 
Calvinism, at least in its (aggrandized) self-assessment, viz. as “proceed-
ing from God and not the human being, who [God] granted to a part 
of Christianity the higher life form, which is embodied in Calvinism” 
(Woltjer and Kuyper 1895: 9). Thus, the historical research of Calvin-
ism is to lead to the identification of what are ultimately the divinely 
determined thoughts and order of life God granted Calvinism to know. 
We add, though the Senate report does not say so explicitly, that these 
divinely determined thoughts will be the sought for Reformed principles, 
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for they will also accord with, or be operative in, “the facts and the es-
sence of things”.
 Towards its end, the Senate report includes a section that touch-
es on philosophy (section 16). In looking for reformed principles for 
our time—proceeding from out of the subjective order—there may be 
candidate principles which, so the report suggests, might be of help in 
providing answers to questions raised in our time and not in the 16th 
century; e.g. questions first raised by Kant about the knowing subject. The 
report lists: questions “about the nature and essence of knowledge, how 
the knowing faculty operates, the relation between the knowing faculty 
and the knowable object, the boundaries of our knowledge, the method 
of acquiring knowledge in the distinct ways of the natural and human 
sciences” (Woltjer and Kuyper 1895: 13). 
 But it would be a mistake, the report warns, to interpret such candi-
date principles about the knowing subject as belonging to the reformed 
principles directly. Their candidacy, in turn, needs itself to be assessed in 
terms of the reformed principles. In a statement that would appear to 
express which principles (or the sort of principles) to expect as present “in 
the facts and the essence of things”, the candidate principles that help to 
understand the epistemic situation need to reckon with certain data, as 
laid down from Calvinistic side, in connection with “the human being’s 
being created according to God’s image”,51 viz. data: 
 “- about the essence of the human being and its faculties,
 - about the relation of our knowledge to God’s knowledge,
 - about the relation of the human being to the cosmos,
 - about the eclipse of our understanding and the darkening of our 
wisdom through sin,
 - about the relation between natural knowledge and specifically re-
vealed knowledge,
 - about the consequences of palingenesis (regeneration) and of illu-
minatio (enlightenment), 
51   This anthropological-religious assumption appears to be the fulcrum for the re-
formed principles. Naturally, it needs to be metaphysically interpreted for it to be reveal-
ing for the objective order of rationality. In the Isagoge Vollenhoven does not offer it his 
support. He makes a specific point of advancing a relational, over against an ontological, 
interpretation of this ‘imaging’. “The formulation being (created) in the image of God, in-
dicating a relational state, is to be preferred over the image of God, because the latter is an 
abstraction, a usage that has proven historically to have its dangers. This danger became 
particularly acute when some who laid the emphasis on “image” then also lost sight of its 
being related to God, subsequently began to ask what that image might be and sometimes 
ended up identifying it with a specific group of functions or even with a supposedly in-
nate understanding.” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 117) 
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 - about the forms that creaturely knowledge has in angels and the 
blessed;
 — and to collect this data in such a way as to be able to erect the 
theory of knowledge” (Woltjer and Kuyper 1895: 14). 
 This much is clear: philosophy is thought to lie very close to where 
the investigation into the epistemic situation—i.e. the subjective or-
der—discloses the contours of the order of the essence of the human 
being—i.e. the (main?) lead into the objective order—that centres in the 
confession that the human being is created in the image of God. Vol-
lenhoven’s appointment to the chair of philosophy is still some 30 years 
in the future. But something of the level of the themes broached here is 
recognizable in his approach to philosophy, though he did not accept the 
scholastic duplex ordo of rationality. Initially, in his dissertation of 1918 
(cf. chapter 2), he held to a qualified scholasticism, but when appointed 
to the Free University in 1926 he had rejected the scholastic framework 
altogether. 
 The report on the reformed principles had a certain stimulating ef-
fect at the turn of the century. Woltjer gave the problem of the reformed 
principles considerable attention, which he interwove with his theory of 
the divine Logos.52 Woltjer was Vollenhoven’s mentor, but mention of his 
influence on Vollenhoven is better touched on later (cf. chapter 4, section 
III.B.4.a.). Kuyper also gave the topic his attention, in a more popular 
way, particularly in the Stone Lectures on Calvinism held in 1898. It is 
instructive to trace Kuyper’s more independent line on this score.53
C. Kuyper on the “Reformed foundation”
Kuyper, as is to be expected, had fairly definite thoughts on the matter. 
To start with, he held that the reformed foundation could not be hon-
oured when a person’s Christian beliefs remain external to the exercise 
of his or her academic talent. For the Free University it was not to be 
a matter of appointing academically talented persons, who were Chris-
52   Cf. Kok 2007: esp. 52-59. For an overview of Woltjer’s work, and the interac-
tions of Woltjer with Vollenhoven as student, cf. Van der Laan 2000. Woltjer himself 
discussed “the nature and task of philology in the light of the reformed principles” in 
Woltjer 1891: 2-20. In Woltjer 1896: 179 he states: “our university, which proceeds in its 
education from determined principles, principles that touch the root of all things”. 
53   For a much fuller sketch of the ‘philosophical situation’ prior to Vollenhoven’s 
appointment at the Free University, cf. J. Klapwijk’s discussion of “the period of philo-
sophical reconnaissance”, in his “Hundred years of philosophy at the Free University”, 
in Klapwijk 1980: 528-553, which, besides Kuyper, also includes discussions of Woltjer, 
Geesink, Bavinck and Pos. 
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tians to boot. The sciences and the academic subject matter, as taught 
and studied at the Free University, had to be Christian “as to principle, 
method and result”.54 The latter were essential to, or at least implied by, 
the “Reformed foundation”. For, as Kuyper explained in his Stone Lec-
tures at Princeton University in 1898, “the birth of the Free University 
[had been] for [the sake of ] the general cultivation of the sciences on the 
foundation of the Calvinistic principle”.55
 In that same lecture series Kuyper explains more fully what this Re-
formed “foundation of the Calvinistic principle” involves. To begin with, 
science is never separated from nor opposed to faith, at least for science 
properly understood. Science, Kuyper holds, is possible only “when you 
discover in the specific phenomena, perceived by empiricism, a universal 
law, and thereby reach the thought which governs the whole constella-
tion of phenomena.”56 In governing phenomena, such a thought cannot 
be without an intention and an interest, determining self-consciousness. 
Science that is self-consciously aware of what guides it, acknowledges 
many presuppositions. It is here that Kuyper speaks generically of ‘faith’:
Every science presupposes faith in self, in our self-consciousness; presup-
poses faith in the accurate working of our senses; presupposes faith in the 
correctness of the laws of thought; presupposes faith in something univer-
sal hidden behind the special phenomena; presupposes faith in life; and es-
pecially presupposes faith in the principles, from which we proceed; which 
signifies that all these indispensable axioms, needed in a productive scien-
tific investigation, do not come to us by proof, but are established in our 
judgment by our inner conception and given with our self-consciousness.57
 The presuppositions that Kuyper here lists are, of course, not spe-
cific or unique to (neo-)Calvinism, and Kuyper did not mean to imply 
this. Furthermore, the man of science of Kuyper’s day (the vast majority 
being in fact men) would not contest grosso modo the presuppositions as 
such. Ever since Auguste Comte had formulated, in his Cours de philoso-
phie positive,58 his “positive philosophy”, as philosophy of (experimental) 
54   Van Deursen 2005: 63, who here paraphrases the university’s annual report of 1897.
55   Quotations are from the English translation of the Stone lectures, Kuyper 1931: 140.
56   Kuyper 1931: 112-113.
57   Kuyper 1931: 131.
58   Comte published this work, in six volumes, between 1830 and 1842. It consti-
tuted the first statement of what was to become the philosophy of science. He advanced 
the important idea of the “encyclopaedia of the sciences”, which holds that the mutual 
relations between the (basic or primary) sciences provide a window on understanding the 
structure of the world. This notion of the encyclopaedia of the sciences was very influen-
tial in the twentieth century. The influence on Vollenhoven (and on Dooyeweerd, for that 
matter) was, as will become clear in the sequel, marked. Cf. Comte 1975, especially the 
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science, there is a growing recognition that science does indeed have pre-
suppositions. What the ‘man of science’ could object to is Kuyper’s attrib-
uting these presuppositions to faith. He would be more inclined to see 
them as held to and affirmed by reason. There might be discussion about 
what, exactly, is “behind the special phenomena”—and perhaps here one 
could speak of faith—or which axioms are indispensable for “productive 
scientific investigation”—but this is surely a matter for reason to dis-
cern! Does this important point about presuppositions then merely come 
down to a discussion as to what to call it: ‘faith’ or ‘reason’?59
 In the meantime, when compared to the Senate report, discussed 
above, and its distinction between the subjective and the objective or-
ders, I believe we can recognize that the ‘thought’, on which Kuyper now 
predicates ‘faith’, is that of the objective order. In the cited passage, the 
‘thought’ is, among other things, the law governing phenomena, thus is 
part of the ‘essence of things’. Its being “given with our self-conscious-
ness” would appear to mean, not that this thought arises in and through 
consciousness, as something of a subjective order, but given with the fact 
of self-consciousness, thus itself presupposed by self-consciousness and 
the subjective order. At least Kuyper gives to the ‘thought’ in this context 
a cosmic significance, as we see more clearly in the sequel.60
 For Kuyper, more is at stake than the semantics of what to name it. 
There is the deeper question as to how the conjunction of science and 
section on “Positive philosophy as philosophy of science” in the Introduction, pp. xlviii-
lxiii.
59   A discussion such as this suffers readily, among other things, from a lack of 
distinction in the use of the terms and from differences in options between languages. 
The Dutch language has only the one word ‘geloof ’—the term which Kuyper used in his 
Dutch text—for what in English is denoted either as ‘belief ’ (classically defined as “think-
ing with assent”, having a wide application) or as ‘faith’ (what might be termed “trusting 
confidence” or “accepted on trust”). The English use of ‘science’ is modelled on, if not 
actually restricted to, the natural sciences, while the Dutch term ‘wetenschap’, like the 
German ‘Wissenschaft’, has a much broader application, meaning any context of expertise 
that requires learning and is advanced by learning. A fruitful discussion of the relations of 
these terms would of course need to take these distinct meanings into account.
60   It is, I believe, of secondary importance whether the objective order be taken 
dualistically, as terrains of the natural (nature) and the supra-natural (grace) , or more 
monistically, as a higher/inner idea controlling lower/outer phenomena. The primary 
point of contention is the postulated difference between the objective order and the sub-
jective order as such, and that difference concerns (cf. chapter 3) the metaphysical versus 
the metalogical order respectively. Kuyper clearly has a more monistic approach to the 
objective order, which was (still) metaphysical. The difficulties in this connection will be 
discussed more thoroughly in chapter 3 below, in the context of the ‘critical realism’ of 
the early Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. 
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faith is put to use. There is a serious conflict, Kuyper held, concerning 
the view of the cosmos, in the light of which the scientific investigation 
of the cosmos takes place. There are, what Kuyper calls, the ‘Normalists’, 
who consider the cosmos to be the panorama of a natural evolutionary 
process “from its potencies to its ideals”.61 Opposed to them are the ‘Ab-
normalists’, who believe that the cosmos is not a natural process. They 
believe that the cosmos is created, that a fall disturbed whatever natural 
processes there are, whereby these processes are turned into abnormal 
ones, and that regeneration is required to counter the abnormality. The 
norm for understanding this “creation, fall and regeneration” cannot be 
found in natural processes themselves, but only in “the Triune God”, in 
whom the Abnormalists find the ideal norm. In comparison with the 
Abnormalists, the Normalists, in making the natural cosmos the source 
of norms or ideals, maintain a worldview of Naturalism, if not Pantheism 
or Deism. So there is a real conflict between the “two scientific systems 
of the Normalists and the Abnormalists”, which is a serious difference in 
worldview—namely between the “faiths” (or presuppositions) of each of 
these scientific systems to the degree that they are tapped into a world-
view—that affects “the whole domain of life”.62
 It will be readily understood that the single ‘Calvinistic principle’ 
Kuyper has in mind is that of the ‘Abnormalists’. Their understanding of 
“creation, fall and regeneration”, which is fed by their Christian convic-
tions—and, we should add, in theology is to be interpreted in the light 
of the content of the ecclesiastical “Forms of unity”—enjoins them to 
accept certain deep seated views about the world, such as its not being a 
self-supporting system, the presence of distinct divine activity in it, the 
possibility of occurrences contrary to natural regularity, and the like. The 
whole becomes a view of a highly furnished world, which neo-Calvinism 
was prone to take as (biblically endorsed) objective reality.
 This is probably about as close to a formulation of the intended 
‘Calvinistic principle’ that Kuyper comes. The principle embodies a view, 
believed to be fundamentally true of the world, and thus its thought acts 
as presupposition in the scientific inquiry and academic understanding 
of the world. This double role is both an asset and a liability. It was able, 
on the one hand, to reach and mobilize a large sector of the populace of 
Calvinist conviction, many of whom lacked advanced education, into 
providing practical support in maintaining the Free University in virtue 
of their being able to identify with the ‘worldview’ in question. On the 
61   Kuyper 1931: 132.
62   Kuyper 1931: 133.
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other hand, its relevance as foundation for an academic institution of 
teaching and research is not immediately clear. Is it a ‘meta-statement’, 
representing a ‘meta-truth’, harbouring (to use Kuyper’s words already 
quoted) the “indispensable axioms, needed in a productive scientific in-
vestigation”, without need of interpretation in their own right? In that 
case the Free University could be seen as endorsing a scholastic ‘meta-
physical order’, whereby ‘supra-natural truth’ (or ‘ideal truth’) informs 
‘natural truth’ (‘reasoned truth’) with dogmatic correctness. Or is the 
principle a statement of orientation, meant to provide a normative con-
text for the university’s teaching and research? This could serve to moti-
vate the university’s operations and provide a practical goal, leaving to the 
research itself the task of discovering the principles relevant to a science. I 
believe that the former, ‘meta-truth’ interpretation—also implicit in the Sen-
ate report—was long predominant. The theological faculty gave this extra 
emphasis and support. The chair of theological dogmatics was, after all, the 
prized position of the university. Certainly its third occupant, after Abraham 
Kuyper and Herman Bavinck, viz. Valentijn Hepp (occupant 1922-1950), 
held that theological dogmatics dictates to all the sciences.63
 We can at least pinpoint what Kuyper, in his discussion as con-
ducted in his Lectures on Calvinism, did not succeed in answering. Given 
the parameters of his thought, Kuyper did not explain how one proceeds 
from the ‘Abnormalist’ position, via the self-consciousness that lies at the 
root of ‘science and its faith’, to the selection of those principles, methods 
and results of science that attest to a Christian scientific practice.64 Only 
63   In the words of J. Stellingwerff, Hepp maintained that “science is subject to 
Scripture, which we know through exegesis; [but] the exegete must proceed from dog-
matics; accordingly the dogmatic theologian has the final say”; cf. Stellingwerff 1990: 
83. One finds this corroborated in Hepp 1937b, from which we cite the following state-
ments: “The God of truth, being Himself one, is the warrant for the unity of the truth, 
which He destined in analogical manner for the human being to praise Him, and that all 
genuine judgments of truth constitute a unity. The unity of science stands firm beyond 
all doubt” (p. 16). To that end Hepp notes that “all a priori judgments, whose acceptance 
is the conditio sine qua non for true science, have their source in revelation” (p. 25). All 
revelation, whether the general (i.e. in Nature) or the special (i.e. in Scripture), “is divine 
truth revelation” (p. 25). Finally, “special revelation must never be interpreted according 
to general revelation, but rather general revelation needs special revelation as hermeneuti-
cal key” (p. 25). (Translation mine)
64   In this formulation one readily recognizes the chief concern of Dooyeweerd’s 
later “transcendental critique of theoretical thought”, which aims to demonstrate the in-
ner connection between scientific thought and religion. This connection is mediated in 
Dooyeweerd by a self-consciousness that is ‘supra-temporal’, initially viewed as transcen-
dent ego, later reformulated in terms of transcendental subjectivity. Vollenhoven never 
endorsed this concern in this form. Vollenhoven (as will become clear) sees knowledge as 
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via some such derivation could a Calvinist framework be formulated, on 
Kuyper’s terms, that would be normative for the faculties and the scienc-
es. In 1900 Kuyper declared that making such a formulation perspicuous 
is the task of Christian philosophy. “And that is what we urgently need, 
‘a philosophical system, erected according to our own principles’.”65 It 
would take another quarter of a century before the first full-time philoso-
pher could be appointed. The expectations within the Free University 
community were high. After all, all incoming students of the university 
are confronted with philosophy.66
 
iV. VollenhoVen’s Program
A. Introduction
In developing his philosophy program for the Free University, Vollen-
hoven was expected to throw light on the matter of basic principles; at 
least, philosophy at the Free University would have to rest on the foun-
dation of Reformed principles and be a ‘Calvinistic philosophy’. Vollen-
hoven openly chose the latter term as label for his philosophical endeav-
our, even though it invites misunderstandings. He meant to indicate his 
allegiance to the historical tradition in which the university community 
stood, the tradition which that community wished to advance in a way 
that is relevant to university life. In this tradition, the Reformed religious 
life-attitude stands central, and in its neo-Calvinist setting it also ad-
dressed problems of society and culture, as is clear from Kuyper’s pro-
gram of sphere sovereignty.67
 Vollenhoven’s main aim is to indicate that philosophy can comport 
with this tradition. This does not mean that he wishes to establish a spe-
cific religious philosophy, nor a philosophy of a worldview. He limits 
philosophy, in the strict sense of the word, to academic philosophy, to 
philosophy with a general academic—‘scientific’ as he called it—charac-
contextualized: “knowing resorts under being”. It is in specifying this “resorting” that the 
constraints upon “theoretical thought” come to the fore, as attested by his distinct use of 
the methods discussed above.
65   Van Deursen 2005: 63; the inner quote is from Kuyper in the university’s annual 
report of 1900.
66   Stellingwerff 1992: 74.
67   Practically speaking the term ‘Reformed’ is a synonym for ‘Calvinistic’, as is also 
emphasized in the Senate report (Woltjer and Kuyper 1895: 7-8). Initially the term ‘Re-
formed’ was applied to Huldrych Zwingli’s attempt at community-centred reform based 
in Zürich, in distinction from Martin Luther’s work, which was called ‘Evangelical’ from 
the start. Through Heinrich Bullinger, who continued to develop Zwingli’s ideas, in par-
ticular the idea of Covenant, this ‘reformed’ branch of the Reformation in Switzerland was 
absorbed into John Calvin’s later consolidation. Cf. MacCulloch 2003: 132, 174-179.
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ter. Only at this level can argument be effective. Here one is expected to 
seek clarity and understanding, to respond to indications of contradic-
tions or of antinomies between approaches. One is expected to review the 
facts without explicit bias and to acknowledge the relevance of material 
one might have overlooked when pointed out. This is what belongs to 
the craftsmanship and erudition of being a philosopher. The sounding 
board for academic philosophy is cosmology insofar as this concerns the 
referent of the realities in connection with which distinctions are made, 
connections are laid, and a general understanding is pursued of ‘how 
things are and develop’ in a network of determinants. In other words 
academic philosophy is practised according to the method of resolution 
and composition, and its worth is to be able to contribute to a better un-
derstanding of life, easing “the confusing diversity between philosophical 
theories” (Vollenhoven 1933a: 48). 
 Now what guides this practice of philosophy is the reflection con-
ducted according to the other two methods that are discussed above, the 
‘method of knowledge organization’ and the thetical-critical method. In 
speaking of methods here, Vollenhoven means to say that the reflection 
taking place at this level has its own rules. It is not a haphazard ‘what I 
happen to think’ or ‘what I happen to prefer by way of philosophy’, but a 
serious pursuit that concerns the presuppositions of philosophy. The dis-
course in which philosophy reflects upon itself is not of the same nature 
as the discourse of philosophical practice as such. Over against the latter, 
there is the reflection on presuppositions, which is meta-philosophical. 
We need to ask what the connection is between the meta-philosophical 
and philosophical discourses. 
B. Vollenhoven’s procedure
If we turn to the main work of 1933, “Calvinism and the reformation 
of philosophy”, we find Vollenhoven’s program in action in a specific 
way. The introduction—the first discussion of content—pleads that the 
execution of philosophy needs two things: systematic insight and his-
torical overview. This places the practice of philosophy squarely within 
the thetical-critical method, although this term does not occur here. The 
systematic insight needed “before all else” is “a clear view of the diversity” 
in the chaos of opinions (Vollenhoven 1933a: 9). An appeal to some sort 
of a ‘philosophical common denominator’ closes the door on systematic 
insight. The historical overview, in turn, is to aid the systematic insight. 
“Nothing is so refreshing as a good bath in history” (ibid.). It discloses 
data that have become lost to memory, and also lays bare connections 
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one had not suspected. Both systematic insight and historical overview 
are needed, without merging one under the other. Clearly, insight and 
overview are not ends in themselves; they are ever going concerns. They 
involve reflection that helps to come to grips with the relevant data of the 
themes and problems one is interested in as philosopher. The reflection 
calls for an intuitive discernment of what is relevant, as contributing to 
the insight and the overview sought.
 A second introduction (this one for specifically the systematic part) 
poses the meta-philosophical question as to what philosophical thought 
is (op. cit.: 13). The question is posed in the interest of a preliminary 
explanation of the use of the term ‘Calvinistic philosophy’. Vollenhoven 
now argues in line with ‘the method of knowledge organization’, though 
again without being methodologically explicit. The central thought is 
that, philosophy being a general science, philosophical thought must lay 
great stress on guarding against excluding anything that is knowable (op. 
cit.: 14). Things are not merely known in themselves but also in relation 
to other things. Knowable is not only the cosmos as such—to which phi-
losophy proper is directed—but also what concerns the whole, and thus 
what transcends it. The knowable reveals itself to the knowing subject, 
and this enables knowledge to arise. Thus a ‘revelatory faith’ is not at all 
a strange component of everyday knowing. In other words, the effect of 
religion and worldview make themselves felt here, of whatever kind, thus 
not necessarily specifically ‘Calvinistic’. But a Calvinist will take a posi-
tion that is informed by the Christian religion and a Reformed world-
view. This puts a premium on the meanings of the words he/she uses, 
as well as on the general orientation that that specific mode of everyday 
knowing represents.
 The discussion then turns to philosophy proper. Vollenhoven now 
lays great stress on the confusion in ‘current philosophy’, which for him 
is philosophy in the 1920s and 1930s. This can cause people to turn away 
from philosophy. For some, the confusion of philosophy puts it at too 
great a distance from real life, for others it makes progress hopeless, if 
not dangerous (op. cit.: 15). In Vollenhoven’s inaugural address (1926a) 
he voices a similar critique in connection with the relation of ‘current 
philosophy’ and science. The Free University needs to go its own way, he 
says, in light of the problematic nature of ‘current philosophy’, which is 
“either life philosophy, which becomes alienated from every reflection on 
questions regarding science, or it progresses in logicistic one-sidedness, 
that exaggerates the meaning of science and forbids every voyage beyond 
the pillars of Hercules of the formalistic passage” (Vollenhoven 1926a: 
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5-6). Thus he sketches the current situation as a dilemma that, either way, 
does not do justice to science.
 What Vollenhoven particularly rejects is interpreting the religious 
and worldview moments of knowing as a species of philosophy, say ‘ide-
alism’, which in turn induces a misleading meaning on philosophical 
idealism as being a ‘Christian philosophy’. This wreaks havoc with the 
dynamics of one’s “faith life” (meaning one’s religious and worldview 
participation). One needs to recognize that “the terminology of most 
philosophers is so saturated with humanism [itself, obviously, of religious 
and worldview signature (A.T.)] that one cannot begin to filter this out 
and bring it in agreement with . . . the language of [Reformed] faith” (op. 
cit.: 16). Thus Vollenhoven concludes: “Synthesis between the Christian 
faith on the one hand and the current philosophy on the other hand is 
impossible” (ibid.; emphasis of the whole statement deleted).
 This important statement needs to be interpreted carefully. The 
‘impossibility’ of the synthesis is not a theoretical impossibility, perhaps 
thought to involve a problematic version of the relation between faith 
and thought, but an impossibility in the light of the (then) current situ-
ation. Also, Vollenhoven does not mean to say that the “Christian faith” 
cannot be in step with non-Christian thought. The latter is simply not 
in the picture here. It is the humanism of current philosophy that spoils 
things. His formulation leaves the door wide open for the possibility of 
a synthesis between ‘non-current philosophy’ and the Christian faith. It 
is not for the sake of the Christian faith that a reformation of philosophy is 
sought, but it is for the sake of ‘current philosophy’, in light of its confusions. 
A philosophy that comports with the Christian faith—a so-called Cal-
vinistic or Scriptural philosophy—is not derived from (hence is also not 
rooted in) the Christian faith, as if there is a template for the ‘Idea’ (in the 
weighted sense to be met with in this study) of a Christian philosophy. 
That would in fact be either a scholastic way or an idealist way of pos-
ing the problem.68 The philosophical discourse is—as Vollenhoven said 
68   In the inaugural address Vollenhoven mentions and argues against “the power 
of the double tradition” of scholasticism and humanism (1926a: 64). On the one hand 
scholasticism Christianizes, in the sense of adding a supra-natural reality to, the natural 
realm, while on the other hand humanism’s linking up with Christianity tends to reduce 
the opposition between Christianity and humanism to “a skirmish between conserva-
tive and progressive rationalism” (ibid.). Vollenhoven argues for an alternative to both 
traditions. At this point in his address he also quotes from the Senate report of 1895 
(cf. Woltjer and Kuyper 1895: 13-14), viz. the part about the importance of including 
questions concerning the knowing subject in relation to Reformed principles. But he 
bypasses—I tend to think intentionally—the scholastic formulation of the problem of 
the reformed principles that we found in that report. 
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of the task of science in his inaugural address—“elevated but limited” 
(1926a: 65; philosophy being a general science, this qualification holds 
for it too). Hence it is of primary importance that philosophy remains 
within the bounds of its ‘place and task’, in line with its method. The 
philosophical discourse presupposes meta-philosophical discourse, but it 
is not a derivation or species of it.
 Finally, what about the positive effect of the meta-philosophical 
discourse on the philosophical? At the end of his systematic discussion 
(chapter 2 of Part I of 1933a) Vollenhoven gives an example. The focus is 
on the continuity of meaning. There are terms, such as ‘nature’, ‘death’, 
‘spirit’, etc. that have a meaning in the religious context, but which of-
ten clashes with the use in different philosophical theories. Unless one 
is clear about this difference, the result is likely to be very confusing all 
around. For example, in the Christian religion, humanity is said to be 
fallen in Adam, which is a failure in answering to the right direction of 
the good life divinely commanded. Outside of the religious context one 
comes across other interpretations, e.g. that humanity has a ‘corruptible 
human nature’, which is quite a different thing, or other more recondite 
meanings, depending on the definition of ‘nature’, say: the lower bodily 
functions, or the human essence as in neo-Platonism, which locates this 
essence between the divine One and the level of individuation (op. cit.: 
48). The fact that there are many philosophical theories is one thing—
the erudite scholar should be able to keep these apart and help others to 
do so—but when there is a feedback to the everyday and the religious 
level, one easily becomes disoriented and confused in what one believes 
or knows (or thought one knew). One has “placed too much confidence 
in current philosophy” (ibid).
 The ending of the sentence containing the last quoted phrase adds 
an important point: besides the overconfidence in current philosophy, 
“one does not see the deep chasm which separates it [current philoso-
phy], in virtue of principle and history, from childlike faith” (ibid.). The 
phrase “in virtue of principle and history” means that the expressions 
of current philosophy can be identified as to its principle(s) and located 
as to its arising in history. These are the very features that the thetical-
critical method seizes on. Thus, via this method it should be possible to 
clarify the differences (the deep chasm) and confront them consciously.
 We have stayed close to Vollenhoven’s text in the above, so as to be 
adequately justified in asserting that “Christian / Scriptural / Calvinistic 
philosophy” is not itself a recondite view of things, as reflected on or un-
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derstood in terms of a prior system of belief.69 A Reformed philosophy is 
a philosophy reduced to the sober proportions of a cosmic context, liber-
ated (ideally) from ambiguities, contradictions and antinomies that beset 
thought when speculative and dogmatic moments are left to have their 
hindering effect. It does not aim to offer an apology for the Reformed 
faith, but it attempts to be in accordance with the meanings of key terms 
of religion and worldview, making it possible, in meta-philosophical dis-
course, to delineate the ‘place and task’ of philosophy (1933a: 22). But 
the substance of philosophy, its main themes and determinants (struc-
tures) are of a general nature and accessible to all who think philosophi-
cally.70 Vollenhoven gives a specimen of this understanding of philosophy 
in the systematic discussion of chapter 2 in Part 1 of “Calvinism and the 
reformation of philosophy”, along with a critical sketch of an under-
standing of the main motives of philosophy that does not comport with a 
Reformed understanding (chapter 3 in Part I of 1933a). The proof of the 
better result does not lie in any transcendental argument, but in a down-
to-earth comparison of what is achieved. Vollenhoven expressed his con-
viction that his own results were conducive to greater clarity than what 
is offered in symbolic logic and in phenomenology (cf. 1933a: 67). One 
could, of course, question this, for Vollenhoven’s thought is for many 
not an easy nut to crack. But the position he takes is clear. A standpoint with 
respect to philosophy is essential, but it is taken always on condition that its 
results remain open to possible improvement. The latter keeps one’s thought in 
direct contact with alternative, and possibly important, insight not yet realized.71 
69   Earlier we made reference to the one exception, viz. the effect of biblical revela-
tion in connection with the heavenly cosmos. Vollenhoven advocated this as the only way 
of knowing this part of the cosmos. Thus it is meant to inform at the philosophical, and 
not merely at the meta-philosophical level. It does not fall within a scholastic pattern of 
nature and grace, for the heavenly realm is not a realm of grace but a realm of spiritual 
nature. But Vollenhoven’s discussion of this is too brief to allow a full understanding as to 
why he thought he needed this at the philosophical level. 
70   In the Preface to Vollenhoven’s History of Philosophy I (1950e) the author states 
that he “ventures to study this part of human cultural history [i.e. the history of philoso-
phy] in the light of the Word revelation, which also here cannot be excluded without 
detriment to the inquiry” (1950e: 5); thereby, he adds, the first volume of this history 
of philosophy begins the execution of “the program that I unfolded in Het Calvinisme 
en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte (1933)” (ibid.). The ‘light of the Word revelation’ is 
not that it adds content to the philosophical concepts investigated, but removes factors 
that hinder seeing the philosophical themes in the conceptions of ancient philosophy. 
The focus is therefore on the problems within the main cosmic themes, viz. (i) genesis vs. 
static structure, (ii) monism vs. dualism (the order of cosmic being), and (iii) ‘wholes vs. 
things’, either as universalism, individualism or partial universalism. 
71   In a comparison of Vollenhoven’s approach to that of Dooyeweerd, J. Klap-
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C. The reform of philosophy
Vollenhoven’s goal was a ‘reformation’ of philosophy. The term ‘reforma-
tion’ is intentionally ambiguous. Vollenhoven wanted on the one hand 
to point to the tradition of the historical Reformation as forming the re-
ligious and worldview background of his philosophical thought, and on 
the other hand to signal the internal difference in philosophy itself that 
would accrue when philosophy is informed by this tradition. In appeal-
ing to the Reformed tradition, in its Calvinian-Kuyperian strand,72 Vol-
lenhoven was able to put a Reformed stance to work, not by apologeti-
cally assigning philosophy the task of routing up ‘Reformed principles’ 
and coming to their defence, but by showing how the historical tradi-
tion of the Reformation itself, in its essential aspects, places limitations 
on philosophy, in part to avoid speculative misunderstandings, in which 
philosophy overreaches itself, in part to be clear as to philosophy’s own 
delimitation of ‘place and task’. How are we to understand this?
 Vollenhoven’s tactic might be surprising. Is this not side-stepping 
the issue? What he side-steps is the scholastic option of the issue involved. 
The relation of the Reformed principles to philosophy is not that of axi-
oms to derived theorems, but more like orienting directive and being di-
rected (or, more abstractly, that of rule to rule-following activity). Those 
partial to the first option require that the statements of religion and the 
worldview in question be themselves treated as a cognitively acceptable 
‘basic statements’. What is then accepted on faith as relevant to live by, 
is at the same time taken to be acceptable to reason as a cognitive belief 
in virtue of the fact that other beliefs can be derived from it (or with its 
help). In that way the belief is ‘asserted’ as basic statement within reason’s 
use. But there is a step from faith to reason here that remains entirely 
wijk asks whether for Vollenhoven “there is a basis or point of application for dialogue 
with those who think differently, as Dooyeweerd intends in his transcendental critique” 
(Klapwijk 1980: 559). This question is posed from Dooyeweerd’s viewpoint. From Vol-
lenhoven’s side one can say that, in virtue of the thetical-critical method, there is never 
a cessation of contact, whether positive or negative. As to Dooyeweerd’s transcendental 
critique, it presupposes an ontology of meaning, in terms of which a format for dialogue 
is posited. One may question how ‘open’ the dialogue then remains (cf. the discussion of 
Dooyeweerd in chapter 3). 
72   N. Wolterstorff distinguishes “two perspectives that have been prominent in 
the Calvinist tradition”: the common-sense philosophy stemming from Thomas Reid in 
Scotland, and neo-Calvinism in the Netherlands. Within the former a ‘reformed episte-
mology’ has been developed in which notions, such as ‘warrant’ and ‘proper function’, 
are set to work to show that certain statements of faith are, in a cognitive sense, ‘properly 
basic’. Needless to say, Vollenhoven is a distinct representative of the second perspective. 
Cf. Wolterstorff 1983: vii. For ‘Reformed epistemology’ cf. Van Woudenberg and Cus-
veller 1998, and for a critical discussion of ‘warrant’, cf. Tol 1998. 
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inconspicuous, and an important feature of its inconspicuousness is the 
step from the specific and concrete character of the non-philosophical (or 
meta-philosophical) context that clings to statements of faith (accepted 
in trust), to the general validity of reason’s use as belief (and asserted as 
true belief ) in the philosophical context.
 Now if the relation of historical tradition and philosophy is taken 
to be more like that of rule to rule-following activity, what does this say? 
Well, one ought to start by taking a tradition seriously, which is to say 
that its significance and effect in life’s practice have to be discerned and 
acknowledged. Clearly, Reformed religion and the Kuyperian worldview 
are such a practical reality. Each are of distinct character. Reformed reli-
gion is experienced in the pronounced form of biblical covenant religion. 
The existential condition of life is that the human being is aware of stand-
ing in relation to God, of being addressed to avoid evil and seek the good, 
of having the freedom to accept responsibility for oneself and for others 
and stewardship for the non-human world. Biblical religion advances a 
basic stance in life. The Kuyperian worldview, in turn, is that of sphere-
sovereignty. It meshes with Reformed religion, in particular in seizing on 
freedom and responsibility and implementing these in a diversity of of-
fices and forms of life, in such a way as to define an harmonious societal 
intercourse. There is divided power and delimited responsibilities. The 
reality of religion and worldview is not, as such, dependent on intellec-
tual or philosophical defence. They are maintained as prized, historically 
grown realities as practices, at the same time being in competition with 
other (world) religions and (western) worldviews of different makeup. 
Their reality in life does not call up questions of truth, at least not im-
mediately, but it sets problems. For any context of activity is constantly 
confronted with challenges and changed through achievements. An in-
direct effect of life practice on philosophy is that the latter finds its own 
practice to revolve around problems as well. For Vollenhoven, philosophy 
is basically an activity aimed at acquiring results (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 
1). Thus, in understanding and in coming to practice philosophy, one 
ought to follow more the line of problems seeking solution than of test-
ing derived truth from an axiomatic basis. 
 What the Reformed tradition can mean for philosophy—at least 
that is the lessen one learns from Vollenhoven’s example, the explanation 
of which I shall take responsibility for—involves a certain approach to 
philosophy. Philosophy is to cease from addressing matters that cannot 
be resolved within the range of human understanding, but at the same 
time to acknowledge certain ‘synthetic a priori’ elements, called up by Re-
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formed religion and worldview, that serve as setting limits to philosophy 
in virtue of its being a practice. Three specific matters are broached in 
this connection from out of the Reformed tradition. They are culled from 
religion, worldview and the theme of knowledge.
1. The religious relevance
To start with, philosophy is not a panacea for all human ills. Much tradi-
tional philosophy has overt, but also covert, redemptive aims to advance 
the human race, not least of all in even down-to-earth philosophies as 
Marxism and Positivism. Such philosophies evince not only an alliance of 
philosophy with worldview matters, such as social struggle or technologi-
cal innovation, but also bring secular religious motives into play.73 These 
are broached in the context of a specifically formulated philosophical 
outlook. They are on that account often abstract, artificial or one-sided, 
and more often than not, dictatorial and dominating to boot. Philosophy 
is pressed into the role of being a redemptive surrogate, either in covering 
over a religious lack or in being a secular substitute.
 Philosophy can be sensitive to such a role only if there is something 
in its makeup that seduces it, even when the actual outreach is misguided. 
From its earliest beginning there is the notion of archè, meaning ‘control-
ling beginning’, that denotes a primal situation of determination that af-
fects everything else. In time, more refined notions take its place, such as 
‘first cause’, ‘highest good’, ‘final end’, ‘absolute idea’, etc. When notions 
such as these are entertained and applied, they cannot but introduce deep 
incisions into how reality is understood. Oppositions are introduced so 
as to indicate what part of reality has the said capacity and what part 
lacks it; or, stated more generally, what part of reality is intrinsically sover-
eign — with respect to which everything else stands in subservience. This 
puts one part of reality in a position of dominance over another part of 
reality. Matters are made worse when such chasms are used to secure the 
difference of good and evil. All this leads to tension-ridden views.74 These 
views may be interesting to consider aesthetically, but they are hardly 
convincing as ways to live by—there are just too many alternatives—
though some do present themselves as being specifically religiously rel-
73   For secular religious notions in Marx, cf. Van der Hoeven 1976, especially “Es-
chatology and Utopia”, pp. 103-106. As for positivism, in volume IV of his Système de 
politique positive, Comte discusses “worship”. Here he formulates projects that are to lead 
to the realization of the “Religion of Humanity”. Cf. Comte 1975: 459-476.
74   Vollenhoven goes out of his way to show that a proper understanding of the 
cosmos should never give occasion to secure the antithesis of good and evil in it; cf. Vol-
lenhoven 2005d/e, 88-90. 
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evant (e.g. Gnosticism, higher Platonism, absolute Idealism, etc.).
 But when philosophy becomes the channel of religious meaning, 
cognition is expected to be the modus that answers to religious need. This 
can only give rise to confusion. When religion is presented in the mode 
of philosophy, deity must in some sense be intra-cosmic, for the catego-
ries of dominance and subjection are used to present this religious mean-
ing. But religion, in its own meaning (certainly in the biblical tradition), 
sees divinity as transcending the world in virtue of being its creator. Here 
the world still has oppositions and differences, but not understood to be 
of such a fundamental kind as to put one part over against another part 
as the fundamental fact. A transcendent creator is beyond the polarities 
of philosophical understanding, for the relation of God and the creation 
cannot be understood in terms of cosmic categories as such. But then 
this suggests a different understanding of the cosmos, viz. one in which 
fundamental tensions and polarities are not expected to be present in the 
world; hence one that assigns a task: should antinomies, contradictions, 
paradoxes, etc. occur, then they are to be taken as marking errors in un-
derstanding, which need to be resolved through the discovery of a better 
understanding. 
 Thus, if sovereignty and subservience are taken in the biblical mean-
ing, this suggests for philosophy a view of the cosmos that lacks anything 
that is intrinsically self-sufficient. Religious belief does proceed from a 
transcendent deity, but there are no uniform categories that do justice to 
the religious relation of God and the world. From out of religion’s own 
meaning, there is no urgent need for ‘proofs of the existence of deity’, 
for intuition (or religious sensitivity) is more relevant here than cogni-
tion. But then, ‘subservience’ too, when not understood as marked by 
a deity of dominance, undergoes a shift in its meaning. For ‘standing in 
subjection’ is then more readily evidenced by features such as: depen-
dence, relativity, relatedness, vulnerability, etc. The specific choice for the 
biblical religion and the intuitive way in which the meaning of the word 
‘world’ functions in the biblical context, throw a light on the understand-
ing of cosmic reality, and thereby philosophy is challenged to pursue 
an alternative understanding as compared to a more traditional, non-
biblical understanding of the world with its deep divisions. The promise 
of this biblical option is an understanding that is free from antinomies 
and paradoxes. 
 Vollenhoven’s first proposal towards reforming philosophy, as mo-
tivated by the Reformed tradition, is to bring to bear an intuition of 
the cosmos that invites and stimulates study and understanding of its 
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richness of diversity, of interconnections, of multiplicity of modes, of 
its possibilities, etc. (cf. Vollenhoven 1933a: 312-313; as over against, 
say, the cosmos taken as ‘vale of tears’, ‘non-being’, ‘domain for exploita-
tion’, ‘self-regulating system’, etc.). The ‘point of contact’ with traditional 
philosophy lies in the theme of sovereignty and subservience, hence he 
is not bringing in anything foreign, rather he removes a source of con-
tinual unrest. It then remains to be seen whether the fuller understand-
ing of the biblical deity and its relations to the world can be of service in 
philosophy; one can explore not only the notions of transcendence and 
immanence, but also the Christian understanding of divinity as Triune.
 So if sovereignty and subservience are different in their being, not 
interlinked in a common categorial system, then the question of their 
connection is of distinct importance. Were one to deny this difference, as 
occurs in the traditional context of western thought, then there are two 
extremes between which other views might be placed. Either everything 
is taken to have a source in itself, to be sovereign in being self-creative; 
— but then subservience is only an effect of the confrontation with a 
greater source. (Nietzsche, with his ‘will to power’, has explored this op-
tion in the context of modernism, though motivated by ancient culture 
and thought.) Or, everything is ‘purely structural’, lacking initiative—as 
in a Parmenidean ‘block universe’—and life is determined by what can 
only be called fate. These (‘analytical’) alternatives are extreme and call 
up antinomies and paradoxes.75 In a ‘synthetical’ understanding, both 
notions are respected in their distinct meaning, and a ‘third factor’ is re-
quired to mark their (non-categorial) ‘belonging together’. Applying this 
to the biblically inspired approach to sovereignty and subservience, this 
‘third factor’ can only be ‘law’. Then sovereignty is the reigning through 
law in a normative way, and subservience is recognition of standing in 
subjection as supported by law. Vollenhoven’s understanding of the cos-
mic whole is that of a domain standing in subjection to normative law. 
Law then signals the boundary of this whole. Philosophy has the task of 
understanding the cosmos, and to limit itself to the cosmos in doing so. 
The motive to accept this task derives from biblical, meta-philosophical 
reflections.
 
75   E.g. in Nietzsche there is the antinomy that successful sovereignty can only take 
place through domination of the environment and at the cost of others’ sovereignty; 
no sovereignty without subservience, and vice versa (cf. Nietzsche 1969: 215-217, the 
application to slave morality). The paradoxes of Zeno are the classical illustrations of dif-
ficulties with the ‘block universe’. 
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2. The worldview relevance
Philosophy can have an important effect on society and on the attitude 
human beings have towards their environment. Utopias recommend dif-
ferent constructions of society, and in modern times there have been vari-
ous templates of society devised towards implementing a radical social 
reform. The extremes are the stifling governmental control of socialism 
over against the minimal government interference of liberalism, and each 
brings with it its own misery. Often there is a specific philosophy whose 
wisdom recommends the societal form in question. Now if philosophy 
were indeed the universal wisdom it aims to be, then it ought to display 
more uniformity than it in fact does, and its promise of beneficence be 
more relevant than is the case.
 When philosophy turns to real life it does not speak with one voice. 
Of course, philosophy, as such, builds no world except that of its own 
concepts and statements. It needs to assume and be able to appeal to a 
world of activity and experience that we acknowledge as being our so-
cietal, cultural and natural world, in short, our life-world. The prima 
facie diversity of the life-world is not an irremediable chaos. Rather than 
brushing it aside in favour of some chosen order enforced on society, it 
should be elucidated and reflected upon in terms of its own focal points, 
its own ‘forms of life’ (to use Wittgenstein’s term).76 This calls for the kind 
of reflection that is typical of worldview consideration which, in Vollen-
hoven, takes place in terms of its own method. Worldview reflection calls 
attention to the life-world and elicits from it a primary interpretation.77 It 
is within that context that different worldview systems and options ought 
to be discussed. In that sense, the Kuyperian view of sphere-sovereignty is 
one worldview option among others, that can be reviewed for its poten-
76   Cf. Wittgenstein 1976: 8e, remark 19. 
77   In ‘Levenseenheid’ (The unity of life) (1955), Vollenhoven speaks of ‘enframing 
concepts’ (omramingsbegrippen) in this regard, i.e. concepts that specify a hermeneutical 
context of practical understanding; cf. Tol and Bril 1992: 131. I believe that a closely sim-
ilar problem, though stated in a different idiom, is broached by Bertrand Russell, when he 
speaks of “the hierarchy of our beliefs”. For him this hierarchy is based on spontaneous or 
instinctive beliefs that are obvious, on which rest derivative beliefs that are less obvious to 
us. But since obviousness varies, a hierarchy such as Russell proposes cannot be stable in 
itself, thus he also calls for the inclusion of “that feeling for reality which ought to be pre-
served even in the most abstract studies.” Russell 1919: 169; cf. also Russell 1966: 127 ff. 
and Russell 1959: 25-26. Questions of obviousness or common sense introduce a factor 
of ‘outlook’, which is to say ‘worldview’, and is no less ‘worldviewy’ when it concerns ‘the 
scientific outlook’. The latter is a choice as to the preferred “conduct of life” as prevailed 
upon by science; cf. Russell 2001: 74-77. The problem of determining “the hierarchy of 
our beliefs” would appear to be a positivistic way of posing a hermeneutical problem.
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tial as a worldview system.78 Philosophy, in the academic sense, ought to 
respect the right and good sense of worldview reflection, and refrain from 
imposing its more general categories on real life.
 Now, though Vollenhoven places this limitation on philosophy, 
there is nevertheless, as with religion, a need for philosophy to take stock 
of worldview reality. The problem concerns pluralism. There is an obvi-
ous diversity of existence. Short of the question how that can be, there 
is the matter of understanding it and being able to deal with it. Only on 
assuming a world of activity, humanly experienced, can philosophy ap-
ply itself to the world, which it needs to do in order to name, describe, 
explain, affirm, criticize or deny things of it. The most general way to 
state this ‘dealing with the world’ is in terms of freedom and responsibility. 
Without freedom no activity can be meaningful; and without respon-
sibility results lack substance. But freedom without responsibility—i.e. 
absolute freedom—turns activity into wanton conduct, when lacking 
context and restraints; then too, responsibility without freedom (i.e. ab-
solute duty) predetermines results in a way that cancels moral obligation. 
How can freedom and responsibility be ‘taken together’.
  Vollenhoven avails himself of Kuyper’s worldview teaching of 
sphere sovereignty. He brings this Reformed influence to bear, not in 
turning philosophy into a species of worldview thought, say, along lines 
recommended by Wilhelm Dilthey,79 but by acknowledging, as relevant 
for scientific understanding, the kind of diversity that sphere sovereignty 
entails at the practical level (Vollenhoven 1953l: 102-103). What brings 
freedom and responsibility together, in a way that is also delimiting for 
philosophical thought, is the insight that activity is rule-bound.
Activity becomes intelligible when seen in the light of a rule be-
ing followed in the execution of activity.80 Now different rules can illu-
minate the ‘same activity’—i.e. one and the same sequence of events—
in different ways. (Think of the different meanings that a simple hand-
shake can have.) Rule-following is meaning-determining without being 
78   This is of course what Kuyper did in his Stone Lectures on Calvinism as a ‘life-
system’; cf. Kuyper 2002. 
79   In his Weltanschauungslehre (worldview doctrine) Dilthey divides worldviews 
into artistic, religious and philosophical types. Philosophy is thereby taken to be a kind 
of worldview. The Dutch tend to see all worldviews as basically implying a religious or 
faith stance, which is probably why they long preferred the broader phrase ‘world and life 
view’. However, this puts religion in a too direct connection to culture, causing confusion 
between the distinct relevance of both religious discourse and worldview reflection. Cf. 
Goheen and Bartholomew 2008 for a current defence of a close-wedded relationship. 
80   Cf. Miller and Wright 2002 for a cross-section of the current discussions of this 
and related topics.
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deterministic or exclusive. Meaning is multiple to the extent that this is 
warranted by the relevant rules. A rule gains in relevance when it links a 
motive to a purpose, i.e. directs what one in freedom chooses to achieve. 
At the same time such a rule makes the reference to and assessment of 
achievement possible, which is to say that responsibility with regard to 
what takes place in the activity is not a vacuous matter. Because most 
activity is in fact interactive, the responsibility is not only to oneself, 
as the executing agent, but it involves other beings as well. Thus when 
taking freedom and responsibility seriously in the context of rule-bound 
activity, the problem of their connection—their ‘belonging together’—is 
not simply a matter of a ‘moral state’,81 but it concerns a diverse texture 
of freedom and responsibility, in the light of the diverse kinds of activity 
and the diversity of the rules to which they are subject. In other words, 
taking cognizance of a diversity of law-spheres is an intellectual requisite 
for dealing with the problem of the human being and the life-world. 
Vollenhoven opts for this kind of diversity of power and delimitation of 
responsibility in securing a philosophically relevant pluralism. 
 The diversity of law-spheres fits in with the religious relevance, in 
that it presents the ‘law as boundary’ in an application of ‘cases of law’. 
Each sphere, in being rule-bound, becomes the domain of a ‘kind of 
functioning’ in accordance with its (main) rule (Vollenhoven speaks of 
‘ordinance’). The rule has the effect of empowering (as an ‘ought’) the ac-
tivity that is relevant in that sphere, granting a ‘right’ to the initiation (in 
freedom) of the activity in question, but also upholding that the activity 
be directed to fulfilling a ‘duty’ (of responsibility).
 So, in both the case of the religious relevance and that of the world-
view relevance, Vollenhoven takes a specific stand in the Reformed tra-
dition. It is a stand of one among many possible stands. He makes his 
choices for ‘Reformed’ reasons, and understands his choices in terms of 
the best meaning he can give to matters of religion (covenant religion) 
and worldview (sphere sovereignty).82 To the extent that this is meta-phil-
81   One is reminded of Kant’s practical reason, whereby freedom is the transcen-
dental condition of activity, revealed by the a priori validity of the moral law (which says 
to act in such a way as to permit the individual’s maxim of the will to be always and at 
the same time the principle of a general legislation). Freedom and the moral law together 
define a ‘causality of freedom’. This specifies an ethic of intentions. Here responsibilities 
tends to reduce to austere instances of duty. Cf. Kant 1997: xiii, 28. 
82   Sphere sovereignty is for Vollenhoven an adequate, indeed normative, view for 
understanding and participating in societal life. This is not to say that he was entirely 
happy with the term. In Kuyper’s use the delegated sovereignty relevant to a sphere is 
too easily confused with the sovereignty that belongs to God alone. “He [Kuyper], in his 
use of ‘sovereignty’, did not think exclusively of the sovereignty of God, but—influenced 
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osophical, the reflection that takes place is controlled by the thetical-criti-
cal method and the ‘method of knowledge organization’. The application 
to philosophy is not a wilful imposition. There is the recognition of a 
‘need’ in philosophy itself, a need called up by philosophy’s being an ac-
tivity itself and aims to achieve a cognitive result. The application is not a 
matter of turning the religious and worldview presuppositions into direct 
philosophical concepts, prior to any choice, assimilation or rejection in 
philosophical discourse (that way philosophy overreaches itself as evinced 
by antinomies); rather, the import of religious meaning (as focussed in 
law) and that of worldview (empowering law-spheres) have the effect of 
defining the parameters that delineate the ‘place and task’ of philosophy 
as (cognitive) activity. In this way, meta-philosophical presuppositions of 
philosophy entail conditions for philosophy. The result in Vollenhoven 
is ‘Reformed philosophy’. Vollenhoven nowhere claims an exclusive or 
privileged right to this philosophy, only that it has a right to be identi-
fied as a specimen of (general) philosophy. “Every philosophy proceeds 
from a worldview basis,” he says, “but not every philosophy accounts 
for this fact” (Vollenhoven 1953l/Tol and Bril 1992: 103). Its strengths 
and weaknesses—assuming it is formally consistent and materially con-
sequential—can only be ascertained in comparison with philosophies of 
different standpoint.
3. The condition of cognition
There is one further condition to consider. Philosophy is a cognitive 
enterprise, hence its cognitive character needs to be specified and war-
ranted. Vollenhoven holds that philosophy is for the most part concerned 
with the theory of knowing and its ontological underpinnings (cf. Vol-
lenhoven 2005d/e, 6) It is through the condition of knowledge that this 
third condition, of cognition, is specified. 
 There are several reasons for this choice of the problem of knowledge 
as delimiting philosophy. First of all, there is a concern from out of the 
Reformed tradition itself. A tenacious feature of that tradition (especially 
the conservative wing of Protestant scholasticism) is the occurrence of 
‘logos speculation’. It holds that to think truly is to think God’s thoughts 
after him. Now all truth may be God’s truth, but that does not cancel 
the need to reckon with the human condition when the human being is 
by Romanticism—also included the authority of office-holders within a societal sphere” 
(Vollenhoven 1950n, Tol and Bril 1992: 44). In another place he says that the term “can 
perhaps sometime be replaced by a better one” (Vollenhoven 1968b, Tol and Bril 1992: 
204). The term ‘sphere responsibility’ or ‘delimited responsibility’ would at least accord 
better with Vollenhoven’s interpretation. 
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cognitively active. The human mind has no direct link with the Divine 
mind. This speculative theory deserves to be critiqued.83
 Secondly, there is the influence of the time of Vollenhoven’s forma-
tive years. He showed special interest in philosophical schools that prac-
tised philosophy with academic rigour and favoured philosophy itself as a 
‘strenge Wissenschaft’ (rigorous science), as Husserl maintained in defence 
of his phenomenology early in the twentieth century (cf. Husserl 1911). 
This in fact involves taking a stand over against the main alternatives, 
viz. either in conceiving of philosophy as a fundamental form of ‘social 
engagement’, as in socialist philosophy (of Marxism and neo-Marxism), 
or practising philosophy as ‘worldview interpretation’, in the spirit of, 
say, the hermeneutical historicism of Dilthey. The aesthetic interest of the 
latter and the societal interest of socialist philosophy were less relevant for 
someone of the Reformed tradition, as over against the cognitive inter-
est of philosophy as a ‘general science’.84 In the guise of a general science 
philosophy would stay in the close proximity of the special sciences. An 
important facet of its task would involve philosophical inquiry into the 
methodological problems of the sciences. The young Vollenhoven made 
a definite choice. A statement from the opening discussion in his dis-
sertation is telling in this regard: “Every topic in philosophy derives its 
importance from questions as to values, boundaries and relations of the 
distinct sciences mutually” (Vollenhoven 1918a: 2).85
 A third argument for choosing for the knowledge condition is to 
83   The equivocation of human thought and divine Logos is explicitly countered in 
Vollenhoven 1932b, and in fact it is an important factor in his argument for an alterna-
tive “Christian logic” (that recognizes limitations). Vollenhoven’s understanding of the 
human being “in God’s image” does not contradict with this (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 
117). See chapter 2, for Vollenhoven’s own early reference to the (divine) Logos, and chap-
ter 4 for his more definitive view. 
84   Cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 9; also Vollenhoven 1953l in Tol and Bril 1992: 96. 
Also, the opening sentence of the article on ‘Calvinistic philosophy’ in the Oosthoeks 
Encyclopedie, states: “Calvinistic philosophy is the correlate, in science, of the Calvinistic 
view of world and life, which is non-scientific in character.” Reprinted in Vollenhoven 
2005c: 76. The three main philosophical interests mentioned here are characteristic of 
modernism. From about mid-nineteenth century on, these began to ‘pull apart’—which 
is really a decentralization of the human subject in the context of modernism—and be 
the topic of heated methodological conflict. For a discussion of this ‘pulling apart’ cf. 
Tol 2005a, where this trait of modernism is placed in the context of the whole ‘modern 
period’ of philosophy. 
85   In this light we can understand why Vollenhoven, early in his career, was open 
to the influence, as he later admitted, of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism and 
Husserlian phenomenology. Both schools take philosophy as primarily serving a basic 
scientific-cognitive interest. Cf. Vollenhoven 1953p in Tol and Bril 1992: 112. 
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catch in the bud the possibility of knowledge being applied to under-
score either an undesired religious influence of philosophy or an uncriti-
cal worldview importance. Knowledge presupposes an agent capable of 
knowing and a referent that is knowable. But how does one deal with this 
duality? There are examples in the history of philosophy—some being 
historically very prominent and influential—in which this distinction 
in knowledge is interwoven with the sovereignty-subjection distinction 
and others with that of freedom-responsibility. Spiritualism, Gnosticism, 
Neo-Platonism, etc. tend to interpret the experience of knowing as indic-
ative of an illumination by divinity, or at least an involving of deity. (This 
is behind the ‘logos’ speculation as well.) Naturally, that experience of 
knowing tends to underscore a privileged position of the knower, taken 
as revealing its elevated relevance or even a right to rule. As to freedom 
and responsibility, a striking example is the application of science, in 
the form of the scientific outlook as privileged modern worldview. Facts, 
when known, are able to be controlled. The subject-object split, on which 
much of modern science is based, allows the knowing subject to subject 
the object to his own aims, within the margins that the knowledge of the 
object technically allows. The scientific outlook can then take on ideolog-
ical forms of advancing programs of construction, whose only check are 
the technological means of execution. There is no responsibility for the 
object, nor for the context of the life-world, for the fascination lies with 
what scientific power can achieve, rather than satisfying the wonderment 
of knowing the object. The ‘substantive reason’ of the latter, that ought 
to accompany actual worldview choices with a view to context and hu-
man ends, is replaced by an instrumental reason that reckons only with 
possibilities in the object as means.86 As worldview, the scientific outlook 
is one-sided, and on that score, as dominating force, detrimental.
Vollenhoven grants to knowledge its own importance, that also 
warrants its distinct status with respect to the religious condition and that 
of worldview. Not that there is no religious knowing. Vollenhoven claims 
that God is knowable (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 173), but the achievement 
of religious knowledge depends on revelation as means. And there is 
86   In Russell 2001, on the scientific outlook, Russell sketches the development of 
science from contemplation to manipulation. The former is based on the impulse of love, 
the latter on the impulse of power. In contemplation the love impulse is satisfied through 
the (Gnostic) ecstasy in the knowing agent, in manipulation the impulse of power is 
satisfied through technical control over the object. He hopes that the instrumental reason 
of scientific technique “will not outweigh the ends which it should serve” (op. cit. : 219). 
Remarkably, Russell, in assessing knowledge, points to either its divine-like quality for the 
knower or the world-view practical use of the object. 
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knowledge at a worldview level as well, this being mainly in the form of 
contextualized or communicated knowledge (involving the organization 
of knowledge). There still remains the important category of scientific 
knowledge. Here one inquires and thus seeks knowledge, and this in-
volves searching out the truth. When truth is sought there needs to be 
a knowing agent, who seeks to know, and a knowable referent in relation 
to which knowledge is sought. There is the overriding importance, here 
too, as to their ‘synthesis’, the warrant of their ‘belonging together’. For 
Vollenhoven this warrant is truth. 
 Vollenhoven maintains that between the knowing agent and know-
able referent there is a “direct connection” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 174) 
that is itself not mediated by knowledge. When truth is the warrant of 
this ‘direct connection’ of knowing agent and the knowable referent, 
then—a negative implication—neither pole should have priority over 
the other. This is what occurs in either subjectivistic or objectivistic ten-
dencies. When the agent is referred over the referent, that invites forms 
of psychologism or aprioristic (formalistic) constructions that go proxy 
for the truth. Cognition is either a psychic state or belongs to the level 
of language. But when the referent rises above the agent, the latter tends 
to be seen as passive, performing the role of receptacle for the data of 
the referent. This is empiricism, the epistemology of which is based on 
a copy theory. Knowledge is the copy of the referent as represented in 
the mind. But truth cannot arise merely through data being copied. The 
agent needs to grasp something rightly. Thus ‘analytic’ solutions are not 
convincing.87
 When Vollenhoven takes truth to be an independent condition of 
knowledge, viz. the warrant of agent and referent to be together, then 
each is gauged in relation to truth, not vice versa. The knowing agent 
has a task or duty, epistemologically, to seek the truth as challenged by a 
referent, not represent it, make a copy of it, control it or whatever. The 
seeking of the agent takes place in law-spheres, subject to modal norms. 
The referent, in turn, has the epistemological value of being knowable, 
meaning that it has an intrinsic diversity that can be grasped or under-
stood rightly or wrongly. Here a feature of structure is present. Truth 
moderates the togetherness of the knowing agent’s rule-bound seeking 
and the knowable referent’s structured complexity of features and quali-
ties. There is knowledge when the discerning agent has rightly grasped 
87   Already in his dissertation Vollenhoven took a stand against formalism and em-
piricism, in favour of a view in which the subjective and the objective sides are in balance, 
held together by a synthetic a priori, the certainty of which is intuitively grasped; cf. 
chapter 2 of this study. 
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some complex feature of the referent.
 When generalizing this to maximal scope, one can see that, when 
philosophy seeks to know the cosmos in a general way, the knowing agent 
is humankind in its subjection to the order of normative law. At the same 
time the knowable referent is the cosmos in its intrinsic complexity, the 
broadest expression of which is the structured or gradated order of the 
cosmic law-spheres. Truth is the warrant that grasping cosmic structure 
in accordance with the normative law-order is not futile, i.e. that it makes 
cognitive sense. In that sense, truth is not subsidiary to philosophy but 
one of its conditions.88
D. In summary
In Vollenhoven’s Reformed understanding of philosophy, as an activity 
that seeks results, philosophy is delimited by a three-fold problematic: 
the sovereignty-subservience duality, the freedom-responsibility duality 
and the knowing agent-knowable referent duality. Philosophy as practice 
is conditioned by these polarities. The philosophical habitat, its ‘con-
sciousness’, is limited to the cosmos, but the ‘form’ of that consciousness 
involves ineluctable features that link philosophy to religious, worldview 
and human reflective realities.
 Vollenhoven made historically contingent choices in coming to 
practice philosophy. But what counts for him is that “by their fruits you 
shall know them” (cf. Matthew 7:16). The results of philosophical ac-
tivity are insights, understanding, statements, that are marked and con-
strained by the three-fold problematic, but constrained in the specific 
way that the three dualities focus thought on what holds each together, 
viz. normative law, the order of law-spheres and truth. Any philosophical 
result is in some sense a reflection of these three foci. One would not be 
far amiss—we are now interpreting Vollenhoven’s oeuvre—if one takes 
normative law to be the principle of cosmic being (est), looks on the order 
of the law-spheres as the context of the cases of an ought (debet), and con-
siders truth—that entails a normative handling of cosmic structure—as 
the principle of ability, of the can (potest), the principle of response to 
law.89
88   In chapter 4 Vollenhoven’s systematic position is subject to a broader discussion.
89   This would link Vollenhoven, though probably entirely unintentionally, to John 
Bisterfeld (1605-1655), one of the encyclopaedists of the Protestant university of Her-
born, where also Caspar Olevian and John Althusius taught. Bisterfeld chose these three 
‘transcendentals’, est, debet, and potest, in his Philosophiae Primae Seminarium (1641)—a 
work much admired by the young Leibniz—as mutually convertible conjugates of 
thought. As applied to Vollenhoven, and interpreted from his standpoint, these notions 
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 One could—though Vollenhoven nowhere does this—pull the 
three-fold problematic of philosophy together, including the three-fold 
result of normative law, order of law-spheres and truth, in what might be 
called philosophy’s ‘fundamental ground schema’. No doubt, prima facie, 
the term ‘schema’ sounds formal and empty. But, upon taking a closer 
look at Vollenhoven’s work, one finds plentiful use of the term ‘schema’. 
To my knowledge, it is never defined formally, but in its occurrences 
it has a kind of (pre-)structuralist use of indicating important effective 
polarities. Thus Vollenhoven speaks of “the schema ‘this-that’” (2005d/e, 
88), meaning the diversity or contrast between two particular things; the 
“schema” of good and evil (op. cit., 91), here too meaning the contrast 
between these; similarly in “schema means-ends” (op. cit., 60); “schema 
nature-grace” (op. cit., 130); and there are other examples. This use is 
certainly not formal and empty but constructive, even constitutive. If the 
word is taken in that sense, then the only oddity in using it in reference 
to ‘ground schema’ above is that this ground schema involves three poles, 
whereas the examples are all bi-polar. But surely this is peripheral. The 
important point is to understand that the three terms are taken together 
in a way that preserves their mutual effective contrast. If this is accept-
able, then the phrase “fundamental ground schema” can be interpreted 
as denoting the delimiting problematic of philosophy in Vollenhoven, 
in its cosmonomic focus. It is this schema that underlies Vollenhoven’s 
program of philosophy. 
signal the primary (but non-convertible!) differences of stature. In Vollenhoven they are 
non-convertible, for est is most primary, with debet in secondary place, followed by potest; 
cf. Loemker 1972: 143. 
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A Bold Beginning: 
Theistic and Metalogical Intuitionism
“Whoever allows truth to exist as abstraction, 
kills its efficacy as norm.”
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1918)
I. IntroductIon
Vollenhoven’s initial choices in philosophy were made in connection with 
his dissertation project in the philosophy of mathematics. The disserta-
tion, entitled The Philosophy of Mathematics from a Theistic Standpoint, 
was published and defended (in that order) at the Free University of Am-
sterdam in 1918.1 In the ensuing eight years Vollenhoven combined the 
further study of philosophy with the pastoral duties of a minister of the 
“Gereformeerde Kerken” (Reformed churches).2 In the fall of 1926 he 
became the first full-time professor of philosophy of the Free University, 
a position he held until his retirement in 1963.
 The time between 1918 and 1926 was, both philosophically and 
personally, eventful for Vollenhoven. The main contours of the philo-
sophical position, which he had developed in the dissertation, remained 
essentially constant until 1922. (In 1921, a ‘metalogical’ moment came 
more to the fore; cf. section IX below.) Vollenhoven described his posi-
tion as ‘theistic intuitionism’ (1918a: 438). His theism was, from the 
1   D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, De Wijsbegeerte der Wiskunde van Theïstisch Standpunt 
(Amsterdam: Van Soest, 1918). Hereafter in this chapter referred to by its bibliographical 
code: 1918a. 
2   He first served in Oostkapelle, in the province of Zeeland, 1918-1921, then in 
The Hague 1921-1926. In Zeeland he became acquainted with Antheunis Janse (1890-
1960), the head of a local Christian grade school, who posed stimulating anthropological 
questions. The period in The Hague enabled Vollenhoven to have close and more per-
sonal contact with his friend and (as of October 1918) brother-in-law, Herman Dooye-
weerd (1894-1977), who lived in The Hague. Cf. the brochure, Van der Walt 1989, on 
Antheunis Janse, also the Vollenhoven biography, Stellingwerff 1992. Cf. chapter 3 for 
our own discussion of these important contacts.
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start, critical of what Vollenhoven later called ‘logos speculation’—a view 
which postulates a close connection between human thought and the 
divine Logos3—but it did include features of traditional scholasticism, 
namely the view of the harmony of subjective and objective rationality. 
But even at the time this scholasticism was subject to definite constraints, 
particularly in connection with the intuition. Discussions with Antheu-
nis Janse and Herman Dooyeweerd, and renewed reflection on Kuyper’s 
thought, helped Vollenhoven to reform his thought and strike out on 
new paths that he, together with Dooyeweerd, called “Calvinistic”. In 
Vollenhoven’s use of this term it implied opposition to, and criticism of, 
much traditional thought.4
 However, the change that the new developments of 1922 initiated 
is difficult to trace in Vollenhoven’s case. For he suffered a breakdown in 
his health, that incapacitated him for most of 1923. It took some time—
his pastoral duties were after all his first priority—before he resumed to 
publish in philosophy. Published documentation of his changed position 
is not found prior to 1925. So the period of illness and recovery forms a 
natural watershed between his initial theistic intuitionism and the sub-
sequent, more focussed Calvinistic understanding of his philosophical 
endeavours. But the period of illness also hides the transformation that 
took place. In view of the paucity of documentation, we need to resort to 
a comparison of his thought before and after the breakdown in order to 
ascertain and assess the change. The present chapter focuses entirely on 
the position of 1918-1922. Subsequent chapters look at what the con-
tacts with Janse and Dooyeweerd brought to bear (chapter 3) and how 
Vollenhoven redrew the lines of his thought (chapter 4) up to the early 
1930’s, when the first version of Isagôgè Philosophiae is completed.
II. the early work
What is the importance of Vollenhoven’s early thought towards under-
standing his mature position, or, more specifically, Isagôgè Philosophiae? 
To the extent that this early thought is focussed on the philosophy of 
mathematics, the importance is indirect. While Vollenhoven did retain 
an interest in mathematics (and the natural sciences), he published very 
little that concerned mathematics directly later in life.5 What Isagôgè Phi-
3   Cf. Vollenhoven 1932b: 1-2; also Vollenhoven 1948p: 27.
4   Vollenhoven continued to speak of ‘Calvinistic philosophy’ in later years. As of 
1923 Dooyeweerd also used the term ‘law-idea’ to characterize his position, though he 
too spoke of Calvinistic thought. In his later years he preferred ‘ecumenical’. Cf. chapter 
1, footnote 3.
5   The main articles are Vollenhoven 1936hh, i.e. “Problemen en richtingen in de 
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losophiae contains as to mathematics does not require any explicit knowl-
edge of the earlier work, except that comparison with that early work re-
veals implicit differences and connections. Vollenhoven never developed 
his interest in the exact sciences to the point of having a workable com-
mand of the basics of these sciences. So his references to mathematics and 
the sciences dwindled as his career in philosophy progressed.
 Vollenhoven’s initial focus was not on mathematics and the natural 
sciences as such but on their philosophy. In the dissertation, in which he 
limits himself to mathematics,5a he states that his explicit aim is to show 
that three main ‘directions’ (or schools) in mathematics, namely, em-
piricism, formalism and intuitionism, are ‘offshoots’ (uitlopers) of three 
“directions in metaphysics”, namely materialism, psycho-monism and 
dualism (1918a: 3). These details will be discussed in their proper place 
below. At this point we want to emphasize that it is hardly illuminating 
to connect an approach in a specific science, i.e. mathematics, to meta-
physics, without the mediating role of the philosophy of science, along 
with essential epistemological considerations and ontological reflections. 
This is indeed as we find it in Vollenhoven. The outcome in metaphysics, 
whereby materialism and psycho-monism are each criticised for being 
one-sidedly monistic, while dualism is embraced as being a viable view—
this outcome is achieved only upon bringing to bear considerations of 
methodology of science, views as to what knowing and knowledge is, 
what the role of intuition and of certain ‘mental objects’ is, and, most 
important, how the polarity of thought and being sets the stage. These 
‘mediating philosophical topics’ are not all discussed separately by Vol-
lenhoven. One finds their relevant features strewn throughout the text. 
This makes understanding the thought of the young Vollenhoven some-
thing of a challenge.
 It is in connection with metaphysics, in the guise of cosmology, that 
Vollenhoven takes a specific stand. The stand is motivated by theism. 
Thus Vollenhoven’s preference for intuitionism, as direction in mathe-
matics, is secured in the philosophical position that he called ‘theistic in-
tuitionism’ (1918a: 438). This position combines a ‘dualistic metaphys-
wijsbegeerte der wiskunde” (Problems and approaches in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics) and Vollenhoven 1938m, i.e. “Is de ruimte euclidisch of niet-euclidisch?” (Is space 
Euclidean or non-Euclidean?). 
5a  Initially Vollenhoven’s aim was broader, viz. to study “the influence of philosophy 
on the latest representatives of mathematics and the natural sciences” (Stellingwerff 1992: 
25), whereby the two forms of monism (materialism and psycho-monism/idealism) and 
Vollenhoven’s own preferred dualism were to be discussed as directions not only in math-
ematics but also in physics, biology and psychology. Cf. op. cit. : 25-27. 
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ics’ with theistic considerations. The dissertation provides by far the most 
important documentation of this position in the time frame of 1918-
1922.6 Because Vollenhoven’s later work is decidedly in philosophy and 
not in the sciences nor in the philosophy of science, it is important to-
wards understanding Vollenhoven’s mature work to raise the question as 
to how his theistic intuitionism influenced and affected his later thought. 
My own conclusion is that, without an adequate understanding of this 
early phase, important features of Vollenhoven’s later thought remain in 
the dark. Also, as our discussion of Dooyeweerd’s early work will reveal in 
chapter 3, there is importance for him too, though to date this has never 
been pointed out convincingly.
 The aim of this chapter is to bring Vollenhoven’s theistic intuition-
ism into focus. We will not be satisfied with a mere description of this 
position. Understanding the effect of earlier thought on later thought 
is not so much a matter of confirming or deleting distinct features of a 
position as coming to grips with the very course of that thought itself. 
To that end we cannot ignore the ‘mediating philosophical topics’ that 
contribute towards delineating the course of Vollenhoven’s thought. But 
that requires ‘collecting’ the relevant fragmented statements in theory 
of science, in epistemology, in ontology, in the philosophy of mind (i.e. 
Alexius Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie) etc., so as to discover, at least in 
outline, how these topics are understood and what relevance they have 
in the defence of ‘theistic intuitionism’. This more general understand-
ing should also provide a more favourable opportunity towards recogniz-
ing what it is that changes when Vollenhoven’s initial definitive position 
comes into view in the second half of the 1920s. The ‘route of discovery’ 
dictates the main course of discussion of this chapter. Beginning with 
arithmetic and geometry, we pass through the stations of philosophy of 
science, epistemology, theory of mind and metaphysics, ending with an 
integrated, theistic view. (The final section is a discussion of a ‘meta-
logical’ shift within Vollenhoven’s early period of thought.) 
6   Vollenhoven’s dissertation is a ‘young man’s book’, displaying the qualities that 
such books generally have: courageous and innovative, but also overambitious. (Cf. foot-
note 37 below for a summary indication of the content.) In the report of mathematical 
theories Vollenhoven’s discussions are at times vulnerable—examples of which the Am-
sterdam mathematician, Gerrit Mannoury, did not fail to point out in his reviews (cf. 
Mannoury 1918, 1919a and 1919b)—but the historical parts are impressively rich in 
details. The sense of working in view of an ideal gives the work its unique value. He is 
daring in his criticisms and assertive as regards his own standpoint. As biographical fact, 
it is, I think, correct to say that Vollenhoven’s talent lay decidedly more with philosophy 
than with mathematics. But he had an aptitude, especially noticeable in later writings, for 
concise formulation that made the reading of the philosophy of mathematics congenial.
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 Vollenhoven’s earliest work has long been neglected. Admittedly, 
he did little to encourage others to take notice. Once he had become 
convinced that ‘Christian philosophy’ was better served by a reassess-
ment in line with Kuyperian neo-Calvinism, he came to think his early 
work as misguided. We shall discuss this in chapter 4. Preferring to look 
ahead rather than back, he invested more effort into developing a more 
adequate approach to philosophy than in repairing what he took to be 
ill conceived. In fact, he never mentions or refers to his dissertation, ex-
cept late in life in (mostly brief ) autobiographical reflections. In these 
reflections he ‘explains’ his early orientation as having been influenced 
in a decisive way by Henri Poincaré.7 The long silence regarding his 
earliest work and the self-critical autobiographical references strongly 
suggest that Vollenhoven held his early work to have been unredeem-
ably surpassed in his post-1922 work. There is also very little evidence of 
interest in Vollenhoven’s dissertation after its initial appearing during his 
lifetime,8 except on Dooyeweerd’s part.9 But the latter’s relation to Vol-
7   These reflections are cited and discussed in section VI of chapter 4; cf. footnote 
183 of chapter 4 for the titles of the sources, which are Vollenhoven 1953p, 1953o, 
1963c, 1968b. 
8   There were a number of reviews when the work appeared; cf. the separate list-
ing in the bibliography, which mentions, among others, ‘G. Mannoury’, ‘H.J. Pos’, and 
‘H.W. van der Vaart Smit’. Cf. chapter 1, footnote 40 for references to Vollenhoven’s 
influence in the early years of the department of mathematics and natural science of the 
Free University. However, there are also late references to the dissertation in E.W. Beth’s 
work; e.g. it is listed in Beth 1940: 267, and Beth 1950: 144. In later years, A.M. Wolt-
ers briefly discusses the historical parts of Vollenhoven’s dissertation as an example of a 
‘proto-problem-historical’ approach in his master’s thesis, written at the Vrije Universiteit 
in 1970. The main part of this thesis was published (after Vollenhoven’s death) as Wolters 
1979a: 231-262. Hendrik Blauwendraat’s recent interest in Vollenhoven’s intuitionism 
(cf. footnote 11 below) motivated Van der Heiden and Muis 2003, which elicited the 
response Tol 2003. For the work of John H. Kok, cf. below.
9   In Dooyeweerd 1973, i.e. Dooyeweerd’s “tribute to the 80 years old cofounder of 
the reformational philosophical trend of thought”, he praised Vollenhoven’s dissertation 
as “an enormous achievement”, in which the latter “presented an extremely penetrating 
critique of the philosophic foundations of the main directions taken in modern math-
ematics; especially his critique of Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers and of Brouwer’s 
intuitionism.” Though this work, Dooyeweerd continues, “proved to be quite bound to 
the traditional metaphysics of realist scholasticism”, nevertheless this phase of pre-refor-
mational thought “remains very important since its critique of the dominant trends in 
modern mathematics contains numerous worthwhile considerations meriting our atten-
tion even today.” This statement evidences Dooyeweerd’s more than passing acquaintance 
with, or at least renewed memory of, the text. This praise after 55 years—which for the 
80 year old Vollenhoven was quite misplaced!—may also be indicative of an influence 
which the work had on Dooyeweerd. We will see that there is rather firm evidence that 
some key notions in Dooyeweerd, such as time and intuition, have a striking similarity to 
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lenhoven’s early work is a topic that requires its own discussion, and will 
be broached in chapters three and four.
 Yet the neglect of the dissertation, and in its wake the neglect of 
the period 1918-1922, has in turn seriously handicapped a fuller under-
standing of Vollenhoven’s thought. Even without internal evidence, one 
does not expect, on psychological grounds, for someone to merely wipe 
the slate of one’s mind clean and start again afresh. Topics come and 
go, but methods, orientations, assumptions and fundamental beliefs are 
more stubborn. We hope to show that in terms of methodology, episte-
mology and ontology, there is considerable continuity between the early 
and late 20s, and lingering influence in later years. And where changes 
are evident, these often occur within ‘schemata’ that provide orientation 
for changes without themselves being directly affected. One set of terms 
in particular, namely ‘monism and dualism’, which are crucial for Vollen-
hoven’s ontology, retain much of their 1918 meanings until the late 30s. 
It is only in the last revision of Isagôgè Philosophiae, in 1941, that Vollen-
hoven’s later understanding of monism and dualism becomes definitive.10 
All this is not to say that Vollenhoven’s thought lacks unity, or that the 
unity of his thought did not shift. But the unity of a ‘philosophical con-
ception’ (not to be confused with its worldview background) is complex, 
permitting a latitude of realization within its defining parameters.
 The important exception to the neglect of Vollenhoven’s early work 
is John H. Kok’s Vollenhoven His Early Development (Kok 1992). This 
book length study greatly eases the task of finding one’s way in the rather 
intricate thicket of themes of Vollenhoven’s early thought. The work also 
provides translations of important parts of the early work, particularly the 
dissertation. Kok focuses on the development of Vollenhoven’s thought 
prior to the work that began after his accepting the chair of philosophy 
in 1926. However, little is said about the connection of this earlier work 
with Vollenhoven’s later development. We, in turn, will direct the discus-
sion of Vollenhoven’s early work to highlighting its main features with a 
view to uncovering the philosophical conception of Vollenhoven’s theistic 
intuitionism. This should help trace the path that led to Isagôgè Philoso-
phiae and Vollenhoven’s later work.11
Vollenhoven’s early use. Cf. section VI.C. of chapter 4.
10   It was S.U. Zuidema (cf. especially Zuidema 1963: 138) who first discussed this 
difference, thereby implying the continuous self-critical reformation that Vollenhoven 
applied to his own thought. 
11   Blauwendraat 2004 discusses Vollenhoven’s early work. In chapter two, “Math-
ematics and philosophy” there is a summary discussion of Vollenhoven’s mathematical 
intuitionism, pp. 49-66. However the philosophical interpretation given calls for discus-
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III. the settIng of the dIssertatIon
An important determining factor of the setting of Vollenhoven’s early 
work is its theism. He claims that philosophy ought not only to reck-
on with God’s presence, but also to conform to God’s will as norm for 
thought and action. Were we to emphasize this at the beginning of our 
discussion we might immediately elicit the response that Vollenhoven 
subjects the philosophy of mathematics to an influence that is foreign to 
it. Such a response would be unfortunate. For, while Vollenhoven does 
maintain the relevance of theism for the philosophy of mathematics—or 
for philosophy in general—he counters the charge that this lacks proper 
motivation. Our strategy, as explained above, will be to begin our discus-
sion from the other end, from the side of mathematics. That will enable 
us to see more clearly why Vollenhoven deemed theism to be relevant, 
and what his theism amounts to, as we include discussion of the said ‘me-
diating philosophical topics’, ending with the metaphysics of substance. 
But when beginning with mathematics, we need to discuss arithmetic 
and geometry in at least such detail as will enable us to discover the turn-
of-the-twentieth-century features Vollenhoven took to be philosophically 
relevant.
A. Arithmetic
Vollenhoven accepted the traditional division of mathematics in two 
main scientific disciplines: arithmetic and geometry.12 Each has a num-
ber of sub-disciplines. But arithmetic is basically the science of number. 
While there are various kinds of number systems—rational, real, com-
plex, and the like (1918a: 223)—all are based on the natural numbers. 
The principle on which arithmetic rests is “the principle of complete in-
duction” (1918a: 427). This principle is based on the series of the natural 
numbers, viz. the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on. The principle of complete 
induction is a basic principle of proof in arithmetic. It states that if an ar-
ithmetical formula holds for the number 1 and also holds for the number 
n when it holds for the number n-1, then the formula holds for all the 
natural numbers. In virtue of this principle Vollenhoven distinguishes 
the science of arithmetic from the account of the natural numbers, calling 
the latter “arithmetic of the first order” and the former “arithmetic of 
sion. In Stellingwerff 2006: 28-31 there is a summary discussion of selected features of 
Vollenhoven’s early thought.
12   Vollenhoven does not discuss the adequacy of this division. In view of 19th 
century developments in mathematics, one might expect separate mention of algebra and 
analysis. The latter includes the differential and integral calculus. The relations of these 
disciplines to arithmetic and geometry will not be discussed here.
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the second order”. Arithmetic of the second order involves arithmetical 
statements and this constitutes arithmetic as scientific discipline. One 
might mention in this connection, though Vollenhoven passes it by, G. 
Peano’s account of (scientific) arithmetic, with its five axioms, the fifth 
of which (in the usual order of presentation) is the principle of complete 
induction.13 This arithmetic of the second order is also subject, as is any 
science, to logical principles, especially the principle of contradiction and 
that of excluded middle.
 On the other hand, “arithmetic of the first order”, as Vollenhoven 
calls it, seeks to account for the natural numbers themselves. This is not 
a science, for the account of the natural numbers is not a matter of state-
ments but of the (intra-mental) construction of terms. It concerns the 
mental process in terms of which the natural numbers arise.14 This is the 
process that lies at the basis of counting.15 This process is not subject to 
the principle of contradiction. However, logic is still relevant here, for 
numbers are subject to the principle of identity, a principle that holds of 
terms generally.
 In this account of arithmetic, Vollenhoven is indebted to the in-
tuitionistic mathematicians, Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) and L.E.J. 
Brouwer (1881-1966). Each is discussed in a separate section of the dis-
sertation.16 These men defended the idea that mathematics is at bottom 
a matter of human mental construction. Accordingly, their point of view 
13   Not that Vollenhoven was unacquainted with Peano’s work. He criticises him for 
his ‘formalism’, namely holding deduction to be the only suitable method of mathemat-
ics, and not seeking an explanation for the notion of number (cf. 1918a: 229-230). The 
five axioms are: (i) 1 is a number; (ii) the successor of any number is a number; (iii) no 
two numbers have the same successor; (iv) 1 is not the successor of any number; (v) the 
principle of complete induction. There are three ‘primitive terms’ here: ‘one’, ‘successor 
(of )’, and ‘number’. For an introductory discussion of this system, cf. Chapter 1, “The 
Series of Natural Numbers”, of Russell 1919. 
14   Apposite is: “[n]umber is not a thing or a symbol but a series creation of the 
mind [geest], which as such has no determinate scope, but [which series] is determined 
only comprehensively by the principle of complete induction” (1918a: 157).
15   Vollenhoven states: “We also distinguish mathematics of second and first order 
and apply this in arithmetic. That of the second order is the science of numbers, the theory 
of their properties, etc. That of the first [order] is not a science, but it is what is given in 
the second [order], namely the act of counting” (1918a: 413). Counting is described psy-
chologically (cf. footnote 20 below), but, in the interest of anti-psychologism, counting is 
in turn accounted for in a way that grounds the three primitive notions of arithmetic in a 
metaphysical and objective intuitionist context (à la a Gegenstandstheorie).
16   Both sections are in chapter IV, “The critical part”; section 15 is on Henri Poin-
caré (pp. 352-384) and section 16 on L.E.J. Brouwer (pp. 385-402). Cf. footnote 37 for 
an overview of the dissertation.
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is finitistic, allowing only the so-called ‘potential infinite’—the infinite 
as an unending series of finite objects—a place in mathematics, not the 
notion of the ‘actual (or completed) infinite’. Georg Cantor (1845-1918) 
had incorporated the notion of the actual infinite in his theory of transfi-
nite numbers, a theory much contested at the beginning of the twentieth 
century by both mathematicians and philosophers.17 The unending series 
of the natural numbers, each member of which is finite, is an exemplary 
basis for mathematical construction. The series of the natural numbers it-
self is accounted for in terms of repetition or successive recurrence. By the 
repeated addition of 1, after having begun with 1, every natural number 
can be reached. The principle of complete induction seizes on this pos-
sibility. For Poincaré and Brouwer the principle is intuitively compelling, 
and in fact this motivates the appeal to an intuition. The principle of 
induction, says Poincaré,
is only the affirmation of the power of the mind which knows it can con-
ceive of the indefinite repetition of the same act, when the act is once 
possible. The mind has a direct intuition of this power, and experiment 
can only be for it an opportunity of using it, and thereby of becoming 
conscious of it.18
Brouwer, somewhat more nuanced, includes the notion of time and syn-
thesis (two-oneness). He states:
This neo-intuitionism [of Brouwer’s own approach; A.T.] considers the 
falling apart of moments of life into qualitatively different parts, to be 
reunited only while remaining separated by time, as the fundamental phe-
nomenon of the human intellect, passing by abstracting from its emotion-
al content into the fundamental phenomenon of mathematical thinking, 
the intuition of the bare two-oneness. This intuition of two-oneness, the 
basal intuition of mathematics, creates not only the numbers one and two, 
but also all finite ordinal numbers, inasmuch as one of the elements of the 
two-oneness may be thought of as a new two-oneness, which process may 
be repeated indefinitely. . . .19
 Vollenhoven accepts these statements insofar as they legitimately 
belong to the foundation of mathematics, legitimately, in the sense that 
these statements indicate what ‘first order arithmetic’ is about. But what 
is the intuition? What about the synthesis of this intuitive bi-unity? And 
17   Vollenhoven also devotes a section to the discussion of Cantor’s work; cf. Section 
8. “The revival of the doctrine of the actual infinite”, pp. 175-188.
18   Cf. Poincaré 1902: 13. 
19   From L.E.J. Brouwer’s inaugural address, Brouwer 1912: 69. Brouwer developed 
his ideas against the background of western mysticism. He gives a sampling of this in 
Brouwer 1905. Vollenhoven quotes a closely similar statement of Brouwer from the lat-
ter’s dissertation, Brouwer 1907; cf. Vollenhoven 1918a: 387.
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how is the intra-mental act of repetition and its temporal character to 
be understood? The intuition is a priori and synthetic.20 Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), who himself initiated intuitionism in mathematics, spoke 
of (mathematical) judgments as being synthetic a priori; but for both 
Poincaré and Brouwer it is the intra-mental act itself that is said to be 
synthetic and a priori. Can Kant still be called upon as a proponent of 
early twentieth century intuitionism? Vollenhoven brings the full weight 
of philosophical analysis to bear upon these sorts of questions, delving 
deep into epistemology and metaphysics. But before we follow suit, there 
is also geometry to consider.
B. Geometry
Geometry was long identified with the famous work of Euclid, and his 
view—Euclidean geometry—was long held to be the science that re-
vealed the exclusive truth about space. But from about the mid-nine-
teenth century, alternative geometries were found to be possible. Typical 
of Euclidean geometry is the parallel postulate, which says (in one of 
its versions) that, given a line and a point not on the line, one and only 
one line can be drawn through the point that is parallel to the given 
line. Non-Euclidean geometries replace the parallel postulate either with 
the postulate of there not being any such line, for every line through 
the given point intersects the given line, or the postulate of there being 
more than one distinct line parallel to the given line. In these alternative 
cases, space is said either to shrink or to stretch respectively as one moves 
away from a given position. In the first case space is convex-like, hav-
ing a ‘positive constant measure of curvature’, while in the second case 
space is concave-like, with a ‘negative constant measure of curvature’. 
Euclidean space has zero measure of curvature, thus it is said to be ‘flat’. 
These different ‘measures of curvature’, being constant and mutually ex-
clusive, ensure that the respective geometries are also mutually exclusive. 
But, besides these geometries, there are also geometries that are more 
general than either Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometries, in that they 
have no quantitative notions, thus ‘measure of curvature’ is not a relevant 
20   Vollenhoven formulates counting as follows: “Accordingly counting takes place 
through the analytical intuition; [the fact] that we count we know by means of the con-
crete intuition which makes us aware of this possession of the analysing intuition. Also 
the certainty we have that this distinction can be repeated continually by treating every 
duality as unity (Brouwer) and that this possibility is unending; this [certainty] we have 
through being aware of the human spirit’s power it possesses in this matter (Poincaré), 
hence in virtue of concrete intuition” (1918a: 414). Vollenhoven here mentions two 
forms of intuition, the concrete and analytical, of what turns out to be a total of three, 
the third being the metaphysical intuition. This is discussed below.
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notion here. These non-quantitative geometries, for example projective 
and descriptive geometry, lack a ‘metric function’. The most qualitative 
geometry of all is topology, known at the beginning of the 20th century as 
‘analysis situs’ (analysis of situation) (cf. 1918a: 146).21
 The unifying idea of geometry that arose in the late nineteenth 
century is that of ‘the group of transformations’. A geometry does not 
study space sec, as if it were an object in its own right, but it studies 
the behaviour of figures in space when ‘moved about’.22 Depending on 
the permitted movement—the technical term is ‘transformation’23—a 
specific geometry studies those properties of spatial figures that remain 
invariant under the application of the transformation rules in question. 
In Euclidean geometry the size and shape of figures remain unchanged 
when subject to change of position, rotation or reflection, while in pro-
jective geometry shape and angles change but the straightness of a line 
remains unaffected. In topology nothing related to size or shape remains 
invariant, but features such as the interior of a figure, connectedness, di-
mensionality, and the like do remain invariant. Each geometry elucidates 
certain select features of space, but no geometry has a privileged position 
regarding the study of space as such.
 Vollenhoven is aware of and assumes these developments in geom-
etry. In order to specify his interest in these matters one other develop-
ment must be mentioned. The question as to the ‘truth of space’ was 
21   Vollenhoven refers, incorrectly, to descriptive geometry and analysis situs as cases 
of non-Euclidean geometry (1918a: 143). Mathematicians speak of Euclidean and non-
Euclidean geometry only when geometry includes a metric (or distance) function. It is on 
account of the metric function being chosen differently for Euclidean and non-Euclidean 
geometries mutually that these geometries exclude each other. Descriptive geometry, pro-
jective geometry and topology are more general geometries, in the sense that they study 
properties that are logically prior to metrical properties, hence they are neither Euclidean 
nor non-Euclidean and treat of features common to both Euclidean and non-Euclidean 
geometry alike.
22   When in Euclidean geometry a proof of the congruence of two figures, say two 
triangles, is given, the net effect is as if one had moved one of the triangles and laid it on 
top of the other to demonstrate their fit. Geometries with ‘constant measure of curvature’ 
(positive, negative or zero) are the only ones in which figures can be ‘moved about’ with-
out distortion. Cf. the work of D. O’Shea, O’Shea 2007, which contains a very accessible 
account of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries.
23   The transformations in question must form a ‘group’. This is an algebraic term 
that limits the kind of transformations permitted. The group structure requires that (i) 
if two transformations are executed in sequence, there is a transformation that performs 
both in one, (ii) the order in which transformations are applied is irrelevant, (iii) there is 
an identity transformation, which leaves everything as is, and (iv) every transformation has 
an inverse. Under these rules a set of elements (transformations) is said to form a group.
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made more problematic through the development of the arithmetiza-
tion of geometry. Descartes had initiated analytic geometry, in which 
he showed how a geometrical structure could be expressed in terms of 
algebraic equations, which could be solved numerically. As long as there 
was no sufficiently developed number concept that could do justice to 
‘irrational numbers’, such as √2 (which represents the length of the hy-
potenuse of a right-angled triangle with sides of unit length) the truth of 
geometry could not be considered supplanted by its arithmetization. But 
the late nineteenth century also saw the development of the real num-
ber concept (Richard Dedekind, Karl Weierstrass, Leopold Kronecker), 
which essentially removed this last barrier. The net effect is that one does 
not need to accept a distinctly geometrical truth, for every geometrical 
statement can be ‘translated’ into the discourse of algebra and the fully 
developed real number concept (including set theory). Geometry is no 
more true or consistent than algebra and number theory. In other words, 
this arithmetization of geometry obviates the need to postulate some-
thing like an intuition of space, at least for mathematical purposes.
 In this question of space and geometry Vollenhoven took a stand 
that was also informed by the intuitionists, Poincaré and Brouwer. Brou-
wer essentially accepted the arithmetization of geometry, except that the 
real number concept (along with much of higher analysis) had to be re-
formulated in terms of constructive procedures. Vollenhoven in turn ac-
cepts this too. He states that the general validity of geometrical statements 
is offered indirectly by arithmetical statements (1918a: 19, 386-387). 
But this does not pre-empt for him the philosophical importance of the 
discussion of the nature of space in its own right, for which Poincaré 
provides the lead.
 Poincaré discussed space and geometry in a way that applied and 
illustrated the idea of a group to the movements of solid bodies in con-
junction with the human body. We all learn to compensate for the move-
ment of objects by a bodily movement that restores the original relative 
position of the object and our body. If a body is deformed, we learn to 
analyse this into partial deformations, each of which we could compen-
sate for in terms of our own body. “If, then, there were no solid bodies in 
nature there would be no geometry”,24 and the laws that we set-up to ac-
count for the phenomena of displacements are the object of geometry.25 
If there were beings with a different bodily structure, say, their bodies 
24   Poincaré 1902: 61. Poincaré is here referring to the empirical origin of geometry, 
where geometrical figures are identified as properties of more or less unchanging bodies.
25   Ibid., p. 63.
87
A Bold Beginning: Theistic and Metalogical Intuitionism
changed in certain ways as they moved, then they would formulate a 
different geometry, for the account of these displacement phenomena 
would call for other laws than we (human beings) draw up in accordance 
with our experience. No one geometry in its own right is to be preferred 
above another. What decides our preference is convenience and conven-
tion in the face of our factual or biological make-up. Our bodily make-up 
in its psycho-physical organization makes three-dimensional Euclidean 
geometry convenient for us. This convenience is for Poincaré a contin-
gent result of human evolution (cf. 1918a: 378).
 Vollenhoven accepts the link of space and geometry to the human 
psycho-physical organization. But he feels strongly obliged to differ from 
Poincaré’s interpretation of it. First of all, if the arithmetization of geome-
try allows us to confer general validity to geometry in virtue of the general 
a priori validity of arithmetical systems, then there must be something a 
priori to geometry as well. Of course, Poincaré never denied this. Experi-
ence may play a role in the genesis of geometry, he said, but its validity is 
not dependent on there being natural solids as facts. Scientific geometry 
works with abstract and ideal figures, therefore the idea of a ‘group’ is also 
a general concept.26
 But secondly, the combination of this a priori validity with the psy-
cho-physical account of the genesis of geometry is not without its prob-
lems. If, in virtue of our psycho-physical organization, three-dimensional 
Euclidean geometry is convenient, that convenience must have a basis. 
We need to appeal to a more fixed—for Vollenhoven even principled—
connection between psyche and soma that explains how our sensibility is 
integral to our bodily make-up. Evolution offers no explanation here. 
It merely points to the outcome of the organization as the interplay of 
many environmental factors. Poincaré’s acknowledgement that the con-
cept of group is a priori does not solve the problem. For this notion, he 
says, “is imposed on us not as a form of our sensitiveness [sic], but as a 
form of our understanding; only, from among all possible groups, we 
must choose one that will be the standard, so to speak, to which we shall 
refer natural phenomena”.27 Poincaré does not see an intimate connec-
tion between the group notion and the human psycho-physical organiza-
tion as such, hence the standard geometry we choose in application to the 
study of nature remains entirely arbitrary.
26   Poincaré states: “The concept of these ideal bodies is entirely mental, and experi-
ment is but the opportunity which enables us to reach the idea. The object of geometry is 
the study of a particular ‘group’; but the general concept of group pre-exists in our minds, 
at least potentially”; op. cit. , p. 70.
27   Ibid., p. 70.
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 The reference to ‘form of sensitiveness’ brings the Kantian notion of 
space, as ‘form of sensibility’, into the picture (presumably that is what 
is meant here). Space, according to Kant, is the side-by-side integrative 
factor of phenomenal givens (sense-data), a factor that is intrinsic to the 
human receptive capacity. In that sense space is part and parcel of the 
human psycho-physical organization. Vollenhoven is more Kantian than 
Poincaré in this regard, for he (Vollenhoven) does regard space as a form 
of sensibility. For him this warrants the acceptance of an a priori feature 
in the region of the psycho-physical, quite apart from any geometrical 
determination. For space, in this sense, allows us to localize sense-data 
within a spatial continuum. But human bodies are themselves included 
in this continuum and participate in it. If we abstract the body from it, 
the very possibility of receptivity to sense-data is eliminated. So if, with 
Poincaré, one agrees that the three-dimensional Euclidean characteriza-
tion of this localization continuum is (most) convenient, then this con-
venience must say something about the character of the psycho-physical 
connection itself. The convenience must be an effect of the nature of the 
psycho-physical connection, allowing us to maintain that our preferred 
standard is necessarily three-dimensional and Euclidean.28
 So, as in arithmetic, there is also a synthetic a priori relevant to 
geometry that Vollenhoven appeals to. The two are distinguished as a 
priori of first and second rank, respectively. The difference in rank marks 
the intra-mental provenance of the a priori of arithmetic over against the 
28   Cf. 1918a: 378-379. It is important to keep in mind that this standard concerns 
‘first order mathematics’ (a term Brouwer used), which is the domain of construction, 
not that of the scientific development of geometry which, like second order arithmetic, 
concerns statements and proofs. Vollenhoven agrees that there is no preferred second or-
der geometry, for each geometry operates in terms of its own ‘group of transformations’. 
Kant, who preceded the development of non-Euclidean geometries, held that Euclidean 
geometry reveals the real structure of space, of which the human form of sensibility is a 
condition. Vollenhoven acknowledges that this view is superseded by nineteenth century 
developments. But he retains the Euclidean characterization of the (first order) human 
spatial operations (1918a: 394). Its focus concerns localization. This has both spatial 
and temporal features, hence the temporal as well as the spatial forms of sensibility are 
brought to bear. Despite this apology on my part, I still think that there is something very 
dogmatic in Vollenhoven’s preference for Euclid. Vollenhoven maintains that it is theistic 
to interpret the human psycho-physical organization as Euclidean, this being a general 
feature of the synthesis of body and soul, holding in virtue of creation (1918a: 379). In 
the mid-1920s, he revises his view of body and soul, in consequence of which sensibil-
ity becomes a psychological notion, based on the ‘psychical function’ of a human being, 
while ‘soul’ is taken to be a holistic directional notion, relevant to the whole human Self. 
The ‘psycho-physical’ is then understood to be a subsidiary feature of the human being, 
and space is no longer dependent on this feature.
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psycho-somatic context of that of geometry.29 Thus, though Poincaré and 
Brouwer help Vollenhoven define the problem of space, he feels com-
pelled to seek an alternative solution, a solution, as we shall see, that calls 
for the distinction between phenomena and metaphysical substances.
C. A partial and qualified Kantianism
Vollenhoven avails himself of Kant’s account of “forms of sensibility” to 
formulate his views as to space and geometry. But there are also certain 
differences. In his appeal to Kant there is an immediate occasion for con-
fusion. Kant speaks of intuition when he appeals to space and time as 
forms of sensibility, while Vollenhoven uses ‘intuition’ in contradistinction 
to forms of sensibility. Forms of sensibility in Kant are peculiar in that, 
as forms, they have an organizing or determining role in connection with 
the human reception of sense-data. Their non-empirical status attests to 
their a priori character, and their determining or conditioning role gives 
them a transcendental meaning relevant for the phenomenal order. Thus 
the representation of a form of sensibility involves a peculiar awareness 
(as concerning something not empirical but transcendental), and it is this 
awareness that Kant calls ‘pure intuition’.30 For him intuitions, includ-
ing the pure ones, always pertain to the phenomenal order of sensibility. 
Kant appeals to the intuition of time to justify the synthetic a priori 
validity of statements of arithmetic—the intuition of time justifies the 
mental operation of successive addition / subtraction as indicated by the 
arithmetic statement—while the intuition of space similarly justifies the 
synthetic a priori validity of geometrical statements—which attribute si-
multaneous (spatially represented) properties to geometrical figures. This 
double intuition serves as the backdrop for the ‘mental work’ involved 
in understanding mathematical validity transcendentally, indeed, it pro-
vides the de jure validity of mathematical statements. The close analogy 
between arithmetical and geometrical statements in this regard in Kant 
allows the account of their validity to be included in one doctrine of the 
transcendental aesthetic.
 Vollenhoven’s distinction of rank between the a priori of arithmetic 
and that of geometry does not fit this Kantian mould. The difference 
between the intra-mental and the psycho-physical is too pronounced to 
see them in correlation. On several counts the difference with Kant is 
29   Consider: “[T]he apriority of arithmetic is of a higher rank than that of geom-
etry and kinematics; we can distinguish them as intuition and form of sensibility” (1918a: 
417).
30   Cf. Kant 1998: 156 (A21/B35).
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reinforced. In the first place, though Vollenhoven does speak of Anschau-
ungsformen and their two kinds, time and space, he does not link arith-
metic to time taken in this sense. In fact he says little about time as form 
of sensibility, but from what he does say it is clear that it is kinematics that 
he deems appropriate here (1918a: 433-434). Time as form of sensibil-
ity—it too is seated in the human psycho-physical organization—is for 
him a condition of motion.31
 In the second place, Kant’s linking of time to arithmetic (this would 
be Vollenhoven’s second order arithmetic) is modified in important ways 
by Vollenhoven. Arithmetical statements must, as do all judgments, com-
ply with the principle of contradiction. Their synthetic character derives 
from their including, as given data, the sequence of the natural numbers, 
i.e. first order arithmetic. To this (first order) arithmetic Vollenhoven 
links a much more intimate sense of time than that of time as form of 
sensibility, namely the time of endurance in successive, currently undergoing 
moments of experience. (The echo of Henri Bergson’s durée here is not co-
incidental.) Vollenhoven takes intuitionists, such as Augustine and Kant, 
to task for failing to distinguish properly between ‘time as succession’ and 
‘time as form of sensibility’. Augustine failed to recognize the latter and 
Kant merged succession with form of sensibility (1918a: 134).32
 Then, thirdly, Vollenhoven makes the explicit choice of reserving the 
term ‘intuition’ to describe the most primal facets of intra-mental aware-
ness, which is the locus of succession and number (first order arithmetic). 
31   Space and time are the kinematic conditions of motion in Vollenhoven. Given 
the transcendental roles of time and space as forms of sensibility in Kant, these forms 
also represent space and time as absolute. Newton spoke of absolute space and absolute 
time as if they are the sensorium Dei, which in Kant become the sensorium humanum. 
But because Vollenhoven does not argue transcendentally, he can separate the role of 
space and time, as forms of sensibility, from that of their stature as absolutes. The result 
is that he sees absolute space and time as limits that science approaches in its attempts to 
localize things spatially and temporally. The forms of sensibility are conditions of local-
ization, namely conditions of the cognitive act (kendaad) of localization, relative to the 
human body, in which “the human being strives in the direction of the limit of absolute 
space [and time]” (1918a: 131). Absolute space and time in themselves, and when not 
taken to be limitative but as absolute boundaries, entail the self-contradictory notion of 
‘completed infinity’ (as completed endlessness). An ‘absolute boundary’ is in this context 
also self-contradictory. By taking absolute space and time to be limitative notions, and in 
correlation with space and time as conditions of sensibility, the impending contradictions 
are averted (cf. 1918a: 300, also p. 135). 
32   Consider the following summary statement: “But the connection of arithmetic 
and time is not parallel to that of geometry and space. Geometry and kinematics are the 
sciences of space and time, respectively. However arithmetic is the science of succession” 
(1918a: 348).
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With this use of ‘intuition’ it follows that there is a deep difference be-
tween the number sequence of first order arithmetic and spatio-temporal 
localization. The former is based on inner perception. Here we are aware 
of intra-mental change. But the locus of localization is in the psycho-
physical organization, which can at best only be sensed. Accordingly, he 
deems it unsuitable to speak of an intuition of space, and he criticises 
Pascal for having defended the relevance of such an intuition (cf. 1918a: 
104). (By implication he also does not accept an intuition of the time 
factor at this level, relevant for kinematics.) In connection with space we 
must make do with the outer perception of bodies, to which the human 
body also belongs. This is why Vollenhoven also speaks of a difference in 
rank of the two kinds of a priori: “the apriority of arithmetic is of a higher 
rank than that of geometry and kinematics; we can distinguish them as 
intuition and form of sensibility” (1918a: 417). 33
 So the two kinds of a priori, pertaining to mentality and sensibil-
ity, respectively, have little in common. However, what they do have in 
common is that both have a subjective and an objective moment. In-
ner perception reveals the presence of mental acts and content, which 
shift and change to be sure, but the presence of which is confirmed by 
self-consciousness (1918a: 72). Outer perception reveals phenomena as 
the appearing of things. But this involves a given objectivity in correla-
tion with the forms of sensibility on the side of the sensible subject. The 
mathematical synthetic a priori finds its direct application in these two 
kinds of perception.
 The cardinal importance of the mathematical synthetic a priori is 
that it is the most primal indication of the subjective and the objective 
‘coming together’. Knowledge, in Vollenhoven, involves the subjective 
‘working over’ of the objective given. To that end the subjective moment 
must realize an integration—a ‘two-oneness’—with respect to the objec-
tive data. Its possibility with respect to mentality is attested to by the 
synthetic a priori of arithmetic, the intuition of number; the synthetic 
a priori of geometry lies in the psycho-physically sensed possibility of 
spatial-temporal localization. 
 The two sides of the subjective and the objective are reflected in 
every judgment. That is to say, Vollenhoven maintains that every scien-
tific statement has a formal and a material moment. The formal reflects 
33   In order to avoid confusion between Vollenhoven’s and Kant’s uses, I use “forms 
of sensibility” as translation of Anschauungsformen, not “forms of intuition”. Clearly, both 
are appropriate in light of Kant’s meaning. Vollenhoven avails himself of the Dutch “aan-
schouwingsvormen”, which leaves the relationship to the use of “intuition” (the Dutch is 
“intuïtie”) linguistically undecided, hence capable of distinct use.
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the moment of the human ordering of thought, the material reflects the 
given (1918a: 434-437). The most empirical of statements is never with-
out the human touch, just as the most abstract statements of arithmetic 
are not without the content of intuition (1918a: 72). Even first order 
arithmetic, which ‘constructs’ prior to making any statements, has its ob-
jectivity, viz. the ‘reality of succession’, of which we are intuitively aware 
in inner perception. Hence mathematical knowledge is not only impor-
tant in its own right, but its own possibility also provides the foundation 
of the possibility of (natural) scientific knowledge generally. 
 But this clarification of the mathematical a priori appeals to a pro-
nounced view of science, which is not universally accepted in all tradi-
tions of science. This topic needs to be discussed in its own right, as one 
belonging to the philosophy of science. In doing so, new features will be 
broached in Vollenhoven’s account and defence of intuitionism. A de-
finitive statement regarding Vollenhoven’s account of number and space 
depends on the elucidation of knowledge and intuition respectively, and 
hence needs to be provisionally tabled. We resume the discussion by fo-
cussing first on prime features of the philosophy of science. That discus-
sion will also introduce one of the props of Vollenhoven’s theism.
IV. the nodal PoInts of (theIstIc) IntuItIonIsm
Vollenhoven’s early understanding of philosophy itself already had strong 
leanings towards philosophy of science. Philosophy for the young Vollen-
hoven comports with that species of modernism that limits philosophy to 
the topic and interest of knowledge. Its primary focus lies with problems 
concerning the demarcation and the relations between the sciences. Thus 
Vollenhoven takes the importance of a philosophical problem to lie in 
“questions as to values, boundaries and relations between the distinct 
sciences mutually” (1918a: 2). This is in line with positivism’s ‘encyclo-
paedia of the sciences’ and neo-Kantianism’s ‘derivation of the sciences’, 
though Vollenhoven has his own view as to the place of the sciences in 
philosophy.
 Be that as it may, it was as philosopher that Vollenhoven chose to 
formulate the nature of his investigations. He expresses the problem of 
his investigations in terms of two primary relations that mathematics has 
to other disciplines, namely to logic and to physics. Mathematics has a 
rigorously logical structure. This means that the main principles of logic 
(identity, contradiction and excluded middle) are relevant for mathemat-
ics. On the other hand, mathematics is also generally applicable, which 
makes it an ideal instrument for physics. “In this way the chief questions 
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posed themselves: what is the relation of mathematics to logic and what 
is the relation to physics?” (1918a: 2).
 Throughout the dissertation, there are three terms that constantly 
recur in the discussion of these two main questions: norm, ‘ratio’ and 
‘empirie’. These terms signal the relevance of the “normative, rational and 
empirical elements” (1918a: 410), respectively, of scientific knowledge. 
In their interplay these terms together delineate a very important facet of 
intuitionism, and their schema also provides critical edge to the opposi-
tion of alternative views. The three terms are best seen in the following 
arrangement:
norm
                                                  
       ‘ratio’         ‘empirie’
 The normative element (norm) appeals to objective logical norms. 
Logic is indeed formal for Vollenhoven, but this needs to be taken in 
a sense that is over and above the factual concern of consistency of dis-
course, the latter being a rational feature. He takes the said logical prin-
ciples to be norms that regulate and guide the knowing subject in its 
treatment of content of thought.34 The rational element (ratio) pertains to 
the activity of thinking as such. This activity takes place in ‘mental acts’—
Vollenhoven speaks of “psychical acts”—and it yields content appropriate 
to these acts. This cognition and its content are basically of three kinds: 
(sense-)awareness, recollection and representation. Cognition is only 
properly cognitive when norms regulate the psychical acts on which cog-
nition is based. In this sense Vollenhoven combats psychologism, which 
has no place for norms. Finally there is the empirical element (empirie). 
This is “the given” that stands in opposition to thought and to mental 
acts in general. It is what is other than thought, foreign to thought (het 
denkvreemde). In a generic sense, Vollenhoven speaks of ‘being’ in this 
regard, but more often it is just the given. The given consists of ‘things’ in 
34   In light of the subject matter of the dissertation, the norms in question are for 
the most part limited to logical norms required for the sciences. But Vollenhoven’s view 
at the time was broader. In a 1919 manuscript on pedagogy, he speaks of norms for “the 
areas of science, morality and art”. Quoted in Kok 1992: 17. Also, in a letter to the theo-
logian, F.W. Grosheide, dated 16 November 1921, Vollenhoven states: “logic is, together 
with ethics, aesthetics etc., precisely as science of norms distinguished from the explica-
tive [i.e. descriptive; A.T.] sciences . . .”; cf. Vollenhoven 16-11-1921. Norms may be said 
to pertain to a ‘domain of validity’. In another manuscript of 1921 Vollenhoven asserts: 
“But the norm as such differs from all that exists. Norms have their own mode of being. 
They hold [“gelden”; i.e. have validity]”; cf. Kok 1992: 21. Viewing norms—often taken 
as objective values—as populating a distinct realm is typical of the Baden or Southwest 
German school of neo-Kantianism.
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interaction, or in ‘relations’ in which things stand through their interac-
tions. Though foreign to thought, things are knowable in virtue of the 
self-revelation by which they ‘give’ themselves as real phenomena. So in 
a summarizing nutshell: knowledge of the given arises when thought (the 
rational element) succeeds in knowing the given (the empirical element) 
under the guidance of norms and ideals (the normative element).35
 In the course of our subsequent discussion various distinct episte-
mological features of this view of knowledge will come to light. At this 
point we limit our discussion to mathematics and its general intuition-
istic form. The characteristic feature of mathematical intuitionism is its 
acknowledgement of the synthetic a priori. Mathematics as such has no 
direct truck with anything empirical. In that sense the application of 
mathematics to physics, or to material content in general, is a secondary 
problem. As to the formal side, the a priori feature of mathematics fo-
cuses on synthesis, not analysis. If it were only a matter of analysis, the a 
priori would limit mathematics to (logically) formal statements (tautolo-
gies and contradictions), as in logical positivism. So Vollenhoven denies a 
unity of mathematics and physics on the one hand and also of mathemat-
ics and logic on the other (cf. 1918a: 9). 
 Returning to the general characterization of knowledge and its three 
features, there is a characteristic a priori feature here, when Vollenhoven’s 
insists that the rational feature of thought needs norms in order to adju-
dicate between a successful coming to know and a possible failure (error). 
In other words the “intra-mental” quality of knowing, in which thought 
in its striving to come to know operates, would leave the sense of legiti-
macy cliff-hanging if divorced from any subjection to norms. So there is 
a ‘synthesis’ here between the knowing subject and the norms that are 
sensed as being ‘necessary’, not necessary in a formal sense, but as indis-
pensable to warrant the legitimacy and the need of thought to be rightly 
directed. It is a matter of grounding certainty. “[Apodictic certainty] ex-
ists in one’s awareness, and to declare this awareness to be legitimate one 
needs to accept the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori. If they are 
to be worthy of the name [of “synthetic a priori”] . . . then their certainty 
must be immediate, intuitive, which is why we refer to this approach 
[richting] as intuitionism” (1918a: 9).
 We add here two points, to be discussed more thoroughly later. 
First, the more specific qualification of theistic intuitionism is motivated 
35   Consider: “the subject of knowing is a function [i.e. activity of thought; A.T.] 
of the Self that strives to know and to that end subjects itself to the norms of logic; the 
object of knowing is a function of the thing outside of me, its appearing, its revelation to 
me or effect on me” (1918a: 228-229).
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by the question as to the source of norms. The answer is that all norms, 
ideals, and the like have a divine origin: “there are no norms other than 
divine ones” (1918a: 175).
 Secondly, only after highlighting some of the inner workings of the 
intra-mental can we be more specific about the synthetic a priori that 
Vollenhoven accepts for mathematics. At this point it is important to 
realize that the appeal to an intuition arises from a general epistemologi-
cal consideration, or, as we will come to call it, a ‘metalogical’ feature of 
validity, not a need that is relevant only to mathematics, as in Kant. Every 
judgment, for Vollenhoven, is a synthesis, for each has a formal and a 
material element, whereby the material element is absorbed by the formal 
element in a way that is normative. It is in reckoning with normative 
validity that “all forms of judgment are modifications of the synthetic a 
priori” (1918a: 435). Hence the appeal to an intuition here is a general 
one. The synthetic a priori that is specific to mathematics has more dis-
tinct features in connection with the difference between first and second 
order mathematics (construction versus statement) and the difference in 
rank between arithmetic and geometry.
 Returning now to the specific discussion of the methodology of 
mathematics in Vollenhoven, that discussion branches out in two direc-
tions. On the one hand he proceeds with a critical discussion in which 
he confronts his understanding of mathematical intuitionism with alter-
native approaches; on the other hand, he sounds out his own intuition-
ism for its epistemological and metaphysical assumptions. An important 
motive for this latter ‘sounding out’ lies in the fact that fellow intuition-
ists—Poincaré and Brouwer—are not theistic intuitionists (in the sense 
that they do not appeal to norms). Thus theistic intuitionism needs to 
be discussed in a way that will reveal its foundations in epistemology and 
metaphysics. It is only in this intrinsic ‘sounding out’ that the notion of 
the intuition becomes fully explicit. We shall discuss each of these two 
branches in turn and continue first with the methodological discussion.
A. Intuitionism, formalism, empiricism
The understanding of intuitionism in the theistic perspective on the in-
terplay of the three elements—the normative, the rational and the em-
pirical—has a critical edge in the confrontation with alternative, in par-
ticular with non-theistic views. No doubt the appeal to the normative 
element is most vulnerable here. Not that non-theists would reject it out-
right, but its separate position as a third element, beside the rational and 
the empirical, is perhaps most readily contestable, certainly for the ‘mod-
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ern mind’. When this is indeed contested, several consequences result.
 (i) When the normative element is denied its distinct position, its 
role of regulating the synthesis between the rational and the empirical is, 
practically speaking, annulled. This calls for a different view of knowl-
edge, in the sense of requiring an alternative view as to the connection of 
the subjective and the objective. Either knowledge is taken to be realized 
when (in a primarily subjective orientation) thought is said to picture the 
facts or when (in case the objective predominates) thought merely reacts 
to stimuli. “Two theories of knowledge stand in opposition here: picture 
theory or reaction” (1918a: 282). The former view is that of rationalism 
(or conceptualism; Vollenhoven also speaks of parallelism in this regard), 
the latter view is empiricism.
 (ii) Presumably the normative element—or whatever the compul-
sive moment is that is retained—could also be merged with either the ra-
tional or the empirical elements. The resulting view of logic will then no 
longer be distinctly normative. When the rational element is central to 
logic, logic will be primarily deductive and its contribution to knowledge 
limited to the analytic a priori. But when the empirical element domi-
nates, logic will be inductive and its contribution to knowledge primarily 
synthetic a posteriori (1918a: 8).
 (iii) Furthermore, an uneven polarity is set up between the two poles 
of the rational and the empirical. The merging of the normative element 
with either pole can be taken as justifying the dominance of the chosen 
pole over the other pole (1918a: 72). This results in reductionisms. Ra-
tionalism will tend to see the given as a construction of its own making. 
Vollenhoven calls this view psycho-monism. Empiricism tends to regard 
the mind as an epiphenomenon. Vollenhoven calls this view materialism. 
Generically, each view is monistic. In contrast, theism is said to be dualis-
tic (1918a: 8).
 In the above discussion the methodological context of Vollenhoven’s 
early thought comes clearly into view. Theism is a ‘dualistic standpoint’ 
in which the normative element is recognized and acknowledged to be 
distinct from the rational and the empirical elements. This calls for a fac-
tor—the intuition—that justifies the possibility of the synthesis of the ra-
tional and empirical elements.36 The implication of this for mathematics 
is that it should exemplify the connection of the rational and the empiri-
cal, without identification with either, and of course remaining distinct 
from (normative) logic as well. The essence of mathematics is seated in 
36   Consider: “If however intuitionism cannot bind ratio and empirie, then it has 
lost its birthright and right to exist” (1918a: 52).
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the synthetic a priori, which calls for an intuitive certainty, such as math-
ematical intuitionism banks on. But, as already stated, not all mathemati-
cal intuitionists are theists in the sense of being properly dualistic, as in-
deed neither Poincaré nor Brouwer was. Their intuitionistic mathematics 
is not at fault—Vollenhoven accepts their mathematical work as basically 
adequate, also in its relation to logic and physics—rather it is the philo-
sophical underpinning and understanding of their work that calls for 
critical revision.
 It is the ‘monistic standpoints’, in which the normative element is 
reduced to and merged with either the rational or the empirical element, 
represented in psycho-monism and materialism respectively, that call for 
more thorough criticism. The implications for mathematics is that any 
functional intuition will be denied as irrelevant. For psycho-monism 
mathematics is merged with logic, a logic itself reduced to matters of con-
sistency and deduction. Vollenhoven calls this mathematical orientation 
formalism, and it is a distinct historical tradition in mathematics. On the 
other hand materialism identifies mathematics with the empirical given 
and inductive research. This is represented by the school of empiricism 
in mathematics. Vollenhoven wishes to demonstrate that these three ap-
proaches to mathematics, viz. intuitionism, formalism and empiricism, 
are “direct offshoots” of theism, psycho-monism and materialism, respec-
tively, taken as metaphysical systems (1918a: 3). To that end, history is 
called upon—the history of philosophy and of mathematics—to “lead” 
the demonstration (1918a: 3). However, we must leave these historical 
discussions, often impressively rich in conceptual detail, for what they are 
and concentrate on the thematic side of Vollenhoven’s work.37
37   It is instructive at this point to report on the structure of Vollenhoven’s dis-
sertation. The text consists of a short introduction and five chapters. The first chapter 
is “The constructive part”. Here Vollenhoven previews the solutions of the four major 
problems: (i) mathematics’ relation to logic as concerns necessity; (ii) mathematics’ rela-
tion to physics as concerns generality; (iii) number and the relevance of time, and (iv) 
space. The second chapter is called “The historical part”. In its three sections he discusses 
empiricism, formalism and intuitionism, respectively, from early classical times till the 
middle of the nineteenth century. In the section on empiricism there are discussions on 
Democritus, Epicurus, P. Gassendi, F. Bacon, J. Locke, J. d’Alembert, A. Comte and 
J.S. Mill; in that of formalism: Pythagorians, Heraclitus, Eleatics, Zeno, Sophists, Stoa, 
Indian and Arabian thought, Scholasticism, R. Lullus, F. Toletus, T. Hobbes, B. Spinoza, 
N. Malebranche, G. Berkeley, (the earlier) G.W. Leibniz, D. Hume; and in intuitionism 
we find: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, A. Augustine, Thomism and the Victorines, 
G. Galilei, R. Descartes, B. Pascal, (the later) G.W. Leibniz, I. Newton and I. Kant. The 
third chapter is entitled “The referential part” and discusses, in five sections, innovations 
that affected mathematics in the second half of the nineteenth century: non-Euclidean 
geometry, the logic of relations, “Gegenstandstheorie”, the revival of the doctrine of actual 
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B. Monism and dualism
The terms monism and dualism play an important role in Vollenhoven’s 
entire thinking. We need to be clear as to their use in his early thought.
 The context of their introduction in the early work is methodologi-
cal. Dualistic thought, in its theistic expression or as “Christian philos-
ophy”, distinguishes between “moral freedom” and “natural necessity” 
(1918a: 3). In other words, it accepts the possibility of freedom with-
out which deference to anything normative would be meaningless, over 
against natural necessity, which in itself is not to be denied.38 Monistic 
thought seeks to make do with only the natural realm. Monism, as here 
understood, is essentially reductionist, in virtue of which monism is also 
one-sided in most of the polarities it confronts, as indicated above.39 Du-
alism is not reductionist. But Vollenhoven throws interesting light on his 
methodological dualism in a summary statement with which his final 
chapter begins. He states:
Monism denies the unique nature of mathematical knowledge and in-
cludes it either with the natural sciences or with logic. Dualism, too, strives 
for unity. But it considers the opposition ratio-empirie to be too sharp to 
reduce the one to the other. Hence, it must look for unity in a common 
root: namely, in the synthetic a priori – this term taken in its broadest 
sense. (1918a: 403)
This ‘common root’ of the rational and the empirical elements is intrigu-
ing. It suggests a prior unity, not merely a unity in virtue of the rational 
infinity, and the arithmetization of geometry. The fourth chapter is “The critical part”. 
Empiricism, formalism and intuitionism are again discussed, but now in connection with 
(early twentieth century) contemporary authors. Its sections are “the newer empiricism”: 
C.F. Gauss, P.I. Lobatchewsky, G.F.B. Riemann and M. Pasch; “the newer formalism”: 
H. von Helmholtz, E. Schröder, G. Frege, logicism and the Marburg school, and separate 
sections on G. Mannoury and B. Russell; finally “the newer intuitionism”: B. Bolzano, 
H. Lotze and H. Bergson, and separate sections on H. Poincaré and L.E.J. Brouwer. The 
fifth and final chapter is “The thetical part”. Here Vollenhoven ties together the loose ends 
that have accrued in the previous discussions in a statement of his ‘theistic intuitionism’. 
John H. Kok reprinted the original text of this final chapter, along with a translation, in 
Appendix I of Kok 1992: 308-353.
38   I believe that this essentially Kantian characteristic of theism’s dualism is central 
to it, since it pertains to norms directly. Other features of dualism, such as “the principled 
distinguishing between human sciences and natural sciences, between rule of thought 
and natural law, between norm and fact” (1918a: 2) are more subsidiary. 
39   This leads among other things to unsatisfactory responses to error. For empiri-
cism error is simply a mistake in need of correction. Error in formalism is an infelicitous 
portrayal of facts, which a revised formulation can ease, in the sense of being more useful 
in a biological sense. The critical theist, distinguishing as he/she does between norm and 
(natural) law, will distinguish between error as anti-normative and error as mistake. Cf. 
1918a: 10-11.
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and the empirical elements coming into a synthesis, which is effectuated 
in knowledge, but a prior unity making knowledge possible. Let us look 
at other statements.
 In speaking of dualism, a Cartesian dualism—of body and soul, 
matter and consciousness (in their usual interpretation)—comes readily 
to mind. But Vollenhoven rejects this dualism as being an unsuitable il-
lustration of the dualism he means. In Cartesian dualism, the elements in 
polarity are mutually incompatible. His statement of rejection is instruc-
tive in connection with the problem at hand.
Descartes is a dualist and accepts the interaction [of body and soul]. But 
this [interaction] becomes impossible if body and soul are related as space 
[is] to thought. However much the interaction may be a conditio sine qua 
non for intuitionism, it cannot be accepted in this way. For, if the intuition 
is to offer its reconciliation, then the two [elements] that are to be recon-
ciled may not stand so far apart from each other as in Descartes, because 
then one only achieves that the intuition is foisted with two mutually in-
compatible predicates. (1918a: 99)
 Leaving the specific reference to Descartes for what it is, there is in 
this quote a more general statement about dualism en passant. The polar-
ity, that specifies a dualism, is said to stand in need of reconciliation, and 
the intuition is looked upon as providing this. To that end the polarity 
must not be so great as to forfeit the possibility of reconciliation. One 
must be able to relativize the difference. In this vein Vollenhoven states: 
“The fundamental thought of intuitionism proceeds from the currently 
experienced (beleefde) synthesis” (1918a: 104); and: “The point of the in-
tuition is the occurrent experience of multiplicity-unity (het beleven van 
veelheid-eenheid), and where this is impossible . . . it is better not to speak 
of intuition” (1918a: 105). So, whatever dualities there be, it must be 
possible to encompass the duality involved in an occasion of experience; 
or stated otherwise, the possibility of unity, as required for reconciliation, 
must be real. In that sense, the interaction, being a necessary condition 
for intuitionism, must entail some feature that keeps the inter-acting to-
gether.
 When we apply this interpretation to specific dualities we get a more 
precise picture of what Vollenhoven has in mind. At the point where 
he first introduces dualism he adds in a footnote: “When we speak of 
dualism we continually mean the approach that distinguishes matter 
and mind [stof en geest] qualitatively; monism denies every qualitative 
difference.”40 No doubt monism, in its reductionist sense, at bottom al-
40   1918a: 3, note 1. We add that the qualitative difference between matter and 
mind involves that of being spatial and non-spatial, respectively. But this is not a funda-
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lows only quantitative differences. But when Vollenhoven speaks of a 
qualitative difference I take him to mean the same sort of difference that 
is relevant to interaction, namely there being a polarity or duality that 
falls within the range of the mutual compatibility of the difference in 
quality—difference of contrast, not of contradiction. Thus some ‘com-
mon category’—or at least the possibility of a unity of contrast within an 
occurrent experience—is presupposed.
 If we turn to more specifically anthropological statements we find 
that the Self—Vollenhoven speaks consistently of the I (het Ik)—exem-
plifies such a point of unity of differences. “Our Self perceives spatially, 
but in the Self we distinguish soul and body” (1918a: 423; emphasis 
added). Here the Self is represented as containing or at least involving 
both soul and body. The dualism of soul and body remains intact, but it 
is clearly not the kind of dualism that Vollenhoven balked at in Descartes 
(as quoted above). “If we now take the Self as a higher synthesis in virtue 
of a determined connection between one soul and one body, then the Self 
is accordingly a synthesis of two substances” (1918a: 423-424). When we 
come to discuss Vollenhoven’s metaphysics, we will find him referring to 
the Self as itself being a substance. In this substance we find the “deter-
mined connection” between soul and body. Thus, though soul and body 
are themselves substances—usually referred to as ‘incomplete substances’, 
for neither is complete as regards the full human being—they do not for-
feit the existence of the unity of the Self, taken as ‘complete substance’. 
This Self, so it turns out, is an invariant principle for all psychical syn-
thesis, whether taking place in the ‘soul’ (as intra-mental experience) or 
in the ‘body’, i.e. in our bodily psycho-physical organization (cf. 1918a: 
429-432). The duality, which is real, still reckons with unification, the 
possibility of which must be provided by some principle or feature that 
includes whatever it is that counts as duality.
 The dualism of thought and being, the basis of epistemology in 
Vollenhoven, is also an example of a reconcilable dualism. “Dualism 
acknowledges the distinct character of both psyche and physis, and it 
connects the contribution of each in the coming to be of knowledge. 
Thought and what is foreign to thought [het denkvreemde], [namely] be-
ing, lie reconciled together in the life tension of the Self ” (1918a: 72). 
The epistemological problem is related to the anthropological one. That 
mental difference for Vollenhoven, for space itself calls for a connection with the human 
agent. In order to speak meaningfully of space one needs to accept both (non-spatial) 
things that interact and a receptive subject with a spatial form of sensibility (cf. 1918a: 
418). Thus there is a common, non-spatial ground in every encounter of mind and mat-
ter.
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which is foreign to thought is ‘brought to mind’, so to speak, via the 
forms of sensibility of the bodily organization and the intuition of intra-
mentality. Every judgment, that itself embodies a reconciliation of the 
subjective and the objective, attests to the effort of the Self that connects 
these. The anthropological and the epistemological moments are voiced 
together in the statement: “Intuitionism in its entirety has lost its right 
of being if soul and body are not distinguished qualitatively. But equally 
its bottom gives way if both stand in contradictory mutual opposition, 
interaction is impossible and accordingly the intuition includes incom-
patible predicates” (1918a: 102).
 Intuition’s bi-unity can give the impression that the unity is an effect 
resulting from a subsequent synthesis. That unification is not excluded, 
indeed that is the aim, and in the currently experienced synthesis this is 
what takes place as ‘psychical growth’.41 But the diversity that is synthe-
sized requires a factor that guarantees that the synthesis is possible. In 
that sense a condition of unity precedes the diversity and its interaction. 
The anthropological statements strongly suggest that the Self is an essence 
controlling through psychical synthesis two ‘species’, namely on the one 
hand that of the intra-mental life of intuition, including time as succes-
sion in occurrent experience, and on the other hand that of the psycho-
physical organization and its two forms of sensibility, space and time.42 
In other words the soul transcends the body in its inner mental life, but 
there is also a connection to the body’s psycho-physical organisation.
 Vollenhoven’s later use of the term monism and dualism in the con-
text of his problem-historical method—initiated in the early 1940s—is 
more restricted to cosmological and ontological features. In reflecting 
on his former use, Vollenhoven, in his later years, considered his former 
“normative dualism” (as I shall call it) of the early theistic intuitionism 
to be a variant of genetic or dynamic monism. The anthropological state-
41   Psychical synthesis is the whole point of intuition’s reconciliation. It is “a growth 
of consciousness such that it preserves and takes up into itself in the further process of 
development what has gone on before, retaining the unique nature of the components. To 
that end what is needed is not development in the sense of unfolding what is present in 
preformation, but in the sense of gathering up, that is, reality of succession” (1918a: 413).
42   We can add that with regard to the three primary psychical acts: recollection, 
sense-awareness and representation, the first is a requisite of intra-mental life, the other 
two are bound to the psycho-physical organization of the body (1918a: 420). Thought is 
more than just an intra-mental function, as will be clarified below, for it requires recol-
lection and psychical synthesis as substratum (1918a: 413). The a priori of intra-mental 
life, it being of ‘first rank’ as compared to the second rank of that of the psycho-physical 
organization, suggests that a higher value is attributed to the intra-mental than is attrib-
uted to the psycho-physical body.
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ments, quoted above, bear this out.43 We shall have more to say about 
Vollenhoven’s self-characterization of his early work in the addendum to 
chapter four.
 The above discussion of dualism has focussed in the main on the 
human being and epistemology, as rooted in the human being. This will 
continue to be the general locus of our interest in this chapter. But we 
here append the note that Vollenhoven also allows for a broader use of 
‘intuition’. “But also religion . . . can only be approached as an intuitive 
connection. . . . Accordingly theism acknowledges in its religious mysti-
cal intuition, that the duality of God and his creature continues to exist, 
for religion is bi-unity and, as with every synthesis of oppositions, can 
only be currently experienced” (1918a: 73). Here Vollenhoven’s dualistic 
notion of intuition, as applied to religion, gives the relation between God 
and mankind a dynamic experiential and unity-in-difference character.
V. “knowledge Is a relatIon”
We shall now delve more deeply into Vollenhoven’s thought. The discus-
sion of the intuition so far has not exhausted the main points of Vol-
lenhoven’s epistemology, in fact not even that of the intuition itself. He 
distinguishes knowledge and intuition, the focus of knowledge is on 
how it arises in the presentation of anything that is foreign to thought, 
while that of intuition is on the intra-mental and concerned with va-
lidity. In connection with the intuition Vollenhoven incorporates Mei-
nong’s Gegenstandstheorie. Both topics have characteristic features that 
are important to take into consideration when reviewing Vollenhoven’s 
development. In this section we shall discuss knowledge, in the next the 
systematics of the intuition will be elucidated along with the place that 
Gegenstandstheorie occupies.
 Knowledge is characterized as being a relation: “All knowledge as-
sumes a connection laid between our thought and the other [i.e. be-
ing]” (1918a: 130; cf. also pp. 186, 208, 412, 420). The characterization 
of knowledge as a relation places this theme squarely in the polarity of 
thought and being, i.e. the relation between the rational element and the 
empirical given. In connection with knowledge, in contradistinction to 
intuition, we can even say that being had priority over thought: “But the 
43   A statement of 1921 emphasizes unity in difference in another way. “‘A body and 
a soul are two’ and ‘a body and a soul are one’ cannot both be true in the same respect, but 
by introducing different points of view (e.g. substantia incompleta and completa) they can 
be connected: they are both true in a different respect”; Vollenhoven 1921c: 104. Cf. also 
chapter two, “Dualism”, of Kok 1992, for a more expansive discussion of Vollenhoven’s 
early dualism.
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supposition of knowing is existence and hence being is logically prior to 
thought. . . . Knowledge is a relation between the Self and the given; if 
one deletes the given, then knowledge is no more” (1918a: 382); “being 
is always richer than thought” (1918a: 437). The prominent example of 
this knowledge is that of perception. Vollenhoven distinguishes between 
outer and inner perception. Intuition, being peculiar to inner perception, 
will be discussed later. Outer or regular perception calls into play condi-
tions of sensibility of the psycho-physical organization, which thereby 
delineates what may be called the phenomenal order. But first we should 
pause to sort out the terminology involving ‘knowing’ and also say some-
thing about the word ‘relation’.
A. The semantics of ‘knowing’
An important difference for Vollenhoven between knowledge and intu-
ition lies in the characterization of knowledge as being a possession, while 
intuition is a consciousness or a mental state (1918a: 440). Terminologi-
cally, the difference is caught in Dutch in the distinction between “ken-
nen” en “weten”. The latter term is usually followed by a pronoun, often 
‘that’ (weten dat). English lacks a similar terminological distinction. Both 
meanings fall under the use of ‘knowing’. However, there is a distinction 
in the use of ‘knowing’ in connection with the presence or absence of a 
pronoun. When ‘knowing’ occurs without a pronoun, as in ‘I know my 
way about’ or ‘she knows the president personally’, the word ‘know’ puts 
the subject in direct relation to the object. In such cases one can speak of 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’. But when ‘knowing’ is followed by a pro-
noun, as in ‘knowing that’, ‘knowing which’, ‘knowing how’, ‘knowing 
when’, ‘knowing where’, etc., then the grammatical object of the sentence 
indicates a state (‘I know that it was wrong’) or a capacity (‘He knows 
how to play a guitar’) or simply consciousness (‘She knows when to leave 
the party’; ‘You know which bike is yours’). When knowledge is said to 
be a relation, we shall take it that Vollenhoven means ‘knowledge by 
acquaintance’. This at least fits in well with Vollenhoven’s use. (The given 
examples of acquaintance only require “kennen” in Dutch, the cases of 
‘knowing + pronoun’ require ‘weten + pronoun’.)44
44   We should also clarify our rendition of Vollenhoven’s distinct uses of “ervaren” 
and “beleven”. The former is ‘experience’, but the latter has no direct equivalent in Eng-
lish. (There is the German “Erleben”.) It is experience actually taking place and (at the 
same time) one’s being sensitive to its taking place, so that one is directly affected by it. 
One is usually aware or is directly conscious of the experience (as a state of consciousness). 
But Vollenhoven also allows for an affect that is unconscious, such as when asleep or 
unaware of being influenced (cf. 1918a: 440). I shall render the noun form “het beleven” 
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 It was Bertrand Russell who made the phrase ‘knowledge by ac-
quaintance’ popular at the beginning of the twentieth century. He meant 
by acquaintance a ‘direct cognitive relation’ between a subject and an 
object, whereby the converse of this relation is that of presentation. “That 
is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as 
to say that O is present to S.”45 Two kinds of objects were especially fa-
voured by Russell as being the objects with which we are acquainted in a 
primal sense: universals and sense-data. But this is acquaintance within 
a reductionist program, which Vollenhoven did not endorse. Normally 
we would not hesitate to say that we are acquainted with things and 
persons (‘I know/am acquainted with just the person you mean’), for we 
know these complex objects (or persons)—to the extent that we know 
anything—in virtue of their presentation. In interpreting Vollenhoven 
(and leaving Russell aside here) one can say that acquaintance takes place 
at the common sense level, the level at which an object presents or gives 
itself, by standing in relation to us,46 in order for it to be known. In this 
sense, presentation involves an order of appearing secured by the objects 
presented.
B. Relations, their nature
The word ‘relation’ too requires some preliminary discussion. The topic 
of relations is complicated and open to various choices. Vollenhoven 
made a number of choices in his early thought, and others later. Though 
the reasons are not always clear, we need to signal the choices and also to 
be aware of the alternatives.
 For Vollenhoven in his early years, relations are always dual. A rela-
tion involves two terms and only two terms.47 There is little said by way 
as ‘the occurrent experience’, the verb itself “te beleven” as ‘to currently experience’ and 
the adjectival use, as in “beleefde synthese”, as ‘currently experienced synthesis’. It would 
appear that A.N. Whitehead’s “occasion of experience” expresses a closely similar mean-
ing, though Vollenhoven’s use precedes that of Whitehead. There is a disjunction between 
“kennen” (to know, to be acquainted with) and “beleven” (to currently experience or be 
aware of ). The former is oriented to a given object that the Self comes to know, the latter 
to an effect upon the Self, usually one that one is aware of (cf. 1918a: 431).
45   Russell 1911: 148. 
46   The term ‘relation’ is used here as a feature that binds or connects things and/or 
persons together. When used to indicate a thing or person in a descriptive sense, as when 
an uncle is a relation or a friend an acquaintance, the use is derivative.
47   Vollenhoven would appear to insist on this point. A footnote reads: “In order 
to prevent all misunderstanding, one is reminded here that, for intuitionism, a relation 
always consists of [steeds bestaat in] two predicates” (1918a: 66, footnote 2; cf. also p. 
12). The note is appended to a statement about knowledge being a relation, which, in 
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of argument to support this limitation to binary relations. There is noth-
ing implausible in accepting relations with more than two terms, e.g. 
‘between’ requires at least three terms, as does ‘give’, in order to satisfy 
their meaning. Vollenhoven will acknowledge this later, when the early 
specific emphasis on binary relations has changed.
 Relations being limited to binary relations, their two terms can be 
generally described as referent and relatum. The referent of a relation is 
the a quo, the term from which the relation proceeds, and the relatum is 
the ad quem, the term to which it proceeds (1918a: 86, 406). This also 
allows for specification of the sense (or direction) of a relation, it being 
always from the referent and to the relatum. This sense of a relation makes 
it important to distinguish a relation (‘aRb’, short for ‘a stands in the 
relation R to b’) and its converse (‘bRa’). When the difference of sense is 
essential to a relation, ‘aRb’ excludes ‘bRa’.48
 But the most important facet by far is (what might be called) the 
‘make-up’ of a relation. Relations, so Vollenhoven insists, presuppose 
suitable predicates in each of its terms (1918a: 12). It is in virtue of these 
predicates of terms that a connection or relation can be laid between 
the terms. The relation, as a “laid connection” (gelegd verband), elicits a 
feature of the relational situation that is not itself constitutional (so to 
speak); only the predicates of the related terms are constitutional. The 
truth-content of a relational statement, namely what one comes to pos-
sess when knowing what is stated, is itself warranted only in light of rel-
evant predicates of the terms of the relation. This view of a relation—or 
rather of its justification—is consonant with the (so-called) ‘monadic’ 
view of relations, which, as it turns out, is consistent with monadological 
features of Vollenhoven’s metaphysics.49
 Vollenhoven’s reading of, for example, Leibniz, Kant, Lotze, Mei-
combination with Leibniz’s view of the inherence of a predicate in a subject, enforces that 
“knowledge of extra-mental reality is dependent equally on both the [knowing] subject as 
referent and the [given] object as relatum” (1918a: 66). So this understanding of a rela-
tion finds a prime illustration in epistemology. 
48   For specific relations the difference in direction may not be relevant, as when a 
relation is symmetrical (such as ‘equal to’) or non-symmetrical (‘brother of ’). For asym-
metrical relations the difference is always relevant, for then the relation implies the nega-
tion of the converse (such as ‘east’ vs. ‘west’, ‘left’ vs. ‘right’, etc.). 
49   At one point Vollenhoven makes a distinction between “real relations” and “ideal 
relations”, in a discussion about the difference between synthesis in music and in math-
ematics. The distinction seems to be one of characterization, viz. factual over against 
ideal, not one of kind: monadic versus non-monadic (1918a: 168-169). The distinction 
between factually real and ideal is important, it being analogous to that between physics 
and metaphysics.
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nong and Russell made him aware of the problem of relations. Relational 
facts have tended to be discredited. Statements that involve relations have 
often been analysed in such a way as to try to circumvent them. A re-
lational statement is then replaced with one or more statements with a 
(supposedly more trustworthy) subject-predicate structure. Russell has 
given an explicit account of three different views as to the nature of rela-
tions.50 We call brief attention to each of these.
 (i) There is, to start with, the monistic (or holistic) view, which holds 
that a relation is a property of the whole formed by the terms that the 
relational statement is about. Take ‘aRb’, say, ‘a loves b’, this statement 
is about a and b. Consider the terms as forming a whole, say denoted 
as ‘a and b’, then the relation is taken to be a property that is attributed 
to the whole (in our example: ‘a and b are in love’). This view reduces 
a relation to a (unitary) property. An evident liability of this reduction 
is that the view does not preserve the distinction between a and b. The 
whole formed by the terms taken together does not preserve an order, 
and also the diversity of the terms is effaced. The emphasis on ‘wholes’ 
generally signals an attitude of disdain towards plurality or diversity. The 
model monist/holist in this regard is F.H. Bradley. In his Appearance and 
Reality (1893), reality is the Absolute, considered to be the whole, while 
plurality and diversity are relegated to appearances, at most attributable 
to the Absolute as aspects. Here relations are explained away as being 
ephemeral. 
 (ii) The second view Russell distinguishes is the monadistic view. 
Here too relational statements are supplanted by predicative statements. 
In this case a relational statement is replaced by two subject-predicate 
statements. The meaning of the relational term is apportioned over prop-
erties attributed to each of the terms. Thus the statement ‘aRb’ is inter-
preted as being equivalent to the conjunction of ‘(a)r1b’ and ‘(b)r2a’. If, 
say, ‘aRb’ is ‘a exceeds b’, then ‘r1b’ denotes the predicate ‘is greater than 
b’, and it is attributed to a, while ‘r2a’ denotes the predicate ‘is less than 
a’, and it is attributed to b. The two predicative statements together are 
taken to be equivalent to the original relational statement. In this case 
too, as with monism, there is a problem with the order of the terms, i.e. 
the directional sense of a relation. This order is not preserved, unless the 
order of the two predicative statements in the conjunction is to account 
50   Cf. Russell 1903, especially “Chapter XXVI. Asymmetrical relations”, pp. 218-
226. Vollenhoven was well acquainted with Russell’s work. His 98 page discussion of 
Russell’s thought (up to about 1915) in 1918a is critical in tone on account of Russell’s 
‘formalism’. But Russell’s anti-psychologism and his appreciation of Meinong, made him 
(at least technical facets of his work) more congenial than Vollenhoven explicitly admits.
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for this. But the conjunctive connection between statements is in itself 
symmetrical, so this is not the way to preserve intrinsic order.
 A different sort of objection can also be raised against the monadistic 
interpretation of relations. Concerning the two predicates, each expresses 
in its meaning one of the terms of the relation as relational factor, not 
however as a term receiving a predicate but as part of what is predicated 
(such as in the example above: the predicate attributed to a, namely ‘r1b’, 
involves the meaning of b and the relational feature, ‘r1’, as a specific fea-
ture; likewise the predicate attributed to b, ‘r2a’, involves the meaning of 
a and the relational feature, ‘r2’, also as specific feature). This tends, to say 
the least, to undercut the intended reduction. The ‘reduction’ achieved is 
not the elimination of a relation—indeed, it is implicitly replaced by two 
other relations—but rather the re-interpretation of a relation as the work 
of the mind that deals with meaning or representations, for only their 
meaning figures in the expression of the predicates. The arch-monadist is 
Leibniz. He held that the relations a thing has to all other things are pro-
grammed into the ‘perceptions’ of that thing and are intrinsic to it. This 
is an ontology that supports monadic relations.51 Relations here are not 
ephemeral, as in the monistic view, but their being ‘laid’ in the things, as 
work of the mind on the basis of predicates of the related terms, makes a 
relation specific to the terms.
 (iii) Russell’s third view is the one he himself advocates. He calls 
it the view of ‘external relations’. Relations are just as real and general 
as properties, and if a property can be attributed to a thing or subject, 
without requiring inhering predicates, then there is nothing objection-
able to attributing a relation to two or more subjects. Upon accepting 
relations, the full ‘logic of relations’ can be developed that does justice to 
the properties of symmetry, asymmetry and non-symmetry and transitiv-
ity, intransitivity and non-transitivity. In virtue of these properties, one 
needs to accept that the terms that enter a relation are not affected by the 
relation (though of course the terms gain relational properties in virtue 
of their standing in relation). They must retain their self-identity within 
the application of this logic. Also the relations themselves retain a general 
(or universal) meaning, and are not particularized into specific relations 
by the terms. That would create havoc with general logical rules, e.g. 
transitivity, for in the rule of transitivity: ‘(x,y,z) if xRy and yRz then xRz’, 
the three occurrences of the R must be identical, i.e. not affected by the 
nature of the (pairs of ) terms related in each occurrence of the relation. 
Thus relations are here said to be ‘external’ to the terms they relate.
51   Cf. Leibniz 1976a. 
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 Vollenhoven’s insistence that intuitionism treats relations as consist-
ing of two predicates puts his intuitionism within the monadistic camp, 
though in a way that does not make relations, in their own epistemic 
sense, merely the work of the mind. Later, in Isagoge Philosophiae there 
is distinct evidence that Vollenhoven allowed for external relations at a 
very fundamental level. Vollenhoven was never partial to monism, in the 
holistic sense of the word. However, in his early work (here in discus-
sion), though he does not advocate an ‘external view’ of relations, his 
use of relations is nevertheless nuanced. At the epistemological level one 
proceeds from ‘the given’, in the way it gives itself, i.e. in the ‘appear-
ance’ of relations, and one knows relations accordingly. Hence, here one 
can allow and make full use of a ‘logic of relations’, without needing to 
keep their monadic ‘make-up’ in mind. But at the metaphysical level, the 
‘monadic make-up’ is essential. “[D]ualism acknowledges substances and 
relations in which they stand, hence it can accept this logic of relations 
as method for the sciences that occupy themselves with relations, but not 
for metaphysics, which after all also speaks of substances [with inherent 
predicates]” (1918a: 157-158). The ‘monadic reduction’ of relations has 
important consequences for the interpretation of the knowledge situa-
tion. Stated in a nutshell: if ‘knowledge is a relation’, viz. knowledge that 
relates the knower (thought) and the given (being), then that relation, 
which is attested to by the truth-content one possesses, must presuppose 
certain features of the knower and other features of the given without 
which knowledge, as possessed, would not be justified.52 But before de-
veloping this further, there is another feature of relations that needs at-
tention, namely what Alexius Meinong calls ‘the partial coincidence’ of 
relations and complexes.
C. Complexes
The problem often raised in connection with relations is how one is to 
understand a relation’s relating. Quite irrespective of the view of relations 
one adopts, though the external view makes the problem particularly no-
ticeable, there is the question: if a relation is to relate (two) terms, doesn’t 
one need new relations to relate the relation to the terms? If this be ac-
cepted as a genuine problem, we can see that an infinite regress threatens. 
Why should the new relations introduced to relate the original relation 
52   Cf. “For if our Self wants to acquire knowledge of something else, then revela-
tion of this other is necessary, as well as the reception [opneming] of this other by the Self. 
Hence knowledge is itself a relation. . .” (1918a: 186; cf. also pp. 66, 228-229). As will 
become clear, the “revelation” required on the side of the object is met with ‘forms of 
sensibility’ on the side of the subject.
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to the two terms be able to do the job if the original relation requires this 
assistance. Would not the new relations in turn require relations so as to 
be able to relate? But then every appeal to relations requires additional 
relations to make the prior relations work. This clearly yields an infinite 
regress that ends either in having to accept that any relational situation is 
infinitely complex, or to reject as self-defeating any serious entertainment 
of relations. The acceptance of an actual infinity places the problem ‘at 
infinity’, but without aiding the understanding in any way. (Vollenhoven 
would add that its concept, interpreted as completed endlessness, is con-
tradictory.) Thus the rejection of relations seems to be the only acceptable 
outcome. F.H. Bradley, the most renowned British neo-Idealist of his day 
and who initially inspired Russell, developed a host of arguments that 
aimed to demonstrate the incoherence of any notion of relations.
 But Meinong, and later Russell, did not accept this undercutting of 
relations. At least, irrespective of the possible value of a reduction, one 
still has to face up to the relevance of a relational statement in connec-
tion with its truth-value. A relation is nothing if it does not relate. This 
requires, in the first place, that we treat relations as being of a different 
category than the terms related by the relation. If one’s asking how a 
relation relates implies the positioning of a relation as term ‘between’ the 
terms it is to relate, then one has implicitly reified or hypostatized the re-
lation, treating it as a thing. We end up with a set of three things, namely 
the two terms of the relation and the relation itself, which together do 
not yield a related whole. This is not the way to understand relations. 
Secondly, one also needs to take into account that the truth-value of a 
relational statement is affected, generally, by the order of the terms of the 
relation. When A loves B, this does not imply that B, in turn, loves A. 
The directional ‘sense’ of a relation comes into play here.
 To facilitate meaningful discussion of relations, Meinong proposed 
that every relation is pared to a concomitant complex of the terms as re-
lated by the relation. Meinong spoke of a “partial coincidence” here, i.e. 
“where there is a complex, there is a relation, and vice versa”.53 Com-
plexes require parts, while relations require terms. One may specify the 
partial coincidence, in its double formulation, as follows: (i) Given a 
complex C, this must have parts, and these parts, say a and b, must stand 
in some relation R to each other. (But R cannot be taken to be an addi-
tional element forming a class with a and b, for that would undercut the 
53   Grossmann 1974: 66. Vollenhoven quotes Meinong directly: “The law: ‘Where 
there is a complex, there is a relation, and vice versa’ [is what Meinong] calls ‘the principle 
of partial coincidence’”; 1918a: 168; cf. also pp. 167, 228, 319).
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relation, which must actually relate.) (ii) Given a relation R, there must 
be terms, and these terms, say a and b, must form the parts of a complex 
C. (But C cannot be the unity of the complex as whole, for that would 
cancel or supersede the parts a and b.) The partial coincidence between 
considering a and b as parts of a complex whole on the one hand and as 
terms of relating relation on the other hand, reminds one that the parts of 
a complex have relational relevance, and that terms of a relation contrib-
ute to a complex unity. Partial coincidence does not privilege one view of 
relations. It defers hypostatization, either of the unity of the whole or of 
the relation as element.
 Now what is the relevance of these systematic distinctions in con-
nection with Vollenhoven?
D. Knowledge and appearance
When Vollenhoven characterizes knowledge as a relation, several things 
are entailed. I first list these and then discuss each in turn.
 In the first place there is the acquaintance on the part of the human 
agent with whatever it is that presents itself as given. This is not a static 
‘here is the human agent’ (situated on the pole of thought) and ‘there 
is the presented object’ (the pole of being). “Knowledge arises through 
interaction” (1918a: 283), the action being something that the human 
agent must initiate with respect to the given object in order to come to 
a knowledge of it. Knowing has its own dynamics, and the knowledge 
gained is formulated in judgments and concepts.
 In the second place, there is the principle of partial coincidence be-
tween a relation and a complex. Knowledge as relation that is laid know-
ingly calls up the companion statement about the knowledge situation as 
complex. Vollenhoven identifies these ‘parts’ of the concomitant complex 
as referent and relatum. “So now too knowledge is a relation between a 
rational being and a given something, hence is dependent on both sub-
ject and object. But no relation without a complex, without order in the 
referent and relatum, and without a non-parallel connection between 
these orders” (1918a: 412). The referent is the knowing subject, while 
the relatum is the given object. But neither is simple. Each introduces a 
thematic complexity that calls for discussion.
 Finally, in the third place, there is the consequence of Vollenhoven’s 
specific monadic view of a relation. If a relation “always consists of” two 
predicates, this seems to say that knowledge, in being a relation between 
the knowing subject and the given object, itself reduces to certain char-
acteristics of the knowing subject and certain other characteristics of the 
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given object respectively. The question is what this ‘reduction’ consists 
of and what its status is. Is the dynamics of knowledge ‘dissolved’ into 
subjective and objective characteristics? We find that the discussion here 
shifts from a discussion of the origin of knowledge, viz. coming to know, 
to the legitimacy of knowledge, viz. how knowledge can be justified. This 
last (or third) point requires us to make explicit our states of conscious-
ness or awareness that accompany our knowing, as ‘predicates’ of the Self. 
States of consciousness or awareness involve thought turned reflectively 
towards the Self ’s own states. In other words it requires us to turn to the 
intuition. And there is also the question: in what sense are ‘predicates’ of 
the non-Self relevant?
 But first, a fuller discussion of these three points in question is in 
order.
 
1. Getting to know
As to acquaintance (the first point), the simplest example of the dynamics 
of knowledge acquisition is extra-mental perception. A human being per-
ceives an object, such as a book or a tree. Perception as relation presup-
poses the contrast of thought and being. In perception the object is given. 
It exists independently of our thought. It “reveals itself to us through its 
relations to us” (1918a: 418) of presentation. The perceiver, in turn, also 
has states of awareness that can play a role in perception. But when we say 
that we see a book, we don’t see our relations to the book (1918a: 418, 
431). (Often we are not even aware of our states as perceiver.) Thus, the 
acquisition of knowledge is oriented to the object perceived. This remains 
a primal situation, whatever the attendant awareness and the means are 
that accompany this primal given.
 Now the simplest specimen of knowledge, gained through percep-
tion, is expressed as a judgment in subject-predicate form: ‘A is b’, say: 
‘The book is thick’ (cf. 1918a: 276). The knowledge gained itself attests 
to thought’s processing or working over or assimilating (verwerken) of 
the given in its being receptive to it. Through this ‘working over’ of the 
given by the Self, as knowing agent, a predicate is formed, in our case ‘(is) 
thick’. Of all that the book ‘presents’, this feature is noticed, selected and 
specifically attributed to it knowingly.
 But one can also gain a concept of the object. Not only can we per-
ceive the book to be thick, but also its having well-thumbed pages, heavy 
covers, faded colours, an out-dated font, etc. In a concept one brings 
together features noticed of the object, and keeps these together in refer-
ence to the object. A concept of the object progressively becomes more 
Philosophy in the Making
112
complete, in the sense of becoming more adequate to what the object 
reveals of its being, as we become more and more acquainted with it. 
At the same time one realizes that the richness of the thing’s being, pre-
cludes the practical possibility of ever attaining a fully adequate concept 
of it. Any actual, less-than-adequate concept of a thing acts as a proleptic 
concept (begripsrepresentant), in the sense that it, factually, does deputy 
duty for the adequate conceptual knowledge one is striving to achieve in 
the process of becoming more fully acquainted.54 The knowing agent has 
a role in both judgment and proleptic concept, but the focus is on the 
thing known. And, between judgment and proleptic concept mutually, 
proleptic concepts are formed on judgments.55
 The focus on the object needs, it would seem, its own warrant to 
secure the formation of judgments and concepts. For the object is selected 
in order to serve as referent or subject of the judgment and the recipient 
of predicates. And in a concept, too, though no actual concept of the ob-
ject is adequate to its complexity, there needs to be the acknowledgement 
of the distinct being that one is coming to know (to some degree), quite 
apart from the degree to which this is private to the knower. (Vollen-
hoven quotes Russell, in evident agreement, who states “different people 
see the same object as different shapes according to their point of view”; 
1918a: 329). Vollenhoven is actually somewhat cavalier here, to the ex-
tent that he does not press the point. But he holds that anything has 
distinct being in virtue of an idea. An idea is an extra-mental archetype, 
or “thing-law”, of a given object, which has a limitative relevance for ev-
ery attempt at knowing the object. A full understanding would count as 
an adequate concept of the idea or thing-law, but no actual concept can 
fully measure up to it, though may approach it in an on-going, limita-
tive sense. In his own words: “If one understands an adequate concept 
to be the complete expression of the thing-law, then this has limitative 
value. But the given, that is, the archetype of the [adequate] concept that 
54   Essential to a concept is its reference to an object or its extension. In concrete 
concepts (as in our discussion) the object is named or described, but in the case of general 
concepts this will be replaced by a variable, this being the placeholder for reference. In 
other words, concepts generally have a feature that is indeterminate or variable (cf. 1918a: 
163). This also distinguishes a concept from the mere grasp of features or characteristics 
(i.e. intensions). Concepts are not formed arbitrarily by mere thought; rather “things 
and thing-relations enter into our subjective forms, [hence] the interaction of things is a 
necessary condition for forming thing-concepts” (1918a: 229).
55   In discussion, John H. Kok referred me to the manuscript on Bergson, written in 
1921, in which Vollenhoven states that, in knowledge acquisition, as judgments accrue, 
(proleptic) concepts, which are based on these, are able to become more adequate. Vol-
lenhoven 1921ms.
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exists only as limit, does enter into a synthesis with the Gegenstände [i.e. 
objective meanings, occurring as predicates; A.T.]. That synthesis is to 
be found in the judgment in which a proleptic concept is the subject of 
a predicate, . . .” (1918a: 411; cf. also p. 440). Clearly, this broaching of 
ideas is metaphysical. Ideas do not figure in an explicit sense in the per-
ceptive getting-to-know, but they are called upon to account for knowl-
edge, in warranting the recognition of the distinctive being one becomes 
acquainted with. Epistemology cannot be adequate without metaphysics, 
which is why it is recounted at this point. When we discuss Vollenhoven’s 
metaphysics, we will return to this use of ideas.
2. The concomitant complex of the knowledge relation.
But—now turning to the second point—every relation or laid connec-
tion has a concomitant complex, in this case that of referent and relatum.56 
In turning to the concomitant complex of the knowledge relation, one 
finds features that occasion the dynamics of knowing. The referent and 
the relatum are each part of larger ‘orders’. There can be no knowledge as 
relation “without order in the referent and relatum, and without a non-
parallel connection between these orders” (1918a: 412). Vollenhoven 
gives various formulations of the relation of referent and relatum, such 
as “the relation between subject and object, between the Self as subject 
of knowing and the non-Self as object of knowing, between the Self and 
the Ding an sich” (1918a: 335). At one point he simply speaks of “a Self 
and a non-Self ” (1918a: 427). These are partial descriptions, for we find 
a fuller description in the following: “If you don’t exercise your thinking 
you will not be able to follow a scientific presentation, and if your eyes 
are defective you will have difficulty with experimentation. With that it is 
granted that ideals should lead us in the use of understanding and sense-
organ. Knowing, then, is not a correspondence of being and thinking, 
but a working over of the given by the Self in its psycho-physical orga-
nization in subjection to the norms and ideals set for human knowing” 
(1918a: 410).
 The emphasis here is on the occasion of knowing. But this is not 
to deny the ‘order of the object’. In fact, our discussion of ideas in the 
previous section, whereby ideas, as thing-laws, govern things in their ap-
pearing and their interacting, has broached a very essential feature of the 
order of the object. Objects belong to a metaphysical order. There is more 
56   In a summarizing discussion Vollenhoven states that “[e]very relation assumes 
a relatum and a referent” (1918a: 437). Hence, for any relation one can consider its 
concomitant complex, not just the epistemological ‘knowing relation’. We return to this 
below.
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to be said, but let us first return to the Self and the order of the knowing 
subject, that initiates knowing through interaction.
 The interaction through which knowledge (judgments and con-
cepts) arises, is contextual. Undeniably the given, though acknowledged 
to involve a reality that is foreign to thought, only gets to be known in 
terms of conditions of sensibility, which involves spatial and temporal 
coordination and the ‘point of view’ of the knower. The factual mediation 
in the active interaction of coming to know something does not forfeit 
the object’s being given, though this ‘giving’ or appearing will be different 
from different points of view. The appearance, as revealed by a thing, calls 
up a representation in the mind of the person viewing, in correlation with 
the psycho-physical organization of that person. Vollenhoven states: “the 
mind [geest] is structured in such a way that a specific colour-awareness in 
the psychical [series] corresponds with a certain frequency of vibrations 
in the physical series (causa occasionalis)” (1918a: 328). This distinction 
between appearance and representation would collapse if there were no 
identity conditions relevant to the thing and its appearances. (Here the 
acknowledgement of the idea of the object is implicit.) Thus the object 
known is not of our making, though our representations of it (which 
come to expression in judgments about it) are limited, being as they are 
in virtue of our own psycho-physical limitations in interaction with the 
mind, a limitation that makes every conceptualization of the object pro-
leptic. If the given were not acknowledged as given, there would be little 
sense in attending more carefully in perception, or attempt to diminish 
handicaps in our sensory system, or to sharpen our concepts to be less 
inadequate in the face of the object than they already are. All this attests 
to there being ideals towards optimizing our bodily sensibility, operative 
in the occasion of knowing.
 Beside the mediating role of the psycho-physical organization, as 
relevant to the object’s being given, there is also mediation that concerns 
the knowing subject. The ‘working over’ (assimilation or processing) ex-
ecuted by the knowing subject needs to be guided. The knowing subject 
is not a mere copy machine, providing a copy of the object in terms 
of the subject’s own awareness (à la formalism), nor is it a behavioural 
reaction pattern induced by the given’s functioning as stimulus (as em-
piricism would have it). The Self seeks to know, and to that end relevant 
norms are called upon by which to adjudicate between a result (whether 
as judgment or as concept) that is acceptable as knowledge and one that 
s unacceptable, as being erroneous.57 The norms are a distinct partici-
57   Accordingly, the human Self is not in itself a knowing subject, but needs a norm 
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pant in the game of knowledge, alongside of the two other elements, the 
rational element of thought and the given object (of being). The norms 
Vollenhoven singles out in particular are the two logical principles of 
contradiction and excluded middle.58 Naturally, there must also be a ‘will 
to know’, meaning that there must be a willingness on the part of the Self 
to come to know in a way that avoids error. To that end there needs to be 
a willingness to submit to norms.
 We note in passing that Vollenhoven is not very explicit about this 
‘will to know’ in its own right. It seems to be implied in any striving to 
know. In any case, the Self is not on its own accord a ‘knowing subject’, 
apart from the recognition of and submission to norms. And, of course, 
the relevance of norms and ideals indicates that thought is embedded 
in a thinking (rational) being, who exercises its (subjective) rationality 
in the dynamics of knowing. So there is a subjective rational order that 
is governed by norms and ideals, as well as an objective rational order—
the metaphysical order—of things and relations, as determined by ideas. 
(The topic of the two rational orders will return in the discussion of the-
ism below.)
3. Monadism and the knowledge relation
The monadistic view of relations—the third of the three points listed 
above—is most evident in accounting for the relation of acquaintance. 
The Self that comes to know or to be acquainted with a given object is 
capable of doing so in virtue of (what might be called) conditions of 
mentality. We see with our eyes and, when we think, there is cognitive 
awareness. But in the factual dynamics of coming to know, i.e. in form-
ing judgments of perception and concepts of things discerned, we are 
usually not explicitly aware of the role of our eyes or the procedure of 
to attune the Self in an appropriate way. This norm—or any norm—is not in the Self as 
such; norms are extra-mental (cf. 1918a: 430). They have a domain of validity that calls 
for recognition. In summary, Vollenhoven’s view of receptivity is (in the main) Kantian, 
his view of mind, decidedly not. For Kant, cognition proceeds from a spontaneity of 
mind. 
58   “[L]ogic must remain formal, hence it can never offer a content . . .; for without 
a content to process not a single judgment can ever be deduced from the logical norms” 
(1918a: 407; I believe Vollenhoven means to say “in accordance with”, instead of “from” 
[uit]). The relevance of the principle of excluded middle—in virtue of which the denial 
of a falsehood yields a truth (cf. 1918a: 313, 407)—is not elaborated on in Vollenhoven’s 
early work. Treating logical principles as norms has some affinity with what has come to 
be known as ‘natural deduction’. In systems of natural deduction one does not proceed 
from axioms, i.e. statements taken to be true, but from rules that are instructions for do-
ing or permission to do something. Cf. Alexander 1971: 246 ff.
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our thought, for the focus is on the object perceived. But it cannot be 
denied that there are conditions, both on the side of the Self (knowing 
subject) and on the side of the object (given thing), which, when not 
complied with, would undercut any ‘laying of a connection’ that knowl-
edge attests to. Thus certain ‘predicates’ need to hold with respect to, on 
the one hand, the Self, as knowing subject, so as to be able to know the 
object, and on the other hand the given object, the non-Self, for it to be 
knowable by the Self, before there can be any (legitimate) knowledge 
acquisition.
 But if one applies the formal wording as to what a relation is—in 
a ‘monadic view’ a relation “always consists of” (1918a: 66, note 2) two 
predicates of the related terms—in a direct way to knowledge as relation, 
confusion may result. Does this mean that what we have described with 
respect to this relation, i.e. the coming to know an object through work-
ing it over mentally, is actually (really!) to be seen as consisting of factors 
that are predicable of the Self on the one hand and the given object on 
the other? When knowledge is said to arise in a process of interaction of 
thought and being, must we count this as illusory, or at most a first guess 
(or a construct of the mind) in the face of what knowledge ‘actually’ is, 
namely the confluence of certain features (‘predicates’) of the Self and 
the object? I believe this would be a wrong interpretation of what Vol-
lenhoven means. For that would mean that in the order of knowledge, 
where the relation is grasped in its own ‘truth-content’ (so to speak), 
there is no ‘reality in the knowing’. Knowledge is of a phenomenal or-
der, but the phenomena nevertheless are real. The difference between 
knowing and straying (being in error) are important and real. We will 
see that, when discussing science, Vollenhoven attributes to knowledge 
its own kind of reality, viz. a ‘metalogical’ reality that is distinct from the 
psychical reality of the Self and the objective reality of the world—a real-
ity that grows through the interaction of the Self and the world in the 
process of increasing our knowing. Hence I take the formal wording of 
a relation, in its application to knowledge, as expressing the conditions 
to which any case (occasion) of knowledge must comply. The conditions 
that hold for knowledge acquisition are not themselves knowledge com-
ponents—as if one will now deal with the ‘real’ knowing that makes the 
acquired knowing second best. They are the conditions that validate or 
legitimate the possession of knowledge. These conditions do not replace 
the genesis of knowledge with an alternative procedure. (The distinction, 
quoted above, between epistemology, which makes use of relations, and 
metaphysics, which reduces relations to substances with inherent predi-
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cates, is crucial here.) It is like driving a car. The conditions for driving are 
having a vehicle in good working order and a driver who is capable, care-
ful and licensed to drive. But this says nothing about an actual drive from 
A to B, although the conditions hold throughout any actual drive taken. 
Knowledge acquisition is likewise a way of getting from A (ignorance) 
to B (knowledge possession). But the conditions for coming to know do 
not prefigure but certify the possession as such. So what conditions hold 
here?
 Vollenhoven introduces the distinction between knowledge and in-
tuition, i.e. between knowing and (occurrent) awareness (beleven), be-
tween what is mentally possessed (knowledge) and what counts as a mental 
state (consciousness), as requisite for knowledge possession. The intuition 
gets at what actually affects the Self, of which the Self becomes aware 
in self-reflection (or self-consciousness). Here we find the Self to have a 
certain make-up that conditions knowledge possession. In other words, 
here are the ‘predicates’ of the Self by which the Self participates in the 
relation of knowledge. This topic, which is that of the intuition, is so 
important and central to Vollenhoven’s early work that it requires its own 
discussion, which we will turn to very shortly below.
 But there is also the ‘object side’ to consider. Here too there must be 
something that helps ‘validate’ knowledge. The object needs to be ‘know-
able’. But what is the ‘knowability’ of the non-Self?
 We quoted Vollenhoven (at the beginning of section D.2.) as saying 
that every relation, not just knowledge as relation, consists of relatum and 
referent (cf. 1918a: 437). That means: “We distinguish in the given, thing 
and relation (first-order relations, forces that things exert on each other)” 
(1918a: 418). These ‘first-order relations’, also called ‘thing-relations’, at-
test to a pluralism in the given. We don’t just come to know solitary 
things, but also the interrelations between them. But these interrelations 
are indicative of their own mutual interactions, hence in an ultimate for-
mulation Vollenhoven speaks of things and their forces—in another con-
text we find him proceeding from this assumption: “For if the essence of 
things is law [i.e. idea] and their relations force [kracht]. . .” (1918a: 346). In 
speaking of force here we have the monadological (Leibnizian)59 reduc-
59   Leibniz spoke of the monads of bodies as centres of force. A question that is 
closer to home is whether Vollenhoven is influenced here by his mentor, Jan Woltjer, in 
particular the latter’s paper “Het wezen der materie” (The essence of matter). Woltjer here 
defends the view that material bodies consist of forces, without there being a substratum 
or Ding an sich that bears or exerts these forces. Prima facie Vollenhoven seems to con-
tradict this, when he insists that one must accept the notion of substance as the warrant 
of constancy in change (or application of force). But (as we will see below), when that 
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tion of the thing-relations to ‘predicates’ (discernable features) of the re-
lated terms. A force is a capacity of a thing, a prerequisite for any activity 
or effect that a thing exerts on any other thing. This being ‘in the given’, 
it is itself foreign to thought. It belongs to the ontology of beings.
 But epistemologically, the relational situation is dominated by the 
relation of knowing, between the knowing subject (perceiver) and the 
given (complex) object. We see the book lying on the table; so we speak 
of the relation of ‘lying on’, but we are not aware of this in terms of the 
‘forces’ operative in the book (gravitational effect/weight) or the table 
(resistance due to its atomic structure). When selecting and concentrat-
ing on the relational feature, when expressing what one sees (comes to 
know), one in fact “hypothetically substantializes” the relational feature 
(1918a: 431). This does not cancel or contradict the monadic under-
standing of thing-relations. It is a hypothetical strategy that is epistemo-
logically useful, but unsuitable in metaphysics.
 We have said that Vollenhoven speaks of the given as ‘revealing’ it-
self to the knowing Self, as in: “the object of knowing is a function of the 
thing external to me, its appearing, its revelation to me or its effect on 
me” (1918a: 228-229; cf. also the quote in footnote 52). This is apposite, 
for it suggests something about the object’s being knowable, though its 
meaning remains vague. In the meantime we have come to distinguish 
two forms of knowledge, namely that of concepts and of judgments. A 
concept always focuses on ‘a thing’, in the sense of having an objective 
reference (whereby an adequate concept—could it be had—would con-
stitute the complete knowledge of the thing’s idea, i.e. the thing in its 
entire make-up). A judgment attributes a predicate to a subject, whereby 
one asserts a property or quality as holding for a thing or (which is also a 
distinct possibility) a relation as holding between things (e.g. ‘the book is 
thick’ and ‘the book is lying on the table’, respectively). In the (phenom-
enal) given there is thing and (thing-)relation, and in Vollenhoven’s ulti-
mate (metaphysical) terminology, this is thing and force. The given’s being 
at all knowable depends on this distinction between thing and (thing-)
relation, i.e. between thing and force, for without that distinction con-
cept and judgment would collapse. There would be no complexity in any 
essential sense. What is revealed phenomenally as ‘thing-relations’ would 
not be indicative of a supporting ‘thing’, but only the data for the know-
ing subject. There would be no intrinsic structure of properties or quali-
constancy is found to lie in the idea or thing-law, there is a possible compatibility with 
Woltjer’s view, all the more so since Woltjer grants ideas a phenomena determining role. 
Cf. Woltjer 1914; also chapter 4, section III.B.4.a.
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ties for a concept to conceptualize, and judgment would have nothing 
to assert, and would thereby devolve into a mere mental categorization. 
Thus the knowing Self can only acquire knowledge in the form of a judg-
ment, and also a subsequent conceptualization, on condition that the 
Self ‘picks up’ this difference between a thing and an interrelated complex 
as facet of the given’s revelation of itself. This facet is what constitutes the 
non-Self ’s capacity to be known (its being knowable). It is not merely a 
distinction of mind to distinguish an object (referent) and a concomitant 
complex of a judgment; there is an analogous difference in the object 
(of thing and force) that induces the distinction in knowing, though the 
analogy is not a one-to-one correlation. Without this distinction in the 
object there would be no extra-mental touchstone to differentiate be-
tween meaning and truth. To both judgments and concepts the principle 
of contradiction applies, thus truth must have a bearing on both. Mean-
ing can be attributed to anything that affects the mind, in the sense of 
being psychically enjoyed. But truth needs to answer to validating condi-
tions.
 In summary, Vollenhoven’s monadism would appear to be episte-
mologically motivated. His view of “knowledge as relation” (“between a 
rational being and a given something, hence dependent on both subject 
and object”; 1918a: 412) brings together several features of his thought. 
First, there are the two orders between which the knowledge relation 
is laid: a subjective order in which thought takes place on the part of 
the knowing subject, and an objective order in which (as Vollenhoven 
also calls it) the ‘being’ and ‘so-being’ of the given object is revealed. In 
the second place, each order must have certain ‘predicates’ enabling the 
knowledge relation (as exemplified by judgment and concept) to be laid. 
There is a certain analogy between the orders: on the side of the object 
there is the difference between thing and thing-relation in virtue of which 
the object is knowable; on the side of the subject there is the mental grasp 
of ‘intra-mental meaning’, involving a unitary term or a term with a rela-
tion. The latter is essential to the knowing subject. Vollenhoven formu-
lates this ‘intra-mental meaning’ in terms of a Gegenstandstheorie, which 
is annexed to his understanding of the intuition.
 We now need to discuss the intuition head-on. But before turning 
to that, there is a mathematical topic, the discussion of which can now 
be completed, for it is directly linked to the understanding of knowledge 
as relation. That topic is the nature of space.
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E. The nature of space
In discussing the nature of space Vollenhoven is prima facie Kantian 
though not without certain differences. In his introductory discussion he 
states: “In any case, space is not parallel to time as succession, only with 
time as form of sensibility” (1918a: 19). If Vollenhoven were Kantian, 
he would have accepted as an intuition the representation of this form of 
sensibility as the capacity of our receptivity to organize sense-data side-
by-side. In other words space (as form of sensibility) would be the direct 
object of an intuition. Since time as form of sensibility is analogous to 
space, the same holds for time. (This is time as sequence, not time as 
succession.)
 But Vollenhoven does not treat forms of sensibility as transcenden-
tal conditions but as conditions for factual relations, more specifically 
for the relation of acquaintance. We don’t see space but we perceive spa-
tial relations, in the sense of difference of positions. This presupposes, as 
given, things standing in mutual relations, and revealed as such in that 
which is the given in the relation of spatial perception. But this given in 
the relation of spatial perception is itself very complex, it being a thing-
relation of thing-relations. Say, I see a book. It consists of pages and cov-
ers. Any two pages stand in a (thing-)relation (r1), so there are many 
relations at this level. But these relations themselves form the structure 
(involving relations of parts, r2, between pages and covers) we call a book. 
And it is that structured object, the complex of the relations of relations, 
that we perceive as spatial object in the (knowing-)relation of perception 
(r3). Space is relevant to this relation of perception, and, as any knowing-
relation, it has a subjective and objective element, of perceiver and per-
ceived. In that sense spatial perception is a species of acquaintance. “Thus 
there is also something subjective in the awareness of space and this ele-
ment may safely be called form of sensibility” (1918a: 130-131).
 This view of space is at least consistent with the assumption of space 
as required by geometry as the study of groups of transformations. Ge-
ometry works with figures and studies their variant and invariant proper-
ties when moved about (transformed). The structure of a figure is a com-
position of relations of relations, viz. an organization of elements (points, 
lines, planes, etc.) any two of which stand in specific relations. Geometry 
is an idealization of what is concretely relevant in perception. Space is the 
ambiance within which figures and things, including the human body, 
move about.
 This embedding of space in the existent relation of acquaintance 
does not detract from its unique character. At least Vollenhoven insists 
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that space is still sui generis (1918a: 421, 422). Its unique character lies 
in the fact that it permits us to localize our perceptions and sense-data. 
Localization is something humans do in determining direction and posi-
tion, but it also assumes a context in which localization takes place. In 
this connection we must distinguish relative and absolute space. Rela-
tive space involves localization relative to our bodies and the given. “The 
existence of relative space must depend on both our thinking as well as 
on the given” (1918a: 419). “Relative space is determined in part by the 
knowing subject, in part by the object” (1918a: 420). On the other hand, 
absolute space sets the limit to every attempt at localization. It is a limi-
tative concept, but not a normative one. It is a supra-individual ideal of 
construction. It is “that picture in which the ideal human being would 
arrange all individual space-impressions with and next to each other” 
(1918a: 426). But just as the limit of a sequence is not to be found in the 
sequence, so the ideal for knowledge is not to be found in the empirically 
given, no more than an ideal for the natural sciences is found in nature. 
Of absolute space nothing is to be found in nature (cf. 1918a: 427). In 
other words, absolute space depends on the idea of the world (discussed 
below).
 Because time as form of sensibility—time as sequence—is on an 
equal footing with space, it too is to be interpreted in its relevance for lo-
calization. The study of time in this sense does not belong to mathemat-
ics. Time as sequence is relevant for motion, hence the study of time, as 
form of sensibility, belongs, as stated earlier, to kinematics.
 Here we see how basic geometry is for the natural sciences. Geom-
etry presupposes space as the relation between the human body and the 
world about the body, the locus of location. This can be reinforced with 
the science of arithmetic, when geometry is arithmetized. When time, as 
one-dimensional sequence, is included one is able to study motion. The 
sciences of kinematics, mechanics and physics follow suit.60 In each of 
these sciences, there is the presupposition of a synthesis between thought 
and the given. Not that each science has its own synthetic a priori that 
accounts for this. Every basic judgment of these sciences is a modification 
of the synthetic a priori (of second rank), namely that of localization, 
this being the (constructive) synthetic a priori of the three-dimensional 
60   The science of arithmetic (second order arithmetic) does not itself originate in 
the phenomenal order of thought and being, but is a product of thought alone, with 
only Gegenstände as content/being. Hence arithmetic does not introduce the order of the 
sciences, although it is a factor in the organism of the sciences. Through the arithmetiza-
tion of geometry, which also affects the natural sciences’ use of geometry, the science of 
arithmetic has a relevance prior to geometry.
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Euclidean character of space (and time). The basis of this synthesis lies 
rooted in the human psycho-physical organization, which influences 
how the data of the world are thought. Thus, though each natural science 
turns some part of the data of nature into the object of study, there is also 
the anthropological influence of the ineluctable human working over of 
the data, within the limitative character of absolute space and time. This 
induces an organization of the sciences mutually, according to the ratio, 
distinct for each science, between the subjective or formal side of the 
judgments of a science and the correlative objective or empirical side. 
In this way the organization of the sciences makes way for the organism 
of the sciences (cf. 1918a: 417, 433-436)61 and for the “reality” of the 
sciences—what I called the “truth-content”—being that of the actually 
acquired synthesis, as knowledge, of the objective (the given) and the 
subjective (the knowing subject) (cf. 1918a: 12, 96, 381). The topic of 
the organism of science will occupy us again in section IX on metalogic. 
VI. the three-fold IntuItIon and gegenstände
A. Awareness versus knowledge
Besides knowledge by acquaintance there is intuition. Intuition is an 
awareness that is very relevant for epistemology, which Vollenhoven as-
sociates with a conscious state of the human Self. This is the ‘knowing + 
pronoun’ form that involves experience in that direct sense that we have 
called occurrent (beleven). It is typically a kind of inner perception, an 
intra-mental awareness that in turn gives rise to a unique kind of objec-
tivity, namely of Gegenstände. At the same time this inner perception lays 
bare the very essence of intuition as intra-mental two-oneness or bi-unity. 
The fundamentals elucidated by this inner perception reach to a meta-
physical level, in that intuitive awareness also allows for Self-awareness, 
or the awareness of my own existence or presence. In elucidating this 
complex problematic we approach the essentials of Vollenhoven’s intu-
itionistic conception.
 It all begins with self-consciousness. This should not be confused 
with self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is a species of acquaintance: the Self 
as knowing subject (hence in willing conformity to the norms of truth) 
61   We add that, though the sciences of this organism are epistemologically situated 
in the thought-given polarity of acquaintance, this does not sufficiently explain their 
nature. Science is more and other than enhanced perception. One needs to include sci-
entific ‘rigour’. This will be acquired through the application of the Gegenstandstheorie. 
The organism of the natural sciences and mathematics—in the order: formal arithmetic, 
geometry, kinematics, mechanics and physics—will play a heuristic role in determining 
the ‘lower law-spheres’ when Vollenhoven revises his thought. 
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seeks to gain knowledge of the Self as given reality (‘thing’). That given 
Self is the full human being. One’s acquired knowledge of the Self is 
formulated in judgments and concepts, which means that the Self, as 
knowing subject, has worked over something of what the Self reveals of 
itself, as it would any other given object, in striving to achieve an ad-
equate concept of it. But this is necessarily partial and incomplete, hence 
the knowing subject must make do with proleptic concepts concerning 
its own Self. This self-knowledge takes place in a Self-approaching process 
in which we gradually acquire more and more truths (judgments) about 
ourselves, expressed as true statements about our Self, and as represented 
in proleptic concepts (cf. 1918a: 429-432).
 But besides this progressive, factual getting to know ourselves, there 
is also the direct self-awareness in self-consciousness. As such this is not 
anything esoteric. We have quoted Vollenhoven as saying that we can 
only get to know a given thing in virtue of the relations we have to the 
thing, and the thing to us. But it is the thing that we become acquainted 
with, not the relations we have to the given thing (cf. 1918a: 418). It 
is this “in virtue of the relations” that now receives attention by way of 
‘self-awareness’. E.g. when I see a book, I get to know an object. But in or 
through self-awareness I am able to add the awareness of my seeing. Then 
I can say that I know the object, but that I am aware of the state in which 
I get to know it. The knowing (kennen) and the being aware (occurrent 
experience, beleven) are distinct; I know the object in virtue of seeing it, 
and I know that I see it in self-awareness.
 This ‘additional’ consciousness is directly linked to the relations that 
are so prominent here. We need to bear in mind the monadic interpreta-
tion Vollenhoven gives to relations. Relations require predicates in the 
related terms. Thus the relation of my seeing an object involves some 
feature(s) of myself as perceiver that accounts for my participation in the 
relation of perception. The object perceived also has certain predicates 
that account for its participation in the relation of seeing, namely in its 
being seen. But we need to add immediately that no one can apperceive 
how this operates or what that state is in the object. This is a consequence 
of things being external to consciousness, hence foreign to thought: “if 
one acknowledges . . . the difference between knowing and occurrent 
experience [or awareness], then one realizes immediately that the ex-
perience of things apart from the Self as substance is an impossibility” 
(1918a: 431). That is to say, one cannot participate in the thing-relations 
of the knowable given; e.g. we do not experience the lying on the table 
of the book that lies on a table, but we can of course experience our own 
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lying on a table.62 
 So what we can do is ‘look in ourselves’ to apperceive what goes on 
in us. That is what self-awareness is all about, and it is distinctly intu-
itional. Self-awareness yields to an inner viewing of the Self to the extent 
that self-consciousness adds consciousness to the relations of the Self to the 
given. In other words, in self-consciousness or self-awareness, I am aware 
of those features in my Self whereby I participate in the relations in which 
the Self stands to other things and persons. This view of consciousness 
is attested to by Hans Driesch, and also Henri Bergson is of influence 
here.63
 Self-consciousness, then, offers a unique disclosure. It enables us to 
become aware of our states of consciousness that are intrinsically relevant 
to our mental life. It is an experiencing of our inner life not as static state 
of (mental) affairs, but an experiencing of its dynamic presence to the 
Self and conditioning the Self in its many kinds of activity. It is a ‘being 
aware as I undergo’, and this is essentially occasional, for the awareness 
that arises in me as state of consciousness is dependent on the occasion of 
experience. Its importance for epistemology is that the awareness of the 
‘knowing that the Self undergoes something when experiencing some-
thing’ is impossible to deny, hence it has a conditioning and delimiting 
effect on what the Self actually comes to know. There is a certainty in-
trinsic to this awareness that needs no further foundation, for it is indeed 
self-awareness. Note: this does not mean to make the Self an immediate 
object one can reach for—that would turn it into a knowing-relation. 
62   The strategy of the hypothetical substantialization of thing-relations, mentioned 
earlier, helps to nevertheless get to know this relation, as over against attempts to be aware 
of it, by artificially turning it into an object of knowing (cf. 1918a: 431-432). 
63   Vollenhoven avails himself of Driesch’s formulation at this point: “I am aware 
that I exist as substance, i.e. stand in relations”. (The quotation is from Driesch 1917: 1.) 
(1918a: 439-440). As to Bergson, Vollenhoven declares of Bergson that “in his system, 
if that term is applicable in his case, many points of agreement are to be found with the 
views advocated in this study” (1918a: 348). But it is only when discussing the kinds 
of intuition that Vollenhoven becomes specific. He follows the lead of the Danish phi-
losopher, H. Höffding, who distinguished four kinds of intuition in Bergson: concrete, 
practical, analytical and metaphysical. There is something of a merry freedom here of pick 
and choose. Vollenhoven finds little use for the practical intuition in the present context, 
so he only retains the remaining three (as we shall see immediately). Bergson responded 
to Höffding’s four meanings by saying: “I should be inclined to say that there are more!” 
Bergson 1983: 34; also Höffding 1916. P.S. About the “practical intuition”, Vollenhoven 
says (in his own review of his dissertation): “The [practical intuition] concerns what is 
obvious in life and, over against pragmatism, it only has value in discovering and stat-
ing problems, not in solving them, as Bergson often appears to maintain” (Vollenhoven 
1918c: 210-211). 
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Nor can we intuit another human being’s awareness, like feeling some-
one else’s toothache. One can know oneself and others only in the self-
approaching process described above. What concerns us now is the im-
mediacy to the Self of what the Self in its current presence undergoes, this 
being a state of consciousness. This is a ‘two-oneness’, the essential schema 
of intuition. Hence, in virtue of its certainty, self-consciousness offers 
prospects of legitimating the results of our mental life, in particular our 
knowing activity, by appealing to this intra-mental fund of certainty that 
human beings have an immediate access to. But we should also add that 
the monadic interpretation of relations makes every relation in which 
a human being participates, specific to that person. Thus Vollenhoven’s 
self-awareness or method of intuition is also ineluctably solipsistic.64
 In working out this view of intuition we need to introduce distinc-
tions not yet broached, in particular the distinctions of act, content and 
Gegenstand.
B. Act, content and Gegenstand
The introduction of act, content and Gegenstand would seem to place 
Vollenhoven’s work in a phenomenological setting. But we ought not to 
proceed from phenomenological presuppositions without discussion, for 
that would introduce confusion. We do best to follow Vollenhoven in 
his own descriptions and analyses first, though there is a general sort of 
compliance on Vollenhoven’s part to his (early twentieth century) time.
 The introduction of mental acts and content in the course of the 
nineteenth century served to replace a rather static view of mentality with 
a more dynamic model. The mind does not merely have the static capaci-
ties of intelligence, will, feeling, etc., that first need to be activated before 
their effect is recognized, but mentality, when taken to be of a psychical 
nature, has a dynamics of its own, which can be analysed and sorted in 
a variety of acts, each of which has its own sort of effect or content. For 
Vollenhoven acts are the mental pole of the relations in which the Self can 
stand with respect to other things, and the content, appropriate to an act, 
is what is effected through these relations as content of the state of con-
sciousness of the Self. In light of his epistemological aims, Vollenhoven 
singles out three acts in particular, namely those of sensing, representing 
and remembering. Sensing is required in connection with the interaction 
of mind and body. The body’s forms of sensibility, temporal and spatial, 
64   Whether he felt this to be a liability at the time (as he did later) is difficult to say 
for lack of evidence. But this feature of subjectivity went by the board in the shift in the 
mid-1920 towards his definitive “Calvinistic thought” (cf. chapter 3). 
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are the main means a human being (or Self ) has towards becoming aware 
of the body and of what the psycho-physical organization of the body ef-
fects. Representing is quite typical of mentality itself. Thinking is nothing 
if not a dealing with representations. Remembering, in turn, lies at the 
heart of the Self ’s ability of attaining psychical growth. Without the ac-
crual of memory, knowledge and awareness could serve no ends or ideals 
of achievement.
 In self-consciousness one can be aware of the mental acts and their 
content. The prime form of this is of course in occurrent experience. 
Hence in its immediacy this involves “a distinct sensation, a remember-
ing of a distinct event or a distinct representation” (1918a: 349), which, 
as distinct content, is psychically enjoyed to the extent that the mind 
undergoes it. But the mind’s enjoying it allows it to be distinctly aware 
that content is present to mind through acts. There is an intimate contact 
between the Self and the activated content, which is constitutive for the 
Self ’s state of consciousness. The awareness of this contact is intuitional, 
and it occasions a certainty of the act’s effect, namely “I am immediately 
conscious that I sense something, [that I] remember something, and [that 
I] represent something” (1918a: 349; emphases in brackets added). This 
intuitive immediacy of consciousness Vollenhoven calls, à la Bergson, 
the concrete intuition. This intuition is essentially a bi-unity, involving 
a mental presence of act / content to my Self. The factor of act qualifies 
the Self ’s own participation, while the content, enjoyed in the undergo-
ing of the relevant act, is held to or retained as ‘mental material’ of inner 
consciousness. This ‘mental material’, when objectively acknowledged, 
Vollenhoven calls, following Meinong, a Gegenstand (a German word for 
‘object’, which Vollenhoven retains in German, as has become common 
practice, in order to retain its peculiar character). “Thus the content is 
what is specific of the Gegenstand, while it itself is the [mental] material in 
the representation (1918a: 163).65 Vollenhoven adds that a Gegenstand is 
“foreign to thought”, which is not to say that it is not mental, but that 
a Gegenstand involves a mental presence of its own accord and is not 
simply ‘thought up’. It is capable of being apperceived in inner percep-
tion. Gegenstände (the plural of Gegenstand) may be looked upon as being 
65   Vollenhoven’s discussion of Gegenstände is generally limited to representations, 
though the act-content distinction is also applied to remembering and sensation, includ-
ing the positing of their content. At one point he does speak of “Gegenstände of sensa-
tion, representation and remembering” (1918a: 404). At another point he also includes, 
besides ‘knowing that’, ‘feeling’ and ‘desire’. But this variety does not require or define 
differences in distinct kinds of Gegenstände. It is the immediacy of what is perceived by 
inner perception that takes precedence (cf. 1918a: 172-173).
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objective meanings, but in the guise of immanent objects (1918a: 162). 
The mind grasps them with certainty in virtue of their immediacy to 
the active Self. Nothing can be more certain than this intuited bi-unity, 
intuited in occurrent experience (or in an occasion of experience).
 The step from content to Gegenstand may seem somewhat arbi-
trary—indeed, an important factor is still missing from our account. In 
incorporating the basics of this theory of Meinong into his own intu-
itionistic framework, Vollenhoven adds a feature lacking in Meinong. 
Eager to avoid psychologism, here too, Vollenhoven felt that the objec-
tivity of a Gegenstand needs to be explicitly warranted, over against what 
could otherwise be considered a grasping at changing, and perhaps only 
fleetingly enjoyed, psychical content. He therefore stipulated that a Ge-
genstand needs to comply to the principle of identity, this principle being 
“the norm for all Gegenstand forming” (1918a: 433). When one posits 
what is experienced in direct awareness, one turns the (experienced) con-
tent into a fixed meaning with an unchanging intrinsic identity, under 
the aegis of the norm of identity. In that way the mind can subsequently 
operate with it as a term of thought with a stable meaning.66
 Vollenhoven also (following Meinong) allowed for complex Gegen-
stände—Meinong called these ‘Gegenstände of higher order—by combin-
ing given Gegenstände. Thus ‘haunted castle’, ‘the man next door’, ‘the 
square root of 10’, etc. are Gegenstände of higher order (complex terms), 
but so are ‘square circles’, ‘wooden irons’ and the like, despite their ‘im-
possibility’. What is impossible about them only becomes evident when 
Gegenstände are used as concepts to characterize essences (things), or in 
judgments. Concepts and judgments are subject to the norm of truth 
and logical consistency. But Gegenstände as such are only subject to the 
principle (norm) of identity. This gives Gegenstände a very wide range of 
mental use, as terms wielded by thought (1918a: 411).67 As we shall see, 
66   Vollenhoven refers to C. Sigwart, Logic, 4th edition, ed. by H. Maier (1911), for 
this understanding of the principle of identity: “it brings to consciousness identity and 
difference of distinct acts of representation, which as such are the same, but not identical” 
(1918a: 14). In Sigwart’s own words, as quoted (in German) by Vollenhoven: “the prin-
ciples of logic [among which the principle of identity]. . . are. . .imperatives that command 
that each object of our representation be strictly held to be the same and to prevent all 
changes, all unnoticed shifts of our representations, . . .” (1918a: 15; translation mine). 
Vollenhoven says furthermore about Sigwart, that “it was first with Sigwart that finally 
a new logic dawned for intuitionism” (1918a: 161). We add that the novelty relates to 
taking logical principles as norms or imperatives governing active mental functionings. 
67   In “De activiteit der ziel in het rekenonderwijs” (The activity of the soul in learn-
ing arithmetic), Vollenhoven repeats the conditions for counting, mentioned in 1918a: 
433. Only now he is more explicit when he states: “the acknowledgment of the principle 
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they are put to special metalogical use in the philosophy of science.
C. Analytical and metaphysical intuition
But the intuition is not limited to this concrete intuition. The intro-
duction of Gegenstände has of itself already strained the appeal to the 
concrete intuition, calling for the recognition of other features of the in-
tuition. Thus, there is also the immediate awareness in which one “grasps 
the equality or difference between two concrete intuitive givens” (1918a: 
350). This facet of the intuition Vollenhoven calls the analytical intuition. 
For example there is the difference between act and content in the mind 
itself that is immediately evident (e.g. the difference between remember-
ing and the remembered), and also one’s positing the Gegenstände, in 
light of the principle of identity, cannot take place without ‘analytical 
awareness’ (1918a: 416). Of Gegenstände and their differences we are also 
immediately aware, and it is in virtue of this objectivity, and by means of 
the analytical intuition, that it is possible to formulate a theory of Gegen-
stände, distinguishing different kinds and different orders among them.68 
The notion of number also “finds its sole explanation [here] for the true 
intuitionism” (1918a: 350; cf. below). Through the concrete intuition, 
‘inner perception’ is possible, but once it takes place the analytical in-
tuition is needed to find one’s way among these mental objects and in 
of identity by this Self [is required] so as to become, in obedience to the logical norm 
(not law of nature), subject of distinguishing” (Vollenhoven and Janse 1919a: 102-103). 
In other words, the content that results from the Self ’s experience of something given can 
be posited as a Gegenstand only when the Self is constrained by or is attuned to the logical 
norm of identity in virtue of which the Self takes on the quality of distinguishing subject. 
In other words the positing ‘identifies’ objective meanings on condition that it is your 
will to turn representations into terms, in the context of inner perception. In this way 
the norm of identity links the Self (as distinguishing subject) to content (as distinguished 
in its own identity). In his discussion of Brouwer, Vollenhoven had stated that the Self ’s 
submission to the law of identity is a role of the Self as “knowing subject” (1918a: 401). 
This would appear to imply, confusingly, that the appeal to the principle of identity 
presupposes submission to the principle of contradiction. In 1918a: 431, Vollenhoven 
states: “The question now arises what the norm is for the truth of judgments. It can hardly 
be other than the principle of contradiction (which includes the principle of identity, 
without being deducible from it) and its deductions.” He probably means to say that 
the principle of contradiction includes the demand of having objective and self-identical 
terms. The principle of identity as such is the norm for objective terms, Gegenstände, and 
if they were subject to truth, Vollenhoven would, inter alia, not be able to accept the so-
called “impossible Gegenstände” (wooden iron, square circle, etc.), which he does accept; 
cf. his explicit statement 1918a: 411.
68   Vollenhoven ends the section on Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie by declaring that 
“his system is very well structured from a dualistic viewpoint and excellently suited for 
theistic and intuitionistic exposition” (1918a: 175).
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dealing with them. Conversely, distinguishing and comparing is so prim-
itive—Vollenhoven sometimes even speaks of “the comparing and con-
necting Self ” (1918a: 416)—that its occurring takes place unbeknown, 
were it not that the concrete intuition signals its occurrence and brings 
what the analytical intuition effects to our consciousness (1918a: 414).
 Then there is also the metaphysical intuition. It’s most complete de-
scription is: “the immediate insight into identity in difference of spatial 
and temporal localization with respect to both the continuity of motion 
(real succession in continuous spatial and temporal discerning [aanschou-
wing]) and the ideas of species in distinguishing individuals” (1918a: 
351). This description is not itself immediately self-evident. It seems bet-
ter first to take a more indirect route to get to the metaphysical intuition. 
Then, when discussing Vollenhoven’s metaphysics in a following section, 
we can return to this statement. For now we can approach the intention 
of the metaphysical intuition from the point of view of the connection 
between the three kinds of intuition.
 The three kinds of intuition are said to hang together. Beginning 
with self-consciousness, the concrete intuition reveals this to be nothing 
but the occurrent experience of the different relations in which the Self 
stands to the given. The analytical intuition gives the Self a handle on this 
participation by distinguishing mental act and content and by positing 
that the awareness of the content is present through acts. But there is a 
feature that is still not sufficiently accounted for, namely, the differences 
in the contents of acts and, accordingly, also the differences in Gegen-
stände. For example, the mere capacity or act of sense-awareness, i.e. my 
sensing, does not explain why I might be (say) first aware of red, then 
blue and then green. Any act of sensing does not of itself produce dif-
ference in content. This difference must be due to (some feature of ) the 
given to which the Self stands in the relations that one becomes conscious 
of in self-consciousness. There must be—in virtue of the monadic nature 
of relations assumed all along—an immediate awareness of the reference 
to a given that is other than the Self in virtue of which the content of the 
acts of consciousness gain their differences of contents. This intuition of 
reference to a given something is the metaphysical intuition.
 We need to emphasize that this intuition is not a direct contact with 
the given as given. That is what the acquaintance relation of knowing is 
all about. The metaphysical intuition is, as is anything intuitional, ‘intra-
mental’ and is predicated on the Self ’s participation in the relations to 
the given. The metaphysical intuition takes into account the feature of 
receptivity or the feature of being influenced or affected by what is extra-
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mental. However this is not to say that the being of the extra-mental, as 
given in its appearance, is carried over unchanged into the intra-mental 
effect.69 The metaphysical intuition is the awareness of being thus af-
fected: that I am affected that way. It induces a distinctness of thinking as 
an effect of a distinctness of being. So this ‘reference to the object’ is not 
a ‘looking the object in the face’, but it is the awareness of an act’s being 
affected by something that effects difference in the mental content. It too 
is an undergoing, the taking place of which yields a certainty.
 Although Vollenhoven does not say so, one could consider, as the 
corollary of the metaphysical intuition, the certainty of there being an 
external world. But to the extent that this certainty of fact does not imply 
an effect upon mentality, it could not replace the metaphysical intuition. 
In the more expansive formulation of the metaphysical intuition (yet to 
be discussed) we will find that Vollenhoven includes two prime features 
of identity relevant to this external effect.
 At this point we can summarize that sameness of acts (whether of 
sensation, of representation or of remembering) but difference in the 
content of these acts, as discerned by the concrete and the analytical intu-
itions, calls for the metaphysical intuition to account for this difference. 
Thus the analytical intuition is the binding factor between the concrete 
and the metaphysical intuition. “This distinction between knowing act 
and content is already analytical intuition and so, the analytical intu-
ition’s assimilation of the concrete [intuition] postulates the metaphysical 
[intuition]” (1918a: 404).70
69   Recall the earlier quote: “the mind [geest] is structured in such a way that a 
specific colour-awareness in the psychical [series] corresponds with a certain frequency 
of vibrations in the physical series (causa occasionalis)” (1918a: 328). The metaphysical 
intuition is a kind of general ‘appeal to externality’ on the part of awareness, without pre-
empting what that externality might be in detail (though a basic difference of thing and 
thing-relation is ‘picked up’ so to speak). Should one ask how the appearing of the given 
can be discerned if it is not carried over or supplanted by the characteristics of the intuited 
representations, then Vollenhoven could again point to the difference between knowing 
and being currently aware. Knowing is a dealing with appearances of the given, but this 
is such that it does not require us to realize that we are being appeared to. Also when we 
realize that we are being appeared to, we may be mistaken as to what appears.
70   This correlation of act and content might suggest a phenomenological connec-
tion. But this would be incorrect. Vollenhoven nowhere hints, let alone states, that this 
correlation evidences a relation of intentionality between act and content, even though 
for phenomenology, this relation of intention secures the principle of intuition. In the 
bi-unity of intuition, as maintained by Vollenhoven, one pole of the duality is always 
the currently experiencing Self. This reflects the Bergsonian provenance of Vollenhoven’s 
understanding of the intuition and the context of life-philosophy.
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D. Gegenstandstheorie and knowledge
When bringing Gegenstandstheorie into closer proximity to epistemol-
ogy—after all, the former serves to provide thought with objective terms 
that are accounted for through conditions of intuition—we can compare 
Gegenstände, judgments and concepts and also inquire as to how they 
interrelate.
 Each of these three attests to a ‘synthesis of thought and being’, as 
controlled by a principle. The synthesis characteristic of Gegenstände is 
intra-mental, being that of the ‘mental material’ of immanent objects 
and the Self as distinguishing subject. The norm that holds here is the 
principle of identity. The realm of Gegenstände may be said to ‘subsist’ 
intra-mentally. Their intuitive availability makes them ideal material of 
thought, serving as objective terms or meanings, irrespective of whether 
there is any relevant ‘transcendent object’, although the metaphysical in-
tuition makes one aware that there is an effect of something external.
 Judgments and concepts also attest to the synthesis of thought and 
being, in the sense that the knowing subject interacts with given data. 
This is the synthesis of knowing, and in both cases this synthesis is sub-
ject to the norm of truth, i.e. the logical principles of contradiction and 
excluded middle. Judgments are the most direct form of this synthesis in 
terms of their subject-predicate structure: the subject-term denotes the 
given, while the predicate is the chosen meaning of thought. With con-
cepts the emphasis shifts towards the given thing, which forms the focus 
of conceptual knowledge. The “reality of scientific knowledge” is based 
on judgments, but this knowledge seeks to increase the understanding by 
coming, through the accrual of judgments, to increasingly more adequate 
concepts.
 Now if Gegenstände and their intuitive certainty are to benefit epis-
temology in general, it must be possible to use them in connection with 
judgments and concepts. Under what conditions can this take place? 
First of all, there is the difference between concept and judgment to 
reckon with. In his Gegenstandstheorie Meinong had introduced the dis-
tinction between an Objekt and an Objektiv. The former, ‘Object’, is the 
Gegenstand as (simple or complex) term, such as a Gegenstand of repre-
sentation. Now Gegenstände of representation are applicable to concepts, 
though a (proleptic) concept is not a representation (1918a: 163). For 
Vollenhoven a concept signals the grasp (understanding) of something 
given or concerning the given, but always incompletely. For in concep-
tual understanding, something is left out or is lacking. A musical tone 
is always produced somehow (voice, instrument, the wind, etc.), has a 
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volume (loud or soft), falls within one of the octaves audible to the hu-
man ear, etc. The concept ‘tone c’ is about a given (or producible) sound 
but with features left out (or left variable). In this sense, the content of 
a concept is determined by choice of attention in the face of the given, 
and this distinguishes the concept from a Gegenstand (of representation), 
which is merely a term posited by (the analytic) intuition. But such a 
Gegenstand can serve as the intension of the concept. In becoming the 
intension of a concept, the Gegenstand brings a fixed meaning of the 
understanding to bear on discerned data, on the condition that the term 
does not contain contradictory predicates (which is why the principle of 
contradiction must hold here, for concepts). Vollenhoven does not settle 
for a concept as a statically held intension, with an extension of data fall-
ing under it; a concept takes part in a striving to understand, and in that 
sense there is the drive towards making concepts more adequate to the 
given than they represent at any one point. A (proleptic) concept acts as 
a series principle governing the functional variability of the intensions, 
as they are added or changed in the concept’s becoming more adequate. 
A Gegenstand determines an intension, but a concept has an extension as 
well (1918a: 412). In summary, a concept is said to possess a Gegenstand 
while not being a Gegenstand (cf. 1918a: 163).71
 Now as to judgments, a judgment is not a concept, though a con-
cept can occur in a judgment as the subject-term. In Vollenhoven’s use, a 
judgment is the most typical case of knowledge being a relation, namely 
the relation of thought and being. The relation is “laid” when the know-
ing subject’s choice of predicate is attributed to a discerned object that 
is in some sense given. Contrary to the situation of conceptual under-
standing, in the relational situation there is the relation that has to be 
respected. This is achieved in being aware of the concomitant complex 
of the judgment, namely the complex of subject (referent) and predicate 
(relatum) as related (“the president is ill”), as over against a summation 
of these terms and an added relation term (“president”, “ill[ness]” + “is”). 
When grasping the content of the judgment, there is a unity of thought, 
a unity that is required so as to be able to ascertain the truth or falsehood 
of that content. In virtue of this unity, the content has the feature of 
‘truth-value’, i.e. the feature making it relevant to consider the content as 
being true or false. Now this thought, which is unique to the relational 
complex—not to be confused with complex terms that lack the relational 
71   This does not prevent Vollenhoven from speaking of a Gegenstand “becoming” a 
(proleptic) concept (1918a: 412). The condition here is that the “becoming” is governed 
by the principle of contradiction, which must be adduced if there is to be any concept at 
all.
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moment, such as ‘tall hunter’, ‘wooden iron’, ‘ill president’, for these lack 
‘truth-value’—is a distinct kind of Gegenstand that Meinong called an 
Objektiv (which term is usually translated directly as “Objective” to re-
tain its technical meaning). A judgment, then, is not itself a Gegenstand, 
but it has a Gegenstand, namely an Objective, this being an immanent 
object intuited when the knowing subject judges. (G.E. Moore and Rus-
sell introduced the term ‘proposition’ in this respect.)72
 The difference between a judgment and the Gegenstand that a judg-
ment is said to have, is evidenced by two peculiar features: “conviction” 
and “the qualification of ‘yes’ and ‘no’” (1918a: 163). In more current 
terminology, this is assertion and the choice of true or false. Assertion (and 
also denial) pertain to the act of judgment. The choice of true or false 
pertains to the content, a choice that is also relevant when judging. The 
Objective, as Gegenstand, is merely the thought, without assertion or de-
nial, and also without choice as to actual truth-value, though the pos-
sibility of this choice is left open in virtue of the peculiar ‘complex unity’ 
that an Objective is. Besides the Objective of the judgment as such, there 
is also the possibility of thinking the parts of the concomitant complex 
of a judgment in terms of their own Gegenstände. In that case, the subject 
term is an Object, but the predicate is said to be an Objective (1918a: 
163-164). This tends to confuse. Does the objective of the predicate dif-
fer from that of the whole judgment? Presumably (though some doubt 
remains) we need to see this in terms of the thought-being connection as 
relevant to Gegenstände, namely as intra-mental subsisting being. In that 
case a Gegenstand of representation, i.e. an Object, has being in the sense 
that it is simply the term (possibly complex) that it is, while the Gegen-
stand of a predicate is said to be a ‘so-being’ (1918a: 163). The latter term 
refers to a qualification, reminding one, in the case of predicates, to take 
into account a predicate’s feature of being (truly or falsely) predicable of 
something. 
 I believe the following example illustrates Vollenhoven’s meaning. 
The judgment “the president is ill” itself has as Objective ‘that the presi-
dent is ill’, which expression preserves truth-value (but without choice 
72   Cf. especially B. Russell, “Meinong’s theory of complexes and assumptions”, i.e. 
Russell 1904. On p. 457 Russell states: “This Objective of the judgment is what (follow-
ing Mr. G.E. Moore) I have called a proposition: it is to the Objective that such words 
as true and false, evident, probable, necessary, etc., apply”. The Gegenstände ‘Object’ and 
‘Objective’ will be written with a capital ‘O’, to distinguish these intra-mental entities 
from the extra-mental (or transcendent) entities: ‘object’, as synonym for ‘thing’, and 
‘given complex’ for ‘things in relations / things in interaction’ (i.e. facts/events), respec-
tively. The term ‘Object’ occurs seldom, being implicit in the use of Gegenstand when not 
further qualified.
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as to which value holds). But the parts of the judgment have their own 
Gegenstände. For the subject term this is the Object ‘the president’ (as de-
terminate intra-mental meaning), but it could also be expanded into the 
complex term ‘the ill president’, for this does not involve a relation. The 
predicate has an Objective, referred to as: ‘illness had by x’. Here there is a 
relational feature in the Gegenstand itself, which is why this Gegenstand is 
an Objective and not an Object. This illustration also makes evident the 
monadic approach to a judgment. A judgment, being a case of knowledge 
as relation, presupposes features in the terms which allow the relation to 
be ‘laid’. Intuitive awareness picks up on the certainty of the Gegenstände 
here. But there is knowledge only when a choice in truth-value is actually 
asserted in the face of the given.
 So, relevant to the epistemological context is the distinction of Ge-
genstände in Objects and Objectives, both involve a certitude of mind, 
the former as relevant for the content of concepts, the latter for that of 
judgments. What about this distinction itself? It involves a difference in 
content that cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of the knowing 
or distinguishing subject alone. (There is a subjective difference of course 
between wielding a concept, as when understanding, and formulating a 
judging, but this is a difference between the acts that does not character-
ize the difference between an Object and an Objective.) So Vollenhoven 
concludes that, here too, there must be a “corresponding distinction in the 
given” (1918a: 404). Hence, our intuiting this distinction is by means of 
the metaphysical intuition, in combination with the analytical intuition 
that is always present to perform the distinguishing. This distinction in 
the given that is relevant here (as Vollenhoven immediately clarifies) is 
the one previously mentioned about things and relations. “Thus meta-
physical intuitionism acknowledges that things and relations between these 
are given, independently of our knowing” (ibid.). Note that Vollenhoven 
here speaks of “metaphysical intuitionism”. The metaphysical intuition 
is an attitude of mind respecting the given, it cannot actually warrant 
(it only surmises) a metaphysical difference. But if we take into account 
the distinction within knowledge between concept and judgment, these 
being oriented to the given, then we can say that a concept concerns a 
thing, namely a particular being, while a judgment concerns the qualifica-
tion of a thing or numerous things via their relations, which involves so-
being. One may then say that concepts and judgments have metaphysical 
intent in that they get us to know being and so-being, respectively. This 
is based on the order of the (thought alien) world, when acknowledging 
the difference between things and their relations, and this acknowledg-
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ment at the same time suggests the distinction entertained in the mental 
order of thought, viz. between the Object and the Objective.73 Hence the 
distinction of immanent Object and Objective in the order of thought 
attests to a very basic structural feature in the order of the existent world 
of transcendent objects, namely things and the relations between things, 
though the reflecting is not such as to be a mere copy of it. The difficulty 
in pinpointing this ‘non-copy difference’ does not diminish the impor-
tance of the distinction of being and so-being in the intra-mental and 
the extra-mental orders. Without it, on the human side the distinction in 
knowing between understanding and judging would collapse, while on 
the object side one could not proceed from the difference between thing 
and relational structure. The metaphysical intuition involves the aware-
ness that this distinction of being and so-being is not of our making. In 
that sense, the difference between being and so-being is a condition of 
reality’s being knowable.
 Now why skim this analytical realist landscape? The obvious answer 
is that it has an intrinsic relevance for the early Vollenhoven. In that sense 
it needs to be mentioned and seriously considered in any overview of 
that early work. But it also has consequences for the future. In the early 
73   Vollenhoven says at one point that being and so-being belong to Gegenstände. 
“Hence the Gegenstand of a judgment qua talis is the affirming or denying relation, the 
so-being, not the being, which is Gegenstand of the representation” (1918a: 164). He is 
paraphrasing Meinong at this point and emphasizing that the ontological status of Gegen-
stände is intra-mental. This should not be confused with being that is “foreign to thought” 
in an extra-mental (transcendent) sense. But I believe there is (another kind of ) confu-
sion in Vollenhoven, when he attributes assertion to the Gegenstand, while this is more 
appropriate to the judgment to which the Gegenstand belongs (ibid.). This is implicitly 
corrected in his own discussion in the next paragraph when he speaks of assumptions and 
compares these to judgments. Also, Vollenhoven no doubt means to say that, concerning 
a judgment—this being a connection of being and thought—the Gegenstand of the judg-
ment is not the relation inherent in the judgment but the concomitant complex of this 
relation. The sloppiness seems to be influenced by the difficulty of insisting on the one 
hand that, via the metaphysical intuition, the mind (thought) attests to being affected by 
the outer world (being), on the other hand that this influence is not a mere copying. So 
in some sense there is similarity between the extra-mental and the intra-mental, but at the 
same time a difference. The following statement shares (I believe) in this confusion: “The 
Gegenstand is . . . the immanent object whose occurrence [ontstaan] is accounted for in 
part by a transcendent object, in the event that it exists, in cooperation with the human 
mind” (1918a: 162). This seems to distinguish between Gegenstände that arise through 
the effect of something existing in the outer world and those lacking such an effect. But 
Gegenstände constitute the order of thought, of which the principle of identity is the 
norm, so whatever ‘impulse’ derives from the outer world, this is necessarily channelled 
through mental acts. It requires subsequent attention to discern which Gegenstände have 
corresponding transcendent objects and which do not.
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1920s these two orders define the problem of the relation between logos 
and cosmos. When Dooyeweerd enters into discussion with Vollenhoven, 
this problem is prominently present. Also, the role of the intuition and 
Gegenstandstheorie—the latter being then referred to as the Gegenstand-
sphere—are reflected on in a way that leads to the modal order. The ma-
ture reflections of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd cannot be properly 
appreciated without reckoning with the provenance of these reflections 
in the early work of Vollenhoven. The subsequent discussions of chapters 
3 and 4 should bear this out. 
E. Summary
In summary, the mental world of immanent things and the extra-mental 
world of transcendent beings are the terrains of the two main philosophi-
cal disciplines: Gegenstandstheorie en metaphysics (1918a: 166) respec-
tively. The immanent things of the mental world come to consciousness 
through the intuitive awareness of inner perception. These things ‘exist 
in the mind’ to the extent that the mind can posit a distinct awareness 
of thought-content. Two kinds of Gegenstände stand out: those of rep-
resentation (or memory or sensation), called simply Objects, and those 
of judgment, Objectives. The posited content need in no way have any 
truck with the transcendent world of empirical things or the extra-mental 
world of validity of norms, ideals and ideas, though something in the 
posited content, that determines a Gegenstand, may have been suggested 
by an effect of the transcendent world. Such an effect is thought to be 
relevant for the difference in kind between Objects and Objectives, this 
being a reflection of the distinction between things and their relations 
in the transcendent world. We can say, as has become usual, that Gegen-
stände subsist in the mental world as objective terms, not as subjective 
notions merely enjoyed. Important for Vollenhoven’s understanding of 
this mental world of thought and its Gegenstände is that it stands under 
the aegis of the principle of identity.
 The metaphysical world is the transcendent world. Because Vol-
lenhoven uses the term ‘transcendent’ in the sense of ‘transcendent to 
consciousness’, this world is not merely a super-sensible world, but it also 
includes the empirical world as given to thought, independently of our 
knowing. It is the world of outer perception, the world that we attempt 
to get to know in concepts and judgments. This world stands under the 
aegis of ideas. Ideas are not (Lockean) representations, but determina-
tions of distinct beings.74 In the section on metaphysics (see below) this 
74   Cf. Vollenhoven 1921c: 79. Vollenhoven speaks of “een anders-gedacht-zijn”, 
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world will be explored in more detail. But for now we can state that a 
very basic feature of this world is that of things with their own inner 
complexity and standing in mutual (thing-)relations. The ‘revealing’ of 
the things of this world, which allows it to be known, is not of our mak-
ing. There is, however, the effect of the thing’s orientation with respect 
to our bodily presence. E.g., for the longest time mankind only knew 
the moon from the side that constantly faces the earth. The fact that 
that is how the moon ‘reveals itself ’ to the inhabitants on earth does not 
make this appearing ‘subjective’. There is a physical limitation, which 
has consequences for our sensibility. But it is such limitations that one 
attempts to lessen—ideally attempt to completely overcome—in a con-
tinuing process of conceptually getting to know better, as we try to make 
our (proleptic) concepts more adequate to the reality that they are about. 
 We need to deepen this topic of metaphysics. But now that all the 
intuitional prerequisites are in place, we can first complete the discussion 
of Vollenhoven’s account of numbers.
F. Number
Space, we found, finds its explanation within the order of knowledge. 
Number, i.e. the first order arithmetic of the natural numbers—this con-
cerns counting as knowing act (kendaad)—is accounted for within the 
‘order of intuition’ (if we may call it that). Because the intuition is the 
occurrent experience of multiplicity-in-unity, it is deemed to be capable 
of providing the suitable—indeed, the only suitable—account of the no-
tion of number (1918a: 105).
 Now, first of all, we can only count Gegenstände (1918a: 124), at 
least in an original sense. The terms that enter into the count must obvi-
ously retain their distinct character. Outer objects can also be counted, 
but their identity condition (via forms of sensibility) is complicated. Ge-
genstände comply directly to this condition in virtue of the principle of 
identity. As objective meanings, Gegenstände are posits of mentality and 
capable of being perceived by inner perception and known intuitively. 
In other words they form a kind of (mental) being in their own right 
(1918a: 72), a ‘mental material’. This gives the notion of numbers—the 
successive grouping of more and more units of Gegenstände—its objectiv-
ity, and even its unique character sui generis (1918a: 229). In Meinong’s 
terminology, a number is a Gegenstand of a “higher order”. Higher order 
i.e. “a being [which is] thought distinctly”. Thus, an idea is not the thought, but the in-
centive calling for distinct thought with respect to a being, itself foreign to thought, that 
‘gives’ itself to be thought.
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Gegenstände are ‘superiora’ in virtue of being composed of other Gegen-
stände, namely the ‘inferiora’ that function as their constituent elements. 
Each number beyond the number one, has constituent units that are 
the inferiora to the number in question. As Gegenstand of higher order, 
a number forms a plurality, and that constitutes a distinct kind of supe-
riora. Numbers are a distinct kind of Gegenstände, they are not concepts 
(1918a: 416). (As concepts, numbers would have to be features of some-
thing.) Our awareness of numbers is in virtue of the analytical intuition 
that seizes the (higher order) difference between the numbers as Gegen-
stände (1918a: 416). It is all intra-mental.
 But something more is called for in connection with the natural 
numbers. “Numbers are not things, but members of a series, that can be 
created by means of the principle of that series” (1918a: 380). The princi-
ple in question is of course the principle of complete induction, recount-
ed earlier (section III.A.). This principle appeals to the power of the mind 
of being able to repeat indefinitely the addition of units (Gegenstände) 
and of our being conscious of that power. The latter consciousness is in 
virtue of concrete intuition (1918a: 384). This is the clue that permits 
Vollenhoven to look deeper.
 The indefinite repetition that one is aware of in concrete intuition 
is traceable to the succession that is characteristic of any occurrent ex-
perience. Every experience has its moments, and in their succession—
their passing by—‘psychical growth’ takes place. This calls for memory 
to prevent the moments from slipping away, for only then can there be 
the development of psychical growth in virtue of the gathering together 
of moments. But this succession can only be real or objective if, here 
too, the principle of identity is brought to bear upon the experienced 
moments: “without the norm of identity there is no awareness of the oc-
current experience of succession [geen weet van de beleving van successie]. 
But the converse is also true: without succession the norm [of identity] 
has no meaning and it becomes a vain tautology” (1918a: 401, 416). 
The Self that undergoes experience needs to subject itself to the norm of 
identity—and hence ought to!—if the occurrent experience is to yield 
an enriching enjoyment rather than a confusing diversion. And “without 
it [namely real succession] our own psychical existence becomes impos-
sible” (1918a: 417).75 So the presence of succession serves as condition to 
define a series principle that is relevant for the series of the natural num-
75   The requirement that the Self subjects itself to the norm of identity is similar to 
the Self having to subject itself to the norm of truth to be knowing subject in the case of 
knowledge by acquaintance. Cf. footnote 67 above.
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bers. The awareness of this presence of succession is in virtue of the con-
crete and analytical intuition, which ‘sees’ that the mind has the power 
to indefinitely continue this putting-in-succession. This is the synthetic 
a priori of (first order) arithmetic, and it is the basis for accepting the 
principle of complete induction.
 Accordingly, the notion of number and that of the series of the natu-
ral numbers are based on (intra-mental) real succession, which is itself an 
indispensable prerequisite of psychical synthesis. Thus it is in the locus 
of the concrete intuition that the meaning of numbers arise, whereby the 
succession of experienced moments forms the raw material, as it were. 
When, through the analytical intuition, these moments of real succession 
become a sequence of Gegenstände, the meaning of number becomes def-
inite (1918a: 417).76 But prior to acknowledging the role of the principle 
of identity here, we realize that succession must actually take place. But 
for succession to take place, time must be presupposed, without which 
succession cannot be. Time here is the succession of moments of an oc-
current experience intuited concretely. Here is the link, deep in mental 
psychical synthesis, between time, number and the concrete intuition. But 
this is decidedly not time as form of sensibility, that organizes sequen-
tially data of (outer and inner) sensibility. The time of occurrent succes-
sion is more like the very form of reflective consciousness itself, or in any 
case a condition for it.
VII. metaPhysIcs
The topic of metaphysics enables us to begin to round off the discus-
sion of Vollenhoven’s philosophical standpoint. The discussion of theism, 
which is to follow, will complete this.
 In his report of Meinong’s work Vollenhoven states that Meinong’s 
juxtaposing of Gegenstandstheorie and metaphysics is analogous to what 
he (Vollenhoven) calls ratio (the rational element) and empirie (the em-
pirical element), respectively (1918a: 166). Meinong holds that the two 
disciplines of Gegenstandstheorie and metaphysics together cover the 
whole domain of philosophy (1918a: 173). Vollenhoven agrees, but only 
on condition that the link between these disciplines be included. That 
76   Reverting to the three terms that are undefined in the Peano system of arithme-
tic, namely ‘one’, ‘number’ and ‘successor of ’, Vollenhoven’s intuitionistic determination 
of these terms are: ‘one’ can be any Gegenstand (Object), ‘number’ is the series principle 
of complete induction, and ‘successor of ’ is real succession, whereby succession does not 
forfeit unity. The latter is best exemplified in the Self, in which succession takes place, but 
controlled by the invariance of the Self. “Hence the Self should be marked as the ideal 
principle of succession and this law is the invariant” (1918a: 429). 
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link is mathematics, for it harbours the synthetic a priori, required to link 
the rational and the empirical elements, in its most original form (1918a: 
166, 173).
 In this summary statement we find again the three nodal points—the 
empirical, the rational and the normative—of Vollenhoven’s standpoint, 
but now in an embellished form. Gegenstandstheorie is the amplification 
of thought in the sense of being a very liberal exposition of ‘the thinkable’ 
(including such odd ‘thinkables’ as ‘square circle’, ‘wooden iron’, etc.).77 
The empirical is linked to metaphysics. This is at first blush a strange 
combination. But Vollenhoven often expresses the juxtaposition of ratio 
and empirie as that of thought and being. Whatever the precise meaning 
of ‘being’ is, it is in any case used in connection with whatever is foreign 
to thought and capable of being cognitively assimilated by thought—at 
least in an on-going attempt—in (proleptic) concepts. Hence, being in-
cludes the things and the interactions between things of the outer world. 
These are material beings. But there is also soul or psychical being. This 
is of particular importance in the case of a human being and its Self. The 
Self is basically of a psychical nature, and while this involves material 
or bodily existence, it also includes higher mental life. This Self is not 
something constituted by thought. It is the reality standing (so to speak) 
‘behind’ thought, with access to thought. So metaphysics, as study of 
being, occupies itself with that which transcends conscious thought in the 
sense of being foreign to thought or presupposed by thought, such as the 
existence of physical things and the Self.
 Then there is the normative element. This is implicit in mentioning 
mathematics as the link between the rational and the empirical elements. 
Mathematics embodies the synthetic a priori, the proto-typical form of 
the synthesis of thought and being. In mathematics there are the a priori 
of space at the psycho-physical level (localization) and the a priori of 
number at the intra-mental level (succession). But the latter is of first 
rank over against the second rank of the former. Only with respect to 
the synthetic a priori of number can one speak of an intuitive certainty, 
77   Vollenhoven does not address the question whether his norm of identity, to 
which the ‘distinguishing subject’ appeals when positing Gegenstände, would not in fact 
preclude such ‘unthinkable’ Gegenstände as ‘round squares’ and the like. These ‘impossible 
Gegenstände’, which Vollenhoven explicitly accepts (cf. 1918a: 411), are (so one would 
think) uncertain as to their identity, and accordingly the distinguishing subject should 
experience difficulty when applying the norm of identity. Vollenhoven could have cited 
such ‘unthinkables’ as indicative of the ‘pre-norm’ situation and as examples of psychical 
confusion. Meinong, who did not appeal to norms, did not feel an objection here. For 
him ‘impossible Gegenstände’ also subsist, which he took to be commendable, so that 
sentences, such as “a square circle does not exist”, would have a referent.
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namely the certainty of the analytical intuition.78 Through this intuition, 
the Self is able to take on the qualities of distinguishing subject (in the 
context of which Gegenstände are posited) and of knowing subject, for in 
the analytical intuition’s distinguishing and comparing of content, iden-
tity is posited in light of the norm of identity, and judgments are formed 
knowingly in the light of the norm of truth. So behind the intra-mental 
synthetic a priori there is intuition and there is the cognitive need for 
norms.
 Knowledge and intuition—or judgment and awareness, respec-
tively—are reconcilers of thought and being. Knowledge reconciles the 
knowing subject with the given object in outer perception. There must be 
something given as knowable, otherwise knowledge falls away. “The pre-
supposition of knowing however is existence and thus being has logical 
precedence over thought” (1918a: 382). Awareness, in turn, reconciles 
the identity awareness with (intra-mental) occurrent experience. Here 
the focus is not on being but on self-consciousness (although, as we shall 
see, self-consciousness is ultimately linked to the Self in a metaphysical 
sense). But since every reconciliation involves relations and every relation 
consists of predicates attributed to the terms of the relation, we need 
also to consider the nature of the terms. In an ultimate sense the terms 
are substances. So the discussion can now turn to metaphysics in a spe-
cific sense: “dualism acknowledges substances and relations in which they 
stand, accordingly it can accept this logic of relations as method for those 
sciences that occupy themselves with relations, but not for metaphysics 
which also speaks of substances” (1918a: 158).
 We can depict the place of metaphysics with an embellished portray-
al of the triadic scheme of the normative (Norm), the rational (thought) 
and the empirical (being) elements.
78   Every judgment, being a synthesis of thought and being, is at bottom a variation 
of the synthetic a priori (1918a: 435). But the difference in rank between the two syn-
thetic a priori’s of mathematics indicates a difference in their evidence. That of number 
is intuitively certain, but that of space is marked by the context of sensibility. Although 
nothing is ‘logically prior’ to the synthetic a priori of localization, in the sense that the 
latter cannot be deduced from more primitive givens, that is not to say we have a ‘dead 
certainty’ about it. There is a factor of acceptance on faith here in the sense that localiza-
tion involves our psycho-physical organization, a structure we cannot apperceive but only 
‘sense’.
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substance                                                 substances
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Knowledge is dependent on the appearing of the given, and in that sense 
can be said to be linked to the phenomenal order of appearances. The 
intuitive order concerns self-awareness, an important part of which is 
positing thought (as Gegenstände). Now we must look ‘behind the phe-
nomena’, so to speak, to discover their substratum, and also attempt to 
discern the substratum of thought, i.e. the metaphysical Self. These are 
the two major examples of substance.79
A. The principle of substance
Vollenhoven’s metaphysics of substances is entirely dogmatic in its use. 
The metaphysics of substance proceeds from the principle “acknowl-
edged by all, [namely] that every operation (werking) requires a subject of 
operation” (1918a: 405; cf. also p. 438). The claim that this principle is 
accepted by all is of course entirely gratuitous.80 But a motive for choos-
ing this metaphysics is to be found in Vollenhoven’s theistic viewpoint, 
as will become clear in the next section. The principle itself states that 
every change is a change of something, and that this something must re-
main recognizably itself or invariant despite the change. Besides speaking 
of ‘subject’ of change or operation, Vollenhoven also speaks of ‘substra-
tum’ (1918a: 429). Thus the subject here is what undergirds or bears the 
79   Consider: “if thought is a connection then there must be things between which 
thought is the connection: the subject and object of acquaintance [kennen], but these are 
themselves but qualities of things that exist metaphysically: the subject of acquaintance 
is a function of the Self that wants to know and to that end subjects itself to the norms 
of logic; the object of knowing is a function of the things outside of me, their appearing, 
their revealing to or their action upon me” (1918a: 228-229).
80   Vollenhoven was no doubt aware that he was on thin ice. In a lecture on Bergson, 
he criticized him for not accepting this principle. For him “everything changes without 
there being anything that changes”; Vollenhoven 1919b. Bergson is a clear counter-ex-
ample to Vollenhoven’s ‘all’. While Vollenhoven acknowledged Bergson’s influence, as we 
saw, this influence did not extend into the area of metaphysics.
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change, what in Greek thought is referred to as the hypokeimenon.
 An important corollary of the principle of substance is the logi-
cal principle that Leibniz made popular: praedicatum inest subjecto, the 
predicate inheres in the subject (1918a: 66, 270ff). However, Vollen-
hoven does not apply this principle in epistemology, contrary to Leibniz. 
If this were applied in epistemology, it would enjoin that, in an ultimate 
sense, a judgment is analytic. Such a judgment would not attest to a 
knowing assimilation of an object, but merely be an image of it, which 
induces formalism. Instead, Vollenhoven links this inherence principle 
to his view of relations, which we can now see as having metaphysical 
relevance: “praedicatum inest subjecto, thus knowledge of extra-mental 
reality depends on both the subject as referent and the object as rela-
tum” (1918a: 66), because every relation depends on predicates in the 
terms said to stand in relation. “Praedicatum inest subjecto” is the shib-
boleth of monadology, and Vollenhoven concurs to the extent that his 
substance with inherent predicates resembles a monad. “The monad is 
supposed to distinguish the substance from the aggregate. But precisely 
for that reason the subject-predicate theory is valid only in metaphysics. 
In metaphysics relations do not have an independent existence, but they 
are reduced to real predicates of referent and relatum” (1918a: 275).81 
The view of ‘knowledge as relation’ has been discussed in the foregoing. 
We now come to its foundation in the metaphysics of substance, namely 
the Self and the extra-mental reality.
 From Vollenhoven’s use of the inherence principle, one can get a 
clearer view of its meaning for him. In a wording taken from Russell’s 
discussion of Leibniz, Vollenhoven states that the metaphysical interpre-
81   Though Vollenhoven is clearly positive about the monadology, he does not use 
this term in the exposition of his own position, not even the term ‘monad’. One can only 
guess at the reason for his reticence. There may be the general problem of the association 
with Leibniz, for whom monads were ‘windowless’. Vollenhoven defends a “causa occa-
sionalis” (1918a: 328) which, however much this leaves the correlation of an appearance 
and the representation it causes in the dark, is not compatible with the notion of a monad 
that is windowless. John Kok therefore speaks of a “mitigated monadology” at this point, 
mitigated “because the monads are not windowless—there is interaction”; Kok 1992: 
222, also (same page) footnote 157. There are also at least two points of criticism that 
Vollenhoven directs against the monadology, as traditionally conceived: (i) it views a body 
as an aggregate of monads, and (ii) the body as aggregate is not sufficiently determined. 
Vollenhoven maintains that a body is itself a substance (i.e. a monad, not an aggregate) 
and that “the monadology needs to be supplemented with the Platonic doctrine of ideas” 
(1918a: 272 note 2; cf. the ensuing discussion for this reference to ideas). Perhaps the 
overall differences between this use in Leibniz and Vollenhoven’s qualified approval were 
still such as to constrain him to avoid this terminology in the formulation of his own 
thoughts.
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tation of the principle implies that “nothing is absolutely real but indi-
visible substances and their variable [sic] states” (1918a: 269).82 From 
Vollenhoven’s comment about Russell being reluctant to admit this, we 
can imply that Vollenhoven agrees with it. A logical consequence of the 
principle is that “the sum of the predicates is to be slightly less than the 
substance” (1918a: 274). In other words the substance is not a kind of 
sum total or mere collection of the predicates that inhere in it—if that 
were true all basic judgments would be analytic—but the substance is a 
reality over and above that sum. In that sense Vollenhoven rejects Leib-
niz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which holds that every 
difference must be discernible in terms of predicates. Vollenhoven sees in 
it a truncated form of the norm of identity. If every difference between 
two things (substances) needs to be grounded in a difference of predi-
cates, then the substances themselves have no reality over and above the 
predicates. The implication of Vollenhoven’s view is that any two things 
are, as such, numerically distinct, without having to presuppose a differ-
ence in predicates (1918a: 274, 285).
 A general question that arises in connection with substances is: 
what is the status or nature of a substance? The terminology of ‘subject’ 
(in the sense of ‘sub-jectum’, something ‘thrown under’) and ‘substratum’ 
suggests a kind of hidden or primary matter. But this would raise an 
insoluble problem. Going back to the basic principle of “change but not 
without a substratum that does not change” Vollenhoven explains: “All 
the same, something cannot stay the same and change, unless this some-
thing is the fixed law that expresses the rule of change” (1918a: 429). So 
there is a category difference between the changing predicates, or the ap-
pearances of things, and that which remains constant in their variability. 
The constancy is that of law, viz. the rule which itself determines change 
and variability. The substance, it turns out, is the ideational principle 
of that rule—an ‘idea’—the essence of a thing. “We too admit, that the 
essence of things, retaining thereby the qualitative difference between 
spirit and matter [geest en stof], is ideational, but extra-mental ideational” 
(1918a: 229). This essence is not someone’s idea or cogitation; its seat 
is beyond human mentality. It concerns “the Platonic doctrine of ideas” 
(1918a: 272 note 2). We need to look at this more closely.
B. Individual substances
Let us first review individual things and then turn to human beings. 
82   Russell’s own wording is: “Nothing is absolutely real but indivisible substances 
and their various states”; Russell 1900: 114.
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When he defends Lotze against negative criticisms of Russell, Vollen-
hoven approvingly explains his (Lotze’s) meaning to be: “the essence of 
things is ‘Geistigkeit’ [spiritual/intellectual], the existence is relation. . . . 
[T]wo things are the same if their idea, their law, is the same; they can 
then differ in relations; e.g. two dogs of the same breed are the same and 
yet not identical; the essence is the same, [while] the objective and subjec-
tive relations differ. Only in this way can individuality be maintained” 
(1918a: 281-282). Vollenhoven seems to be saying that the substantial 
essence of things is the kind or species they represent. Their existence in 
relations, i.e. their origination, their interaction with other things and 
the like, is responsible for their mutual differences. But since relations 
are reducible to predicates, we can say that a German shepherd dog does 
things in a German shepherd dog-like way; i.e. its ‘predicates’, namely its 
characteristics, hang together in a way that is characteristic to that breed. 
But these predicates also induce differences in the interactions any Ger-
man shepherd dog is involved in, and that accounts for the individual 
differences.
 But this is not entirely satisfactory.83 Individuality seems to be 
maintained only through the differences of existence. But the notion of 
substance as law means that the substance is a fixed law expressing a rule 
of change (1918a: 429). In this connection, ideas are ‘thing-laws’, i.e. 
“ideas regulate functional development as fixed laws” (1918a: 228). So 
the idea of a thing is not just a constant pattern of coherence between 
the characteristics, properties, states and what not of an individual thing, 
but the idea regulates the coherence in a way that keeps the individual, 
in all its changes and development, in line with its species identity. Ideas 
regulate both simultaneous coherence and successive change, and in that 
way keep the dynamics of an individual within the bounds of its essence. 
Within those bounds the exemplars of a species can have all the indi-
vidual difference they in fact have, because for each there is an idea.84
 One might express the notion of individual substance in the fol-
lowing way. The thing is a distinct mental and/or physical existence, with 
fitting properties, features, etc. The idea is an extra-mental essence. The 
two, the thing and the idea, maintain a very basic relation. But the thing 
is individual and the general idea is an extra-mental essence. To maintain 
83   John Kok helped me to see that the formulated view is indeed unsatisfactory.
84   Thus Vollenhoven says that in the case of identical twins, “there is in an objective 
sense distinction of ideas”; Vollenhoven 1921c: 80. Also, in his letter to the theologian 
F.W. Grosheide, 16 November 1921, he states: “if God observes an animal he immedi-
ately knows both the species connection (also which species) and the individual distinct-
ness.”
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a relation, there have to be basic features on each side on which the re-
lation is based (monadism). The (general) idea needs to have a specific 
relevance of ‘holding for’ the individual, while the thing requires a ‘con-
forming to’ the idea as a general feature. That means on the one hand 
that the idea needs to be individuated, something that only God can 
do, and which in fact he does—in connection with the human being: 
“God constantly realizes the general idea ‘human being’ in a particular 
way” (1918a: 72-73). On the other hand, the deepest metaphysical fea-
ture of things is that they are dynamic. A thing has the capacity of force 
to influence and affect other things, which is to say that they can enter 
into thing-relations and interact mutually. But this is not just chaotic 
happening; there is a coherence and continuity that guarantees that the 
changing features conform to a development evincing a species identity. 
There is a regularity or a ‘succession’ in the features, which is to say that 
things are structured temporally and spatially. In that way the idea, when 
individuated, serves as an individual regulator, while the individual thing 
regulated maintains a coherence and continuity in its dynamic space-
time existence, conformal to its species identity, in a way that expresses 
‘real succession’. One expects a distinct term here, representing the indi-
vidual and its controlled states, such as ‘monad’. But Vollenhoven seems 
consciously to refrain from using this term (cf. footnote 81 above). 
 There is also a larger context, defined by the limitative nature of ab-
solute space and time, which is supra-individual. That will be addressed 
when discussing the structure of the world. 
C. Again: the metaphysical intuition
It is appropriate now to pick up on a matter we had to leave unfinished 
earlier, and that is Vollenhoven’s more specific formulation of the meta-
physical intuition. It is described as the “immediate insight into identity 
in difference of spatial and temporal localization with respect to both the 
continuity of motion (real succession in continuous spatial and temporal 
discerning [aanschouwing]) and the ideas of species in distinguishing in-
dividuals [soortideeën in de onderscheiding der individuen]” (1918a: 351). 
Being an intuition, it concerns a fundamental awareness or state of con-
sciousness, but being the metaphysical intuition, the awareness concerns 
the mind’s content being affected by the presence of the outer world, 
though the effect is not that of a one-to-one copy or picture of the world.
 The metaphysical intuition has been mentioned twice already. The 
first time was in connection with the differences in the contents of rep-
resentations, memories and sense-data, that could only be accounted for 
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as the consequence of being affected by the outer world. Via the ana-
lytical intuition this awareness of differences can be grasped in their own 
right, and in light of the principle of identity, turned into Gegenstände. 
The second reference to the metaphysical intuition was in connection 
with the distinction, among Gegenstände, between ‘Objects’ and ‘Objec-
tives’. Objects are distinct (intra-mental) meanings (terms), representing 
things, or features, properties or aspects of things. They may be simple 
or complex, and entertained through the imagination or through the 
experiential awareness of things. Objectives are relational complexes, the 
awareness of which we bring to bear when understanding things in their 
own (thing-)relations (say, head resting on hand) or the (thing-)relations 
to other things (say, hand picking up a book). This awareness, whether 
of terms or of relational complexes, is important in that it conditions 
what the knowing subject recognizes as ‘the given’, i.e. what things reveal 
of themselves as data for knowing. The data is grasped ‘term-wise’ and/
or ‘relational complex-wise’. The metaphysical intuition acknowledges 
that this distinction is not itself merely ‘thought up’, but that it reflects 
a difference of being. Not surprisingly, this distinction is important for 
epistemology as well, in that concepts ‘have’ Objects (as their intensions) 
and judgment ‘have’ Objectives (on which propositional truth-value is 
based).85
 Now, in the third, more specific, reference to the metaphysical intu-
ition, the focus is on localization. Localization assumes the larger context 
of space and time. Space, we found, has both a subjective and an objec-
tive determination. It calls for a perceiver with a spatial ‘form of sensibili-
ty’, who cannot but see what he/she sees in a spatial, side-by-side way. On 
the other hand, the thing perceived also has intrinsic complexity, of parts 
in relations, that sustains an extensional viewing. Time, as sequence, here 
falls in the same category, except that it involves a one-dimensional se-
quential viewing, supported by a succession relation in the object seen.
 Vollenhoven now calls the ‘objective side’ of space and time, abso-
85   Many Gegenstände, whether as Objects or Objectives, can be ‘thought up’ and are 
constructed intra-mentally, as higher order Gegenstände, without having a motivation in 
terms of the given. These lack correlative transcendent objects. In the case of Objectives, 
the judgments that possess Objectives that lack a correlation to the given are considered 
false, those that do have such a correlation, true (cf. 1918a: 165, 306, 319). In a more 
current terminology, an Objective can be considered to be a proposition (as did Moore 
and Russell, in interpreting Meinong), and the transcendent correlate, when it exists, 
a fact. Then propositions have truth-value (true or false), while a fact could be called a 
‘truth-maker’. The presence or lack of presence of a fact motivates the choice as to the 
truth-value of a proposition that is accepted. So are fictions ‘false-makers’? For Vollen-
hoven there is no such species of transcendent reality.
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lute space and time. We cannot speak of space and time being ‘things’, in 
the sense of completed wholes, for that would disregard the subjective 
component required when referring to space and time. Space and time 
not being completed wholes, they cannot have boundaries, for then they 
would need to be absolute. For, if space (or time) stops ‘here’ (‘now’), 
what about the ‘there’ (‘then’) beyond the boundary? Every boundary 
assumes the context of space and time, hence the concept of an ‘absolute 
spatial or temporal limit’ is self-contradictory (cf. 1918a: 135). So space 
and time are absolute in the sense that they provide the context for the 
drawing of limits. This is not to accept Newton’s notions of absolute 
space and time (which are an independent block expanse and an eternal 
flowing, respectively86). But one needs to recognize that any locating or 
ordering of sensations by the human subject assumes a limitative context 
in which there is always a ‘beyond’ with respect to the localization in 
question.87
 Thus localization assumes the larger context of a limitative abso-
lute—an ‘ever beyond’—in space and time, which is in step with the 
psycho-physical organization of the sensing (human) subject, for which 
space and time are forms of sensibility.88 I believe we can say that each of 
the two references to the metaphysical intuition, described earlier (viz. 
86   I. Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. by F. Cajori 
(New York: Greenwood, 1969), vol. I, p. 6. It is only with the advent of Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity that the question of the ‘shape’ of the universe affects the notion of the 
boundary of the universe. It is now clear that travelling within the universe never meets 
up with a boundary. This is analogous to not meeting a boundary when travelling on the 
earth. But this does not require the universe to be (spatially) infinite, no more than that 
the surface of the earth is infinite. The term ‘absolute’ needs to be carefully defined if it is 
to be useful. Cf. O’Shea 2007: esp. 32-35. 
87   “Absolute time is the limit for the infinite possibility of constantly locating pro-
cesses, to the extent that they are discerned . . . , more completely” (1918a: 382). As to 
absolute space: “Not that we take it to be a thing, but it does need to exist outside of our 
thinking of the empirical given, if one is to speak of relative localizations” (1918a: 382-
383). In summary: “Limitative absolute space and time are on an equal footing. To these 
answer in the Self, in its striving to attain complete knowledge, the ordering attempt to 
arrange sensations in this absolute space and processes in this absolute time” (1918a: 347-
348).
88   This bare and formal condition of localization of the space-time continuum is 
evidently able to take on more human meaning as context of signification. Vollenhoven 
formulates a curious task for Christian psychology: “the possibility of localization is not 
unexplainable; one needs only to have recourse to the theory of local signs (or ‘place-
marks’ (Land)). When every point in our spatial picture corresponds to a determined 
psychical sign, a distinct impression, the problem is solved. The empirical realization of 
this postulate in the near future must be set as the first requirement for Christian psychol-
ogy” (1918a: 422-423). 
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the substrate for mental content and the basis for the distinction be-
tween Object and Objectives), assume or imply the differences involved 
in spatial and temporal localization. The first reference simply calls for an 
awareness of an outer source that induces differences of content. In the 
second reference, one can readily place the ‘thing-relations’ among spatial 
and temporal relations. Now, in the third reference to the metaphysical 
intuition, Vollenhoven appeals to the immediate insight into identity in 
the difference of spatial and temporal localization. ‘Identity’, in this con-
text, is new.
 For this awareness of identity, Vollenhoven points to two features 
within the domain of spatial and temporal localization: the continuity of 
motion and the ideas of species in the distinguishing of individuals. In 
referring to these as identity conditions, Vollenhoven is indicating what 
is basically constant within the domain of localization or the outer world 
vis-à-vis human awareness.
 The first identity condition is the (basic) feature that pulls the spa-
tial and the temporal dimensions together, namely (continuous) motion. 
This continuous motion is said to be a “real succession in spatial and 
temporal discerning”. For the human being, the spatial limit of localiza-
tion is three-dimensional Euclidean space, taken as ‘absolute space’, while 
the temporal limit of localization is one-dimensional time, taken to be 
“one-dimensional real succession” (1918a: 434). So it is the temporal 
dimension of motion that induces ‘real succession’ to continuous mo-
tion.89 This real succession prevents change from being haphazard. The 
‘real succession’ that is relevant here cannot be the subjective undergoing 
of experience in self-consciousness, as revealed in the concrete intuition. 
For that takes place intra-mentally, in explicit disjunction from sensibil-
ity and its spatial and temporal dimensions. The ‘real succession’ here is 
the objective counterpart (as it were), which concerns the given world to 
the extent that the given is organized and thus capable of being discerned 
as the most basic feature of identity that the spatial and temporal dimen-
sions permit, namely in (the trace of ) continuous motion. So this feature 
of identity is the outer expression of real succession, and we are now said 
to be immediately aware of such an identity. (This factor of objective real 
89   This appeals to the situation of our human psycho-physical being structured so 
as to make three-dimensional Euclidean space a synthetic a priori for localization, now 
expanded to include time. “[F]or us the connection of Euclidean three-dimensional space 
with one-dimensional real succession is the only one possible, this being for the same 
reason on which the preference for this particular space construction is based. Other be-
ings [viz. other than the human beings we are] could have a different mechanics, but real 
succession would always be one of the dimensions” (1918a: 434).
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succession will recur in the discussion of theism.)90 
 The second immediate awareness of identity at the level of spatial 
and temporal localization is that of the ideas of species (soortideeën) in 
the discerning of individuals. This is not a matter of an awareness of 
relational change, but of an awareness of (species) identity of the things 
that are subject to change. However much individual things can be dis-
tinguished—this thing over against that thing, as governed by individ-
ualized ideas—there is over and above this an immediate awareness of 
species identity between individuals that are genetically related. Species 
too are governed by ideas, only they retain the generality of the species 
concerned, controlling the development that can take place within the 
limitations of species identity. Thus this immediate insight into species 
identity is an intuitive recognition of the general idea of a thing in its 
spatial and temporal development, which is why Vollenhoven places this 
intuition among differences of spatial and temporal localization.
 Taking these two instances of metaphysical awareness as concerning 
identity-in-difference together, we can see at once that, as compared to 
the earlier, less specific indications of the metaphysical intuition, Vol-
lenhoven has now given a more specific formulation to the intuition of 
what was previously simply called “things and (thing-)relations”. He has 
now pointed to the intuitive identity involved in each of the two compo-
nents. In building on this simpler expression there is, we admit, a certain 
plausibility in speaking of a ‘metaphysical intuition’. The plausibility lies 
is its ontological roots. The categories of thing and thing relations are 
so fundamental and basic to thought, that it is difficult to express any 
knowledge of reality without appealing to these categories as necessary 
conditions. In an earlier context we pointed to Vollenhoven’s speaking 
of ‘being’ and ‘so-being’ in connection with ‘things’ and ‘thing-relations’. 
The metaphysical intuition is the immediate insight into the ontological 
conditions of the world as given to thought.
 Now, what of the unity of intuition, viz. the unity of the concrete, 
analytical and metaphysical intuitions? In an earlier context it was point-
ed out that the unity is a complex unity. In its grasping of sameness and 
difference, the analytical intuition fulfils a bridge-function between the 
concrete intuition and the metaphysical intuition. In a summary expres-
sion of the three intuitions, already quoted, Vollenhoven speaks of the 
metaphysical intuition being postulated (in the sense of ‘acknowledged’, 
90   In a summary statement about the reality of succession, to which we return 
below, Vollenhoven indicates its two applications: (i) it is important as distinguishing 
feature between divine and the human existence and (ii) to distinguish between things 
metaphysical and physical (cf. 1918a: 428). 
151
A Bold Beginning: Theistic and Metalogical Intuitionism
not as ‘posited to be such’) by analytical intuition, in virtue of the latter’s 
working over of the concrete intuition.91 The content of mentality can-
not be sufficiently accounted for without acknowledging an effect of the 
given world on that content, especially to the extent that this concerns 
identity. But in postulating this metaphysical intuition, Vollenhoven is, I 
believe, saying that this intuition cannot be informed by (let alone de-
rived from) the concrete and the analytical intuitions, singly or com-
bined. In other words, each of the three forms of intuition is a distinct 
fund of insight: (i) concrete intuition: awareness of what one undergoes 
in concrete occurrent experience, (ii) analytical intuition: awareness of 
sameness and difference, and (iii) metaphysical intuition: awareness of 
identity in differences regarding the given world (identity in differences 
of space-time localization as concerns motion and species identity of dif-
ferent individuals). These three together, in the given order, delineate 
the basic contours of consciousness as ‘state of awareness’, as revealed in 
self-consciousness. Though each form of intuition is immediate, there is 
nevertheless a difference in how the different forms interlock. Concrete 
intuition must be first, or else awareness simply does not take place. Only 
when there is awareness can there be awareness of similarity and dif-
ference (the analytical intuition), and on the basis of this, awareness of 
identity in difference (the metaphysical intuition).
 Our discussion of the metaphysical intuition has focussed on the 
world, as do Vollenhoven’s discussions generally. But we need to add that 
the Self too, being a metaphysical reality according to the principle of 
substance, falls within the ‘reach’ of the metaphysical intuition. The same 
sequence of concrete, analytical and metaphysical intuition holds here. 
Only now we need to take into account that the succession of moments 
one is aware of in concrete intuition and distinctly noted in their simi-
larity and difference by the analytical intuition, (also) calls for a ‘subjec-
tive’ reality that is relevant to this intra-mental awareness and which does 
the comparing and relating (cf. 1918a: 350). Vollenhoven claims, as im-
mediate awareness, that there must be something given in this respect, 
and that this must be what we call ‘the Self ’. This is (as will be argued 
further below) not to know the Self, for then the Self is taken as object 
of knowledge. We cannot even say that this Self presents itself in self-
consciousness, for self-consciousness is the awareness of the states of my 
Self, being the indicators of the relations in which the Self stands to other 
91   The quotation in question is: “This distinction between knowing act and content 
is already analytical intuition and so, the analytical intuition’s assimilation of the concrete 
[intuition] postulates the metaphysical [intuition]” (1918a: 404). 
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things. The metaphysical intuition only claims the certainty that, in the 
light of concrete experience and analytical awareness, there is the effect of 
a reality underlying this. But one must leave to the principle of substance 
the characterization of this reality as being that of a Self.92 
 And what, also, of the connection between intuition and knowl-
edge? We emphasized that intuitions serve as conditions for knowledge. 
Knowledge (acquaintance) focuses on the object, and judgment and 
concept result from thought’s working over of the object as given. The 
intuition has its own focus in self-awareness. We did also say that con-
cepts and judgments have Gegenstände, which are themselves the result 
of the concrete and analytical intuition. But in the context of discussing 
the connections between the three forms of intuition that Vollenhoven 
accepts, he states: “if the connection [between these forms of intuition] 
is lacking, then the first [i.e. the concrete] and the fourth [i.e. the meta-
physical] will exist without connection and hence self-consciousness and 
world knowledge, [the latter] being impossible without concepts of spe-
cies, will remain unconnected” (1918a: 351).93 Vollenhoven here says 
92   At this point my reading of Vollenhoven diverges somewhat from that of John 
Kok. I believe he does not sufficiently distinguish the different roles assigned to the meta-
physical intuition on the one hand and the metaphysical principle of substance on the 
other. The intuition is an immediate awareness, and it is metaphysical when that aware-
ness concerns the certainty of identity-in-difference of what affects mentality without 
being attributable to anything within mentality. The metaphysical principle of substance 
proceeds from the self-identical reality underlying change, a (constant) reality that needs 
to be posited by the metaphysical principle if change (and hence also succession) is to be 
deemed real, as intuition enjoins. There is a passage in Vollenhoven that would appear to 
support Kok’s reading. In a summarizing formulation of the three intuitions Vollenhoven 
adds: “from self-consciousness through the activity of the mind to postulating a Self and 
a non-Self that stand in connection with each other through relations”(1918a: 427). So 
here the role of intuition is said to end ‘metaphysically’ in ‘postulating’ a Self and a non-
Self. Kok accepts this reading at face value, while I take the use of “postulating” here to 
be unfortunate, but perhaps explainable in light of the context of its being a summary 
formulation. If one keeps the distinct meanings of the metaphysical intuition and the 
principle of substance in mind, one can point to the ambiguity of this ‘postulating’ here 
and avoid a ‘Self-centred reading’ that makes Vollenhoven’s thought more idealistic than 
it appears to have been. Cf. Kok 1992: 75, 80-81, etc.; cf. also the comment at the end of 
section VII.F. 
93   In this context Vollenhoven also mentions the “practical intuition”, which is the 
second one in his listing of the (four) forms of intuition in Bergson. But he states that 
“true intuitionism” only accepts a practical intuition for the purpose of stating problems, 
hence he does not include it in his discussion of the three forms of intuition he does ac-
cept as being fundamental. In his own review of his dissertation Vollenhoven describes 
the practical intuition as “focussing on what is obvious in life, and it has, contrary to 
pragmatism, value only in discovering and positing problems, not in solving them, as 
Bergson often seems to think”; cf. Vollenhoven 1918c: 210-211.
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that a consequence of the lack of connection between the concrete and 
the metaphysical intuition is that self-consciousness, which is the con-
crete intuition, and world knowledge, which is embodied in judgments 
and concepts, will be disconnected. We need to discuss two things here: 
the connection between the metaphysical intuition and world knowl-
edge, and the connection between concrete intuition and world knowl-
edge.
 As to the metaphysical intuition and world knowledge, one does 
not, of course, intuit the world. But if world knowledge involves, neces-
sarily, the concept of species, then Vollenhoven does allow this concept 
to have its own Object as Gegenstand, which, as intension of the concept, 
at the same time, grasps the essence of the species, i.e. the species iden-
tity—and that brings in the metaphysical intuition. But we need to look 
at this more closely. The concept of species, as example of world knowl-
edge, is empirically gained. If A looks like a German shepherd dog, and B 
looks like a German shepherd dog, and so does C, then one can form the 
concept of this kind (or species) of dog. Now this concept is proleptic, 
for it cannot pretend to be a complete knowledge of the species, which 
would be a knowledge of the (general) idea of this species. But however 
incomplete this knowledge is, the (proleptic) concept can be entertained 
in such a way that one becomes aware of the concept’s Gegenstand. This 
awareness is intuitive, as is everything that concerns Gegenstände. But 
then this intuition is metaphysical, for, though it arose in a conceptual 
context, the awareness involved is that of the (species) identity of spatially 
and temporally different individual dogs. The connecting of the empiri-
cally defined concept of the German shepherd dog species and the meta-
physical intuition of the identity of the idea of this species only works if 
one, somehow, links the identity-in-difference of the empirical German 
shepherds and the fixed, or self-identical, meaning of the mental Object 
‘German shepherd’. This is not trivial. The self-identical meaning of the 
Gegenstand is governed by the principle of identity (identity of meaning; 
intuition), while the species identity of the different dogs is governed by 
the idea (identity of essence; substance). Here we have the two orders, the 
mental (subjective) order and the extra-mental (objective) order, coming 
together. Vollenhoven was very hesitant about the connection of these 
orders, but he did speak of a ‘harmony’. The discussion of this point will 
be resumed below in the context of discussing theism.
 Then there is the connection between the concrete intuition and 
world knowledge. The fact that this is linked to the analytical intuition’s 
connecting role of the metaphysical intuition and the concrete intuition 
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must assume the connection between the metaphysical intuition and 
world knowledge, just discussed. Now we have explained earlier, quite 
explicitly, that Vollenhoven denies that there can be direct (occurrent) 
awareness of a state of being outside of the psychical subject. So his refer-
ence to the concrete intuition cannot be meant as a case in which self-
consciousness somehow ‘feels’ the world. The inclusion of the analyti-
cal intuition makes it more likely that the concrete intuition is meant 
together with the analytical intuition. In that case the whole domain of 
Gegenstände opens to us. The awareness of identity-in-difference (meta-
physical intuition) is connected to the concrete intuition via the ana-
lytical intuition through the mediation of Gegenstände. The awareness 
of an identity-in-difference is grasped in terms of Gegenstände, and this 
provides the connection with the concrete intuition, without having to 
assume any recondite ‘experience’ that is outside of the psychical subject. 
So, to the extent that world knowledge is had in concepts, these concepts 
have in turn Gegenstände, and these Gegenstände provide a fixed point for 
the concrete intuition’s awareness here. 
 The topic of knowledge and intuition will return when discussing 
the ‘metalogical’ situation of scientific knowledge. In that context too the 
connection between intuition and knowledge is essential.
D. A human being
A human being too is an existent creature. “The metaphysical existence 
of the Self is accepted in virtue of the principle that for every change 
there is something that changes” (1918a: 438). This is the original prin-
ciple of substance, applicable to a human being as well as to things, to 
which Vollenhoven again adds, ingenuously: “accepted and applied by all 
[philosophers?] without reserve” (1918a: 438; cf. also p. 405). The Self 
is an ideal unity of changing states and qualities. The Self as substance is 
therefore understood as law or controlling principle of change (1918a: 
433). If we apply the distinction made earlier between individuated idea 
and dynamic reality in coherence and continuity, then we find that the 
use of the word ‘Self ’ shifts between these two meanings. On the one 
hand the Self is the individuated idea or ‘thing-law’ of a distinct human 
being, on the other hand the Self is the individual that stands in relations 
to other individuals and things, but always within a personal coherence 
and continuity of ‘psychical synthesis’. This double use does not attest to 
confusion, but it delineates the Self as ‘complete substance’, calling for 
the synthesis of change and the constancy that regulates change.
 Prominent in this regard is the difference between body and soul, 
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found in the Self, the Self as their “higher synthesis” (1918a: 423). But 
the exact nature of body and soul is difficult to grasp clearly. For, there 
is another duality that plays a more prominent role. When speaking of 
the body, Vollenhoven always speaks of the psycho-physical organization. 
This presumably is the ‘body as substance’. It has a ‘psychical dimen-
sion’ interwoven into it. Through this bodily organization a human be-
ing stands in relations with other beings and with the world in general. 
This is the basis for knowledge by acquaintance, which proceeds from 
the given object as sensed. But, besides the psycho-physical, there is also 
self-consciousness, in which an individual is intuitively aware of its own 
states and qualities. This awareness of our acts and their different con-
tents—an awareness that is intuitional, the content of which may be pos-
ited as intra-mental Gegenstände—is said to be a “primal psychical event” 
(1918a: 416). In its being intra-mental, its operation is not a bodily or 
physical event, though human mentality in fact is never disconnected 
from the body. Also the intra-mental should not be identified with full 
conscious life. For, as we found, the mind can be affected in its states sub-
consciously and even unconsciously, as when in sleep (cf. 1918a: 440). 
This complex mental life is (presumably) the ‘soul as substance’. It is dis-
tinct from the body in that the body is the terrain of sensibility, while the 
mind is the region of intuition. But the term ‘psychical’, being relevant 
to both, bridges the difference—and this difference is, I believe, the fun-
damental one here—between the psycho-physical body on the one hand 
and the intra-mental awareness of (predominantly self-)consciousness on 
the other. The two are attributable to the Self in light of the reality of 
what Vollenhoven calls ‘psychical synthesis’, which binds body and mind 
together.
 Psychical synthesis is characterized as being “a unity with retention 
of the distinct character of the [constituent] elements” (1918a: 421). The 
three capacities of memory, sense-awareness and representation are essen-
tial here. Vollenhoven says little about their exact roles, except to suggest 
that if the body were to fall away, sense-awareness and representation 
would not be available (1918a: 420). But clearly, the empirical input 
of data takes place via sense-awareness and representation as acts of the 
psycho-physical body, whose acts in turn align mental content. This con-
tent, and the acts to which they are correlated, must be present in order 
for the upper psychical capacity of self-awareness to be able to grasp these 
intuitively and currently. All this can only be meaningful, in the con-
structive sense of a growth of consciousness, provided there are acts and 
contents of recollection on the basis of which psychical synthesis can take 
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place (1918a: 413). So the third capacity of memory would appear to be 
essential to intra-mental life. The acts together are an important factor in 
bridging the difference between the psycho-physical body and the mind.
 Growth of consciousness has need of bodily input, but as such it is 
not a determinate (or natural) process. It also calls for effort from the side 
of intra-mental awareness. We found that at the intra-mental level the 
knowing subject must comply to norms if its effort to acquire knowledge 
is to be successful and not end in error. In that sense the knowing subject 
involves its own will to know, for to be a knowing subject the Self must 
submit, in the sense of subject itself, to the norm of truth.94 Here a pecu-
liar tension can arise within the life scope of the Self in connection with 
the Self as “subject of willing” (1918a: 430). Our personal and factual life 
is, as such, not normative, dominated as it is among other things by the 
feeling of pleasure and pain and a factually existent ‘subject of willing’. 
If emotion and will oppose the norm, then the knowing subject must 
“eliminate” this; “thus the norm demands that the truth be acknowl-
edged, separated from pleasure and pain, sine ira et studio [‘without posi-
tive and negative prejudice’; Tacitus], even if the factually existent Self as 
subject of willing does not want this” (1918a: 430). Thus, by implication, 
feeling and willing can influence the mind adversely, and when such oc-
curs the mind is required to deal ‘forcefully’ with this anti-normative 
situation, setting matters aright in disregard of one’s own feeling and will-
ing! This dominance of the cognitive over feeling and willing is justified 
by the norm to which cognition is subjected. But Vollenhoven does not 
say how to implement this in practice. 
 In short, the body in its psycho-physical organization affects the 
mind in the sense that it provides the input of data, but it may also 
hinder its submission to norms. The mind, in turn, absorbs the input 
of acquaintance as intra-mental possession and in reflection enriches its 
own state of awareness, but only if it wills to submit to norms. Thus the 
disruptive anti-normative tendencies can be of body or of mind. Vollen-
hoven often speaks of the interaction between body and soul. No doubt 
this involves the factual exchange that takes place between the psycho-
physical body and the mind. But more important is perhaps the oppor-
tunity that interaction presents for the Self to undercut anti-normative 
tendencies in the continuous struggle to submit to norms. In that sub-
mission lies the priority.
 
94   Similarly, the distinguishing or thinking subject, another quality of the Self, 
must comply to the norm of identity in positing Gegenstände. Cf. also footnote 67 above.
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E. Microcosm and macrocosm
In the course of Vollenhoven’s own summarizing discussion we find the 
statement: “The human being is a microcosm” (1918a: 442). The phrase 
occurs in a passage that critiques the mystical notion of the human being 
as ‘microtheos’, a ‘god in the small’. Mysticism lets God and the world 
merge, says Vollenhoven, in consequence of which a human being too is 
thought to partake directly of divinity. But when God and the world are 
properly distinguished—the proper distinguishing of which is part and 
parcel of Vollenhoven’s theism, as we shall see—then norms, ideals and 
ideas are called for to secure the difference of God and the world. Likewise 
these factors of difference help delineate the human being’s place vis-à-vis 
the cosmos. A human being, as a ‘world in the small’, can never really 
merge with the world in the large, let alone God. A human being has its 
own place, secured by its essence. But in the security of that essence we 
can compare the structure of a human being with that of the ‘world in 
the large’.
 This ‘theme of macrocosm and microcosm’, as Vollenhoven will lat-
er call this problematic,95 goes unmentioned here. So the solitary occur-
rence of “microcosm” is of course far from being a sufficient indication 
of Vollenhoven’s adhering to this theme. But when seeking an overview 
of the numerous, philosophically basic polarities in Vollenhoven’s early 
work, there is a ‘coming together’ that suggests an ordering that is con-
sistent with this theme in one of its historically viable renderings. Our 
emphasis will be on the ‘coming together’, but it helps heuristically to 
keep a ‘micro- and macrocosm schema’ in mind.
95   We note that John Calvin found the human being “not ineptly” characterised 
as “man a microcosm”; cf. Calvin 1960: 54. This may be in the background of Vollen-
hoven’s use here. It was only while developing his consequential problem-historic method 
for the study of the History of Philosophy In the late 40s that this theme came into full 
prominence in Vollenhoven’s work as problem. In his prior work the theme is initially fully 
present, as will be argued here, but it was soon tempered considerably, though traces of 
it are evident in the Isagoge, left untouched in the last revision in 1945. (Cf. in chapter 1, 
section II.E., in the context of the discussion of the ‘method of resolution and composi-
tion’.) The theme, which has deep roots extending to Presocratic thought, involves the 
cosmic expression of universality and individuality, placed side by side. This horizontal 
positioning of man (and perhaps animal varieties as well, there are numerous ways in 
which it can be operative) and the world implies the presence of a number of basic 
analogical similarities in their structure. A popular though speculative illustration of this 
horizontal positioning is the view that ontogenesis (in this case of humans and animals) 
passes through all the stages of phylogenesis. This application however is not traceable in 
Vollenhoven. Cf. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, Schematische Kaarten: Filosofische concepties in 
probleemhistorisch verband (Schematic charts: Philosophical conceptions in a problem-
historical lattice), i.e. Vollenhoven 2000: 354-355.
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 The most insistent philosophical polarity in Vollenhoven’s early 
work is that of thought and being. This duality is first broached as an 
epistemological subject-object distinction. But even as epistemological 
distinction, being (or the object) is that which needs to give or reveal 
itself to thought in a process of coming-to-know. Being is external to 
thought, and every bridging of the difference in a concept of something 
does not annihilate the difference but presupposes it. Even as adequate 
concept (could it be had), the difference between the concept, as belong-
ing to the order of thought, and that which the concept is about, being 
of the order of being, remains intact (cf. 1918a: 443). The very fact that 
there is an order of thought and a metaphysical order of being is telling. 
We see at once that this difference is the basis for the distinct focus of 
“self-consciousness”, which is intuitional, on the one hand, and that of 
“world knowledge”, which is dependent on the given, on the other. The 
distinction of Self and World is the thought-being distinction in cosmo-
logical dress. Could this be a distinction of microcosm and macrocosm? 
Yes, it could, but only if there is a significant analogy of structure in each.
 When we now look at each order, we find, first, that thought calls 
for foundation in the Self. But “thought as function of the Self is empty” 
(1918a: 229). We need to include a larger context of body and mind. 
Thus, through the psycho-physical organization of the body, thought 
gains its data through sensibility in the two forms of space and time, 
while through the ‘psycho-mental’ capacities, consciousness and self-con-
sciousness can take place. When we now look at the metaphysical order, 
we see that there is a basic distinction between the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’, 
i.e. between what is factually present (nature) and the region of ideas: 
“the essence of things, thereby preserving the qualitative distinction of 
matter and spirit [stof en geest], is ideal [ideëel], but extra-mental ideal” 
(1918a: 229). But we also see at once, on the one hand, that the factual is 
enclosed within the limitative notions of absolute space and time, which 
are correlated to the human forms of sensibility of space and time, and, 
on the other hand, that the region of ideas is, as the extra-mental domain 
of validity, at a level with the norms and ideals that have validity for 
the mental life of the Self. So thought and being, when taken in their 
own contexts of the Self and the World respectively, appear to have basic 
analogies or a similarity in their make-up, suggesting a side-by-side posi-
tioning. This brings a micro- and macrocosm schema into the picture.
 By adjusting our previous schema to highlight the two sides of the 
Self and the World, we can depict the basic distinctions, in a provisional 
simple version, as follows.
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    [Microcosm]   [Macrocosm]
    Mind / Gegenstände          World of unchanging ideas
 Self     - - - (acts / content) - - -  World    - - - - - - ( ? ) - - - - - - - - - - - 
  Body         World of changing appearances
   - psycho-physical  - things, and things in relations
   - time & space as forms  - absolute space and time as limits
     of sensibility    of localization
 
The usefulness of this schema is that it helps to convey a basic moment 
of organization of a philosophical conception. Texts that are exclusively 
devoted to a single area of philosophy will generally offer little by way of 
indicating a basic philosophical position. But a text such as Vollenhoven’s 
dissertation itself keeps reaching down to fundamentals. It does not stay 
at the level of the philosophy of mathematics. So one’s understanding 
of the text calls for attention as to how basic themes come together. The 
schema of micro- and macrocosm offers a heuristic aid towards capturing 
ontological, anthropological and cosmological matters which, certainly 
in their intersection, touch on basics.
 We will find that this schema is also very useful towards depicting 
Vollenhoven’s understanding of theism, when coming to that. For now, 
I wish to add two remarks in relation to the schema as it stands. In the 
first place, space and time, as relevant for the factual world of changing 
appearances, are not themselves distinct ‘things’ in the world. Only in the 
context of the human perception of the world can one speak of time and 
space, meaning that there, time and space are dependent on the one hand 
on things and their forces (in the macrocosm) and on the other hand on 
the human forms of sensibility (in the microcosm). Space and time are 
relational, and they are predicated on the relevant features of the World 
and of the Self. In that sense, the Self and the World ‘belong together’ 
and ‘come together’ in every reconciliation of thought and being, but 
never so as to annihilate the distinction between these. The natural sci-
ences make essential use of the space and time structures (in kinematics, 
mechanics and physics). They too are predicated on the subjective and 
the objective, at the natural or factual (real, as over against ideal) areas 
of the body’s forms of sensibility and world of changing appearance. It is 
in not belonging to either the world in the large or the human psycho-
physical structure that the sciences constitute a ‘reality’ of their own, a 
reality ‘in between’ that of the Self and the World at the bodily-factual 
level. The “reality of science [is] itself a synthesis of the given, the object, 
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and subjective factors” (1918a: 12, cf. also pp. 96, 106, 381, 434-437). 
The above schema of the Self and the World help to put this in perspec-
tive. 
 The second remark is to point to a further analogy between the 
‘mind’ on the part of the Self and ‘ideas’ on the part of the unchanging 
ideal world. When the Self wants to know, it must ‘become’ a know-
ing subject, which implies a submission to the norm of truth.96 In other 
words, mentality threatens to be psychically anarchic unless such sub-
mission takes place. Norms have general validity, holding for individual 
mentality that becomes normatively correct only on condition of such 
‘holding’. Now there is an analogous arrangement of generality and indi-
viduality on the part of ideas. There are general ideas of species (essences), 
but they need to be individualized in order to hold for distinct things and 
human beings. Without such ‘holding for’, the dynamics of individual 
things or human beings would be chaotic, lacking the constraint of the 
species characterization. Taken together, viz. ideas and norms, it becomes 
clear that they both belong to the ‘region of validity’, which involves both 
the mental on the human side and the extra-mental on the part of ideas 
(on the side of the world).97 This will prove to be of particular signifi-
cance in the discussion of theism.
 Other illustrations add to the plausibility of the micro- and macro-
cosm schema. There are the obvious dual foci of self-consciousness and 
world knowledge. Also the two forms of ‘the reality of succession’, one 
with respect to the Self and the other as regards the world, give added 
support. But the schema is not an end in itself. Its usefulness is to help 
offer an adequate analysis of Vollenhoven’s themes and thoughts.
F. Self-knowledge and self-consciousness
We can now again pick up the topic of self-consciousness and discuss it 
in connection with the specific relevance of the metaphysical intuition 
for it. Self-consciousness is not to be confused with self-knowledge. The 
latter, we saw, requires the quality of knowing subject seeking to become 
more and more acquainted with the Self to the extent that the Self reveals 
itself. Self-knowledge is a species of ‘world-knowledge’ or acquaintance 
with beings, for this approach is not different from that of knowing any 
96   A relevant citation is: “the subject of knowing is a function of the Self that wants 
to know and accordingly subjects itself to the norms of logic” (1918a: 228).
97   To complete the picture, the ‘realm’ of Gegenstände is intra-mental, and they 
may be said to subsist. This distinguishes the realm of Gegenstände from both the real 
(existence) and the ‘region of validity’ (norms and ideas). Cf. the more explicit diagram 
below.
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other thing. The approach is outward, via the appearances, and its re-
sult is always incomplete. For we become acquainted with our selves, as 
creatures with body and soul, through the avenues of what we reveal of 
ourselves and how we interact with other human beings and things. This 
‘Self-knowledge’ involves a Self-approaching consciousness (Ik-benaderend 
bewustzijn; 1918a: 433), via the world as it were. In other words, in this 
approach we would become acquainted with the ‘appearances’ to our-
selves, whereby the diversity of ‘bodily appearances’ and ‘mental appear-
ances’ (in the sense of attestations of mentality) would be quite evident. 
In relating this to the Self, the body and the mind will each be treated as 
a unity of substance, but as substantiae incompletae, for neither is congru-
ent with the complete Self.
 But, there is also a direct self-consciousness of the Self, in which the 
Self is grasped intuitively (from within itself ). Vollenhoven emphasizes 
that this is entirely different from Self-knowledge. “The Self-approaching 
consciousness differs toto caelo from self-consciousness” (1918a: 439). 
Grasping the Self intuitively does not take place in the guise of the qual-
ity of knowing subject. Self-consciousness is prior to, and a condition 
for, Self-knowledge. Actually the metaphor of ‘grasping’ is misleading. 
The Self is not a ‘kernel’ of some primal reality, capable of being grasped. 
The Self is an ideal law—the complete substance—that harmonizes the 
basic states of mind and body in continuity, coherence and development. 
Unless we could retreat into the mind of God, where we might expect to 
‘find’ this law (as idea), an alternative interpretation of the use of ‘Self ’ 
needs to be sought. Self-consciousness, as we found earlier, involves the 
awareness of our states in the experience of undergoing them. These 
states, like the ‘perceptions’ of Leibniz’s monads, signal the relations in 
which the Self stands.
 So self-consciousness involves a complex and peculiar awareness. It 
answers to concrete intuition to the extent that the Self currently experi-
ences its specific states. But because the experiences actually take place, 
there is also a passage from one state to another state, similar to what 
Leibniz called ‘appetition’.98 This is the temporal succession of states. The 
Self is able to be aware of this through the analytical intuition, which 
brings the differences between these states to consciousness, provided 
memory retains them. (Here too awareness of number is made possible 
in the groupings of distinct moments.) But finally the metaphysical intu-
ition contributes its share in connection with the reality of the Self. The 
Self as substance is the (human) essence that is individuated into the idea 
98   Cf. Leibniz 1976a, section 2: 636, or Leibniz 1976b, section 15: 644. 
Philosophy in the Making
162
or thing-law of an individual human being. At the same time the deep-
est orderliness of a human being is the movement of the succession of its 
(psychical) states (in psychic growth). Now the metaphysical intuition is 
the immediate insight into the identity in difference of space and time as 
regards continuous motion—now to be applied as coherence and conti-
nuity in the succession of states—and as regards the idea of species of dif-
fering individuals—now relevant as the unique Self that I am. This meta-
physical intuition signals the awareness of myself as having a constant 
identity, in virtue of my Self as idea, in the succession of my changing 
states, that is coherent in virtue of my Self as ‘thing-law’. In other words, 
the Self as idea or law manifests itself as the law of succession of my states 
(on the context of psychical growth). A human being cannot fix onto that 
law apart from actually experiencing succession. Thus the metaphysical 
intuition of the Self is the awareness, acting as warrant, that the currently 
experienced succession is real. My Self is the warrant of the identity that 
remains constant in this succession. The moments of this succession can 
be subjected to the principle of identity and thus be turned into Gegen-
stände. But the reality of succession is prior to this, the awareness of which 
is not subject to any norm. “The succession is currently experienced by 
that Self even without the acknowledgement of these norms; however 
the moments are only distinguished again in subjection to the principle 
of identity, the norm for all Gegenstand formation” (1918a: 432-433). (It 
is as if the Self itself, as law or idea, is the ‘norm’ of the awareness of suc-
cession, but then the human being would have to subject itself to its Self, 
which is humanistic and distinctly paradoxical.) But a human being can 
never divorce itself from the succession of its occurrent experience, thus it 
can do no better than acknowledge that the temporal factor of succession 
s the determining form of this awareness of succession.99 And of course 
psychical synthesis acts on the moments and prevents them from remain-
ing detached units.100 This is as basic as we can get in understanding the 
99   In the section devoted to Brouwer, when discussing Brouwer’s intuition of time, 
Vollenhoven states: “We immediately recognize here the connection with the metaphysi-
cal intuition and the awareness of the occurrent experience of succession: the intuition 
of time is currently experienced as succession of moments, but this is only possible with 
a unity as basis (metaphysical intuition). The latter [is] the principle of the unity of per-
sonality. . . . Only succession is currently experienced immediately; the unity of the Self 
must be presupposed. . .” (1918a: 394).
100   This psychical synthesis does not enable one to reach the unity via the moments. 
Vollenhoven does claim that the unity of the Self can, while the unity of extra-mental 
things cannot, be currently experienced, “but not consciously, for consciousness always 
splits” (1918a: 440-441). Read in context, one will understand that Vollenhoven does 
not mean to say that consciousness splits apart into two parts (perhaps suggested by the 
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metaphysical existence of the Self as substance.
 We can now see why self-consciousness is so important to Vol-
lenhoven. It focuses the attention on the states of the Self, these being 
indicative of the relations in which the Self stands. In that sense, self-
consciousness is consciousness of one’s standing in relations to what ex-
ists, to the extent that these relations depend on the states in the Self. The 
deepest intuition of this self-consciousness is that of the awareness of the 
reality of succession of one’s states. Thus, in a way that is completely open 
to our awareness, we have an intra-mental indication of the unity of be-
ing and thought. Here ‘being’ refers to the reality of succession (and the 
presupposed unity of the Self ), and ‘thought’ denotes the (self-)awareness 
of undergoing that succession. It is through the play of the three forms of 
intuition, concrete, analytical and metaphysical, that this synthesis was 
achieved. Thus intuitionism is a viable foundation of knowledge, taking 
knowledge to be a reconciler of thought and being. The success in achiev-
ing this in the Self, i.e. ‘the world in the small’, gives confidence when 
seeking reconciliation with the ‘world in the large’ outside of the Self. 
“Philosophy ought to proceed from self-consciousness” (1918a: 404).
P.S. A textual aporie recurs in the above, in connection with the meta-
physical intuition, and relates to what is raised in footnote 92 above. The 
metaphysical intuition is engaged in a way that would appear to be more 
correctly attributed to the metaphysical principle of substance. When 
‘intuiting the Self ’, there is the self-consciousness of the occurrent expe-
rience of succession of moments (concrete intuition), which moments 
the analytical intuition distinguishes and keeps apart. The metaphysical 
intuition, in turn, is the awareness that this succession of moments is 
real, i.e. actually occurs in the Self. One can understand Vollenhoven’s 
insisting that “this is only possible with a unity as basis”, that basis being 
“the principle of the unity of personality” (1918a: 394; cf. also footnote 
99). That ‘unity of personality’ can be none other than the Self. In its 
having to be presupposed (ibid.) one is immediately inclined to think 
of the relevance of the principle of substance, the Self being a substance 
and the basis of all its changing facets. But Vollenhoven adds, after “unity 
as basis”, in brackets: “metaphysical intuition” (cf. the quote in footnote 
difference between knowledge and intuition), but rather that consciousness is a divider. 
Conscious awareness always involves the awareness of distinct moments. This is prob-
ably why one does not come across Bergson’s ‘durée’ in this connection (as undivided 
duration of experience), despite the Bergsonian provenance of Vollenhoven’s ‘intuition’. 
Vollenhoven’s repugnance towards anything suggesting a holistic consciousness relates to 
its pantheistic overtones. The latter is incompatible with Christian theism.
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99), which is puzzling. If this were counted as a slip of the pen, reading 
“metaphysical principle” for “metaphysical intuition”, then this passage 
could be considered amended. For there would then also be restored con-
sistency with the statement that “only succession is currently experienced 
immediately; the unity of the Self must be presupposed” (ibid.). 
 But elsewhere—cf. the quote in footnote 100—Vollenhoven states 
that, whereas “the unity of things external to us cannot be currently 
experienced, that of the Self can [be currently experienced]” (1918a: 
440-441)—however, he adds that this is not a conscious experience! 
Vollenhoven, as noted earlier, also states that the mind can be affected 
unconsciously, such as when asleep (1918a: 440). But how is the uncon-
scious awareness of the unity of the Self affected? Perhaps Vollenhoven 
means to suggest that this is religious, e.g. regeneration. But then it is of 
a different order. I am not acquainted with any passage in Vollenhoven’s 
early work where this is broached. Therefore it is not at all certain that a 
‘self-(un)consciousness’ would make for a redundancy of the principle of 
substance.
 I believe we should retain the distinction between the roles of the 
(metaphysical) principle of substance and the (epistemological) principle 
of intuition, including the metaphysical intuition. Where, in the text, 
the metaphysical intuition seems to usurp the role of the metaphysical 
principle, I prefer to take this as confusion rather than taking it at face 
value. The havoc that results from permitting the confusion of things 
metaphysical and epistemological would threaten to undermine a consis-
tent interpretation of Vollenhoven’s early thought.
G. Occasionalism
The schema of micro- and macrocosm helps draw diverse facets of Vol-
lenhoven’s thought together. But this does not characterize the ‘coming 
together’ itself. If we attempt provisionally to characterize Vollenhoven’s 
conception (we return to this later), then we can do no better than be-
gin with Vollenhoven’s own characterization as “theistic intuitionism” 
(1918a: 338). The qualification ‘theistic’ will be discussed below. The 
noun ‘intuitionism’ is a programmatic term of seeking to reconcile any 
duality in a normative way. Intuitionism’s “right to exist” (1918a: 52) 
depends on its being able to bind the rational and the empirical elements 
of knowledge. This is the main epistemological duality, and it is recon-
ciled by means of the synthetic a priori. Other dualities are also brought 
together. The Self binds soul and body through psychical growth, and, in 
the religious experience, God and creature are brought together. There is 
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always a duality or multiplicity becoming a complex unity. There is a dy-
namism at work that constantly seeks to relativize difference by turning it 
into a workable togetherness. The main function of norms, ideals, ideas, 
thing-laws and the like—elements of constancy in the ‘domain of valid-
ity’ that must be brought to bear in the dynamism of reconciliation—is 
to guide, orientate or direct the many in their becoming one.101
 At the same time the term ‘dualism’ can mislead. We made note of 
the fact that Vollenhoven also speaks of a ‘common root’ (1918a: 403) 
as precondition for the possibility of synthesis. The duality must not 
be taken as a static or principled difference. It is here that experience 
plays its crucial role, as fundamental for intuitionism. “The fundamental 
thought of intuitionism proceeds from the currently experienced synthe-
sis” (1918a: 104). Here Vollenhoven prescribes that the diversity must 
come within the range of an occasion of experience, the effect of which is 
that, through the experiential undergoing of the diversity or multiplicity 
(Dutch: “het beleven”), a merging (or coming together) can take place 
through psychical synthesis. Here the occasion itself is the precondition 
for the possibility of unification. Thus the term ‘occasionalism’ suggests 
itself as characterization of Vollenhoven’s intuitionism.
 Occasionalism, as here used, involves an object-subject relation. The 
object comes first in the sense that it must present itself as initiating the 
occasion in which the subject proceeds with its work of assimilating the 
object. (We quoted earlier: “being has logical precedence over thought”; 
1918a: 382.) This occurs at the bodily level, where physical stimuli oc-
casion the experience of sense-data (here Vollenhoven himself speaks, as 
we saw, of causa occasionalis; cf. 1918a: 328, also p. 330). Knowledge by 
acquaintance also proceeds from the presentation of the object to the 
Self. And at the intra-mental level of the intuition itself, there is the Self ’s 
being in touch with mental content that triggers the intuitive certainty of 
intuitive consciousness.102
 In the addendum to chapter 4 we discuss Vollenhoven’s own char-
101   In 1921, Vollenhoven characterizes his position epistemologically as “epistemo-
logical dualism”, on account of the importance of the distinction between idea and con-
cept; cf. the further discussion below; Vollenhoven 1921c: 79.
102   Considerable and important points of agreement can be found with the ‘oc-
casionalism’ of A.N. Whitehead, as found in his writings from the mid-1920s. This is a 
typological agreement, not a causal-interactive one. (There is no evidence that Whitehead 
was ever aware of Vollenhoven’s existence.) However an important difference is that there 
is less of a microcosm-macrocosm arrangement and more of a universalism (holism) to 
Whitehead’s occasionalism. (Holism does not cede independent reality to a microcosm.) 
An accessible introduction to Whitehead’s thought are his two lectures “Nature lifeless” 
and “Nature alive” (1934), reprinted in Whitehead 1938, chap. 7 and 8. 
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acterization of his earliest conception when looking back at it more than 
30 years later. We will find that the term ‘occasionalism’ has in the mean-
time taken on a technical meaning, as the descriptive term for a ‘type’ of 
thought, in the context of his later problem-historical method. But that 
characterization will appear to accord remarkably well with the analysis 
of his thought offered in this chapter, even though, when looking back, 
Vollenhoven came to a different self-characterization. He himself spoke 
of ‘ennoetism’, which is a term that emphasizes a contemplative mind 
that absorbs the object in the process of its contemplation (‘ennoetism’ 
means: in the mind). Clearly, this introduces a problem, the discussion 
of which we leave until the end of chapter 4. There are different strands 
that come together in this problem, and to unravel them we need to be 
able to refer, among other things, to Dooyeweerd’s early thought as well. 
The discussion of his early work is in chapter 3.
VIII. theIsm
Vollenhoven’s theism appeals to divinity both as a fundamental moti-
vational factor of his philosophical endeavour and to cap, topically, the 
philosophical understanding that he achieves. In the combination of 
these two appeals to divinity there is a restless tension. After all, aims 
can be realized in different ways. Vollenhoven was a ‘theistic thinker’ all 
his life, in the fundamental motivational sense, but his formulation as to 
what this entails in terms of philosophical understanding varied over the 
years.
 Vollenhoven held that it is possible to combine being a Christian 
and a thinker (1918a: 2). He accepted this not as a fact of faith, to be 
defended by reason, but as a mission to execute in the deployment of 
thought. It is as mission or ideal that Vollenhoven introduces theism. It 
is defined at the beginning of De Wijsbegeerte der Wiskunde as “the phi-
losophy that God wills that we should have” (1918a: 2). In that open-
ing text nothing is said as to how we can know what God wants, or 
also why, whatever this will is, it should commend itself to the thinker, 
Christian or otherwise. At the end of the book Vollenhoven is more ex-
plicit. There he says that theism is not an existing system; “in an abso-
lute sense it is the epistemic system [kensysteem] that God wants that we 
form concerning all the given” (1918a: 443). Theism in this sense is an 
ideal that we can never completely realize. Here the phrase ‘all the given’ 
refers of course to the reality that is knowable for human beings. And 
what God’s wanting implies is that we form our knowledge in accordance 
with the logical principles, used as norms, which is more than merely as 
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rules of deduction, as formalism would have it, nor as generalization of 
data-experience, as empiricism teaches. In concluding his discussion of 
Meinong, Vollenhoven had said: “There are no norms other than divine 
norms” (1918a: 175). And, in criticism of Malebranche’s “We see the 
things in God”, Vollenhoven says that it is not our task to see what God 
sees, for, were this the case, then “that eradicates the distinction between 
God as norm giver, also for our thought, and the human being who is 
subject to his norms” (1918a: 53). Truth, says Vollenhoven, is “the view 
of facts the way God wants us to view them” (ibid.). To illustrate this 
negatively (for a positive interpretation, cf. below), a view of the facts that 
is impermissible is any view that (for example) engenders contradictions 
(the principle of contradiction being viewed as a norm). Thus thought is 
bounded by norms, acting as injunctions that are to be abided by in will-
ing submission, not (supra-)natural facts we cognitively accept on faith. 
In short, theism, as here described, does not call upon a human being to 
think God’s thoughts after him, but to think as God wills that we ought to 
think, namely according to norms.
A. Actual infinity
But the appeal to divinity also has a more specific theological and meta-
physical content, with relevance for mathematics. The relevance for 
mathematics lies in the problem of infinity. Mathematical intuitionism 
was attractive to Vollenhoven on account of its rejection of the actual in-
finite in the constructive parts of mathematics. But this was not the end 
of the matter. In the discussion of Poincaré’s work, Vollenhoven indicates 
that Poincaré argues for the denial of the actual infinite in mathemat-
ics by the radical tendency of treating everything related to science, in-
cluding its object, as a construction. Theistic intuitionism disagrees, says 
Vollenhoven, for it acknowledges the given (object of science) as prior 
to construction (or assimilation), and it distinguishes the given from 
that which the human mind is able to create (1918a: 380). Therefore 
Poincaré, who, in his idealistic humanism, did not make this distinction, 
denied the actual infinite completely. But theism “discounts the actual 
infinite [only] to the extent that human creativity reaches, hence within 
science, within that ‘reality’ in which, in distinction from the given, this 
latter and the [knowing] subject enter into a synthesis” (1918a: 381). In 
other words, the given is a reality that, in a metaphysical sense, allows for 
the existence of the actual infinite.
 In introducing the problem of infinity, Vollenhoven had, from the 
start of his project, immediately stated its connection with “the posi-
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tion taken in the conflict over the possibility of metaphysics” (1918a: 2). 
Within (mathematical) intuitionism there is no consensus, for Poincaré 
denied the actual infinite out of hand, while Brouwer, who had pantheis-
tic and mystical leanings, had his own thoughts on the matter.103 For Vol-
lenhoven, the given depends upon an existent infinite being, who con-
trols existence by means of (extra-mental) ideas. Ideas have an intrinsic 
possibility of including infinite complexity. That is why the given, taken 
metaphysically, does not as such discount the notion of infinity. In the 
metaphysical order of reality, divine (objective) rationality is operative. 
But we must be careful in relating this to human understanding. The no-
tion of ‘completed infinity’ is indeed a possible Gegenstand. But it cannot 
be taken up in a (proleptic) concept—i.e. taken up into the context of 
knowledge—for, in virtue of the principle of contradiction, which holds 
for concepts, this concept must be rejected as being self-contradictory (cf. 
1918a: 413).104 What is given to know is richer than what one actually 
gets to know.
103   Even before completing his doctorate on the intuitionistic foundation of math-
ematics in 1907, Brouwer published a work entitled Leven, Kunst en Mystiek (Life, art and 
mysticism); Brouwer 1905. In this work he expresses sentiments that centre on the retreat 
into one’s Self, as a “dying unto the old world of sensibility, of time and space and all other 
diversity, and the eyes, no longer bound, open to a joyful silence” (Brouwer 1905: 14). 
This is how the soul “finds the naked formless essence of the divine unity” (ibid.; Brouwer 
here quotes Meister Eckhart). This divine unity would appear to be the actual infinite. 
It is reflected in Brouwer’s mathematics, in his acceptance of the “intuitive continuum”. 
In his dissertation he states: “The continuum as a whole was intuitively given to us; a 
construction of it, an act which would create as individualized ‘all’ points of it by means 
of mathematical intuition, is unthinkable, and impossible”; Brouwer 1907: 62. In the 
biography of Brouwer, the biographer, Dirk van Dalen, comments: “Brouwer’s view of 
the continuum shows a suggestive similarity to the mystic experience of the initial chaotic 
state of the individual. . . . So the continuum, being traditionally the flowing, continu-
ous medium, must from Brouwer’s point of view, have been the structure par excellence 
created by a human faculty analogous to the original mystical state”; Van Dalen 1999: 
114-115.
104   This argument involves the assumption that ‘infinite’= ‘not finite’/‘unending’, 
for only then is ‘completed infinity’ contradictory. Also, the fact that Vollenhoven now 
speaks of “complete”, rather than “actual”, suggests the (impossible) process of passing 
completely through an unending series. The recognition of the actual infinite in meta-
physics does not endorse Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers. This theory falls within 
the constructive part of mathematics, and statements of existence within the domain of 
the theory can only be proven, according to mathematical intuitionism, by an appeal to 
finite procedures (including the potential infinite of the principle of complete induction). 
We can also mention here, as K.A. Bril pointed out to me, the fourth of the twenty-five 
theses Vollenhoven appended to his dissertation for the occasion of its defence, which 
reads: “The denial of the existence of an actual infinity is correct for epistemology, not for 
metaphysics.”
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 What one “gets to know” mathematically is what Vollenhoven calls, 
following Brouwer, mathematics of the second order. This is mathematics 
as a system of judgments and concepts, in arithmetic or geometry, as the 
case may be. But this appeals to, and presupposes, a ‘first order’ mathe-
matics. For arithmetic, this involves the wherewithal of the natural num-
bers, accounted for through the act of counting; for geometry it concerns 
the context of space, which is the context of localization, orientation, 
measure and the like. First order mathematics focuses on construction 
or synthesis. But it is not a matter of practical or empirical construction. 
It is construction that is geared to and exploits the possibilities of the 
human constitution of mind and psycho-physical body. Mind and body 
are the foci of the synthetic a priori in mathematics. In the case of the 
mind, the Self is able to intuit this directly in the self-conscious discovery 
of the reality of (psychically experienced) succession and the analytical 
realization that the mind has the power of unending repetition, once an 
act is possible (e.g. of turning an experienced moment into a Gegenstand, 
which can be successively added, giving rise to numbers). The principle 
of complete induction is based in this unending a priori synthesizing 
capacity. In the case of the body, the mind can do no more than ‘sense’ 
the body, by means of the body’s forms of sensibility of time and space. 
These forms, in turn, are the subjective conditions for the human being 
to localize itself and other bodies and things about it. The ‘convenience’ 
of three-dimensional Euclidean space for localization, and the attempt 
of ever more complete localizations (outward and inward continuity) in 
absolute space and time, are indicative of the constitutional connection 
of the human mind and body. Thus three-dimensional Euclidean space 
is the form of this a priori synthesis of localization. Behind each of these 
unending a priori synthesizing capacities is the reality of succession.105
 But these anthropologically founded mathematical ‘principles’, in 
their being concerned with the human constitution, are also metaphysi-
cal, in the sense of pertaining to the human being in its capacity as crea-
ture. As with any creature, there is an idea involved that controls a crea-
105   On the last page of the dissertation Vollenhoven himself states his conclusion. 
“Our conclusion is that given metaphysically are things [both material and mental] and 
relations [i.e. their forces] both of which must be thought, as to their form of existence, in 
real succession. First order arithmetic is then based on the activity of the human mind 
in se, the localization attempts in space and time as forms of sensibility are based on the 
activity of mind and body together; absolute space and time are the supra-individual limits 
posed as ideal on our capacity to order” (1918a: 444). Here we see, what has not been 
emphasized as yet, the role of succession as that of ‘a common root’ of both arithmetic 
and geometry. Naturally, this does not merge time as occurrent succession with time as 
sequence (form of sensibility).
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ture’s existence. I believe that this is in the background of Vollenhoven’s 
statement: “three-dimensional space can be maintained as being an a 
priori synthetic thought of God” (1918a: 379). This ‘thought of God’ 
concerns the psycho-physical organization, in so far as this is determina-
tive for the human capacity to localize. The “divine thought” concerns a 
constructive creaturely capacity, and it is not a statement or divine truth 
in its own right. This “thought” fits the context of first order mathemat-
ics, not second order mathematics. The “thought” involves an infinity of 
being, capable of synthesis, as is normally controlled by an idea.106
 Important towards grasping Vollenhoven’s theism is the question 
how one is to understand Vollenhoven’s use of the term ‘God’ (as the 
actual infinite). Then, the matter of the relation between God and the 
world calls for more thorough elucidation. Finally, because Vollenhoven 
appeals and adheres to the Christian faith, we expect a relevant reference 
to the understanding of ‘God’ as seen from that perspective. We turn 
now to a discussion of these matters.
B. Divine transcendence and immanence
Vollenhoven accepts theism, but he is also critical of some of its implica-
tions. In the realist setting of Vollenhoven’s thought, God is most readily 
referred to in the context of the duality of ‘God and the world’, a phrase-
ology that Vollenhoven also uses (1918a: 438). The metaphysical prop-
erty of God as being actually infinite, sets God off against the finite, or at 
most potential infinite, context of the world, finite in temporal duration 
and in spatial extent, and secured in that finitude as set in absolute space 
and absolute time (which, being limitative in lacking fixed boundaries, 
are potentially infinite). God transcends the world. But if this were one’s 
primary focus, theism could not be adequately distinguished from deism, 
the view which, indeed, also emphasizes God’s transcendence but limits 
his relevance to being the ‘First Cause’ of the world. One misses a sense 
of God’s continuous presence here. But were one to offset this with an 
emphasis of God’s immanence, then the balance might be tipped towards 
pantheism, which makes the status of the world, in its difference from 
God, problematic (cf. 1918a: 443).
 The terms ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ need a reference to 
the world to give them meaning. This reference is part of the problem 
of deism and pantheism, for both adjust God’s presence or absence, his 
relevance or irrelevance, by taking the world as referent. But the Jewish-
106   Discussion with John H. Kok helped clarify my understanding of Vollenhoven’s 
use of ‘thought’ here. 
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Christian tradition sees the world as a creation of God. This, of course, 
is also a statement about God vis-à-vis the world, but it also invites a 
focussing on God without such a reference. After all, one cannot apply 
the categories of the world to God, at least not without further ado. The 
world in space and time is a poor model for understanding the deity. Vol-
lenhoven agrees with Augustine in the latter’s view that space, time and 
change were themselves created with the creation of the world. According 
to the human measure, this puts the time of creation at the beginning of 
time, and by implication—Augustine does not seem to have addressed 
this question—the place of creation from where all positioning proceeds. 
But since time and place themselves arise in and through creation, the 
creation act of God cannot itself be defined or located temporally and 
spatially. In the “excellency of an ever-present eternity” (Augustine) God 
in his essence is non-temporal and non-spatial, hence is thereby also all-
present with respect to time and space but without determination of 
when and where (cf. 1918a: 133-134).107 This way of speaking about God 
retains its validity with or without the world, for the temporal and spatial 
dimensions do not affect it either way. “God is neither discrete, nor tem-
poral nor spatial; whereas he is active” (1918a: 284, n. 1). This ‘activity’ 
of God, being non-temporal and non-spatial in character, would appear 
to suggest that this feature of God is the very principle of the dynamics 
of reality, an activity that makes present in space and time, a source of 
empowerment. Because ideas arise in virtue of this activity (cf. below), it 
cannot be taken to be an activity of thought as such, but would appear 
to be deeper or more primary than thought, on a par with Vollenhoven’s 
later cherished characterization of God as “the Sovereign One”.
 But how is the difference between God and the world then to be 
introduced? And how is one able to acknowledge God’s transcendence 
and immanence?
1. The distinction of God and the world
The distinction between God and the world—to raise this point first—
comes to pointed expression in the following passage. Vollenhoven’s 
study of Rudolf Hermann Lotze raised the following consideration:
Hence he [Lotze] distinguishes here unending time, as a subjective way of 
viewing, and the succession of the activity itself, which makes this putting-
in-a-series possible, and of which holds that it is “die eigenste Natur” [the 
most characteristic nature] of what is real. This distinction appears to us to 
be of the greatest importance for theism and hence also for true intuition-
107   Vollenhoven quotes from Augustine, The Confessions, Book XI, chapter 13; cf. 
Augustine 1994: 167-168. 
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ism. For when the essence of things is law, and their relations force [kracht], 
then it is self-evident that space is a form of sensibility and also absolute 
time construed spatially; but if succession, too, is a [mere] subjective form, 
as Lotze maintains prior to 1878, then the essence of things is intellectual 
[geestelijk] and eternal: the distinction between presence [bestaan] in the 
Counsel of God and in reality falls away and with it the creation, which [in 
that case] is merely the name for the transition of the one into the other. 
But when, in contrast, the reality of succession is acknowledged, as Lotze 
does after 1878, then created things have a characteristic existence of suc-
cessive self-development [een eigen, successief zich ontwikkelend bestaan], 
sufficiently distinguished from that of God; this existence [bestaan] is no 
longer a modification of the one substance, and God must have more at-
tributes than personality and unity. He also possesses the incommunicable 
[attribute] of eternity. (1918a: 346)
 Lotze is here said to distinguish between time as form of sensibil-
ity, which is a subjective condition, and as succession, the latter being 
the characteristic that makes ‘putting in a series’ possible, as objective 
condition. It is Lotze’s characterization of succession, as being the most 
characteristic feature of what is real, that is the focus of attention here, es-
pecially in view of the possibility of being able to make a clear distinction 
between God and created reality when succession is taken to be objective.
 Now Vollenhoven does not question his own ontology. The essence 
of things is law, meaning that this essence is secured in the (intellectual/
spiritual) “Counsel of God”. And the relations of things are forces. From 
the foregoing it is clear that Vollenhoven means to say that things influ-
ence each other, viz. enter into mutual interactions. And that means that 
things lay between themselves spatial and temporal relations, calling for 
forms of sensibility so as to be able to be viewed as such. But Vollenhoven 
then seems to cut corners. He only mentions space as form of sensibility, 
and time is explicit only as absolute time, said to be construed spatially. 
I believe he means to say, when fully expressed, that absolute time and 
space delineate the context of spatial and temporal viewing. These are, 
as he says elsewhere, ideals. Hence unless there is another feature that 
guarantees objectivity, absolute time and space are nothing without the 
viewing subject and its striving. In other words, they reduce to subjective 
notions. And furthermore, since time is usually thought of as a dimen-
sion, time is then actually construed spatially. This emphasis on space at 
the cost of time, when objectivity is lacking, is what seems to be involved 
in Vollenhoven’s formulation in which he short-changes time.
 But then the feature of succession is brought to bear. If this is taken 
to be subjective, then it does no more than underscore the merely sequen-
tial schema of time as form of sensibility. In connection with change, this 
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merely underscores the before and the after, but it does not give a handle 
on temporal development. Now the essence of a thing, as idea, is as such 
eternal. Thus, if at the level of factual reality there is no way of account-
ing for the temporal feature of things, viz. in their developmental change 
(coming to be and passing away), then the distinction between things as 
they exist in the world and in the counsel of God becomes blurred (“falls 
away”). To talk of creation then amounts to no more than to pass from 
the idea of things to a viewing of things in terms of subjective forms of 
space and time. Things are then no more than a modification in the di-
vine mind. They never take on an extra-mental status. This amounts to 
a monistic view with pantheistic overtones, for one is unable to draw a 
clear distinction in this modification. For Vollenhoven these consequenc-
es are sufficient to condemn the whole view.108 
 But everything changes when succession is taken to be objective, or, 
as Vollenhoven says, taken as real. Then there is a factor over and above 
that of the forms of sensibility, especially as regards the feature of time. 
Real succession is not merely a matter of passing along a series of mo-
ments of time, arranged as earlier and later, but real succession says that 
change involves real states of development. Succession allows for a dis-
closure of things in terms of their own intrinsic possibilities, as governed 
by a law. If the idea of a thing is its law—Vollenhoven’s own statement is: 
“ideas regulate the functional development as fixed laws” (1918a: 228)—
then it is the law of change of this self-disclosure in its real succession 
of states. We now have a sufficient distinction between things, existing in 
their self-development, and things as present by their ideas in the divine 
mind. The reality of succession enforces that existent things are temporal 
as opposed to being eternal. Things are finite, but especially finite in 
time. Eternity is an attribute of God, not of creatures.109
 We can supplement this account with several considerations. In the 
first place, we previously pointed to the two contexts of ‘real succession’ 
in Vollenhoven. The long quote makes no reference to real succession in 
the human Self, deep in the psyche. But it seems evident that the char-
108   Vollenhoven definitely rejects such a monistic metaphysics when he appeals to 
the reality of succession. In his discussion of Russell, Vollenhoven states: “if there is [only] 
one substance, then our consciousness is a part of the self-consciousness of the one, but 
then we could not design a system of the All (monism)”, for such a system (so we add) 
would require recognition of diversity. Thus “a monistic logic is absurd” (1918a: 318).
109   In the discussion about God’s essence being non-temporal and non-spatial, Vol-
lenhoven adds: “[God’s] being non-temporal does not only include the negation of ob-
jective temporality, which holds of everything, but also that of succession, whereby He 
distinguishes himself from creation” (1918a: 134). In a footnote here (no. 2) he refers to 
the scholastic distinction: “creatio in successionem et in tempore.”
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acterization of succession, as “the most characteristic nature” of what is 
empirically or factually real in connection with the things of the world, 
holds without change for the human Self as well. The heart of the Self 
is psychical growth or synthesis, controlled by the Self as idea. This is a 
succession at the heart of human experience. The important difference 
between the two contexts is that the succession intrinsic to experience can 
be intuited in self-consciousness, that of the world needs to be accepted 
as a metaphysical truth (illumined or conditioned by the metaphysical 
intuition), over and above space and time as forms of sensibility.
 Secondly, the distinction between God and the world is here dis-
cussed in terms of ideas in the Counsel of God and succession in the 
world. But this can be broadened. Nothing is changed or discounted if 
we think of the ideas as belonging to the ‘realm of validity’. But then, 
besides ideas, one can include norms and ideals. They too are a factor 
in determining the distinction between God and the world, viz. the hu-
man world. “The normativity of logic can only be maintained by distin-
guishing God and world, for otherwise the logical ‘laws’ [i.e. the logical 
principles of identity, contradiction, excluded middle] are merely empiri-
cal discoveries or arbitrarily posed rules” (1918a: 438). (Recall, logical 
laws are norms, and norms are “(syn)theses of God” (1918a: 407).) And 
as to ideals, “the Spirit [of God] posits and maintains the norms and 
ideals” (1918a: 410). Clearly, the way the distinction between God and 
the (non-human) world is drawn in terms of ideas (and succession) also 
holds for the distinction between God and human beings. The latter, 
besides being structurally controlled by their own individual idea or law, 
are also subject to norms and ideals in their mental life.
 Then, thirdly, there is the understanding of ‘world’. Vollenhoven 
sides completely with Kant in taking world to be an idea.110 The world 
is not a thing. We cannot point to it with distinction, but at best only 
approach it in an empirical synthesis. It is a whole of appearances, of 
which it is impossible to say whether it is finite or infinite. Every bound-
ary would have to be absolute, but we cannot think what is not bounded, 
i.e. what is beyond the boundary. Hence the world can never be taken as 
being complete in itself. It is not self-conditioned. The world does have 
cosmic features that support viewing it as spatial and temporal. But this 
does not make the world a mere object of consciousness. “For every ap-
pearance poses problems, inter alia of thing and relation” (1918a: 135) 
– meaning that behind the appearances there is interaction of real things. 
But with real things come ideas. Also, the world as a whole is not the sum-
110   This paragraph is based on 1918a: 134-135.
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total of things in relations (which would make it an ‘analytical’ notion). 
That whole needs its own condition of organization, met with in its own 
idea. Though Vollenhoven does not say so in this particular discussion, it 
would appear to follow that the idea of the world especially serves to regu-
late its development, in the sense of its being in succession or process. So 
the factual world cannot be understood apart from what might be called 
the ‘world order’ of the factual world and its ideational condition.
2. Transcendence and immanence with respect to the Self and the world
Now finally something can be said about the divine transcendence and 
immanence. In discussing the distinction of God and the world, Vol-
lenhoven, we found, points to the presence of a ‘realm’ on which a hu-
man being, or anything of the world, has no influence. Also it cannot be 
identified with anything of the human being or the world. It is a ‘realm’ 
of objective validity, relevant for ideas, norms and ideals. Is this realm 
divine? I don’t believe Vollenhoven thinks of this realm as being itself 
divine, at least not independently divine. It can be considered to be a realm 
that God has devised and uses as means. Then ideas have a “presence 
[bestaan] in the Counsel of God” (1918a: 346) and norms are “posited 
by God the Holy Spirit” (1918a: 391), more or less (so I tend to think) 
the way sensations have existence in human receptivity and Gegenstände 
are posits of human mentality. If sensations and Gegenstände ‘are’ human, 
then (roughly similarly) ideas and norms can be considered to be divine 
in their distinct way, and so norms are said to be “divine (syn)theses” 
(1918a: 407). But the important point is there being a realm of validity, 
and this attests to the presence of divinity in positing it in a way that 
transcends the factual, changing world.
 Now, when considered in itself, this realm of validity might remind 
one of Plato’s ideal world. It is important to realize that Vollenhoven 
does not endorse considering this realm merely ‘in itself ’. There is an 
immanence that matches transcendence. On Vollenhoven’s view: “With-
out some content to be worked over, not a single judgment can ever be 
deduced from [i.e. be in accordance with] logical norms. Even the prin-
ciple of identity assumes Gegenstände, and the principles of contradiction 
and excluded middle require judgments for which they hold. Without 
thoughts there is no norm for thought” (1918a: 407). This correlation of 
norms to what they norm has everything to do with divine immanence. 
Having stated above that the logical norms attest to God’s transcendent 
presence—for, we now add, the norm-character of logical principles de-
rives from the divine will—Vollenhoven continues: “but [this norma-
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tivity] also requires God’s immanence in maintaining these laws for our 
knowing” (1918a: 438; emphasis added). Thus the character of validity 
of norms, their ‘holding’, calls for a correlate, viz. that which answers 
to the norm. But the latter—at least as regards logical norms—involves 
human thoughts, judgments and concepts. The impingement of norms 
for our mental life is what attests to God’s immanence. Or, stated from 
the side of the human being, thought cannot be broached without being 
obligated to reckon with truth as norm. To wilfully disregard norms is 
at the same time to disfavour God’s immanence. The Self has the qual-
ity of knowing or distinguishing subject only on condition that the Self 
subjects itself to logical norms.111
 God’s immanence is attested to in our willing compliance to norms. 
No doubt the same holds for human action in the light of ethical norms 
of right and wrong. But is God’s immanence thereby solely of human 
relevance? I believe there is a metaphysical relevance too, though Vollen-
hoven does not (to my knowledge) say so explicitly. The realm of validity 
not only includes norms and ideals, it also concerns ideas. Now ideas fix 
the essence of things, which is their species characteristic. These are gen-
eral ideas. But, as discussed earlier (cf. the section VII.B. on individual 
substances), Vollenhoven accounts for individuality in terms of God’s 
individuating the general idea of human being. In this way particular 
ideas of individuals function as thing-laws, controlling their functional 
development. In other words, a thing-law is an individualized idea that 
controls the actions and appearances of that thing in a way that is in step 
with its development within the bounds of its species.
 Quite apart from how we ought to evaluate this view of individual 
creation, it seems difficult to discount its being additional evidence of 
God’s immanence, in Vollenhoven’s view of things. General ideas “in 
God’s Counsel” are individuated, and as individuated ideas control, de-
lineate, ‘hold for’ a factually real (space-time-genetic) creature. If a norm’s 
holding for distinct (human) thoughts evidences God’s immanence, then 
an individuated idea’s being a thing-law for a (human or non-human) 
creature—which is of God’s doing in letting a creature be—can hardly 
be counted as something of a different order. There can be no individual 
without its own controlling idea, hence I take this to evidence God’s im-
manence with respect to the creation of each individual.
 When we accept this additional case of God’s immanence, we get 
111   The theist is therefore very aware of his or her attitude. “For the Self that strives 
for knowledge[,] to acknowledge the normativity of logic is . . . for theism a theonomic 
urge. . . . [T]heism willingly subjects itself in the conviction that also these norms of God 
are good” (1918a: 439).
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a more integrated understanding of Vollenhoven’s metaphysics. The key 
notion here is the principle of substance. Every substance has a unity 
that is more than the sum of its features. This unity has the character of 
a law, controlling the changing features, illustrative of the ‘predicates that 
inhere in a subject’. Such a complex unity, with an inner dynamics of 
changing features (‘perceptions’, ‘states’), is the monad of Vollenhoven’s 
monadology. Though, as we said earlier, Vollenhoven eschews the term 
‘monad’ (but not ‘monadology’), one cannot fail to recognize the mo-
nadic view of substances in this metaphysics. But now we can see that 
each substance is a ‘spiritual’ entity, in terms of its individual law-thing, 
maintained by God, which controls the factual existence of a thing in its 
temporal and spatial features in a genetic-species context.
 There is a passage in Vollenhoven’s discussion of Brouwer in which 
the two ‘evidences of divine immanence’—norms holding for human 
thought and ideas holding for things—appear together. “Our fundamen-
tal thought of metaphysical (spiritual) substances, whose appearances are 
the object of physics, is in complete harmony with our view of truth as 
norm, posited by God the Holy Spirit as law-giver with regard to the 
striving of the supra-individual subject of science” (1918a: 390-391). 
The “complete harmony” between the two justifies our having taken 
them as analogous. In the World-order, these “metaphysical (spiritual) 
substances” are the monads, the appearances of which are the phenom-
ena studied by physics. On the human side are the norms, to which 
human beings are subject in their quality as knowing (or distinguishing) 
subject. The context of the discussion (in the quote), which is about sci-
ence, accounts for the fact that the human subject is here taken to be the 
scientific community, not an individual subject. But this does not affect 
the argument at this point.
3. Provisional summary
Although Christian theism still needs to be discussed, we can attempt a 
provisional summary on the basis of our discussion so far.
 In Vollenhoven’s approach, the distinction between thought and 
being forms the basic polarity. On this distinction is predicated the dif-
ference between intuition and its context in self-conscious awareness on 
the one hand and world-knowledge and its striving to attain adequate 
concepts on the other. Awareness and knowledge themselves are always a 
synthesis or reconciliation of thought and being, hence they ‘bridge’, so 
to speak, the polarity of thought and being. The distinction of thought 
and being is also dressed up cosmologically in terms of the human Self 
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and the World in the large. The analogy between the setup of each—the 
Self with body and mind, and the World-order with its physical reality of 
things in relations that appear and the ideal reality of metaphysics—sug-
gests the schema of microcosm and macrocosm, a philosophical theme 
with deep roots in the western history of thought.
 In mentioning this schema, certain misconceptions should be 
warned against immediately. We need to say at once that a popular use of 
this schema, one in which the physical world is in some sense taken to be 
the body of God, is, in Vollenhoven’s case, entirely unserviceable. God’s 
reality is an “Excellence” that is prior to and beyond any world, it being 
itself the fundamental condition of any world. It is only in connection 
with our given world and our human reality that we can discern a tran-
scendence and immanence of God, in that there is a transcendent ideal 
realm of validity that impinges immanently upon the human subject and 
holds for the given things of the world. This is the central nerve of Vol-
lenhoven’s theism.112
 We may hazard to complete our previous ‘cosmic’ overview dia-
gram, hoping for a positive heuristic effect. 
[Divinity]
[Microcosm]                                      [Macrocosm]
                     norms/ideals                         general ideas
    Mind                       Unchanging             
                  qualities of subject             being            ind. ideas: monads
Self--(acts|content|succession) --   World- -- (succession) --
          psycho-(time: form of sens.)   Order                             abs. time
    Body       Changing   
       physical (space: form of sens.)  appearances       abs. space
       (of feelings and strivings)   (of things & relations)
[ ‘’: impinge upon; '’: hold for through individuation]
 
 The ‘World order’ (the term itself is not in the early Vollenhoven) is 
112   The limited usefulness of this schema of micro- and macrocosm was clarified 
in discussions with John H. Kok and Jeremy G.A. Ive. As to the phrase ‘God and the 
world’, when this is meant to state something ultimate with respect to reality, the expres-
sion is unsatisfactory. For it leaves untouched both the difference by which the two are 
distinguished and the connection that justifies the use of ‘and’. God’s being ‘original’ (the 
Excellent or Sovereign One) ought to cancel any discussion of the (supposed) framework 
in which God and the world are held together, assuming this to be distinct from God. For 
a discussion in defence of such a framework, whereby God is taken to be “the first being 
of the universe”, cf. Plantinga 1980.
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the factual world of things and relations, with a capacity of self-develop-
ment, as controlled ideationally. The ‘things’ include plants and animals. 
This ‘genetic’ development is of particular importance in its attesting to 
the reality of succession in the empirical world. It is itself psychical in na-
ture, being the reality behind organic phenomena which, in their outward 
appearance, are spatial and temporal.113 The factual world is a whole of 
appearances, whose boundary cannot be conclusively drawn. For, while 
every boundary calls attention to what is beyond, the unbounded can-
not be thought by a human being (1918a: 135). The relations between 
things, which act as forces through which things position or affect each 
other, are a condition for being able to be aware of space and time. They 
are absolute in that they form unending parameters for the localization 
of appearances.
 This factually real world is however ‘incomplete’. Its structure is an 
open structure, in the sense that its controlling principles are not intrinsic 
to it. There is a realm of validity, an ideational world that transcends the 
factual world, in which general ideas are the essences of species, in the 
context of which individualized ideas control the appearances and devel-
opment of individuals belonging to a species. An individualized idea is a 
thing-law for the individual it holds for, being its unchanging substance 
of changing appearances, or the subject of inhering qualities, which ap-
pearances and qualities are themselves in real succession. The net result is 
a monadology of substances (monads) that interact through their intrin-
sic striving or states to which outer appearances attest.
 Roughly in tandem with the World order is the ‘world’ of the Self. 
It is itself a substance, thus outwardly it is part of the world order. In a 
self-approaching process it can get to know itself as an existing Self in 
contradistinction from other human beings and non-human things.
 The Self is a psychical synthesis, controlled by the idea of the Self. 
The Self is itself a metaphysical entity, a principle of invariance control-
ling the ‘states’ of body and mind. The psychical qualities of the body are 
interwoven with physical matter to form a psycho-physical organization. 
These states of the body can be sensed, allowing the reception of data 
that the body itself arranges in temporal and spatial patterns. Besides 
113   This is of course a new argument. In discussion with Hans Driesch Vollenhoven 
expressed his preference for studying living organism using the methods of physical and 
chemical science and that of psychology, rather than postulate a vitalistic entelechy, such 
as Driesch did. This means that the early Vollenhoven allows for a ‘plant psychology’. He 
distinguished human psychology, which is personalized, from that of animals and plant, 
which is not personalized. We return to this in the discussion of A. Janse in the next 
chapter.
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the act of sense-awareness, there are also the acts of representation and 
of remembering. Through these acts there is a reservoir of content that 
forms the basis of mental life. The Self, being intuitively aware of both 
acts and content, is able to posit these as self-certain states of the Self on 
the basis of actually undergoing their presence (in concrete intuition) 
and distinguishing them in their self-identity as Gegenstände (through 
the analytical intuition). The reality of succession in self-conscious ex-
perience makes intuition possible. The Self discovers that, as mind, to 
cogitate what is psychically enjoyed, requires compliance to the norm 
of identity.114 This is indicative of the general situation of mind: without 
compliance to norms, the psychical synthesis lacks orientation and aim. 
The Self is a subject in the context of science, morality and art only when 
subjecting itself to norms and ideals.
 Vollenhoven also speaks of another “reality”, viz. the reality in which 
thought and being, or the Self and the World are reconciled. This is the 
reality of knowledge and science. In reference to our schema, it needs to 
be situated between the Self and the World, for each contributes to it, 
with space as its foundational feature. It is a reality that grows through 
human effort. It calls for a Self that subjects itself to norms, especially 
the norm of truth (logical principles), but also requires ideals to pursue. 
The primary ideal of science is the supra-individual ideal of forming a 
continually more adequate concept or understanding of the World. The 
World, as acknowledged in its Idea, calls up the ideal of an adequate 
understanding of it. This basic aim of science is important in connection 
with Vollenhoven’s Trinitarian theism and certain metalogical reflections 
of the early 1920s, yet to be reviewed. 
C. Trinitarian theism
The discussion of Vollenhoven’s theism has focussed on divinity in a ge-
neric sense, though we discovered distinction in the difference between 
ideas and norms. A central, not to say characteristic, doctrine of Chris-
tianity is that of the divine Trinity. Vollenhoven’s own Christian theism 
takes this into account. God is a Godhead of three Persons: God the 
Father, the Creator, God the Son, the Logos-revelation, and God the Holy 
114   My guess is that the ‘immortality of the soul’, which is a feature of the mind as 
‘substantia incompleta’, relates to the impingement of norms on the mind, interpreted 
as evincing divine immanence. Could a ‘mortal mind’ answer to the divine call? Vol-
lenhoven nowhere indicates his defence of this characteristic in his early work. But after 
1923 this immortality is contested. Given the importance of this theme, one tries to see 
how it might have been defended, apart from a general ‘scholastic-theological’ under-
standing. Anthropological remarks recur in chapters 3 and 4. 
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Spirit, the Guide. Vollenhoven offers no apology for this doctrine, but 
he does integrate the roles of these divine Persons in a way that pulls his 
entire conception together into a close-knit unity. In view of the possibil-
ity of ‘Logos speculation’, which has not been discussed as yet, we shall 
need to take a careful look at the distinct uses of the Persons of the deity, 
though we also state at once that there is nothing like a ‘full theological 
account’ to be found in Vollenhoven’s early writings.
1. God, the Father
To start with the first Person, God the Creator, the references to this 
Person are rather meagre, but the relevance of this Person is difficult to 
miss. In an aside in the discussion of Poincaré’s thought, Vollenhoven 
states: “there is no evolution unless God creates new ideas” (1918a: 379). 
Knowing that for Vollenhoven the substance of a thing is an idea, acting 
as the thing’s thing-law, it follows that the very possibility of any new 
reality requires the creation of the appropriate ideas of that reality. This 
primary condition is traditionally met by God, the Father.115
 The first Person of the Trinity is also broached, implicitly at least, 
in the long quote above about Lotze (cf. section VIII.B.1. above) where 
Vollenhoven speaks of “the Counsel of God”. In the Reformed confes-
sions this phrase occurs in the teaching about God the Father, who, by 
his “eternal counsel and foresight”, preserves and rules over the creation 
(world).116 Kuyper discusses the term in his commentary on the Heidel-
berg Catechism. He attributes to it a very broad meaning. God’s Coun-
sel means “his goodwill, or also his predestination, his decision, his prior 
decree, and also, if you will, it can be expressed more simple yet as his 
order (bestel), his will, his law, his ordinance.”117 In drawing his conclu-
sion Kuyper summarizes: “First there is a thought, then there is a word, 
115   For lack of textual evidence we need to leave unmentioned what, if any, the 
means of creation are for Vollenhoven here. Vollenhoven is silent about (say) the Pauline 
doctrine of the mediating role of the Son, i.e. the Logos, “by whom and for whom” all 
things were created (Col. 1: 16). Thematically there is the individuation of ideas in Vol-
lenhoven, which suggests mediation. But he nowhere discusses this in his early work.
116   Cf. Heidelberg Catechism, Sunday 9, Question/Answer 26. The term also occurs 
in Sunday 12, Question/Answer 31, in which Christ is said “to reveal the hidden counsel 
decisions and will of God [the Father]”. In the Belgic Confession the term occurs in Article 
16, about the divine election. The term (counsel /boulé ), as used in reference to God, 
occurs only once in the Gospels (Luke 7: 30), several times in Acts (cf. 2: 23; 13: 36; 20: 
27) and in the Pauline letter to the Ephesians 1: 11. The New International Version edi-
tion of the Bible translates this as ‘purpose’ or ‘will’. For these confessional documents, cf. 
Zwanepol 2004. 
117   Kuyper 1892: 189. 
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and only then an affair arises. . . . The thought, the thinking through, 
the planning [beraming] of God’s Counsel is accordingly prior to all cre-
ation” (op. cit.: 193-194). We cannot be sure that Vollenhoven endorses 
this broad meaning of ‘Counsel of God’ in its entirety. But in the quote 
about Lotze the term is used to indicate the presence of “the essence of 
things” in God’s Counsel, as idea or thing-law, in contradistinction to 
the existence of the thing in creation, which is the existence of succes-
sive self-development. Seen in that light, ideas are an ingredient of God’s 
planning and rule over all things. We may take this to mean that, for 
Vollenhoven, God the Father is the warrant for the metaphysical order 
that sustains things and their interactions, including the essence of the 
human Self.118
 Now, if we take a slightly closer look at Kuyper’s view of creation, 
there is the possibility of an influence that only became explicit in Vol-
lenhoven later, though there would appear to be an immediate relevance 
as well. In Kuyper’s view, the Persons of the Trinity convene in the work 
of creation.119 The Father is the “principal actor” here, for he has priority 
over everything, from whom the thought proceeds. (The Father chooses 
the best thought among the alternatives of “possible worlds”; op. cit.: 
194.) Then, secondly, there is the eternal Counsel, “which disposes over 
all things” (op. cit.: 202). Here, however, the Son has a role. “That Son is 
the eternal Word, in which the content of the Counsel of the Lord lies ex-
pressed” (op. cit.: 200). This divine speaking now is: “God’s calling forth 
[in het aanzijn roepen] of things that are outside of himself, of which 
the plans and representations lie hidden in his eternal Counsel” (op. cit.: 
207). Then, thirdly, it is only on the basis of this Counsel that Creation 
takes place, “which realizes this Counsel of the Lord in its [the Creation’s] 
origination and development” (op. cit.: 202). Here the Holy Spirit is of 
influence. “And now where these creatures are not only called forth but 
also receive an existence [een zijn], having breath and life and animation, 
there it is the Holy Spirit that hovers over all that is created and ignites 
and makes it laden with life” (op. cit.: 207). Accordingly, the triune God 
created our universe in a completely self-sufficient way, without requiring 
118   One accepts this, of course, on faith. But comparison and choice between op-
tions of faith are still relevant. Vollenhoven opts that for dualism it seems better to end “in 
the Counsel of a God who has wise reasons for everything, than in fate” (1918a: 408).
119   This convening holds in Kuyper for the other two main divine activities as well, 
namely salvation and sanctification. Only, in the case of salvation, it is the Son who takes 
the lead as “principal actor” (hoofdwerker), with the Father and the Holy Spirit cooper-
ating, and in the work of sanctification the Holy Spirit is the principal actor, with the 
Father and Son cooperating; cf. Kuyper 1892: 168.
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anything outside of itself. “First this universe was only in God’s thought. 
Then he expressed it through the Word and it stepped outside [of Him]. 
And having been called forth outside of Him, it is guided to its goal by 
the Holy Spirit” (op. cit.: 207).120 
 In a summarizing statement, late in his career, entitled “Life-unity” 
(Levenseenheid),121 Vollenhoven is explicit in his view of the Persons of 
the Trinity as also convening in the work of creation, though his wording 
is more directly biblical and less theologically laden than Kuyper’s word-
ing; e.g. he does not adduce the work of the Son/Logos there in terms 
of ‘God’s Counsel’ but merely refers to ‘God’s speaking’ in the Genesis 
1 creation account.122 But, upon realizing that Vollenhoven is definitely 
familiar with this view of creation, one suspects that all along this is in the 
background of numerous summary wordings of creation in Vollenhoven, 
when he speaks of the creation of things, the imposition of the law (or 
God’s creational speaking) and the development of creatures.123 Certainly 
the last point about the development is explicitly said to be guided by the 
Holy Spirit already in the first version of the Isagoge in 1930 (§19). This 
is not the place to discuss this further. But we will see in chapter 4 that 
Vollenhoven’s shift to the more definitive ‘Calvinistic philosophy’ made 
him question and reject the interpretation of the confession of God’s 
creation work in terms of a doctrine of ideas. But Vollenhoven was less 
reticent about the work of the Spirit, probably because its effect is more 
‘empirical’. At least there is a peculiarity in connection with the work of 
the Spirit, already in 1918, to which we now turn.
2. God, the Spirit
Turning first to the third Person, namely God the Holy Spirit, rather than 
120   This summary statement is complete only if we add that creation in Kuyper is 
not limited to what took place “in the beginning” (Genesis 1:1), but includes the goal of 
creation, namely the Completion (voleinding) at the end of time. God’s Counsel holds 
sway over creation, right up to this completion (Kuyper 1892: 194). Providence is God’s 
foreseeing what creatures need and providing for that need, hence it assumes the creation 
but considers it from the perspective of time. But because everything has been laid down 
from eternity in God’s Counsel, this providence, as foresight, is attributable to God only 
in a figurative sense (cf. Kuyper 1892: 216).
121   Vollenhoven 1955i: 118-133, esp. pp. 123, 124 en 126. 
122   When one keeps this in mind, then there is a mediating creation role of the 
Son in Vollenhoven, capable of accounting for the Pauline “by whom and for whom” all 
things were created (Col. 1: 16).
123   Cf. Vollenhoven 1926d: 190; also Vollenhoven 1930d, §§ 74, 75 and 76. In 
Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 117, Vollenhoven states explicitly that “the activity of Logos and 
Spirit play a special role in [God’s creating activity]”. This statement stems from 1941.
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the second Person, there is a fairly explicit description of his work. We 
already quoted, but repeat in this context: “Our fundamental thought of 
metaphysical (spiritual) substances, whose appearances are the object of 
physics, is in complete harmony with our view of truth as norm, posited 
by God the Holy Spirit as law-giver with regard to the striving of the 
supra-individual subject of science: practising science is to approach the 
adequate concept as ideal” (1918a: 390-391). “[T]he Spirit posits and 
maintains the norms and ideals . . .” (1918a: 410).
 The work of the Spirit, as formulated in these quotes, is directed 
specifically to human beings in their higher mental life.124 Norms and 
ideals require submission and enjoin human deference, hence the very 
possibility for the Self ’s taking on the quality of knowing subject (and 
distinguishing subject) involves the human response to this ‘law-giving’ 
role of the Spirit. This law-giving is not to be confused with the thing-
laws (the ideas) of things in general. The latter are related to essence, and 
that is a determination of being, limiting variability of factual response. 
Norms and ideals however are primarily relevant for mental activity: 
norms orientate and ideals are goal-guiding. Thus the law of contradic-
tion, as a norm of truth, enjoins that contradictory statements be exclud-
ed from our system of knowing, while adequate concepts serve as ideals 
to strive for in the process of which use is made of proleptic concepts.
 The ‘law-giving’ role, so explicitly apportioned to the Spirit, is per-
haps unexpected. One is more inclined to think of law solely in connec-
tion with ideas, or at least with that expression of divine will that orga-
nizes and maintains the world. But the context of knowledge acquisition 
(as species of higher mental life) is essential here. In a lecture on Bergson, 
first given in 1919, but written out only in 1921, Vollenhoven repeats 
this same thought. The act of knowing needs to be executed “in obedi-
ence to God’s norms. He is Law-giver here.125 There can be little doubt 
about the Spirit’s ‘Law-giving’ role as linked to ‘norms’, and this connec-
tion is in direct rapport with human activity and response.
124   The norms and ideals relevant here are those with respect to the pursuit of 
knowledge in science. There are also norms for morality and art, though these are not 
mentioned in the dissertation. Vollenhoven broaches this in an unpublished manuscript: 
“Paedagogiek en Paedagogie”; Vollenhoven 1919ms. In the letter to the theologian, F.W. 
Grosheide, dated 16 November 1921 (quoted earlier), Vollenhoven writes (we repeat 
the quote): “logic is, together with ethics, aesthetics, etc., precisely as science of norms 
distinguished from the explicative [i.e. descriptive; A.T.] sciences . . . .”; Vollenhoven 16-
11-1921. So the work of the Spirit in the dissertation is especially directed to scientific 
knowledge acquisition.
125   Vollenhoven 1921ms: 12-13. There is also a press report of the lecture, as given 
in 1919; cf. Vollenhoven 1919b.
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 It will not have escaped notice that, when the Father-Creator is the 
warrant for the metaphysical order of substances and their appearances, 
and the Spirit is the ‘law-giver’ for human mental activity, we in fact have 
an apportioning of the relevance of these divine Persons over the differ-
ence between the World-order (‘macrocosm’) and the Self (‘microcosm’) 
respectively in their own internal operation, metaphysical and epistemo-
logical, respectively. We can add that the indications of divine transcen-
dence and the matching immanence, discussed above, also agrees with 
these Persons, for we had to distinguish this relevance in connection with 
the World-order on the one hand and the Self on the other. This helps us 
in understanding the work of the second Person of divinity, namely God 
as Logos, to which we now turn. His position ‘between’ the first and third 
Persons suggests a relevance ‘between’ the World-order and the Self. The 
Logos puts us in touch with the conditions of knowledge, and knowledge 
has everything to do with the ‘reality of science’, the achieved reconcilia-
tion of being and thought.
 
3. God, the Logos
Knowledge as relation, we said, bridges the difference between thought 
(reinforced with Gegenstände) and being (the given in appearances). In a 
generic sense, thought has its locus in the human Self, while being, which 
is that which is foreign to thought, has its focus in the World-order. (Of 
course, the Self too is a being. It is its distinctive psychical nature, of body 
and mind and our intuitive ability to be aware of it in self-consciousness, 
which sets it apart.) If the relation between Gegenstand (thought) and the 
given (being) is to be worthy of the name, it must be more than a mere 
one-to-one side-by-side arrangement of ratio and empirie. (This is why 
the schema of micro- and macrocosm cannot be the end-all and be-all in 
itself, and also why knowledge itself is a distinct reality as ‘reality of sci-
ence’.) Knowing involves thought’s (ratio) working over the given (empi-
rie / being) according to norms and ideals. In the larger context of theism, 
this calls for a mutual arrangement of the order of the Self and the order 
of the World, whereby each secures a ‘rationality’: the Self a ‘subjective 
rationality’ (of norms and the epistemic qualities of a subject), the World 
an ‘objective rationality’ (of ideas and monadology). But Vollenhoven 
prefers to conduct his discussion using the terms ‘ratio’ and ‘empirie’. In 
any case, the important point is that God has a role at this level. There 
is a connection between ratio and empirie that is relevant for knowledge 
and is warranted by the divine Logos. “Likewise, the divine Logos may 
not be inserted in the theory of knowledge as an unknown third [factor], 
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to which ratio and empirie would stand in the same one-to-one relation” 
(1918a: 409) for that resolves nothing in the correspondence itself. But:
proceeding from the judgment we see in it the synthesis enacted by the 
cooperation of norm, ratio and empirie and hence we can only find the nor-
mative, rational and empirical elements through analysis. In other words, 
operations are taking place, more or less in obedience to the norms, there 
is connection, an interaction between ratio and empirie. The Logos, then, 
is not an unknown third [factor], but in him rests on the one hand the 
disposition of two distinct things, namely as subject and object of knowl-
edge, respectively, to enter into a synthesis; on the other hand, the Spirit 
sets and maintains the norms and ideals to which the actualization of this 
disposition from our side must subject itself, lest it result in invalid [i.e. 
anti-normative] or not completely valid [i.e. not ideal] knowledge respec-
tively. (1918a: 409-410)
 The subject-object relation of knowledge, said to be grounded “in 
two distinct things”, is of course secured in the Self as knowing subject 
and the given as knowable (or appearing) object. The judgment attests to 
the synthesis. The divine Logos predisposes the synthesis to take place. But 
the disposition as such is not easy to grasp. No doubt there is a motiva-
tional element (e.g. in connection with the will to know in the qualities 
of distinguishing subject and knowing subject) on the side of the human 
subject.126 But the object too must be involved in the disposition, at least 
that is as Vollenhoven would have it.
 Now it would appear that rationality is involved here. At least that 
is present in both subject and object. The “logical order of our thought” 
(viz. subjective rationality) harmonizes with “the order in the given that 
is independent of thought” (viz. objective rationality), for both “stem 
from the same Logos” (1918a: 409). This common source in the Logos 
may invite ‘Logos-speculation’, so Vollenhoven proceeds cautiously. He 
declares that he does not contest the harmony of these two rational or-
ders; on the contrary, he claims that it can be found directly in special 
revelation (cf. 1918a: 409). “The ultimate ground of things—we gladly 
admit it—is rational and not blind, but the danger in this statement lies 
126   We should probably also include the forms of sensibility in this regard. In his 
critique of Brouwer, Vollenhoven states: “In our opinion theism offers a considerably 
more stable basis for geometry, in taking space to be a form of appearance and form of 
sensibility, which God himself does not possess, for he determines the essence of things, 
but donated to the creature to be able to know certain objects appearing in a determined 
way” (1918a: 399). In a note Vollenhoven refers to page 410, the page we quoted from 
above (the main quote about the Logos). The uncertainty regarding the form of sensibil-
ity being dispositional pertains to the question as to whether human receptivity, which 
makes us sensitive to ‘being appeared to’, follows from our psychical essence or is a trait 
of our rationality.
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in equating human and divine reason” (1918a: 408). A popular version 
of this equating is ‘thinking God’s thoughts after him’, which is specula-
tive, for one does not reckon with the difference between divine thinking 
and human thinking. In considering this to be ‘dangerous’, Vollenhoven 
clearly rejects it.
 Apart from signalling this danger, Vollenhoven also takes the extra 
step in contesting, what most forms of Scholasticism would probably ac-
cept, namely that the harmony of the two orders is a sufficient foundation 
of knowledge. Knowledge is a relation, as every judgment evidences. But 
harmonization is for Vollenhoven not itself a connection or a relation. 
A judgment attests to the assimilation of a given object by the know-
ing subject. The predisposition of the Logos is, in part, to stimulate the 
knowing subject’s assimilation, it is not to secure (though it does warrant) 
harmony. For one cannot let the order of our thought simply dictate to 
the object. There are elements of the order of our thought—Gegenstände 
such as a wooden iron, a round square, etc.—that are not met with in re-
ality (the given) and hence have nothing with which to harmonize. Then, 
from the side of the object, one also needs to recognize or acknowledge 
features of the object in the course of the knowing subject’s working over 
the object. Such recognition or acknowledgement (of the idea) would 
also appear to be part of the Logos’ disposing. But if we merely ‘take’ 
the object and grasp its representation, we only ‘copy’ it—and thus, true 
enough, to be in harmony with it!—but we then do not as yet know 
it, for there is no predication. In sum, we cannot merely proceed from 
either the subject or the object, and then construct a harmonious syn-
thesis, when accounting for knowledge. (That would be, in view of Vol-
lenhoven’s philosophy of science, a variant of formalism or of empiricism, 
depending on which side is predominant.) This view of the relevance of 
the Logos could also invite speculation. Vollenhoven opts for an alterna-
tive approach of analysis. The human task lies in the analysis of the coop-
eration of the normative, rational and empirical elements implicit in the 
acceptance of judgments (cf. 1918a: 409-410), rather than in offering 
an account for (or a justification of ) their synthesis.127 It is in emphasiz-
ing analysis and the human task that Vollenhoven here distances himself 
from a speculative use of, or appeal to, the Logos.128
127   By opting for analysis Vollenhoven accepts that some knowledge is always giv-
en or at least already present when analysis proceeds. This would appear to be primary 
knowledge by acquaintance or of presentations as grasped by outer perception, and the 
concrete intuitive givens of inner perception. In terms of science, this prior knowledge 
relates to the synthetic a priori of geometry and of arithmetic, respectively.
128   Though Vollenhoven uses the notions of ‘Logos speculation’ and ‘scholasticism’ 
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a. Truth and knowledge
So Vollenhoven seems to sidestep rather than undercut scholasticism and 
Logos-speculation. The scholastic harmony between the logical order and 
the metaphysical order does remain in place, but it is not available di-
rectly. Also the Logos is quite evidently present. What does this imply? 
Let us canvas Vollenhoven’s epistemology to pin-point more carefully the 
relevance of the Logos.
 Wouldn’t truth be considered to have a direct link with the Logos? 
Perhaps surprisingly, Vollenhoven’s understanding and use of truth in this 
his earliest thought do not have direct rapport with the Logos, at least in 
a constitutive sense. Truth is (as already quoted) “the opinion of the facts 
as God wishes that we have” (1918a: 53), whereby we need to distinguish 
between “God as norm-giver also for our thinking and the human being, 
subject to his norms” (ibid.). In being subject to norms, the human be-
ing is subject to God the Holy Spirit, and truth is integral to this. Truth 
is not an effect of, or warranted by, the Logos. Indeed, as already quoted, 
“truth is a norm, posited by God the Holy Spirit as law-giver” (1918a: 
391). Also, through the immanent impingement of norms, truth is “self-
guaranteeing”, as Vollenhoven notes appreciatively in connection with 
Lotze (1918a: 160-161), for no human being can abrogate a divine norm 
nor ignore its obligating effect.129 At best we can say that knowledge pos-
session, of which every judgment is a case, is availing over truth-content, 
such as the Logos would dispose the human being to have.
 Now how does this understanding of truth work in the actual ac-
quisition of knowledge? Let us consider the primary form of knowledge, 
namely that of acquaintance. An object ‘gives itself ’ by its entering into 
relations and interacting with other things, all the while being controlled 
with care, he is not very explicit in what he takes them to be. But his later criticisms of 
these notions give a kind of hindsight into at least relevant features of his former use. Lo-
gos speculation ignores the boundary between God and the World/Self (cf. Vollenhoven 
1926a: 18, 21) as attested by “thinking God’s thoughts after him”, likewise with the 
absence of ‘transcendent and immanent’ conditions for the Logos. Scholasticism, in turn, 
evinces an uncritical appeal to rationality. In emphasizing the harmony between subjec-
tive and objective rationality, there is an equivocation of the general feature of a concept 
(formed by the subject) with the analogical similarity discernible in different methods 
of science (scientific order of the world), thereby confusing a conceptual synthesis with 
a methodological synthesis (cf. Vollenhoven 1926a: 62). This enables the harmony of the 
two orders to be considered a sufficient criterion for knowledge. 
129   This property of truth is not merely founded in the contradiction of scepticism, 
which must assume the truth of its denial of truth, but is also supported by a positive 
view, such as in Plato, where God is the measure of all things, or in Lotze, where norms 
continue to hold even while searching for norms. (Cf. 1918a: 75, 87, 160-161, 312, 405.)
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by the idea of the object in question. This ‘giving’ allows it to be noticed 
as real phenomenon or appearance. The knowing subject’s noticing of 
the given phenomenon gives rise to representations in the knowing sub-
ject through psychical acts. The knowing subject in turn must submit 
to norms if the content of the representation is to be more than fleeting 
experience, and to be involved in predication. The idea is part of the order 
of things, while the norms are correlated to the order of thought. But ac-
quaintance is more than a harmony between these orders. For a represen-
tation is a result of my noticing, which may be (and usually is) very lim-
ited, while the given phenomenon is an expression of a thing that exists, 
which is extremely complex. (“[B]eing is always richer than thought. . .”; 
1918a: 437). But in acquaintance we do relate these, and this takes place 
in judgment when the representation is attributed to something real, as 
justified by my noticing. Vollenhoven’s example: “the tree in my garden” 
is a representation, which is neither true nor false as such. In the judge-
ment “the tree in my garden exists”, the representation is attributed to an 
object, truly if the object exists, falsely if there is no such object. Truth 
is a norm here in that the attribution that gives rise to the judgment in 
knowledge by acquaintance involves the activity of the knowing subject, 
who ought to base the attribution on what is noticeably given.130
 The role of the divine Logos is indeed not sufficient to account for 
acquaintance. The attribution of a representation (as predicate) to a thing 
(as subject of judgment, formulated as a proleptic concept) signals the 
assimilation of the given by the knowing subject. Ideally, this assimila-
tion is predisposed by the Logos, though of course often very practical 
motives are operative too. But be that as it may, there is no need—at least 
not an obvious one—to refer to any harmony between the order of things 
and the order of thoughts, such as is warranted by the divine Logos. But 
Vollenhoven had said that he does agree with the notion of harmony. 
How relevant is this? And is it put to use anywhere?
b. Logos and acquaintance
Now the Logos is not entirely absent from knowledge by acquaintance. 
130   Vollenhoven outlines this way of dealing with truth in the 1919 manuscript, 
“Paedagogiek en Paedagogie” (Vollenhoven 1919ms). In 1918a Vollenhoven tends to 
equate the norm of truth with logical principles: “The question now arises, what the 
norm is for the truth of judgments. It can hardly be other than the principle of contradic-
tion (which absorbs the principle of identity, without being derivable from it) with its 
derivations” (1918a: 431). The discussion of the 1919 manuscript is a welcome ‘synthetic’ 
addition to the ‘analytic’ understanding of 1918a. “Logic must be viewed as purely formal
. . . . Logic evaluates the correctness of judgments according to norms”; 1918a: 407.
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Because knowledge is a relation, with every judgment is associated a con-
comitant complex of referent and relatum. The judgment cannot be ap-
portioned exclusively to either the human subject (who determines the 
predicate or relatum) or the given (which provides the judgment’s subject 
or referent). It signals their ‘interaction’, the subject’s ‘assimilation’ of the 
given. Thought and being have entered into a synthesis. But the result, as 
concomitant complex, also calls for a raison d’être. There is more than just 
the interacting of subject and object, as predisposed by the Logos. For 
“both subject and object would not lend themselves for such a synthesis 
in case it was not in the nature of both. For each relation assumes a predi-
cate in both terms, and hence a laid connection” (1918a: 12). A subject’s 
submission to norms (of the Spirit) and an object’s revealing something 
according to its idea (maintained by the Father) may be, and no doubt 
are, in harmony, but that is not the connection laid on their basis. (A 
disharmony between the order of thought and the order of things would, 
of course, forfeit the very possibility of such a connection that constitutes 
knowledge.) The knowledge that is gained, signals the laid connection, a 
case of achieved reconciliation of subject and object, and this requires a 
warrant distinct from either the Spirit or the Father, though both are pre-
supposed. Knowledge comes to be possessed, hence truth-content is had 
knowingly. This is what the Logos warrants, for this would appear to be 
in virtue of the Logos’ being the ‘common source’ of the order of thought 
and the order of being (cf. 1918a: 409).
 But knowledge by acquaintance is not the only kind of knowledge. 
Acquaintance is knowledge gained through outer perception in everyday 
experience. The accumulation of judgments allows the knowing subject 
to formulate concepts, which afford a closer understanding of reality. 
This brings us to scientific knowledge which, while not in opposition to 
everyday experience, has an added depth to it. It turns out that the Logos 
has a more prominent role here.
c. Logos and scientific knowledge
Scientific knowledge is predicated on the human striving to know the 
human environment (cf. 1918a: 413) in a (self-)conscious effort to know. 
This requires not only memory and psychical growth of the content of 
memory, hence succession is presupposed (1918a: 413), but also stable 
terms and invariant laws (1918a: 429). In other words, in scientific 
knowledge one strives for the certainty (in the psychical growth) that is 
only available when conditioned by intuition and intra-mental aware-
ness. How is this certainty brought to bear upon our initial acquaintance 
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of the environment?
 In the first place, Gegenstände are applied to provide stability of 
meaning. Gegenstände are “posited as the substrate of the phenomena” 
(1918a: 429), i.e. phenomena, perceived as sensory content, are placed 
in a web of meanings that provides terminological clarity, an “immu-
tability of thought” (ibid.). Without such immutability, any scientific 
exchange of thought would be impossible (1918a: 429). Thus this is es-
sential for inter-subjectivity at the scientific level. Also, the discerning 
of phenomena and their features, when formulated in the light of Ge-
genstände—hence formulated in terms of the representations and their 
interconnections one is aware of—is more rigorous and objective than 
when formulated merely as sensed in perception. The discerned too now 
forms more clearly the challenge of thought. The clearer one discerns 
the given object and its interactions by means of Gegenstände (Objects/
entities and Objectives/propositions), the more objective (gegenständlich) 
is the content discerned, and the more intensely does one apperceive 
its objection (its being gegenständig) to assimilation. In other words, the 
‘given’ is consciously placed in an intra-mental light (of cognized entities 
and propositions).131 (One almost wants to say: the given is placed in a 
consciously prepared ‘field of inquiry’, adjusted to the relevant inter-sub-
jective investigation taking place. But this is to anticipate a near future 
development.)
 One needs to keep in mind that the added focus on awareness, 
which the more systematic use of Gegenstände encourages, should not be 
seen as cancelling the reference to the given, intrinsic to the use of con-
cepts. (Such a cancelling threatens when ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘concept’ are 
not distinguished.) It is helpful to repeat here that a concept may ‘have’ 
a Gegenstand as its intension, but it has an extension too, which provides 
the extra-mental reference. Concepts are derived from judgments through 
abstraction (1918a: 161, 275), and on that account proceed from a situ-
131   In accounting for Gegenstände Vollenhoven assigns (as pointed out) a role to 
the metaphysical intuition to account for the differences in content between different 
Gegenstände. It is therefore not counterintuitive, in a scientific context, to use Gegenstände 
as substrate for phenomena. (A phenomenon harbours problems, inter alia that of thing 
and relation, hence the intra-mental reflection of this in terms of Objects and Objectives 
is fitting; cf. 1918a: 135.) To be relevant, some of the Gegenstände of representation must 
agree with transcendent objects in the phenomena. (This may tend to blur the differ-
ence between the appearance of the given or transcendent things and the corresponding 
representations, suggestive of an uncritical scientific idealism.) But because (presumably) 
a whole web of Gegenstände is applied as substrate, one is then in a position to be able to 
discover new phenomena, as suggested by the web of Gegenstände, namely when search-
ing for further fitting transcendent objects of the Gegenstände so used. 
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ation of the assimilation of the given by thought (1918a: 130, 412), as 
signalled by prior acquaintance. Thus, like judgments, the principles of 
contradiction and excluded middle are applicable to them (which means 
that they have truth-value132). Concepts can also be used to indicate con-
nections. Though examples are regrettably lacking, one may take (so I 
presume, say) the statement of a formal implication (e.g. ‘all humans are 
mortal’) as expressing (as Objective) a lawful connection between con-
cepts. When instantiated, such an expression of lawfulness represents an 
essential connection. Such a connection is a very select instance of grasp-
ing how the inherence of qualities in a substance is itself structured, as 
governed by the idea.133 The long and the short of all this is that, when, 
in a scientific context, Gegenstände are applied to undergird phenomena, 
the distinction in Gegenstände between Objects and Objectives brings 
to the fore an emphasis on conceptual entities and connections between 
them, respectively, in a way that provides for a scientific analysis of the 
phenomena being studied.
 Methodology is also essential to science. There are methodological 
differences between the sciences mutually. But the sciences also belong 
together, in being part of the vast activity called the scientific enter-
prise.134 The sciences that Vollenhoven mentions explicitly are (second 
132   I believe we may reconstruct this as follows. A Gegenstand can be associated 
with a concept, i.e. be the Gegenstand had by a concept, only in such cases as when the 
principle of contradiction is applicable. Take, say, ‘large ball’, which is a complex Gegen-
stand. It can be the intension of a concept, say, ‘x is a large ball’, which is abstracted from 
the judgment ‘this is a large ball’. The latter has truth-value, which is preserved in the 
abstracted concept so long as there is an implicit scope to the variable expression. In other 
words, Vollenhoven’s concepts suggest a context of use in first order predicate logic. This 
is reinforced by his insisting that a concept is also the principle of a series, the series being 
formed by the values of the variable occurring in the expression of the concept. The vari-
able here must preserve the extra-mental reference, thus be interpreted in realist fashion. 
133   When interpreted in terms of the first order logical idiom, the formal implica-
tion is ‘(x).A(x)B(x)’. Here the ‘A(x)’ and ‘B(x)’ are concepts, in Vollenhoven’s sense. 
When instantiating this universal generalization by substituting a definite value, say ‘c’, 
for the variable, we get ‘A(c)B(c)’, which expresses an essential connection between 
features applicable to c, for example, take ‘A(x)’ to be ‘x is human’ and ‘B(x)’ ‘x is mortal’, 
then the instantiation says: if c is human then c is mortal. The universal generalization 
expressed the ‘connection’ that mortality cannot be divorced from humanity, the instan-
tiation states this in application to c.
134   The discussion of the sciences is here limited to mathematics and the natural 
sciences. Vollenhoven also speaks of ‘normative science’, e.g. he states that for theism 
theoretical logic is a normative science (cf. 1918a: 401-402). Cf. also the letter to F.W. 
Grosheide, quoted in footnote 124 above (Vollenhoven 16-11-1921), where logic, along 
with ethics and aesthetics, is said to be a “science of norms”. It is difficult to ascertain, 
from Vollenhoven’s early writings, what the precise nature of a normative science is. But 
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order) arithmetic, geometry, kinematics, mechanics and physics (1918a: 
417, 433-434). This order is not random. Taken methodologically, the 
sciences form an organism (1918a: 417). It is in the guise of this meta-
phor that Vollenhoven speaks of ‘the reality of science’ (also known as the 
‘encyclopaedia of the sciences’).
 The heart of the ‘reality’ of science is that it constitutes a reconcili-
ation of thought and being. Though science is complex, and taking into 
account the ‘enhancement’ of the factor of thought through the emphasis 
on Gegenstände and the understanding of things and their connections 
via concepts on the side of the object (being), the bottom line is still—
this also is and remains characteristic of knowledge as such, viz.—“being 
enters into the judgment via the (purely formal) forms of our thought” 
(1918a: 434). Judgment is reconciliation of thought and being, which 
says that ‘all judgments are synthetic and all have a formal and a material 
element” (1918a: 435). This holds for arithmetic which, though intra-
mental, has the ‘mental material’ provided by the intuition of number. 
In geometry, there is the notion of space that is itself in part subjective 
(the spatial form of sensibility), in part objective (relations between and 
in things). The natural sciences all appeal to space, and these sciences 
develop and advance by making increasing use of mathematics. In that 
sense, the synthetic a priori that holds in mathematics, is also valid in the 
sciences that build on mathematics. Thus “all judgment forms are modi-
fication of the synthetic a priori” (1918a: 435).
 If the judgments of every science consist of a formal (a priori) and 
material (ideal or real) element, what distinguishes the sciences mutu-
ally? Vollenhoven’s immediate answer is short-lived, at least in 1921 he 
suggests an important revision (cf. the section on ‘metalogic’ below). But 
he did hold—“as his opinion”, he says with some uncertainty (1918a: 
435)—that the distinction between the sciences can be accounted for 
quantitatively, merely in terms of the different ratios between the formal 
and the material elements (1918a: 435). Arithmetic is largely formal, 
but it does have intuitive content. Each science adds some content, in 
the form of Gegenstand representing phenomena, that is lacking in the 
science it is directly based on. Vollenhoven makes no effort to distin-
guish kinds or categories of Gegenstand at this point.135 Geometry is not 
see the discussion of Dooyeweerd in chapter three, where this question returns and a 
provisional statement is made.
135   One senses an indirect influence of the Marburg neo-Kantians here in the pro-
nounced unity of method of all the sciences. Although this school developed the sciences 
entirely from out of the self-development of thought, Vollenhoven takes thought and be-
ing together. But the common method he favours on this basis does not do justice (as he 
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just (arithmetized) analytic geometry, but has in addition the notion of 
a group (of transformations), and within the range of possibilities of the 
group concept, different geometrical systems can be defined and studied 
(1918a: 433). Kinematics, in turn, adds the notion of one-dimensional 
real succession, representing the factor of time. So there are as many sys-
tems of kinematics as there are geometries (1918a: 433-434). Vollen-
hoven does not state the additions unique to mechanics and physics, 
but we may conjecture that these involve the addition of the notions of 
kinds of forces and energy forms, respectively. From arithmetic upwards, 
there is a (quantitative) increase in the encumbrance of content through 
the ‘amount’ of Gegenstand, in the range of its terms, that the science in 
question studies.
 Hence, the organism of the sciences has, as principle of unity, the 
one common method of knowing, a material-formal and a formal-material 
method in one (cf. 1918a: 436). Every science reconciles thought and 
what is strange to thought. At the same time, the ratio between the for-
mal and the material allows for “uncountable modifications”. The or-
ganism of the sciences is not nearly full-grown.136 (We here leave the 
statement of method for what it is. Features of it return in the section on 
‘metalogic’ below; and in chapter three there is a fuller discussion.)
 Returning now to the Logos, whereas we previously had difficulty 
pointing to a relevant role for the Logos, this now comes into full view. 
The very formulation of the aim of science, viz. “human striving to know 
the human environment in the most general way” (1918a: 413), is in 
direct step with the disposition, provided by the Logos, of subject and 
object coming into a synthesis. In short, the Logos motivates science. To 
know the environment is for a human being to be at home in it, recon-
ciled to it. But couldn’t this just be a pious or innocent way of affirming 
human dominance over nature, through science, now justified by appeal-
ing to the Logos, much as Descartes foresaw when he states that, via the 
natural sciences, human beings could “render themselves the masters and 
possessors of nature”?137—not if one disallows an interpretation of science 
will soon come to see) to the qualitative differences between the sciences, when referring, 
as he does in 1918a, only to differences in ratio of the formal and the material. There is 
also a ‘scholastic’ feature here of taking conceptual synthesis as having direct method-
ological implications (cf. footnote 128 above).
136   The three features discussed above in connection with scientific knowledge, 
namely phenomena expressed by Gegenstände, reference of concepts and connections, 
recur in Vollenhoven’s revised thought in 1926, though the notion of the ‘organism’ of 
science is revised quite drastically; cf. chapter three.
137   Descartes 1972: 119.
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that gives priority to subjective rationality. The Logos’ being the common 
source of the rationality of the subjective order and the objective order 
guards against such an interpretation. 
 But the subjective order and the objective order do have to be 
adapted to the context of science. The subjective order has gained signifi-
cance through the intra-mental interpretation of the appearances, dealt 
with by a science, in its upholding these in a web of Gegenstände. At the 
same time the reference to the objective order, which is that of the world 
order, is supplemented in that the (proleptic) concepts through which 
(something of ) reality is understood, have well-chosen Gegenstände as 
their intensions, and also put connections between things into sharper 
relief. But however much the synthesis of these two orders of rational-
ity may be achieved in science, the world order itself still far exceeds the 
knowledge and understanding actually gained of it to date. So an appeal 
to the harmony of the subjective order and the objective order cannot be 
a license for the subject to dominate the object. The harmony is never 
complete, always partial, with the insufficiency on the side of the subject, 
hence in this sense too it can never be a “sufficient basis” for knowledge.
 So the striving to know continues unabated, though there is grati-
tude in any progress made. Science, for Vollenhoven, must be seen as 
something that essentially needs to be practiced, like a project that is 
never completed.138 This makes it to be a human enterprise of striving, 
viz. to come into a better rapport—more reconciled—with the environ-
ment.
 The following statement, already cited, but very relevant in our 
present context, sheds confirming light. “Our fundamental thought of 
metaphysical (spiritual) substances, whose appearances are the object of 
physics, is in complete harmony with our view of truth as norm, posited 
by God the Holy Spirit as law-giver with regard to the striving of the 
supra-individual subject of science. Practicing science is approaching the 
adequate concept as ideal” (1918a: 390-391). If “the object of physics” 
can be read as “the object of the natural sciences”—after all Vollenhoven 
is here speaking generally of appearances of metaphysical substances—
then this “fundamental thought” concerns the philosophy of science di-
rectly.
 Science is practiced by the community of scientists (= the supra-
138   This is in step with, though Vollenhoven does not endorse its humanistic over-
tone, the prevailing modernistic and neo-Idealist sentiment of the time, of European cul-
ture having the spiritual Gestalt of shaping its historical life according to (infinite) ideas of 
reason and unending tasks. The scientific enterprise itself unfolds unending possibilities 
of rational knowledge. Cf. Husserl 1970b: esp. 274.
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individual subject of science). That community is subject to the logi-
cal norm of truth. Its position is characterized in relations to norms, as 
standing in subjection to these, not in relation to the world, as domi-
nating over it. The “adequate concept” which this community strives to 
achieve as ideal, must be—to use details from previous discussions—the 
complete knowledge of the world as complex whole, as determined meta-
physically by its idea. This ‘idea of the world’ is that of the monadology of 
substances, their “thing-laws” intermeshing to form the rational order of 
the world. In mentioning the “complete harmony” between (his funda-
mental thought of ) the metaphysical order and the order of the scientific 
community, Vollenhoven is implicitly referring to the Logos, all the more 
so since there is a reference to divinity here (the Holy Spirit, who guides 
through ideals inter alia of the adequate concept), and the connection 
laid by the Logos is based on that of the Spirit (normatively guiding 
thought) and the Creator (maintaining metaphysical ideas).139
 So the organism of science is hemmed in and supported by the sub-
jective order and the metaphysical order of the world. The Spirit guides 
in positing the ideal of the adequate concept, the Father maintains the 
world and its phenomena through the order of ideas. The unity of the 
sciences is the unity of method, and this makes the organism of science a 
whole and a reality in its own right, in need of its own warrant, which is 
the Logos. Thus, there is a ‘dualism’ here too, between the fact of science 
and its principled guarantor, the Logos. If such a guarantor of scientific 
rationality were lacking, then the knowledge-seeking human being would 
seek a point of attachment or implementation of rationality elsewhere. In 
Vollenhoven’s early thought, the most likely alternatives to reconciliation 
would be the monistic variants of formalism and empiricism.140 Formal-
139   The aim of science being to understand (in continuously more adequate con-
cepts, as governed by logical norms) the given reality (as governed by ideas), the duality 
of concept and idea is characteristic here. The idea, fully known, is the adequate concept, 
which serves as the limit (never reached) in the actual process of scientific understanding. 
In 1921 Vollenhoven used this “dualism of concept and idea” as characteristic epistemo-
logical feature of his standpoint. Cf. the discussion of metalogic in the next section.
140   In Vollenhoven’s case, the theme of a common scientific method, in its for-
malistic variant, was particularly pressing on account of its prevalence in the Marburg 
School of neo-Kantianism. There the idea of the unity of method was used to derive the 
diversity of the sciences. Proceeding from the autonomy of thought, thought advances, 
through its own activity of posing problems, and creates the content and the categories 
relevant to science. This has a spin-off that informs culture with rationality. One of the 
earliest critical comments on the Marburgers is in Vollenhoven 1921c: 83, 86. As to the 
variant of empiricism, in this same article Vollenhoven confronts Hegel, whose “romantic 
metaphysics” he takes to be “empiricistic”, in the sense that “thought is sacrificed to be-
ing”. The dialectical method is the method of the self-moving notion, as part of the world 
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ism encourages maintaining rationality as (subjective) principle of domi-
nance in light of an absolute spiritual freedom, while empiricism sees in 
rationality a(n objective) structure that leaves no leeway for responsibility 
in its favouring deterministic bodily behaviour. So a ‘Logos understand-
ing’ of the scientific enterprise undercuts these problematic alternatives, 
in relating the rationality of scientific knowledge to the reconciliation of 
the human being and the environment. Not that the environment is as 
such hostile to the human being. The analogy of cultivation is perhaps 
useful here. Cultivation is taking care of nature, while at the same time 
being of cultural benefit to the human being. Knowledge is what the hu-
man being enjoys when ‘cultivating’ the world-order, in accordance with 
the conditions, means and ideals the human being has to achieve this. In 
that sense, whatever doubts one might have about Vollenhoven’s appeal 
to the divine Logos, he does favour, practically, a distinct and worthy 
understanding of science.
d. Logos speculation?
Vollenhoven endorses a Logos-doctrine as an integral part of his Trinitar-
ian theism. The doctrine itself concerns rationality. Seen in operation and 
as implementing Vollenhoven’s understanding of theism—viz. thinking 
as God would have us think, hence always in subjection to norms and 
ideals—I believe Vollenhoven is not guilty of Logos speculation. There 
is no “thinking God’s thoughts after him”, which leaves the question 
of human viability entirely unanswered.141 There is also no appeal to a 
harmony between the subjective human rational order and the objec-
tive rational order of the world as settled principle that could encourage 
dogmatism of thought. The world embodies an infinite complexity that 
the human being can, at best, only approach serially and potentially, and 
always with a sense of overcoming inadequacy in understanding. Thus 
the order of knowledge, as achieved understanding, is a finite ‘reality of 
science’. The human being exerts effort when coming to know the world, 
and what results always bears the human stamp.142 The Logos is the war-
process, through which the world becomes rational; op. cit. : 83, 84, 87.
141   There is also the problem of what exactly divine thinking is. Vollenhoven took 
any reference to divine discursive thinking to be meaningless. He stated this in reply to 
the theologian, F.W. Grosheide, who had written that “Divine logic is richer than ours” 
(Grosheide 30-10-1921, and Vollenhoven 16-11-1921). 
142   This is in line with the discovery of Thomas Kuhn, decades later, of the paradigm 
dependence of scientific knowledge. The fact that this had a ‘bombshell’ effect when 
launched in the early 1960s evidences the naïve view of ‘harmony’ between thought and 
fact within neo-positivism then dominant. Cf. Kuhn 1970. 
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rant that this achieved result is intrinsically meaningful, in the sense that 
it does, however partially, contribute to a reconciliation between the hu-
man being and the world. The human being experiences the evidence of 
that warrant in the certainty of the anthropologically founded synthetic 
a priori’s of arithmetic and geometry.
 But what are we to think of this appeal to the Logos? Is it entirely 
without its speculative moments? Vollenhoven himself soon came to ob-
ject to a number of its features. Without anticipating these here, let us 
instead try to get an overview of Vollenhoven’s Logos-doctrine as it was.
 In summary, the role of the Logos in the early Vollenhoven is three-
fold. (1) The Logos is motivational in that it is the disposition for subject 
and object to enter into a synthesis. This makes it the prime condition 
for knowledge, which is always an achieved synthesis. (2) The Logos is 
the source of rationality. For the synthesis between subject and object to 
be possible, they must lend themselves in their nature to such a synthesis 
(cf. 1918a: 12). The subjective rational order in the human being and 
the objective rational order in the world are in harmony in virtue of their 
source in the Logos. (3) In consequence of this harmony, the Logos is 
the principled assurance that the (subject’s) ideal of the adequate concept 
does represent a complete knowledge of the idea of the world. It is in this 
third sense that Vollenhoven speaks of theism as ideal, viz. “the epistemic 
system that God wants that we form concerning all the given” (1918a: 
443).
 Vollenhoven’s view of reason, implicit in this use of the Logos, is 
in line with the classical view of rational understanding promoting wis-
dom.143 When stating this in broad strokes and in the spirit of the mind-
set of the early Vollenhoven, the following picture emerges. In the clas-
sical view, reason is linked to the ‘spiritual realm’, where the principles 
of wisdom reside. In Vollenhoven this is divinity insofar as this tran-
scends the world and the human being. But divinity is also immanent, in 
that the world and the human being are subject to the control of ideas, 
the impingement of norms and the beckoning of ideals. Here the Logos 
makes itself felt in bringing being and thought, the world and the Self, 
ideas and norms/ideals together as knowledge. Rationality is grounded 
in the spiritual realm, not as a factor of reason in relation to faith (as a 
web of belief ), but as itself a factor of assurance in the context of religion. 
143   This motive recurs also in the work of the renowned Dutch logician, E.W. Beth 
(1908-1964), especially in his last work, Door wetenschap tot wijsheid (Through science to 
wisdom); Beth 1964. He was acquainted with Vollenhoven’s work (cf. footnote 8 above), 
but regretted Vollenhoven’s being a “confessional thinker”, and how that influenced his 
protest against Cantor’s work; op. cit. : 19-20.
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Here religion is the relation of the human being, in his/her environment, 
to the spiritual realm, in the active sense of complying to or hindering 
what divine immanence enjoins. Reason is the ‘good sense’ that says that 
complying is conducive to promoting the right relation of the human 
being to his/her world, as evidenced by knowledge in its reconciliatory 
effect.
 Though reason’s link to the spiritual realm is not without its am-
biguity—especially as to what empowers reason—it cannot be denied 
that the Logos’ motivating subject and object to enter a synthesis is posi-
tive and indispensable. For if, instead, knowledge finds its motivation 
in mundane gain or control, it tends to become a factor legitimating 
violence, rather than contribute to wisdom, as intellectual developments 
in the twentieth century illustrate only too clearly.144
 More problematic is the defence of rationality in subjective and ob-
jective guise. The conviction that they are in basic harmony is gratuitous, 
short of an explanation of what the subject-object distinction entails. We 
found that subjective rationality belongs to the Self, that embodies the 
pole of thought, while objective rationality belongs to the World-order. 
Here we came upon the suggestion of a micro- and macrocosm schema, 
a classical but also speculative structure. It would appear that the analogy 
of structure between the Self and the World-order is itself the ground for 
harmony. To his credit, Vollenhoven soon rejected the bald opposition of 
this schema, when realizing that thought itself belongs to being and resorts 
under it. The problem that arose out of this reconsideration is that of 
understanding how the ‘logical function’ of the human being itself fits in 
with, and is conditioned by, the structure of the cosmos.
 The third feature of the Logos causes the greatest discomfort. Vol-
lenhoven’s ‘realism of science’, seeing in science a reality beside that of the 
Self and that of the World-order, on the one hand underscores the dis-
tinct realities of the Self and the World-order, on the other hand makes 
for a very ethereal implementation of the reconciliation that achieved 
knowledge embodies. Whatever the personal and institutional prerequi-
sites of science are, they go largely unmentioned. (Though Vollenhoven 
144   In the course of the 20th century a transformation of rationality took place (in 
the context of modernism in science, morality and art) viz. from substantive reason to 
instrumental reason. This transformation has replaced whatever higher motive of reason 
there was with the desire for control within the life-world. In modernism the life-world 
(of science, morality and art) is constantly in the making, and understanding it is geared 
to improving and exploiting the making. ‘Post-modernism’, I believe, is modernism in 
process of questioning this process, while at the same time applying it in deconstructive 
ways. Cf. Tol 2005a.
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did mention a healthy psycho-physical organization, a keen mind and 
a willing striving to achieve ideals; cf. 1918a: 430.) With the empha-
sis on the unity of scientific method, the Logos comes into full focus, 
as methodological warrant, but without any discussion of the intrinsic 
complexity of scientific methodology and the different kinds of science 
(mathematical, descriptive, human, social, information, technical, etc.). 
Perhaps one can turn this around—though one cannot be sure that Vol-
lenhoven would agree—and ask whether the emphasis on the encyclo-
paedic nature of the methodology of science is itself not meant to focus 
on the (divine) Logos, as warranting faith and confidence in light of it 
being the condition of knowledge’s reconciliation. That would put the 
scientific enterprise in touch with the Christian faith, as centred in the 
Logos, but in a way that leaves untouched the inner complexity of the 
scientific enterprise. In other words, we then have an understanding of 
science that, in a broad sense, is neo-Idealist and that accommodates 
Christian dogma.
 In the early Vollenhoven there is, in any case, a narrow fit between 
the divine Logos and human scientific knowledge, which soon became 
very uncomfortable. When he revised his position he attributed to the 
Logos a much broader revelatory significance, without retaining the di-
rect lineage to scientific knowledge (cf. chapter 4). 
 Be that as it may, Vollenhoven’s early thought proceeds from three 
realities: that of the Self, Scientific knowledge and the World. The first 
and the third are conditioned, in part transcendentally, in terms of what 
each needs to be itself, viz. the impingement of norms and the control of 
individual ideas, respectively; and in part dogmatically, in how the needed 
conditions are provided for by a feature of divinity, viz. norms and ideals 
posed by the Holy Spirit and general ideas of essence maintained by the 
Father. The transcendental factors form the boundary between divinity 
on the one hand, and the Self and the World on the other. The dogmatic 
factors of divinity fall within the transcendent essence of divinity (of will 
and thought respectively) in its Excellence. When we include the role of 
the Logos as motivating the synthesis of which knowledge consists, then 
Trinitarian theism provides the fundamental context of Vollenhoven’s 
conception. And because Trinitarian theism is per definition Christian, 
the early Vollenhoven has succeeded in formulation a ‘Christian under-
standing’ of reality. In illustration, capping our former diagram, we get:
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Divinity
    
 Holy Spirit/Guide         Son/Logos      Father/Creator
    
      norms/ideal                   disposition to          general ideas (essences)
                            synthesize            
 obligation                 individual ideas (thing-laws)
         S   O 
   Self        World
Reality of Science
[ ‘’: impinge upon; ‘’: individuation]
IX. metalogIc
The position of the Logos, as indicated in the diagram, is ‘central’, and 
also distinct in that it is not presented in terms of its own conditions of 
transcendence and immanence. At least Vollenhoven gives no explicit 
indication as to how that might be understood. What he emphasizes is 
the Logos as condition for science and thus also as the warrant of the 
validity of scientific knowledge. This theme of validity is not made explicit 
in the work of 1918 (except in connection with the synthetic a priori’s of 
mathematics).145 But in 1921 Vollenhoven writes more explicitly about 
validity in the context of what he calls “the meta-logical world”. This 
requires attention in its own right to see how it fits in with Vollenhoven’s 
early thought generally. Also there are several features of it which, in 
hindsight, act as stepping stones towards new developments. For that 
reason we want to include a discussion of this is a separate section.
 By way of introduction, the following citation from Vollenhoven’s 
letter to the theologian of the Free University, F.W. Grosheide (Vollen-
hoven 16-11-1921), states the provenance of validity, taken as posited 
synthesis, that implicates the domain of the Logos.
Proceeding from God, Reformed-wise, we must say that His thought is 
. . . syntheticizing, and now with that positing (also via His thought, not 
just via His will) is also the positing of all contents (included their relation 
and distinction) in the meta-logical domain. In addition [there is] the pos-
iting of the norm that we ought to image this meta-logical world, to see it 
145   The relation of truth to validity is conspicuously lacking in this discussion of 
validity. In 1918 truth is a logical norm, warranted by the Spirit, and is identified with 
the logical principles of contradiction and excluded middle. Every judgment of knowing 
that is a properly normed reconciliation of thought and being may be accepted as true. 
But scientific validity depends, for an important part, also on the mathematical a priori’s 
and their application in the natural sciences.
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and read from it relation and distinction.146
 This statement, though not a shining example of clarity, does sug-
gest with the reference to divinity, “Reformed-wise”, a Trinitarian con-
text. This is borne out by the three “posits”: thoughts—otherwise said to 
be ‘ideas’ of the Father—content “in the meta-logical domain”—which, 
as we shall see, must concern the Logos—and the norm or injunction to 
represent this content of the “meta-logical world”, which we may assume 
proceeds, as does all norm-giving in the early Vollenhoven, from the 
Spirit. In referring now to a metalogical domain or world, where before 
he merely referred to the Logos—at least he now speaks of “the sphere 
of pure epistemological ‘validity’” (see below)—Vollenhoven indicates a 
more realist approach to the Logos, with its focus on validity. In being 
located between the Self and the World, or rather between the rational 
order of human thought and the rational order of the world, one may 
expect this meta-logical domain to have a mediating role.
 Vollenhoven’s addressing a metalogical concern becomes evident in 
1921 in his use of a more metalogical terminology. It is a shift of empha-
sis towards epistemic concerns. There is no essential change discernible 
in Vollenhoven’s metaphysics, but more weight is placed on the epistemic 
structure that is built around it, and in that sense there is an increased 
appeal to matters related to the Logos.
 Soon after completing his dissertation Vollenhoven took a more 
careful look at the epistemological context of his thought. Why he did 
this is difficult to say for sure. But the emphasis on ‘extra-mental’ norms 
and ideas was inter alia motivated by ‘anti-psychologism’,147 perhaps un-
expected for someone for whom intuition is so important. Then there was 
the urge to carve out a distinct niche in the predominantly neo-Kantian 
context of the time. It was through Heinrich Rickert, a member of the 
Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism, that both matters were ad-
vanced. We know that Vollenhoven read Rickert shortly after 1918, and 
that he took some ‘metalogical’ terminology over from him.148 The term 
146   Vollenhoven 16-11-1921. Grosheide had written Vollenhoven after reading the 
latter’s “Hegel op onze lagere scholen?” (Hegel in our elementary schools?); cf. Vollen-
hoven 1921c. He inquired as to whether Vollenhoven saw the possibility of applying the 
metalogical distinctions he makes in this article to questions of biblical exegesis. Vollen-
hoven replied in a carefully worded nine page letter, that is in fact a valuable statement of 
aspects of his thought at that time.
147   Vollenhoven’s single-term characterization of Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie had 
been that it is “anti-psychologistic”. We have already mentioned Vollenhoven’s positive 
assessment of this theory in the service of theism and intuitionism; cf. 1918a: 161, 175.
148   In a letter to Felix Krüger, dated 19 May 1920, Vollenhoven says that, while 
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‘metalogic’ was current in Vollenhoven’s day, especially in neo-Kantian 
circles, though it does not occur in Vollenhoven’s dissertation. The term 
pertains to what is assumed or needed in connection with grasping logic 
and its truth, whether formulated or unformulated: the unformulated 
is what is intuitively grasped, the formulated is what is circumspectly 
apportioned over requisite categories. There is a realist tendency in its 
use, so metalogic tends to emphasize the ontological or realist features of 
knowledge.149
 Vollenhoven’s most explicit statement on metalogic is in “Hegel in 
our elementary schools?” (1921).150 Here he contrasts ‘hetero-thesis’, as 
subjective opinion, with ‘hetero-logic’, as objective state of affairs, and 
also ‘synthesis’, as a subjective relating, with ‘systasis’, as acknowledged 
objective connection. These terms are Rickert’s.151 They are said to mark 
‘spheres’, which is a way of emphasizing irreducibility of validity. For 
example, Rickert took generalizing thought to be proper to the natural 
sciences, but not to history which calls for particularizing thought. ‘Het-
erologic’ marks objective validity, over against the subjective preference of 
heterothesis. The second contrast, between synthesis and ‘systasis’, con-
cerns the difference between judgment as synthesis of opinion on the one 
hand and the judgment’s structure as concomitant complex on the other. 
That structure is now called a systasis,152 which literally means ‘standing 
together’ (of referent/subject and relatum/predicate).
writing his dissertation, he was not closely acquainted with the Baden (= Southwest Ger-
man) School (of W. Windelband, H. Rickert, E. Lask). But, in the meantime, having 
read Heinrich Rickert’s Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (1892), he finds multiple points of 
agreement (vielfach in Einklang). Cf. Vollenhoven to Krüger 19-05-1920. Rickert was ini-
tially at the University of Freiburg (1891-1916) before becoming Windelband’s successor 
at the University of Heidelberg. Besides ‘Baden School’ the Southwest German School of 
neo-Kantianism is also referred to as the ‘Freiburg School’. 
149   The article “Metalogik” in the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie does not 
contain a general definition of the term on account of the diversity of its use. In a very 
brief report of the term metalogic in Ed. von Hartmann, B. Erdmann, H. Rickert, G. 
Ralfs and N. Hartmann, the author, Th. Rentsch, remarks that “the ‘transcendental on-
tology’, developed in metalogic, represents the terminal point of the development of 
neo-Kantianism towards a transcendental Platonism”; Rentsch 1980 (translation mine). 
Vollenhoven’s own metalogical views themselves take on a more realist turn when, in 
1926, he expresses affinity with Bolzano’s use of “Wahrheiten an sich”, etc.; Vollenhoven 
1926a: 51-52; cf. also chapter 4.
150   Vollenhoven 1921c; the article is in two parts, both dated July 1921.
151   Cf. Krijnen 2001: 256 ff. 
152   I shall treat ‘systasis’ as a foreign term and italicize it when not occurring in a 
quote or single quotation marks. Vollenhoven retained the term systasis into the early 30s 
until it became redundant for him.
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 Vollenhoven now asserts the following about ‘heterology’ and ‘sys-
tasis’:
The way one distinguishes nature or physis from the metaphysical, in like 
manner one can distinguish in epistemology (first the psychical, then) the 
logical, that norms the psychical, and behind that the ‘world’ of the objec-
tive hetero-logy and systasis, the metalogical sphere or also the sphere of 
pure epistemologicall ‘validity’. (Ibid., p. 80)
We see immediately that this is stated against the background of the dis-
tinction between the World and the Self. The World displays the order 
of metaphysical substances, the appearances of which are the concern of 
physics, while the Self, itself psychical in nature, is controlled or regu-
lated by logical norms. The ‘world’ of objective heterology and systasis is 
“behind” this. In being concerned with “pure epistemological ‘validity’”, 
it is directly relevant for (the organism of ) science. In other words, this 
“metalogical sphere” is hard to place other than in conjunction with the 
Logos.
 This metalogical or objective sphere is then placed in a broader con-
text of constancy and change. Vollenhoven states:
Hence in the objective sphere rest dominates, in the subjective sphere mo-
tion, change, transition. . . . In other words, thinking approaches being; 
better put—so as to avoid all confusion of knowing and occurrent aware-
ness [beleven]—thinking approaches being in the way it processes this in 
its own way; thinking approaches the adequate concept, the complete 
knowledge of the idea. (Ibid., p. 80)153
The theme of “thinking approaches being” is all too familiar. Thinking 
proceeds from the Self (subject to logical norms) and involves process-
ing what is given to it from the side of the World to think. It is a case of 
the subject thinking the object, i.e. of subject and object undergoing a 
synthesis, such as the Logos motivates. Vollenhoven now introduces here 
the contrast of change and rest. Knowing involves the process of getting 
153   I wish to point out that the phrase “thinking approaches being in the way it 
processes this in its own way; thinking approaches the adequate concept, the complete 
knowledge of the idea” repeats precisely the relation of thinking and being that Vollen-
hoven had maintained in 1918. In his valedictory lecture, given 26 October 1963, Vol-
lenhoven claims to remember that, during a conference in Hardenbroek on epistemology, 
in 1919, he pointed to “the necessity of advancing beyond knowing to being, of which 
knowing is a part.” The above quote, which is from 1921, is not consistent with this 
report of memory, at least its last phrase. Vollenhoven had from the start emphasized the 
priority of being over thinking (cf. 1918a: 382, 437). But that is not to make it a part of 
being. Knowing’s ‘resorting under’ or taken to be a part of being is first evident in 1925. 
Vollenhoven 1963a: 97. Stellingwerff, who takes Vollenhoven at his word here, without 
any verification, draws conclusions that are in fact unfounded; cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 40-
41. 
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to know. In and through knowing one approaches the adequate concept, 
as factor of ‘rest’, though never actually acquiring it. But it is there as 
beckoning ideal. Vollenhoven now underscores this role of the adequate 
concept more explicitly than had previously been the case. The adequate 
concept, which, as ideal, stems from the Spirit, has a pronounced rel-
evance (as factor of rest) in the process of knowledge. This being a meta-
logical feature, it is something that is warranted by the Logos. The Logos 
too is now etched out more distinctly than before. We need to look at 
this more carefully, especially the tandem: (adequate) concept and idea.
 Now two things are relevant in connection with an idea. First, there 
is our being aware of it. Awareness of an idea, says Vollenhoven, is the 
grasping of a being distinctly thought (een anders-gedacht-zijn; Vollen-
hoven 1921c: 79). An individual thing is grasped in its idea, which is its 
warrant and controlling principle. This ‘grasping’ is an acknowledgment, 
the awareness of which is provided by the metaphysical intuition. The 
latter (we repeat) is the “immediate insight into identity in difference”, 
which includes the insight into “the ideas of species in different indi-
viduals” (1918a: 351). The metaphysical intuition involves our ability 
to grasp the distinctive identity of an individual, put into effect on the 
occasion of an acknowledgment.
 But secondly, there is also the epistemological implication of the 
idea, in the sense that, were it actually known, that would involve a com-
plete knowledge of the individual or reality so characterized, in all of its 
relations. Such knowledge constitutes an adequate concept of the idea, 
but not, of course, practically to be had on account of its unending pos-
sibilities and features. Human beings make do with stand-ins or proleptic 
concepts, whereby the adequate concept serves as validating ideal in the 
use of proleptic concepts, that is, within the scope of thought in the 
process of coming to know. As ideal it serves as a goal that is also direc-
tion determining for the coming to know process (Vollenhoven 1921c: 
81, note 1). Such a role is said to be ‘metalogical’ (and so pertains to the 
Logos). But can this be distinguished from the metaphysical intuition?
 As validating ideal, the adequate concept has the two features, viz. 
being an endpoint or goal of thought and being direction determining for 
the process of coming to know. How can this be metalogically described? 
In this connection Vollenhoven speaks of “schouwen”, which is literally 
‘to behold’ or ‘to view’: “in supposition we already behold intuitively 
this endpoint [of the adequate concept as ideal]” (vermoedend schouwen 
we reeds intuïtief dit eindpunt; Vollenhoven 1921c: 85). This description 
of sighting the ideal is already sufficient to realize that this ‘metalogical 
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intuition’ is not the same as the metaphysical intuition. The metalogical 
intuition is a ‘suppositional viewing’ or ‘taking stock of ’ a goal, an effect 
of which is to orientate the knowing process; the metaphysical intuition 
is the ability to grasp, or is the state of grasping, the controlling identity 
of something as distinctive being—the that we grasp something when 
we acknowledge the idea. But in ‘transcendental realism’, as advanced 
by Vollenhoven,154 there is, behind every ideal (or adequate concept), the 
idea (as thing-law). When ideal and idea are taken together, this gives a 
‘fuller’ use of intuition than would be the case when only one of these 
two is respected. Within neo-Idealism, with its ‘autonomy of thought’, 
one tries to make-do with only the validating (epistemic) ideal. For Vol-
lenhoven goes on to say that Husserl’s intuition is limited to being aware 
of essence—his ‘Wesensschau’, in which any content of consciousness is 
a goal (object of intention) in itself—while in Bergson’s use there is no 
acknowledged goal, whereby in his case the intuition takes on the gliding 
feature of the life stream (ibid.) We understand Vollenhoven to be saying 
here, against neo-Idealism, that either the ontic focus of an idea is taken 
up into the ideal (as in Husserl), but then the “taking stock” becomes that 
of intuiting (mental) entities, or the ideal delineates a direction of motion 
without a distinctive being behind its (relative) goal (Bergson). Either 
way there is only a metalogical intuition, not a metaphysical one. Vol-
lenhoven makes the further statement that neo-Kantians generally tend 
to use the term ‘idea’ exclusively for the ideal. “Monism [that character-
izes neo-Kantianism] has no word for what I called, in realist fashion, 
‘idea’, for it cannot admit the existence of this idea (the thought of God)” 
(Vollenhoven 1921c: 86, note 4 from previous page). Hence, for Vol-
lenhoven, the use of ‘idea’ remains distinctly theistic and distinct from 
metalogical use.
 Now why did Vollenhoven come to emphasize this ‘metalogical’ 
feature of his thought? There are, I believe, two reasons. In the first place, 
validity is the ‘sort of thing’ that can only be sighted in acknowledge-
ment. Something is or is not valid. There is no change or development 
here. This secures the ‘rest’ that Vollenhoven speaks of in the statement 
154   Vollenhoven speaks of “the Christian realism” that “acknowledges mind and 
matter to be metaphysically real” (Vollenhoven 1921c: 81, note 1), which, of course, 
means that they are governed by ideas. The same was said by Vollenhoven in his 1918 
dissertation. The self-characterization he there gives as ‘theistic intuitionism’ is best taken 
to be a ‘transcendental realism’, for there are determining conditions, both epistemologi-
cal and metaphysical, for the Self and the World. In 1918a: 220 Vollenhoven speaks of 
surmounting rationalism (typical of formalism in mathematics) and embracing “tran-
scendental realism”. When Dooyeweerd joins in, the term ‘critical realism’ also occurs (cf. 
chapter 3). 
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quoted above. This rest gives stability to thought when ideals are accept-
ed. To be sure, it is linked to a metaphysical reality. But, in the epistemic 
context of actual thinking, it is not the grasping of essence that satisfies 
thought—that might, at best, link a Gegenstand to the identity of a corre-
sponding transcendent object—what satisfies is the sighting of a goal that 
directs thought towards gaining and increasing validity (as knowledge).155
 The second reason is to give the process of thought, which has an 
unavoidably subjective feature, more clearly objective support. At the 
same time thought needs to recognize the objective and not rule over 
it: “it is not thought that, in its pride, imposes the law on the object, 
but it needs to acknowledge the objective by taking into account [objec-
tive] heterology in the [subjective] heterothesis, systasis in the synthesis” 
(Vollenhoven 1921c: 80). However, when the objective is duly acknowl-
edged, one may nevertheless speak of a “certain autonomy of thought in 
its own sphere” (ibid.). The content of thought does not come from (sub-
jective) thought itself (this over against the Marburg neo-Kantians), but 
thought does have to proceed methodically in the assimilation of content. 
The emphasis here is on the procedure within the organism of the sci-
ences. To that end it needs “norms and ideals that do not hold elsewhere” 
(ibid.). The heteronomy appealed to here “can well be combined with 
an autonomy, the ‘sovereignty (of regulation, not of creation) in its own 
sphere’” (ibid.).156
 This emphasis on the metalogical can also be seen as high-light-
155   It is perhaps possible to interpret the ‘rest’ of the adequate concept (as epistemic 
goal) and its direction-giving relevance for the process of thinking in terms of proleptic 
concepts as attesting to divine transcendence and immanence, respectively, with respect 
to the Logos as second Person of the Trinity. There is too little explicit textual support 
either for or against this interpretation of the two features of the adequate concept. But I 
tend to regard it as correct, for it forecloses on Logos speculation, hence enables Vollen-
hoven all the better to circumvent this “danger”. At least by 1926 there is a ‘full bound-
ary’, involving the whole Trinity, between God as three Persons and all of creation.
156   This is the first occurrence of the Kuyperian phrase in Vollenhoven’s work found 
to date. The fact that it is put in quotation marks sets it off and makes it an intended 
choice. This ‘sphere sovereignty’ should not be confused with Vollenhoven’s rather loose 
use (in the pattern of the Freiburg neo-Kantians) of ‘sphere’, ‘world’, ‘circle’, ‘terrain’ 
or ‘area’ for things objective, subjective, qualitative, metaphysical, metalogical, logical, 
psychical-logical, psychological-logical, etc., all of which occur in “Hegel op onze la-
gere scholen?” (Vollenhoven 1921c). It is only in connection with the one occurrence 
of ‘sphere sovereignty’ that he speaks of “norms and ideals that do not hold elsewhere”, 
thereby thinking especially of the methodology of science, when properly controlled by 
the metalogical intuition. The given characterization is, I take it, sufficient to distinguish 
it from the other uses of sphere, circle, etc. And it puts “sovereignty in its own sphere” 
within the direct range of influence of the Logos.
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ing features of the fundamentals of science. We note in passing that, 
whereas the principles of logic are extra-mental norms (given by God 
the Spirit), the use of logic, when thinking, is something that is carried 
out in a psychical process. In that sense “logic is the ethics of psychical 
thought” (Vollenhoven 1921c: 82). But knowledge arises through the 
use of thought in the assimilation of the given, and this knowledge needs 
its own criteria of validity, apart from conforming to the logical norms 
governing the psychical thought process. Here is where the metalogical 
quest arises, a quest that is of particular importance for the philosophy of 
science. How can objectivity be guaranteed if the thinking taking place is 
necessarily subjective?
 Vollenhoven had of course introduced the Gegenstandstheorie to 
counter psychologism. A Gegenstand is an objective meaning, discerned 
by the analytical intuition, the objectivity of which is secured in the con-
formity to the principle of identity. A Gegenstand is nothing if not a self-
identical term. It would appear that the very terminology of ‘heterologic’ 
versus ‘heterothesis’, and ‘systasis’ versus ‘synthesis’, and especially the 
statement: “to acknowledge the objective by taking into account [objec-
tive] heterology in the [subjective] heterothesis, systasis in the synthesis” 
(Vollenhoven 1921c: 80), expresses the roles otherwise attributed to the 
Gegenstand, as Object and Objective respectively—“would appear” (I 
say), for Vollenhoven does not say so in so many words in “Hegel op onze 
lagere scholen?”. But the Object is the meaning [a heterological one?] 
one holds in thought when fixing the intension of a (proleptic) concept 
[heterothetic?], and the Objective is the relational complex [the systasis] 
one has in mind when assessing and asserting a judgment [the synthesis]. 
The conspicuous absence of such a relevant term as ‘Gegenstand’, relevant 
in this metalogical context, is difficult to explain unless it is in fact redun-
dant here. I believe we can safely assume this to be the case.157 At the same 
157   Supporting evidence is in C. Krijnen’s study of Rickert, referred to earlier. He 
speaks of Rickert’s ‘Prinzip der Heterothesis’ as essential to his ‘Gegenstandsmodell’; Krijnen 
2001: 256. The absence of the term Gegenstand may relate to the absence of another term, 
viz. ‘concrete intuition’. The metalogical intuition of the ideal of the adequate concept 
is aligned to the metaphysical intuition. The role of the analytical intuition—immediate 
awareness of difference and similarity—which in Vollenhoven’s prior work was linked to 
the concrete intuition, would appear to have shifted. I believe the metalogical intuition is 
simply the analytical intuition. Its being more in tandem with the metaphysical intuition 
than with the concrete intuition, justifies reassessing its role and hence also renaming it. 
In Vollenhoven 1921c the emphasis is not on norms (impinging on the Self ) but on the 
adequate concept as ideal (directing the growth of scientific knowledge). This may be a 
formal reason for not mentioning the cluster of notions relevant to norms (Self, distin-
guishing subject, concrete intuition, analytical intuition, etc.). A material reason may be 
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time we can lament Vollenhoven’s using these contrived terms of Rickert, 
even though this use was short-lived. They hinder seeing the continuity 
of Vollenhoven’s thought at this point.158
 There is a point in the discussion of science here that seems to sug-
gest a new element. In a footnote Vollenhoven makes a remark in the 
context of a discussion of contradictions, that will become crucial for his 
later thought. When one is confronted with contradictions, one needs 
to consider the ‘respect in which’ to foreclose contradictions, i.e. one 
cannot (may not) attribute two contradictory predicates to one and the 
same subject at the same time and in the same respect (cf. Vollenhoven 
1921c: 101; emphasis added). Can this question of ‘respect in which’ be 
linked to another metalogical notion here introduced for the first time, 
namely that of “diverse domains of validity of logical norms” (verschillen-
de geldingsgebieden der logische normen; Vollenhoven 1921c: 85, note 3)? 
Interpreted in the context of Vollenhoven’s thought at the time, he must 
be referring here to the various domains of the sciences. These domains 
were formerly distinguished exclusively by the quantitative characteristic 
of the ratio of the formal (form of sensibility) and the material (range 
of phenomena represented by Gegenstände) in each science. In view of 
Vollenhoven’s metalogical interest, would it not be fitting to include a 
criterion for the ‘respect in which’ the categories of a science are relevant, 
to pinpoint the use of the principle of contradiction? After all, he had not 
spoken of “domains of validity” with respect to logical norms before. The 
most natural way to realize this would be to introduce an ‘ideal’ for each 
science, which would also guide the growth of knowledge in a science. 
There would then be a ‘metalogical intuition’ for each domain of science, 
a ‘viewing’ of the domain’s qualifying characteristic in the light of its ad-
equate concept as validating ideal. We know that Vollenhoven will very 
soon (in the mid-1920s) make just these moves. (More telling is also their 
occurrence in early work of Dooyeweerd, discussed in the next chapter.) 
that ‘self-consciousness’, ‘concrete intuition’ and the like now sound too subjective and 
thus are left out of the discussion here. But if one distinguishes between norms and ide-
als, there is no reason to assume that Vollenhoven might at this point have dropped the 
cluster of terms related to norms.
158   In Logos en Ratio, Vollenhoven comments on this “heteronomic” terminology 
in Rickert. The latter’s “heteronomy of values”, Vollenhoven says, does not signal a break 
with humanism. It must be seen in the context of Rickert’s characterization of the sciences 
of value as individualizing (over against that of the natural sciences as generalizing). The 
individual encounters norms or values as “the other”. But this is not to say that their prov-
enance lies outside human beings: “the values stand above the individual as social norms, 
but the philosopher is still called upon to ‘ground’ the former in the ‘reine Ich’. . .”; Vol-
lenhoven 1926a: 59.
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We cannot be certain that the preparations found in this article, are not 
in fact steps already taken, here presented in rudimentary form, awaiting 
explication.159 In any case, the previous strong sway of the (Marburg-
like) unity of scientific method is definitely disrupted in favour of a more 
(Freiburg-like) pluralistic approach. In 1926 the organism of the sciences 
is said to consist of ‘fields of inquiry of distinct modality’.160
 So while the three heterological features of Gegenstände (Objects 
and Objectives), concepts (with external reference) and fixed connection 
were already present in Vollenhoven’s thought, that of ‘domains of valid-
ity’ is new. Such domains give a pluralist allocation to the said hetero-
logical features. He needs the notion of an ideal—which is that which 
orientates thought and guides it in a sure way, “restfully”, in the advance 
in knowledge—to give substance to this feature. He had, of course, also 
spoken of ideals before, and certainly of the adequate concept as ideal, 
but not in terms of a ‘metalogical intuition’. In amplifying his use of 
intuition—the redubbed analytical intuition—as inclusive of viewing or 
sighting, the additional emphasis on ideals of knowledge is made more 
evident. 
 The introduction of these epistemic notions was motivated, in part 
by the drive to increase his own insight and to clarify his theistic stand-
point, in part to differentiate his standpoint from that of prevalent non-
theistic thought. In his response to the letter from F.W. Grosheide, re-
ferred to earlier, he spoke of the hetero-thesis/hetero-logy and synthesis/
systasis distinctions as “the discovery that was so liberating over against the 
trap [klem] of [neo-]Kantianism”161 According to Vollenhoven, neo-Kan-
tianism in general cannot accept the notion of an idea as acknowledged 
distinctive being, distinct also from a distinctively thought epistemic goal 
159   The article is a criticism of a work in elementary arithmetic by two Hegelian 
inspired authors (P.J. Bouman and J.C. van Zelm). Vollenhoven confronts these authors 
with his intuitionist position. The fact that Vollenhoven brings his former philosophical 
discussion up-to-date in long footnotes, points, I believe, to the desire to announce the 
newer views publically and to confirm their authorship. Cf. also chapter 3, section II.A. 
160   I don’t think there is sufficient evidence to hold that Vollenhoven here links these 
“diverse domains of validity of logical norms” to the notion of sphere sovereignty, also 
mentioned in this article. At best he thinks of the entire scientific enterprise, the ‘organ-
ism of the sciences’, as a ‘sphere’ that stands subject to its own logical norms of method-
ological procedure. The domains that are associated with the fundamental sciences belong 
to the metalogical realm, as we find in Dooyeweerd’s early work at the time. The more 
Kuyperian understanding of ‘sphere sovereignty’ only appears when the notion of ‘law as 
boundary’ is underscored in a cosmological setting (cf. chapter 3).
161   Vollenhoven to Grosheide, 16-11-1921. Presumably Vollenhoven was especially 
thinking of the Marburg neo-Kantians.
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and direction-giving ideal. (An important motive of neo-Kantianism was 
to avoid Kant’s appeal to the “Ding an sich”, which is the reality behind 
the appearances, interpreted by Vollenhoven as consisting of Ideas. Here 
Vollenhoven is more Kantian than the neo-Kantians!) Without the idea 
behind the ideal, the ideal itself becomes a mere projection of thought, 
and so the autonomous character and creative function of thought is held 
to be immune to critique. But when the idea is acknowledged, there is a 
characteristic duality of idea and ideal, the latter being the adequate con-
cept one approached in thought. This gives added reason for Vollenhoven 
to emphasize and concentrate on the role of the Logos in connection with 
his theistic standpoint. The Logos after all disposes subject and object to 
merge in the pursuit of knowledge. Thus, through the Logos there is a 
coming into rapport of human rationality—thought guided by adequate 
concepts as ideals—with the structure of the world, as grounded in ideas, 
that attests to divine (i.e. objective) rationality. The advance of scientific 
knowledge, however much this calls for human effort, is divinely pre-
pared and conditioned. For,
thinking is . . . a function of the soul, which gains its high value through 
the inner affinity of subjective reason in the human being with the objec-
tive rationality, assumed to be in the world (because God has laid it there) 
. . . . (Vollenhoven 1921c: 86)162
 The ‘inner affinity’ is exactly what the Logos guarantees. And be-
cause “practising science is to approach the adequate concept as ideal” 
(cf. 1918a: 390-391) it seems that the divine Logos has to be acknowl-
edged in order to understand the most fundamental condition of scien-
tific thought. At the same time, an essentially scholastic feature—viz. the 
supposition of the harmony between the subjective and objective orders 
of rationality—has been made more secure and more nuanced through 
this emphatic metalogical elucidation. In effect this makes a break-away 
from scholasticism more difficult to achieve.
X. the concePtIon’s characterIzatIon
The thought of the ‘early Vollenhoven’ we have canvassed in this chap-
ter—in the time period 1918-1922—is given two characterizations. 
Vollenhoven first spoke of “theistic intuitionism” (1918a: 338). Then 
in 1921 he referred to his position as “epistemological dualism” of (ad-
equate) concept and idea (of being) (Vollenhoven 1921c: 81). Common 
162   In the same vein: “consciousness is more than a fact, namely [it is also] a function 
that organizes the given according to an organizing principle that is also operative in the 
world” (Vollenhoven 1921c: 87).
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in this period is the presupposition of “Christian realism”, which attri-
butes metaphysical reality to mind and matter (geest en stof) (1918a: 3; 
Vollenhoven 1921c: 81, note 1).
 The take-off point of theistic intuitionism is in the philosophy of 
mathematics, in particular the mathematical intuitionism of the intu-
itionist mathematicians, Henri Poincaré and L.E.J. Brouwer. Vollenhoven 
sounds out the philosophical role of the intuition. He tackled this by first 
positioning his analysis in a methodological context. Mathematical in-
tuitionism is, broadly speaking, an alternative to two other approaches: 
formalism and empiricism. Upon comparison, including a historical re-
view of their developments, intuitionism is found to be more satisfactory 
than formalism and empiricism. But Vollenhoven finds his fellow intu-
itionists to be wanting in their specific ‘intuitionist standpoints’. Poincaré 
placed too much emphasis on construction, as motivated by pragmatic 
humanism; Brouwer gave the mental constructions of mathematics too 
little status of their own, this being a consequence of his pantheistic and 
spiritualist leanings. Vollenhoven’s own intuitionism calls for finitude in 
mathematics and science proper. But the ‘theistic’ qualification allows 
accepting the given (metaphysical) reality as being an infinite reality. 
This theism has been interpreted above as a ‘Trinitarian’ theism, a theism 
culled from the Reformed tradition of Dutch Calvinism.
 For Vollenhoven, theism endorses a ‘dualism’, the primary exemplar 
of which is that of norm and fact, or freedom and necessity. Norms derive 
from God, and they condition subjective or ‘psychical’ processes. Facts 
are governed by natural laws, and this is a matter of internal structure, of 
being created that way, as maintained by ideas in the mind of God. While 
the norms and ideas are posited dogmatically, norms also have a tran-
scendental obligatory effect upon the human being as knowing subject, 
while ideas condition things as substances (in being their ‘thing-laws’) 
with inhering qualities. The structure of metaphysics is a monadology 
of substances, whose inhering qualities appear as phenomena. This gives 
the human being two epistemic options of outer and inner perception. 
Outer perception is a ‘coming to know’ that proceeds from the given 
phenomena and is channelled in the human being via the psycho-phys-
ical body and its capacity of sensibility. Here norms guide the ‘working 
over’ of the phenomenal givens as sensed, which results in judgments 
and concepts. Inner perception is immediate (intuitive) awareness on the 
part of a human being as substance (Self ) of its own inhering qualities 
in relation to itself (self-consciousness) and in relation to other human 
beings and things. Intuition is the certitude that the inhering qualities 
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are present and, as present, that they condition. There are three kinds of 
intuition: concrete, which is awareness of self-conscious experience in the 
undergoing, analytical, the immediate awareness of sameness and differ-
ence in the acts and contents of experience, and metaphysical, which is 
the awareness of identity in difference, as effect of either outer or inner 
being. Judgments and concepts are to outer perception what Gegenstände 
(Objects and Objectives) are to inner perception.
 The two kinds of perception are predicated on the peculiar distinc-
tion between the Self and the World, as inner and outer being, respec-
tively. This suggests an analogy of structure, indicative of a micro- and 
macrocosm schema. This is borne out in that the psycho-physical orga-
nization of the Self, and its forms of sensibility of space time, is in step 
with the World of facts, plants and animals, set in the context of absolute 
space and time localization. Besides this factual (or real) level there is also 
the ‘ideal’ level of the intra-mental within the Self and the extra-mental 
as regards the World. This level is also the ‘domain of validity’. Here the 
Self takes on mental qualities in virtue of the impingement of norms (and 
ideals), while on the part of the World there are the ideas, the essences of 
species, that are individuated to be the (intellectual) thing-laws or sub-
stances that control the appearances and development of things and their 
interrelations. There is a priority of the ideal over the real. The real is alive 
and becomes, but it is intrinsically geared to being managed by the ideal. 
Intersecting the polarity of Self and World there is the ‘dualism’ of ideal 
and real, unchanging and changing being, norm and fact.
 The dualities and polarities are seen as qualitative differences with 
a workable effect. They are contrasts capable of and requiring reconcili-
ation, achievable in virtue of a deeper unity controlling the oppositions. 
Hence the dualities and polarities presuppose a dynamic unity making 
reconciliation possible.
 The ‘workings’ of this reconciliation is basically of an occasionalist 
nature. Something is given or felt, and this in turn activates or occa-
sions an operation that does something with what is given or felt by way 
of enhancing, guiding or controlling it. Hence knowing proceeds from 
given phenomena, which occasion representations in human receptivity. 
These representations are the material for the Self ’s forming judgments 
and concepts, as knowing subject when orientated by norms. Judgments 
and concepts are a “reality of science”, also a reality of reconciliation, 
signalling the satisfactory working over or assimilation of the initial given 
phenomena (of the World) by the knowing subject (Self ).
 A prime example of occasionalism is the intuition. Intuition is the 
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certitude of the Self ’s being affected on the occasion of its undergoing 
experience. This certainty allows the Self to posit the effect as condition 
of consciousness, which, in light of the impingement of the principle of 
identity, gives rise to Gegenstände. The latter are self-identical meanings, 
being simple or relationally complex mental objects (viz. so-called Ob-
jects and Objectives, respectively). When this ‘intra-mental material’ is 
judiciously brought to bear in judgments and concepts, expressive of the 
knowledge of things and their relations, there is the deepening of insight 
that makes scientific knowledge possible.
 Vollenhoven’s theism is presented as the ultimate warrant of the 
interaction of the Self and the World. The World’s structure is in virtue of 
ideas that are thoughts in the mind of God the Father. The Self ’s cogni-
tive, ethical and aesthetic thought takes place in qualities of subjection to 
ideals and norms, which find their source in God the Holy Spirit. God as 
Logos is the disposition needed for Self and World to undergo the syn-
thesis resulting in knowledge as reconciliation. The Logos also embodies 
the basic conditions for maintaining the ‘reality of science’ as ‘organism’.
 In 1921 Vollenhoven introduced a new way of characterizing his 
standpoint. He now speaks of “epistemological dualism”, the character-
istic feature of which is the duality of concept and idea. The terms as 
such are not new for him. The term ‘idea’ denotes the essence or the 
‘thing-law’ of anything existent, while the notion of a concept is that 
of ‘adequate concept’, which is the complete knowledge of an idea. Be-
cause a complete knowledge of anything can never be had, the adequate 
concept serves as ideal of knowledge to strive for. In tandem with the 
metaphysical intuition, which is the awareness of identity in difference 
of ideas, there is now also metalogical intuition, that sights the ideal as 
beckoning goal of knowledge. This metalogical intuition has validating 
import against the background of the idea. In other words, epistemic ide-
als, formerly attributed to the Spirit—the warrant for all ideals—is now 
brought into a more direct rapport with the Logos.
 There is no discernible difference in the metaphysics nor an essen-
tial change in the structure of knowledge implied in this new charac-
terization. But Vollenhoven is now able to emphasize different features. 
The metalogical intuition emphasizes a realist view of validity, for the 
validity provided by the ideal of knowledge calls for a background of 
ideas (being). There is a shift also in the consciousness of knowledge. 
Vollenhoven’s emphasis on the validity of the metalogical intuition seems 
to supplant the need for philosophy to begin with self-consciousness. 
This helps alleviate the possible misunderstanding of Vollenhoven’s hav-
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ing embraced a kind of ‘psychologism’. Also it avoids the solipsism of 
self-consciousness. There is also the suggestion of a shift in the view of 
the organism of science. There is mention of “diverse domains of validity 
of logical norms”, whereas formerly the distinction between the sciences 
mutually was a quantitative matter of differing ratios between the mate-
rial and the formal elements of a science.
 The change in characterization also attests to a more insistent 
“Christian realism” over against neo-Kantian practice. Marburg neo-
Kantians propagated the notion that thought produces the very facts and 
content it itself works over when realising scientific knowledge (Vollen-
hoven 1921c: 83). This denies an order of reality that is God-given. The 
neo-Kantians of the Southwest German school, while they differed with 
the Marburgers on important points, do not differ, in Vollenhoven’s as-
sessment, on this principled point. They too “failed to break with the 
one-sided interest in thought: they only concern themselves with forms 
of thought in disregard of the object” (op. cit.: 83). Neo-Kantians only 
have an eye for the ideal of thought (op. cit.: 86, footnote 4), not the idea 
behind the ideal that gives it importance in reality.163 In that light one 
can understand Vollenhoven’s concern for realism: the heteronomy of 
thought calls for a recognition of being that is given and which thought 
approaches. However, this is to endorse neither a naïve nor an empirical 
realism, for, in approaching the given, thought operates according to its 
own method, which is critical and requires respect for transcendental 
conditions. In that sense there is a certain ‘sovereignty of thought’ that is 
consistent with heteronomy.
 Throughout these early years Vollenhoven maintained the distinc-
tion between thought and being. This distinction is operative both in his 
intuitionism and in the metalogical re-emphasis of his standpoint. It is 
on this polarity that the duality of Self and World is also predicated. We 
recognize in this polarity the schema of microcosm and macrocosm, for 
both Self and World are cosmic, though Vollenhoven did not specifically 
name this schema. But it does not need to be named in order for him to 
come to a point of critical reassessment, viz. if thought itself has being, 
then, strictly speaking, the distinction between thought and being is not 
only unclear, it is in fact impossible to draw. (It is like trying to distin-
guish boys from humankind to which they necessarily belong.) But this 
calls for deep reflection on the nature of the Self and its thought on the 
one hand and the metaphysics of being and its structure on the other, for 
163   Thus Vollenhoven can claim that neo-Kantians limit the whole use of ‘idea’ to 
what he calls the ideal (Vollenhoven 1921c: 85, note 4). 
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these topics tended to make the distinction between thought and being 
operational. Only when Vollenhoven saw an alternative solution for this 
problem was ‘Calvinistic philosophy’ on the way to be born.
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reforMing reVisions:  
froM Monadology to law-sPheres
“But that with sufficient effort and available time one can achieve the 
goal of a Calvinistic [understanding of ] science that can withstand 
[neo-]Kantianism and not [merely] avoid it—of that I am no 
longer in doubt. . . . I now see more [clearly] its possibility.”
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven to A. Janse (21 March 1924) 
i. IntroductIon
In this chapter we look at two contacts Vollenhoven kept in his early 
years, namely in the period 1918-1926, that were of special significance 
to him at the time. The first contact is Antheunis Janse (1890-1960), the 
second Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). This is the period in which 
Vollenhoven served as minister of the Gereformeerde Kerken (Reformed 
churches), first in Oostkapelle, in the province of Zeeland (1918-1921), 
then in The Hague (1921-1926). From there he returned to Amsterdam, 
when he accepted the appointment to the chair of philosophy at the Free 
University, as its first full-time philosopher.
 In the period in question, in particular the years in The Hague, Vol-
lenhoven executed an important overhaul of his thought. He becomes 
more self-consciously Calvinistic in his thinking. For him this meant 
placing the difference between God and the creature centre stage, with 
the difference characterized as ‘law’, i.e. law as the boundary between 
them. Not that he had been insufficiently aware of the difference between 
God and World in his early work. But he had contextualized this dif-
ference in a specific metaphysics, namely a monadology, by means of a 
realism of ideas. Ideas in that context are ‘thoughts of God’, by which be-
ings are maintained in their distinct individuality. Each being is, monad-
like, a creature governed by its idea or ‘thing-law’, which controls all its 
properties, qualities and changing appearances and relations to all other 
things. Thus the monads together constitute a vast network of changing 
and (seemingly) interacting beings, the whole of which is our cosmos. 
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There is a ‘logic’ to this whole, a ‘monadology’, in that all the monads act 
in harmony with each other, controlled by God’s predestining Counsel. 
At some point Vollenhoven began to feel the liability of the speculative 
character of this metaphysics and theology. After 1923 ideas are no lon-
ger on his philosophical palette. The human being cannot read God’s 
mind. In this respect God is ‘above the law’, beyond the range of human 
ability.
 The rejection of the monadology as speculative metaphysics had 
implications for the understanding of the cosmos ‘under the law bound-
ary’. In what sense does the cosmos deserve unstinted respect? It deserves 
respect in the evidences of its being ineluctably law-bounded. Kuyper 
had spoken of ‘sphere-sovereignty’, which denotes a view of society in 
which officeholders have delegated authority (or limited sovereignty) in 
distributed domains (or distinct societal spheres of efficacy). Each sphere 
has its own focus of responsibility, meaning that each sphere is differently 
marked or conditioned as to how power exercised within it can be good, 
wise and God glorifying. The ‘boundary’ of a sphere is a law-condition 
that is part of the difference between God, who imposes law, and the hu-
man creature, who stands in subjection to law. This Kuyperian teaching 
in turn suggested a teaching on which a cosmology could be based, but 
only after Vollenhoven, now accompanied by Dooyeweerd, had worked 
out the outlines of an epistemology and philosophy of science that recog-
nizes domains requiring acknowledgement by intuition before logic and 
scientific method can meaningfully be set to work. When the domains 
were clarified as to their conditions, cosmological presuppositions could 
be pointed to that embody these conditions. Only then could Kuyper’s 
societal teaching of ‘sphere sovereignty’ be re-gauged to serve as cosmo-
logical theory of ‘law-spheres’.
 Vollenhoven’s transition from a monadology to the theory of the 
law-spheres is the main theme of this chapter. It took place at two levels. 
There was first of all the speculative side that needed considerable trim-
ming. A favoured haunt of speculation is metaphysics and theology. In 
the early Vollenhoven these disciplines harboured his realism of ideas and 
an associated Trinitarian theism. At the time, these topics were formu-
lated in a way that was in agreement with a widely supported Christian-
intellectual understanding. But he came to a more Calvinist-Kuyperian 
standpoint, in the light of which former work no longer satisfied. So he 
sought reform and an understanding of philosophy that comported in a 
more satisfactory way with his standpoint.
 The problem comes to a head in scholasticism, itself an inextricable 
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mix of the philosophical and the theological, a term much overworked 
in Vollenhoven’s Reformed milieu. One peg of this tradition is anthropo-
logical, in that it maintains a duality in the human being, of an immortal 
soul and a mortal body held together in a complex unity. The early Vol-
lenhoven gave his support to this view. The body is clearly mortal, being 
part of changing empirical reality that unfolds and develops. But mental-
ity, despite its own changing states, is sensitive to the impingement of 
norms and is able to acknowledge ideas of distinctive being. That attests 
to an unchanging basis of mentality, an ‘immortal soul’ in the human 
being.
 It was Antheunis Janse who openly questioned this view of an im-
mortal soul in discussions with Vollenhoven. Janse read widely—authors 
such as Hans Driesch, Max Scheler, Maria Montessori, etc.—but the 
result was at first somewhat eclectic. Vollenhoven provided critical com-
ment to Janse’s reading in philosophy. More decisive was Janse’s reading 
of the Bible. This he read as a religiously sensitive person. The anthropo-
logical content in the Bible, he found, addresses ‘existential’ questions of 
living human beings. Rather than confirming the view of an immortal 
soul in the human being, the term ‘soul’ in biblical discourse is, so he 
took it, short for the whole living person. The so-called biblical support 
for an immortal soul view does violence to the text. Vollenhoven was 
initially taken aback, but he soon came around in acknowledging Janse 
to be essentially correct.
 Vollenhoven became more aware of how thoughtlessly philosophy 
is read into the biblical text in the tradition of scholasticism, turning 
that text into a source of speculation. With Janse, Vollenhoven came to 
see that the Bible, as word-revelation, in the first place offers redemptive 
orientation in terms of the religious life, this being itself, a this-worldly 
life-with-God, in recognition of the divine will. A biblically inspired reli-
gious life stands on its own feet. It enjoins a life attitude of love, of doing 
justice to every diversity. The philosophical challenge is to stop doing 
philosophy in the accommodating categories of scholasticism, do phi-
losophy without speculative intent and be guided by the love command. 
 The most visible, because vital, consequence of this ‘reformation’ 
of philosophy is perhaps the notion of ‘standing-in-subjection’. It draws 
attention to the notion of subject, but now in its passive connotation of 
sub-jectum, ‘thrown under’, not in its active connotation of subjecting, 
the Self in autonomous control. If we may generalize, the Janse effect led 
Vollenhoven to reconsider his initially more self-centred understanding 
of subjectivity, particularly as evidenced in his appeal to what he called 
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the concrete intuition (what one learns in and of oneself, monadically 
or solipsistically), and reformulate it as a subjectivity of responsibility, a 
subject standing under law in law-spheres, a tasked subject. We take this 
transformation, from self-centred subject to tasked subject, as the guid-
ing thread in the discussion of the early Vollenhoven-Janse contact.
 The second level of Vollenhoven’s transition from a monadology to 
the theory of the law-spheres took place at the more grass roots level of 
methodology. Here too there is an element of scholasticism that needed 
to be overcome. 
 Vollenhoven had initially upheld a qualified scholasticism in his 
view of rationality, in the sense that he maintained a harmony between 
the subjective rationality of human thought, as guided by logic, and the 
objective rationality that is inherent in the structure of reality. Ideas cap-
ture that objective structure as ‘thoughts of God’, and human rationality 
is set on the course of gaining knowledge of the ideas through adequate 
concepts (i.e. limitative notions of the complete knowledge of ideas). 
Traditional scholasticism takes this harmony of subjective and objective 
rationality to be a sufficient basis for knowledge, provided that objective 
rationality is somehow available or revealed in the idea and subjective 
rationality is motivated to match it in the adequate concept. But here, 
as we found in chapter 2, Vollenhoven disagreed. To be sufficient for 
knowledge, the scholastic harmony needs the supplement of the intuition 
as well. Knowledge needs not only to be rationally understood but also 
to be confirmed in the certainty of its validity. Here an intuitive moment 
is essential, supporting ‘synthetic a priori’s’, so as to warrant the concept’s 
becoming more adequate to the idea it seeks to know.
 To repeat an essential strand of chapter 2, Vollenhoven’s study of 
mathematical foundations had emphasized the need for a synthetic a pri-
ori for (first order) arithmetic and a synthetic a priori for geometry. For 
these a priori’s he sought an anthropological justification. The arithmetical 
a priori is the principle of recurrence, which, as Poincaré had averred, is 
nothing but the power of the mind to repeat indefinitely an act once that 
act is possible, and that the mind has a direct intuition of this power (cf. 
chapter 2, section III.A.). On the other hand, the a priori of geometry 
focuses on localization, the unlimited continuum of positions far and 
near (in three-dimensional Euclidean geometry + one-dimensional time), 
as gauged by our bodies in their psycho-physical organization. The certainty 
in geometry cannot be as great as in the case of arithmetic, for bodily 
self-awareness is limited to sensibility, with time and space as forms of 
sensibility (cf. chapter 2, section V.E.).
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 There was progress when, in July 1921, Vollenhoven formulated 
a metalogical variant of his intuitionism (cf. Vollenhoven 1921c). He 
now accepts the more pluralistic notion of different scientific domains of 
logical validity, in each of which scientific knowledge is sought. Logical 
thought is in methodical progress, advancing insight to become more 
adequate to the adequate concept of a domain, which itself represents 
the full truth of that domain. The full truth is the complete knowledge of 
the idea governing the being of the domain in question. A distinct intu-
ition of certainty is now specified, one that ‘sights’ the adequate concept 
of a domain, as ‘intuitively viewed’ goal. This ‘metalogical intuitionism’ 
is no longer linked to an anthropological feature, though the Self must, 
of course, acknowledge what it intuitively sights on. But, as such, this 
variant of intuitionism still falls squarely within the scholastic context 
of the harmony between subjective and objective rationality. Objective 
rationality is still warranted by the metaphysical presence of ideas of dis-
tinctive being. The metalogical intuition has only reinforced and re-orga-
nized Vollenhoven’s qualification of the scholastic harmony as to how the 
concept becomes adequate to the idea.
 A main topic of discussion between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, 
according to the document evidence to be reviewed in this chapter, con-
cerns the methodology of ‘critical realism’ (as Vollenhoven’s early position 
now comes to be called). The aim of their contact was to promote a more 
distinctive Calvinistic metaphysics, or life- and worldview as Dooye-
weerd called it. Dooyeweerd wrote up their burgeoning views. A charac-
teristic trait of their development becomes particularly noticeable in the 
treatment of the ‘content of knowledge’ and its metalogical warrant. The 
earlier anchorage of synthetic a priori’s in anthropology no longer served, 
once different scientific ‘domains of validity’ are distinguished. Together, 
these domains of knowledge form the ‘Gegenstand-sphere’, an important 
feature of which is its ‘region categories’ or ‘modalities’. A modality is ini-
tially merely the notion of the highest factual unity of the Gegenstand (= 
objective meaning content) within a science, as intuitively viewed by the 
Self. A modality is therefore closely allied to a science’s adequate concept, 
i.e. the anticipated complete knowledge of what is studied in a science, 
for the modality is the intuition of the highest unity of the adequate 
concept. In its context of intuiting the highest factual unity, ‘connec-
tions’ relevant for the region in question are discerned and catalogued as 
‘synthetic apriori’s’ in their own right.
 Then, in late 1922, there is evidence of an provisional reorientation 
of the Gegenstand-sphere. In critical realism the Gegenstand-sphere is war-
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ranted by the divine Logos and accordingly not directly linked to either 
the Self or the World. This ‘sphere of the content of knowledge’ is now 
described as the ‘created logos’ (consciousness, act-content correlation) 
using a phenomenologically spiced terminology. To ‘modality’ (as region 
category) is added the notion of ‘modally distinct mode of viewing’. The 
tandem ‘modal viewing and modality viewed’ now serves as context in 
which the essential connections, expressed as ‘synthetic a priori’s’, come 
to view. As our discussion will show, this methodological shift has novel 
consequences for the theism of critical realism.
 Retaining the realist mode of thought, a new step of progress is 
evident, in the latter half of 1923. On Dooyeweerd’s side this step is the 
easiest to follow. He advances the notion of a ‘law-idea’ to capture how 
the cosmos is itself law-bounded in spheres of law, but at the same time 
organized in a way that evidences God’s providential upholding of the 
cosmos. This law-idea is presented as the cosmological organon of the 
Calvinistic life- and worldview, and in that role as providing a foundation 
for epistemology. On Vollenhoven’s side there is a lack of direct docu-
mentation. But we can say that he now too works with the notion of the 
law as boundary between God and the cosmos, as evidenced in spheres of 
subjection to law. He saw this as organized in what can be called ‘the in-
tersection principle’ (of thing and law-sphere). The intuition of (modal) 
law is determinative for the qualities of subjection on the part of the Self. 
Vollenhoven’s side of this development is the main topic of chapter 4. 
What this step towards a ‘Calvinistic standpoint’ implies with respect to 
the ‘qualified scholasticism’ of the harmony of subjective and objective 
rationality needs to be addressed in its own right.
 The ‘discussion’ with Dooyeweerd is actually a bit of a misnomer, 
at least to the extent that this can be reconstructed. It is only from one 
extant letter that Dooyeweerd wrote to Vollenhoven, and from later re-
ports, that we know that it took place. Between 1921 and 1923 Dooye-
weerd’s research papers work towards conceptual clarity in terms of the 
standpoint of critical realism. In 1923 Dooyeweerd begins to publish 
his findings. His writings during the 1920s have never been read against 
the background of Vollenhoven’s early thought. My detailed discussion 
of Vollenhoven’s early work in chapter two sheds light on Dooyeweerd’s 
writings of the early 1920s. A careful analysis of the characteristic traits 
in Dooyeweerd’s texts documents the emergence of notions that will find 
their way into the settled positions of these brothers-in-law. But my dis-
cussion will seek to emphasize the context that was valid at that time. 
My analysis also puts us in a position to test their statements about their 
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contacts and what these contacts entailed. I have found it to be expedient 
to bracket all statements about that contact, or the lack of it, in favour of 
letting the evidence guide us. My conclusion will be that Vollenhoven’s 
presence in the emergence of Reformed philosophy is far more promi-
nent than has been recognized or at least admitted to date. Hopefully this 
discussion will contribute to setting the historical record straight. What 
is most impressive in the cooperative enterprise of the brothers-in-law, 
apart from the actual path followed in their research, is the intensity of 
their search for new ways and avenues. This is too easily overlooked or 
its importance smothered in the smugness of ‘knowing the outcome’. 
However, that outcome in the late 1920s and early 1930s turns out to be 
less homogeneous than it is commonly assumed.
 The guiding thread of the discussion of the Dooyeweerd texts is: 
from adequate concept to modally qualified law. As stated above, we 
leave for chapter four a more integrated account of Vollenhoven’s formu-
lation of philosophy as based on the cosmology of law-spheres. 
 An unexpected turn of events of a more personal nature also played 
a role of some significance at the time. Just as the need for critical changes 
began to be felt, Vollenhoven suffered a collapse in mid-January of 1923. 
This kept him out of the running for most of that year. In the meantime 
both Janse and Dooyeweerd made ‘moves’ (so to speak) that Vollenhoven 
could take cognizance of only after or in the late stage of his recovery. In 
both cases, Vollenhoven could not give his full approval. In Janse’s case 
this concerns anthropology—Janse’s two ‘sides’ of body and soul. With 
respect to Dooyeweerd there is the problem of the interpretation of the 
notion of law in terms of what Dooyeweerd called the ‘law-idea’. It was 
not until 1925, and especially 1926, that Vollenhoven again turned to 
publishing in philosophy. By that time he had been able to integrate the 
efforts of both Janse and Dooyeweerd into a review of his options. 
 In the following account, we are able to indicate the essentials of 
Vollenhoven’s response to Janse’s new ideas. But in Dooyeweerd’s case this 
is not feasible to the same degree. Part of the reason is the lack of material 
from Vollenhoven’s side. We know very little as to what actually trans-
pired between the brothers-in-law, when discussion was resumed after 
Vollenhoven’s illness. Another reason is that Dooyeweerd initially shared 
Vollenhoven’s position, so that the continuity was more pronounced than 
the discontinuity. When a discontinuity becomes evident in late 1923, 
we need the context of Vollenhoven’s publications of 1925-1926 (and 
later)—which attest to Vollenhoven’s own overhaul of his position—to 
be able to give the Dooyeweerd effect (whether positive or negative) its 
Philosophy in the Making
224
full due. That is why we leave that overhaul to the next chapter.
II. the Janse contact: from self-centred subJect to tasked subJect1
Antheunis Janse was a school teacher, whose formal training was limited 
to elementary and normal school. Through concentrated self-study of 
the Bible, philosophy, theology and politics, he developed his talent and 
became the author of many books, brochures and articles. He was one of 
the initiators of the Association for Calvinistic philosophy when this was 
formed in December 1935. During the second World War, he person-
ally suffered at the hands of the Germans. Yet, on religious grounds, he 
openly opposed resisting the German occupation. This estranged him 
from many of his friends and associates, including Vollenhoven.2 After 
the war, there was renewed contact. But he was soon diagnosed as having 
Parkinson’s disease, which slowly incapacitated him.
 Janse was headmaster of the Christian elementary school in Big-
gekerke, a small village within ten kilometres (as the crow flies) of Oost-
kapelle, where Vollenhoven was pastor of a congregation from 1918 till 
1921. Janse studied Vollenhoven’s dissertation. Their contact grew out of 
the correspondence, started by Janse, that was initially about the disserta-
tion. Vollenhoven took an interest in him, and this led to an exchange 
that lasted until 1950.3 Though Janse was more than two years Vollen-
hoven’s senior, he looked up to Vollenhoven as to a mentor, who in turn 
responded in kind. Janse’s lack of academic credentials prevented the re-
lation with Vollenhoven from becoming one of equals,4 but this did not 
1  This discussion of Janse’s early work attempts to give a full account of what Janse 
brought to bear in his contact with Vollenhoven during the early 1920s, but also the 
limitations of his influence. As for the later dispute about the human soul that took place 
in the mid 30s, which involved Janse as well as Dooyeweerd, one may consult J. Glenn 
Friesen’s website: www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html.
2   For details about Vollenhoven’s response to Janse’s stance regarding the war, see 
Stellingwerff 1992: 155-157. 
3   The Janse Archives, long in private hands, are now in the Historical Documen-
tation Centre at the Free University of Amsterdam (Archive number 157). (J. Glenn 
Friesen first drew my attention to its presence in the HDC.) The extant Vollenhoven-
Janse correspondence is very extensive, with several hundred letters on both sides. This 
correspondence is to date largely virgin terrain. There are also remarks in a personal diary 
for the years 1929-1946. For more on Janse, cf. Janse, W. 2001: 285-288; also Van der 
Walt 2008. 
4   Vollenhoven says, in an aside that reveals implicit class distinction, that Janse was 
always called “Mister Janse by us”. (This is “meneer/mijnheer Janse”, not “meester Janse”, 
the latter being how he would be addressed as teacher.) Given the context of this statement, 
which is a discussion between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, the “us” includes Dooyeweerd 
as well. It may also be interpreted as referring to the circle of the Association for Calvinistic 
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restrain Janse from taking an independent stance on topics he was well 
read on, guided by a trained sense of spiritual discernment. Vollenhoven 
acknowledged that Janse’s stimulating questions influenced him, espe-
cially in the early years of their contact. It set him to thinking certain 
matters through anew. We shall try to discover what the stimulation was 
and the nature and extent of Janse’s influence.
A. Teaching elementary arithmetic
Their first contact focussed on arithmetic and Janse’s experience of teach-
ing it at the grade school level. Janse found practical confirmation of 
some of the basic matters Vollenhoven had defended about the status 
of numbers in his dissertation. The intuitionistic view, that number is 
based on an activity of the mind, namely counting, and that this activity 
is prior to the formation of the number concept, made sense to Janse. He 
observed that a child does not grasp numbers via the empiricist’s way of 
viewing collections, nor by way of the formalist’s preference of a concep-
tual-representational approach via symbols. The quantity of a collection, 
whether perceived or represented, cannot be directly ascertained when 
the amount is more than four or five.5 Our only recourse is to counting. 
This also affects the way a child learns to perform arithmetical calcula-
tions. For example, it takes greater effort to calculate what ‘2 + 6’ is than 
‘6 + 2’. Janse could appeal to the results of German practical psychologi-
cal studies of learning arithmetic based on counting, which turned out to 
be comparable to Vollenhoven’s intuitionistic ideas. So Vollenhoven and 
Janse published a joint paper on the topic, entitled “The activity of the 
soul in learning arithmetic”.6
 Arithmetic continued to hold their attention. A work of P.J. Bou-
man and J.C. van Zelm, entitled “Arithmetical thinkables in logical co-
herence, with – as specimen of applied logic – a method of arithmetic 
for elementary schools”, published in 1918,7 turned out to be popular. 
The work bore the stamp of the Hegelian philosopher, G.J.P.J. Bolland 
(1854-1922), a leading Dutch thinker at the time. The work pleased 
neither Vollenhoven nor Janse, for neither had Hegelian leanings. Each 
published a critical discussion of this work.8
philosophy, of which Janse was a board member. Cf. Vollenhoven 1968b: 207.
5  Cf. Vollenhoven 1918a: 27.
6  Vollenhoven and Janse 1919. Janse’s primary source was Ranschburg 1916. 
7 P.J. Bouman en J.C. van Zelm, De rekenkundige denkbaarheden in logische sa-
menhang, met – als proeve van toegepaste logica – een rekenmethode voor de lagere school 
(Amsterdam: W. Versluis, 1918).
8 Cf. Vollenhoven 1921c and Janse 1921a. Each paper is dated July 1921. Vollen-
Philosophy in the Making
226
 Vollenhoven took the opportunity that this publication presented 
to argue that it does not suffice to merely oppose standpoint to stand-
point—i.e. a non-Hegelian ideology over against the Hegelian ideology 
of the authors—the difference needs to be made explicit in consequences 
at the level of insights and method.9 Thereupon Vollenhoven gives a sum-
mary account of his intuitionistic views, and their opposition to formalis-
tic and empiricistic views, though now in the terminology of a more direct 
metalogical discourse (of concept and idea; ‘worlds’ of rest and empirical 
change; etc., as discussed in chapter 2). Janse took the more practical side 
and discussed the inadequacies of the Hegelian method. Though it was 
refreshing, he said, to be shown an alternative either to a rote mechani-
cal approach or to an approach that burdens every step with a justifying 
reason, this Hegelian alternative does not reckon with the psychology 
of the child. For Bouman and Van Zelm attempted to combine think-
ing and doing in one by focussing on what they call “the self-organizing 
capacity of thinkables”.10 By continuously distinguishing and combining 
numbers (as ‘thinkables’; e.g. ‘4’ can be ‘disunited’ by thought into 1, 1, 
1, 1, while the later can, in turn, be ‘reunited’ by thought into ‘4’), there 
is an arithmetical ‘growth’ from one thinkable to another that is not arbi-
trary, but such that “the one thinkable can be thought as a seed of another 
thinkable”.11 A mainstay of Vollenhoven’s philosophical critique levelled 
at this work is that the Hegelian approach—the dialectical method at 
work in the self-organization of ‘thinkables’—introduces change in the 
(meta)logical sphere, i.e. mixes and confuses empirical change with eter-
nal truth.12 Janse’s practical critique focussed on emphasizing that this 
method is not in tune with the mind of the child. The “self-development 
of arithmetical thinkables” does not reckon with how a child thinks.13
B. Maria Montessori and child biology
The psychology of the child – there lies the immediate crux of Janse’s 
concern. As teacher his task is to guide a child’s development. This in-
volves stimulating the child’s mind and correcting errors in understand-
ing. But Janse also wished to understand which conditions are conducive 
hoven’s title is eyebrow raising: “Hegel in our elementary schools?” 
9   Vollenhoven 1921c: 79.
10   Janse 1921a: 139.
11   Ibid.
12   Vollenhoven 1921c: 84; Janse 1921a: 140-141.
13   Janse 1921a: 141 ff.
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for learning and which occasion errors.14 He wished to understand what 
makes a child tick. This led him to read up on pedagogical develop-
ments and new insights that would help him to understand ‘the soul’ of a 
child. The novel pedagogical method of Maria Montessori (1870-1952) 
was making waves at the time, and Janse reviewed her work extensively. 
In a paper, dated 26 November 1921,15 he discussed her work and un-
derscored its importance for education, and for Christian education in 
particular. At the same time he emphasized that the ideological context 
of Christian education requires that certain limitations be imposed on, or 
alternatives taken into account with respect to, Montessori’s more general 
worldview position. Janse’s own frame of reference in this paper is still, 
broadly speaking, in line with Vollenhoven’s substantialist anthropology. 
But in the following year we find him radicalizing his thought to the 
point of proposing an anthropological view that would bring about se-
rious revisionary reflections on Vollenhoven’s part. But in Janse’s own 
anthropological view certain Montessori features continued to play a sig-
nificant role.
 We need to see in some detail what Janse’s reaction is to Montes-
sori’s approach and position, for he finds her work on the one hand to 
be helpful and challenging for Christian education, while on the other 
hand to contain certain ideological features that are unacceptable. What 
Janse admires most about Montessori is her sharp eye for what he calls 
“child biology” in her work (1921b1: 336). In her pedagogical approach 
she fully respects the living child, which implies that the child must be 
given every opportunity for growth and development. The child learns 
most naturally when stimulated at a time when the child is most ready 
for it. The living child in the classroom also requires freedom to enable 
it to develop in a way that answers to its needs and stage of develop-
ment (1921b1: 330). The requisite freedom must be protected from un-
welcome intrusions from without by maintaining a carefully structured 
context of learning. It must be clear what is and is not permitted, and 
these rules must be strictly maintained (1921b2: 375; 1921b3: 19, 24). 
Also, by conducting “exact experiments”, it must become clear which 
pedagogical means are conducive to the child’s development and which 
14   Janse investigated the main causes leading to spelling errors, reckoning it to be 
more important for the child to recognize these causes than merely to learn to spell cor-
rectly by rote; cf. Janse 1923a.
15   He published this paper—“Sketches . . . for self study”—for the sake of peda-
gogical study clubs that were active at the time. It appeared in three instalments. Cf. Janse 
1921b. I shall distinguish the instalments, in this section, as 1921b1, 1921b2 and 1921b3 
respectively without mention of the author. 
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less so (1921b1: 339). The focus on this “biological activity and free-
dom” (1921b3: 25) was for Janse a pedagogically sensible way of getting 
to understand the child better in its learning situation and of advanc-
ing that learning. “Montessori’s great merit is perceiving the child from 
a biological standpoint and never losing sight of the living child in her 
methodology” (1921b1: 338). There was a pedagogical challenge here 
that the Christian school movement could not and should not ignore.16 
“Montessori,” so Janse concluded, “opened our eyes for God’s natural 
laws of child life” (1921b2: 371, 375)
 But Janse’s positive response is not the whole of his response. He 
also finds influences in Montessori’s work, especially ideological ones, 
that are less welcome. For example, he sees a “personalism of the child” 
that makes the child an end in itself (1921b1: 333; 1921b3: 24). This 
is fostered in terms of a life-philosophy that exaggerates respect for life. 
Life itself is an end-all and be-all—he quotes her statement: “‘Life’ is 
the source, creator and goal of our existence” (1921b1: 333)—thus her 
view is a variant of monism (1921b2: 373; 1921b3: 24). Janse’s Christian 
standpoint, as informed by the theism at the time (cf. below, also 1921b1: 
332; 1921b2: 371), advances a dualism of natural law and norm, and 
thus was by definition at odds with monism, which, in Montessori’s case, 
comes down to neglecting the norm in favour of natural law. 
 Janse gives two telling consequences of this neglect. In the first 
place, the controls that are to guarantee the free growth and development 
of the child are chosen with a view to making “exact experiments” of the 
life-situation possible. This limits and restricts the insight into the lawful-
ness of the pedagogical situation to that of natural biological lawfulness.17 
The controls that constrain the pedagogical situation ought also to be of 
16   “In the area of the biology of the child Christian pedagogy must reckon with her 
[Montessori’s] work and respect her labour, for she shows us the child from a side from 
which we are not used to seeing it” (1921b3: 24). Also: “In our opinion, our Christian 
education would neglect its Christian calling, if it does not apply itself with full force to 
the theoretical and practical application of the biological principle of the activity of the 
child in the school” (1921b3: 19).
17   Janse quotes Montessori: “Life reveals itself—creates, offers its gifts—but all within 
limits and laws that are unchangeable” (1921b1: 333; emphases presumably Janse’s). The 
quote is from chapter two of Montessori 1916. Hélène Leenders, in a careful study of 
Montessori’s work, finds that Montessori’s extolling life leads to three questionable as-
sumptions: “that children are by nature prone towards realizing a good development, 
that the development of different children is in principle uniform, and that her [edu-
cational] material is the only material that is possible [because determined by scientific 
experiment]”. Leenders 1999b; cf. also her dissertation, on Montessori and fascistic Italy, 
Leenders 1999a.
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a moral and more generally of a spiritual character (1921b1: 331, 335, 
339-340; 1921b2: 377). The latter are not given sufficient latitude in 
Montessori’s approach.
 In the second place, psychology is limited to a role that is subservi-
ent to biology. Montessori’s psychology, Janse claims, is ‘mechanistic’, for 
it operates within the unchanging laws of life (1921b1: 333; 1921b3: 
24).18 There is no fixed inward reality, only the physiology of capacities 
that develop into perceptual, cognitive and practical unities. Life itself is 
such that she sees it (as Janse says graphically) as “souling and bodying” 
in the child according to natural laws (het leven dat ‘zielt’ en ‘lichaamt’ 
volgens natuurwetten, 1921b1: 334; also 1921b3: 24). This hampers the 
exercise of the higher functions of the soul. The role of psychology is 
to help stimulate the learning instinct. But what Montessori attempts 
to activate is always outwardly directed, lying in the extension of the 
sense organs, and this lacks an inner spiritual resonance. Consciousness 
operates through the sense-organs, and the aim is to connect inward life 
to them. “The entire psychological side of her method consists not in 
tracing the activation of the functions of the soul as such [Janse has just 
mentioned ‘thinking, willing and feeling’; A.T.], but in the activation of 
the sense-organs through ‘the inward life’ and in providing material [i.e. ap-
pearances] for the sense-organs so as to satisfy the creative drive of ‘life’” 
(1921b1: 335).19
 Thus praise and blame flow energetically from Janse’s pen. The 
praise for the clear emphasis on the biology of the living child as subject 
of pedagogy is unstinted.20 In fact Janse’s concluding statement is that 
“Montessori’s biological view of the child in school and her adjusting of 
18   I think that the term ‘mechanistic’ is ill-chosen. In Janse’s own discussion he 
recognizes that the unchanging laws are biological laws, and that they are such as regulate 
the response of the human organism to the stimulation of the sense-organs. However, it 
may be that Janse held that such life response could be clarified (to a limited degree at 
least) mechanistically, as did Vollenhoven at the time; cf. footnote 21 below.
19   In this sense, Montessori’s method has traits of behaviourism, in the sense of 
operant conditioning (B.F. Skinner). The environment of the life context has a stimulat-
ing effect on behaviour. In that sense Montessori’s method is amenable to practical or 
political forms of indoctrination. In the 1920s and 1930s she sought to integrate ‘fascistic 
culture’ in her approach. This attempt was evidently subsequent to the time that Janse 
studied her work. It is not mentioned in his Montessori paper, nor have I found any men-
tion of this in Janse’s later writings. Cf. the dissertation of H. Leenders, mentioned above, 
Leenders 1999a.
20   Expressions, such as: “splendid criticism” (1921b1: 332), “very great merit” 
(1921b1: 336; 1921b2: 370), “splendid contribution” (1921b1: 336), “heartfelt esteem” 
(1921b1: 336), “very powerful attack” (1921b1: 337), she “opened our eyes” (1921b2: 
371), etc., occur throughout this paper. 
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the school and the [pedagogical] method to the biological laws of life have 
the right to be fully appreciated, powerfully propagated, scientifically elabo-
rated, and practically applied on the part of Christian Pedagogy” (1921b3: 
22). To be negligent here is to “slight God’s laws of nature of child life” 
(1921b3: 22). At the same time the errors in her philosophy, worldview 
and psychology (1921b1: 337), discussed above, make it impossible for 
Janse to endorse her overall position.
 If the reader has difficulties reconciling the praise and the blame, 
Janse had no problem here, for he assimilated Montessori’s work in the 
framework of a dualistic view. In his words: “we reject Montessori’s Mo-
nism and we stick to Dualism. (Object and subject are two, and not to 
be united in the idea ‘life’)” (1921b1: 373). Christian Pedagogy, Janse 
claims, had too long failed to appreciate the life of a child in terms of its 
own (bodily) expression of its life, its capabilities and its needs, i.e. bio-
logical laws which ought to be respected as divine laws (cf. 1921b2: 371). 
Here Montessori offers a fitting antidote, which is timely and necessary. 
But Montessori, in turn, did not sufficiently sound out the personality 
and spiritual side of the living child, i.e. its ‘soul’, her monism and the 
limitation of psychology to biology being the handicaps in this regard. 
Thus Christian Pedagogy ought to continue to point out “that the ratio-
nal and moral and especially the religious norms for human life have in 
themselves infinitely more importance [gewicht] than the biological laws” 
(1921b2: 371).
 The dualism between laws of nature and norms for the mind and 
spirit reflect Vollenhoven’s own dualism directly. This induces Janse to 
reinterpret Montessori’s anthropology. Where she sees body and soul to 
be two sides of life as unity—life as actively ‘souling’ and ‘bodying’ from 
within itself—enabling the body to grow and the mind to develop, in-
cluding the multiplicity of its functions, the Christian pedagogue dis-
covers, with respect to the “functions of the soul”, that it is “in reality 
nothing other than the Self, the person, the living-soul-as-substance, 
the ‘Zentralbezogenheit’ [central involvement], the bearer of ‘life’, that 
which remains itself in the flood of appearances” (1921b1: 334). This 
is the human being, hence also the child, as spiritual being, as person 
who responds to rational, moral and religious norms in and through its 
functioning as living being. Janse formulates here, as he will later ac-
knowledge, the scholastic view of the human soul as ‘immortal substance’ 
or ‘substantia incompleta’, and it is in the main in step with Vollenhoven’s 
own anthropological view at the time. The only important recognizable 
difference with Vollenhoven’s view is that Vollenhoven tended at the 
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time, as is evident from his discussion of Driesch, to see biology as a sec-
ondary science, dependent on psychology on the one hand and chemistry 
and physics (or physiology) on the other.21 Janse places biology more in 
the centre of the human psycho-physical bodily organization. But there 
is complete accord in the overall view: “We [Dualists] do not see, in the 
background of the functions of the soul, ‘Life’ that ‘develops itself ac-
cording to fixed laws’, rather [we see] the living soul as spiritual substance, 
which ought to obey the norms that are imposed on it, but is not domi-
nated by laws of nature” (1921b2: 376). Janse could accept, and in fact 
heartily recommended, Montessori’s “biology of the child”, as governed 
by natural laws of growth and development, but only on condition that 
this be supplemented by a recognition of the deeper dimension of the 
spiritual substance and its compliance to norms.
C. Janse’s initiative, Vollenhoven’s initial response
The next significant step in the contact between Janse and Vollenhoven 
is a letter of Janse to Vollenhoven, dated 1 November 1922. The let-
ter is abundant evidence that the anthropological problem continued to 
hold Janse’s attention. But he now indicates a shift in his view.22 He has 
continued his reading on the topic, in particular authors such as Max 
Scheler, Hans Driesch, Herman Bavinck, and the dissertation of The Rev. 
S.O. Los on the topic of feeling in the Holy Scriptures. Janse is now
inclined to assume a dualism: spiritual world (= heaven or of the heaven) 
and earthly world (matter and living soul). Our spirit returns to God [in 
heaven], who gave it—but we are living soul = be-souled-body and then 
‘of the earth’, as such ‘dust and [ashes (Job 42:6)]’, not only our body (Kör-
per). In Scheler I found a beautiful view of Spirit as the subject of the ‘Akte’ 
[acts] and in Driesch a beautiful view of be-souled body as one ‘Leib’ [i.e. 
21   Following Driesch, in his early work Vollenhoven took the essential concept of 
biology to be that of organic form. This is applicable to plants and animals and also to 
human beings. Organic form attests to the synthesis of matter and instinct, the matter be-
ing physical-chemical in nature and the instinct psychical (note the monad-like structure 
here). Vollenhoven criticizes Driesch for accepting a distinct organic entelechy (an inner 
goal directing force), before having seriously entertained the possibility of a uniform ex-
planation of organic form as the expression of the interaction of psyche and physical mat-
ter. On the latter assumption biology, as science, makes use of the methods of the physical 
sciences and psychology. (Hence psychology is relevant for anthropology, zoology and also 
botany. This may suggest an Aristotelian psychology, but the context of Vollenhoven’s 
early thought does not support a psychology of three faculties.) Cf. Vollenhoven 1920a: 
23-24; cf. further discussion below. 
22   Janse’s Montessori paper, we repeat, was dated 26 November 1921, but since it 
appeared in three instalments, it was fully public only in the course of 1922. The novelty 
of this letter of 1 November of that year is quite unexpected.
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living body]. For body [Leib] is more than Körper— . . . it includes the 
soul that belongs to a body (Körper). Isn’t soul, flesh, in the Holy Scriptures 
always of the earth? In the Holy Scriptures, soul = life. And spirit is from 
above. And spirit works in on living beings, as we perceive daily. In this 
way I make a clear distinction between soul and spirit.23
 Janse’s distinction between spirit and (living) body cuts through the 
traditional body-soul distinction in a quite radical way. According to the 
view he now proposes, the soul is no longer an (incomplete) substance,24 
for its role is replaced by two different factors. On the one hand, the soul 
as warrant of life is now seen as being inherent to a living being itself. 
The living being is Leib, i.e. ‘be-souled body’, versus Körper, which is 
body not intrinsically alive. On the other hand, the factor that served to 
distinguish the (substantial) soul from the body—its constancy and its 
intrinsic focus on norms over against the vicissitudes of the body and its 
dependency on natural laws—is now apportioned to the spirit. This spirit 
is an animating factor, a gift of God, not an inherent mental faculty (or 
cluster of faculties). One can be strong in spirit, i.e. have the courage to 
do what needs doing, while at the same time tremble in the execution. 
(Janse mentions the Dutch King William III in this regard.) The soul’s 
unity with the body makes it incapable of being immortal. Though Janse 
continues to speak of ‘soul’, the soul that ‘be-souls’ a body is in fact now 
more like a function of the living being than a substantial component 
within it. And though the name of Maria Montessori does not occur 
here, Janse has now implicitly come closer to her idea of a living being 
than had previously been the case (though still retaining the distinction 
between factual and normative psychology). Also, Janse’s understanding 
of living being, of soul that ‘be-souls’ the body, is now distinctly holistic, 
as in Montessori.
 Vollenhoven’s reply is dated 7 November 1922, hence he replied 
quickly, within a week.25 Vollenhoven admits that the distinction be-
23   J.H. Kok quotes a large part of this letter in his Kok 1992: 41, footnote 46 in 
Dutch. The above translation is mine.
24   As to the use of ‘incomplete’, it is not the soul as substance that is incomplete. 
The substantial (or immortal) soul is itself only a part of the human being. There is also 
the body, itself a mortal substance, which is also an incomplete substance in comparison 
to the (full) human being. The connection of the two substances in the Self (‘Self ’ as 
the “higher synthesis”; Vollenhoven 1918a: 423), which is a “complete substance”, is in 
virtue of creation (as over against experiential accrual), hence difficult for a human being 
to fathom.
25   The entire letter (in Dutch) is in Stellingwerff 1992: 61-62. John Kok incorpo-
rated a key passage in Kok 1992: 42. I quote this passage (slightly adapted) in the next 
paragraph.
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tween spirit and soul has more about it than is commonly thought. But 
this admission is rather perfunctory. For Vollenhoven focuses on the 
(more or less) Aristotelian background of the authors mentioned by 
Janse, which authors, so the letter seems to imply, are leading Janse astray 
in his writing.26 Vollenhoven proceeds to list his objections to the Aristo-
telian three-faculty psychology as current in the scholastic tradition. The 
key part of this letter is Vollenhoven’s “tentative solution” to the problem 
of the Aristotelian psychology, which solution he asks Janse to consider 
and respond to. The problem was never Vollenhoven’s own problem in a 
direct sense. Vollenhoven’s proposed “solution” is for Janse’s consideration 
(it is also “not yet ripe for publication”, Vollenhoven adds). It retains the 
view of the immortality of the soul, but in its formulation Vollenhoven 
makes more use of metalogical terminology (of 1921) that was his wont 
in 1918. In any case, the tentative solution defends the notion of the im-
mortal soul, which is implicitly under threat in Janse’s letter and probably 
explicitly so in Janse’s draft article.
 The “tentative solution” reads as follows.
The tentative solution as far as I see it is this. There is an ideal world of 
validity [van het gelden], neither psychic nor rational, but ‘holding’ [gel-
dend]. Then a world of values: ethical, juridical, and religious values, and 
so forth. Also a world of physical beings; probably also one of that which 
is biological to which I begin to attribute more independence than I did 
earlier. The faculties are not layers, but relations of the one soul to those 
diverse terrains. The soul of plants, animals and humans is distinguished 
not by the number of faculties, 1, 2 and 3 respectively, but by the nature of 
the relations between the respectively distinguished souls on the one hand 
and these worlds [on the other]. In this way the soul remains a unity.
The whole human soul, as unique new project of the Divine Artist, is im-
mortal; psychology continues to have one Gegenstand and one method, 
namely, that of inner perception. Physiological psychology is not psychol-
ogy, but physiology; which can inform us at most about the relation of 
soul and body, probably only about the latter and its reactions and so 
forth, that accompany psychical acts. And we have nothing that requires 
conceiving re-birth as a donum superadditum.27
 Much of this “solution” fits the early Vollenhovian mould, though 
there is some novelty. There are three (perhaps four) ‘worlds’. The “ideal 
world of validity” might be thought to be the metalogical domain of the 
26   In the same letter Vollenhoven asks Janse to withhold publishing an article on 
the living soul and the life-giving spirit, “for I would regret it if the confusion in this area 
in our psychology continues unabated”; Stellingwerff 1992: 62. Presumably a copy of this 
manuscript was included in Janse’s letter to Vollenhoven. I shall refer to this article as ‘the 
draft article’.
27   Cf. Kok 1992: 42.
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Logos, though in stating that it is “neither psychic nor rational”, he seems 
to have in mind the extra-mental world of ideas apart from the human 
Self and the Logos. The second world of values can be accounted for if we 
recall that Vollenhoven spoke not only of science but also of morality and 
art.28 There are norms for (scientific) thought, but also ideals and values 
for human action (all of which are warranted by the Spirit). Then, the 
world of physical beings is the domain of changing things, characterized 
by force and relations. The possibility of a fourth world, as domain of 
biology, is something new, for Vollenhoven had tended to treat biology 
as secondary to psychology and the physical sciences.29 It is difficult to say 
what the incentive is that is making Vollenhoven reconsider biology (an 
influence of Janse’s Montessori paper?), but in 1926 the status of biology 
as independent science is definitely accepted.
 The three-fold faculty psychology of Aristotle is now explained in 
terms of the various relations the soul can have to the domains distin-
guished, without needing to actually divide the soul into three faculties 
(of cognition, animation and nutrition). The soul’s relation to the ideal 
world is, clearly, the ground of cognition, its relation to the world of 
values serves to animate activity, and its relation to ‘things’ is nutritional 
(or vegetative) to the extent that living tissue and water, minerals, etc. are 
required to sustain life. But the fact that this ‘relational approach’ is said 
not to require diversity in the psyche, the latter being the common term 
of these three relations, suggests a possible change in Vollenhoven’s ‘logic 
of relations’. A consistent ‘monadic view of relations’—“a relation always 
consists of two predicates”30 of the related terms—would require such a 
diversity in the psyche. Vollenhoven now appeals to differences in the 
“nature of the relations [themselves]”, as relevant for the souls of plants, 
animals and humans, on the one hand, and the ‘worlds’ on the other. 
That is to say, plants have only the one ‘vegetative’ relation (to the physi-
cal [life-]world), animals stand in both ‘vegetative and animal’ relations 
(to the physical world and world of values, respectively—assuming that 
28   Cf. chapter 2, footnote 124.
29   Cf. footnote 21 above.
30   Vollenhoven 1918a: 66, note 2; cf. the discussion of ‘relation’ in chapter 2 above. 
In a monadic view, the relations in which a human being stands make use of the quali-
ties of or states in the human being, on the basis of which the relations can be ‘laid’ (on 
the human side). The Self, as law of the individual, regulates the mutual coherence and 
continuity of these qualities. At this point in time (end of 1922) it is more likely that 
Vollenhoven has modified his understanding of a relation, rather than that his anthropo-
logical view has changed significantly. In a text of Dooyeweerd at that time (1923a2; cf. 
section III.E. below) there is talk of ‘essential connections’, which would appear to imply 
‘external relations’.
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animals can be said to relate to values to the extent that they sense in-
stinctively what is good for them and act accordingly) and human beings 
stand in these two relations as well as the third, the ‘cognitive relation’ 
(to the extra-mental world). Because the unity of the psychic moment in 
the human being is preserved, psychology’s method of inner perception 
is not hampered, and its Gegenstand, i.e. the objective meaning that char-
acterizes it (which is probably something like ‘the dynamics of psychical 
growth’?) also holds across the (psychological) board. The only threat to 
this unity is physiological psychology. But Vollenhoven decides that this 
is essentially physiological, and thus is psychological only in an indirect 
sense. Finally, if in human beings this soul is immortal—in the study of 
Driesch Vollenhoven spoke of the personalized soul in human beings 
over against the non-personalized souls of animals and plants31—then 
there is no need for any donum superadditum, a superadded gift of grace.
 Janse responded immediately with a draft letter of 23 pages, dated 8 
November 1922, but this was never sent, according to Stellingwerff. He 
let his response simmer and a partially rewritten letter (even longer than 
the draft letter), dated 30 December 1922, was sent in reply to Vollen-
hoven’s letter of 7 November. Janse felt that Vollenhoven had misunder-
stood what he took ‘living soul’ and ‘life-giving spirit’ to be. Vollenhoven, 
in fact, had not really addressed his ideas (as contained in his letter, the 
content of the ‘draft article’ is unknown). From later correspondence (see 
footnote 41 below) we know that Vollenhoven did not set this letter of 
Janse aside. Despite his very busy schedule, in mid-January he was work-
ing on his response. But on Sunday morning, 14 January 1923, Vol-
lenhoven collapsed on the pulpit from overwork and mental exhaustion. 
This triggered a serious psychosomatic breakdown of his health. It wasn’t 
until November of that year that he resumed his pastoral tasks, and in 
December he preached again for the first time after his recovery. But 
his first philosophical publication posterior to his illness is dated March 
1925. There is a definite gap in the Janse-Vollenhoven contact at a very 
crucial moment.32
31   Cf. Vollenhoven 1920a: 24. The distinction between the personalized and non-
personalized soul is one reason why Vollenhoven’s early psychological view did not sup-
port a three-faculty psychology, when his monadic theory of relations was in full force. 
Implicitly Vollenhoven had a ‘two-faculty’ psychology. The unity of the Self was taken to 
be the psychical synthesis of (at least) memory, representational and perceptual input of 
the psycho-physical body, and the (personalized) data of inner (mental) perception. But 
Vollenhoven says so little about the body and sensibility—after all, the body can only be 
accessed indirectly via the forms of sensibility—that it is difficult to know how he consid-
ered the workings of the non-personalized psyche.
32   Cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 63-64. Part of the pressure on Vollenhoven was his hav-
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D. Living soul and life-giving spirit
Janse keenly felt the importance of his ideas about living soul and spirit. 
When it became apparent that Vollenhoven would be ‘out of reach’ for 
some time, Janse proceeded to publish his own ideas without awaiting 
further consultation with Vollenhoven. The ideas he raised in his letter 
of 1 November 1922 are given a more thorough discussion, and one is 
able to surmise after the fact the extent of the influence of this material 
on Vollenhoven.
 Janse published six (fairly short) articles, during Vollenhoven’s sick-
leave, on the theme of the living soul in Paedagogisch Tijdschrift.33 These 
articles have gone unmentioned, I presume because unnoticed. Stellin-
gwerff makes no reference to them,34 and Kok also passes them by in 
his study of the early Vollenhoven. Yet here we find the first published 
critique of the notion of the ‘immortal soul’ as substantia incompleta, 
and also the first initiative towards what became “Calvinistic philoso-
ing to fill in for a colleague pastor for some time. He was also under contract to write a 
popular volume on French philosophy for the Volksuniversiteitsbibliotheek [Open/Home 
University Library], with February 1923 as expected date of completion. Cf. letter of J. 
de Zwaan, chairman of this series, 9/10 February 1922 to Vollenhoven. What also cannot 
be discounted, given the timing, is a possible added effect of intellectual anxiety about 
the problem of the immortal soul, as raised by Janse. Stellingwerff reports that Mrs. Vol-
lenhoven returned Janse’s letter of 30 December to him at the end of January, 1923, along 
with a note in which she states that her husband has been institutionalized. Roger Hen-
derson mistakenly reports that Mrs. Vollenhoven’s note was dated 8 November 1922; cf. 
Henderson 1994: 28, note 65. In fact, her note, which is in the Janse Archives, is undated.
33   I have not been able to ascertain whether the draft article of Janse, that Vollen-
hoven refers to in his letter of 7 November 1922, is identical to one or more of the articles 
Janse published in 1923. But in light of the agreement between the content of Janse’s let-
ter to Vollenhoven of 1 November 1922 and these published articles, there could hardly 
have been significant differences, if any. The six articles are:
- Janse 1923b, “Levende wezens” [Living beings] (dated 20 February 1923); 
- Janse 1923c, “Tweeërlei levenshouding tegenover ‘de levende ziel’” [Two kinds of life 
attitudes towards ‘the living soul’] (dated 27 February 1923); 
- Janse 1923d, “Oostersche opvattingen over het levende wezen” [Eastern views about 
living beings] (dated March 1923); 
- Janse 1923e, “Indo-Germanen contra Semieten over de levende ziel” [Indo-Germans 
and Semites on the living soul] (dated March 1923); 
- Janse 1923f, “Liefde voor – of heerschappij over de levende zielen (Indo-Germanen con-
tra Semieten)” [Love for or dominion over living souls (Indo-Germans contra Semites)] 
(dated March 1923); 
- Janse 1923g, “Waar gaat het om in de artikelen over ‘de levende ziel’?” [What is the 
point of the articles about ‘the living soul’?] (dated 3 December 1923).
34   There is no reference in Stellingwerff’s Vollenhoven biography, i.e. Stellingwerff 
1992, nor in his history of Reformed philosophy, i.e. Stellingwerff 2006, nor in his chap-
ter six on “The rise of Calvinistic philosophy”, Stellingwerff 1990: 107-127.
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phy’. From the correspondence with Janse, that was resumed after Vol-
lenhoven’s recovery, we get some idea as to Vollenhoven’s response. But it 
is only in the light of what Vollenhoven comes to publish after his illness 
that one can surmise (cf. below) the actual effect though, as we shall see, 
Vollenhoven did not approve of everything in these articles. Of course, 
Janse and Vollenhoven each had their own emphases. The educational 
context of Janse as teacher, in interaction with young, but very concrete 
‘human living souls’, placed a stamp on his work. Vollenhoven, in turn, 
sought a methodologically responsible philosophical formulation of the 
anthropological problem. He came to put particular weight on the term 
‘direction’ (as we shall see). But Vollenhoven later did admit that he was 
influenced by Janse. The nature and extent of it needs to be discussed.35
 Janse’s new ideas, to state them briefly, can be placed under three 
heads: (1) living soul and scientific explanation; (2) world-view attitudes 
towards living souls; and (3) biblical understanding of living souls.
1. Living soul and scientific explanation
Living beings are characteristically different from dead matter, in the 
sense that non-living matter may be divided into parts, and these parts 
recombined to form a whole, while a living being is an indivisible whole 
(cf. Janse 1923b: 118). This (in itself obvious) fact needs to be taken 
more seriously in scientific explanations than is usually done. A living be-
ing cannot be explained in terms of a conglomeration of given elements 
or parts, rather, such components of a living being can only be explained 
by accepting the living being as given whole (cf. ibid.). In biology one 
must keep life intact if one is to come to knowledge of the living being 
as such (cf. op. cit.: 119). There is an analogous problem in psychology. If 
one treats an animal or human being as a body + soul, or consciousness 
35   In the end, the anthropological problem was never really resolved. An intangible 
feeling of dissatisfaction continued to haunt it even in Vollenhoven’s old age. Vollen-
hoven’s chosen term ‘direction’ is first explicitly used in an anthropological context in Vol-
lenhoven 1930b: 24, i.e. De eerste vragen der psychologie [The first questions of psycholo-
gy]. Cf. also Vollenhoven’s extensive reflections in his lecture “Problemen rondom de tijd” 
[Problems in connection with time]; Vollenhoven 1963: esp. pp. 184-194. Dooyeweerd 
too did not come to full clarity in his anthropological views, which in themselves display 
considerable differences with Vollenhoven’s. In 1942 he published 32 theses on “De leer 
van den mensch in de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee” [Anthropology in the philosophy of 
the law-idea]; Dooyeweerd 1942: 134-143. Anthropology was to be discussed in extenso 
in the third volume of Dooyeweerd’s planned trilogy, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wi-
jsbegeerte [Reformation and scholasticism in philosophy]. The first volume, on Greek 
philosophy, was published in 1949, but the remaining volumes were not published, in 
fact the manuscript of the third volume remained a torso. Cf. Verburg 1989: 264-269.
Philosophy in the Making
238
as thinking + willing + feeling, then psychology has lost its object, namely 
the living being as “living soul”, according to Janse (cf. op. cit.: 119). 
Metaphysics too needs to reconsider this. Explanation is not advanced 
one stitch if, in the face of the failure of mechanistic explanations of life, 
one introduces a vitalistic principle (such as Driesch proposes), for one 
then continues to proceed from ‘parts’ without being able to reckon with 
the whole in its unity. “Whether one reduces the living being to the liv-
ing cell (materialism), or to a ‘life-force’ (vitalism), or to two ‘substantiae 
incompletae’ (soul as spiritual substance in a body as material substance) 
(scholasticism), as a whole it remains a mystery, which resists all further 
scientific ‘explanation’” (op. cit.: 120-121).36 
 Janse wishes to exclude all dualism in the approach to factual living 
being or living souls. They are not “souls or vitalities in a body”—one is 
reminded of what Gilbert Ryle would later call “the dogma of the Ghost 
in the Machine”37—but “be-souled bodies”, intrinsically living or ani-
mated bodies. There can be no soul without a body, no thought without 
brains; no thinking, feeling or willing can be perceived in disjunction 
from the body (cf. Janse 1923c: 142). This is as we experience plants, ani-
mals and human beings. But Janse also emphasizes that living beings and 
living souls, as given wholes, are the objects of the sciences, biology and 
psychology, respectively (cf. Janse 1923d: 145).
2. Worldview attitudes towards living souls
One finds two attitudes in the approach to living beings: vanity and hu-
mility. The attitude of vanity is evident from the scientific approach that 
wishes to explain at all costs. This natural scientific approach proceeds 
through analysis and synthesis and is applied at the cost of having to deny 
the given whole of living beings. Philosophers and psychologists then end 
up wrestling with abstractions, and natural scientists study dead matter 
in the hope of being able to understand the living being better (cf. Janse 
1923c: 142). When one’s attitude is that of humility, one readily accepts 
the mystery of life as given, and one avoids reductions or the introduc-
36   This is probably the first time that someone spiritually akin to Vollenhoven 
raised objections against this anthropology. That Janse does indeed have Vollenhoven in 
mind in this first of his six articles of 1923 is evident from the last of the six. There he 
says: “Hence most of the difficulties stem from the division of the subject itself in the sense 
of: the human being is body and soul (scholasticism), or it is only soul (psycho-monism) 
or it is only ‘body’ (materialism)”; Janse 1923g: 226. The formulation of this criticism 
uses the main distinctions and terminology of Vollenhoven’s dissertation, that Janse had 
studied carefully.
37   Ryle 1949: esp. chapter 1, “Descartes’ myth”, pp. 13-25.
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tion of special explanatory principles.
 These attitudes, especially that of humility towards life, have given 
rise to various world-views. The man in the street never thinks of an ani-
mal as a machine. Also Eastern thought has always respected the unique 
character of living beings. Then too in early Greek thought one finds 
the acceptance of soul-stuff or world-soul (cf. Janse 1923d: 146). To-
day life-philosophy is re-emphasizing Eastern traits. Generically one may 
group this with Indian philosophy, that tends to project one’s own life 
onto the world, onto the universe and on God. German Idealism has a 
similar trend. This results in the Indo-German attempt to look for life 
itself, the “Ding an sich”, as a higher reality. This stands in contrast to Se-
mitic thought, which is also ‘Eastern’, but with a different focus. It is not 
anthropo-centric but theo-centric (cf. Janse 1923e: 150), and it is on the 
whole realistic and not idealistic (cf. op. cit.: 151). In “Semitic realism”, 
as found in the Bible, the human being is not portrayed as emotionally 
bonded to life and in love with nature, but as having dominion over na-
ture (cf. Janse 1923f: 178). Thus, it is Semitic to maintain that psychol-
ogy studies living beings only from their factual side, not their normative 
side. Psychology can posit no norms (cf. Janse 1923c: 144). Norms re-
late to ‘spiritual substances’, which in turn belong to the spiritual world. 
Only the effects of the spiritual world in the living soul are perceptible 
and fall within the domain of psychology, not spiritual substances as such 
(cf. ibid.).
3. Towards a biblical understanding of ‘living soul’
Semitic realism calls for a more specific review of the use of ‘living soul’ 
in the Bible. Janse discovers that the use of ‘soul’ is intimately tied to 
the concrete living being. It is associated with ‘breath’. In the Bible God 
is portrayed as “the Giver of all life-breath in living creatures” (cf. Janse 
1923d:147). Texts, such as, “And God breathed into his [man’s / Ad-
am’s] nostrils the breath of life and man became a living being [lit. ‘living 
soul’]” (Genesis 2: 7) are read by Janse as conveying insight and specific 
information.38 This breath is life-giving spirit, given to animals and hu-
38   Janse warns against the ‘naive realism’ “that wishes to proclaim directly as the 
truth our view concerning facts and Holy Scripture.” He allows that parts of his view (as 
he emphasizes) may be subjected to criticism, but “in essentials we proceed safely when 
we trust Holy Scripture and experience as they come to us” (cf. Janse 1923g: 226, note 1). 
I interpret Janse as claiming that the data of Scripture and experience, when acquired in 
trust, reveal their true meaning, and may then be appealed to without further interpreta-
tion. Janse would appear to maintain that trust, or what is accepted in good faith, makes 
further hermeneutics redundant. (But this, I believe, is still hermeneutically naive so long 
as the ‘history of revelation’ in the context of human history is not taken into account.) In 
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man beings alike. In virtue of this life-giving spirit, animals and human 
beings are active and animated creatures. This makes it possible to con-
sider beings in their full activity, which, for human beings, calls for a 
reckoning with norms—the good, the true and the beautiful (cf. Janse 
1923f: 229)—but also with their factual presence and perceptual appear-
ance. In this given factual presence one deals with ‘living souls’, be-souled 
bodies. Janse speaks in this regard of an inner side and an outer side. 
These inner and outer sides can never, of course, be separated from each 
other, thus there can be no soul without a body, nor living body without 
soul. They form a whole. But the be-souled body is alive in virtue of the 
spirit operative in it. The spirit is as such imperceptible, and only its ef-
fects in the living soul can be observed.
 The spirit enters the human being but also departs. “The human 
being is flesh and bone, dust and ash, just as animals are. Except, when it 
dies—‘like the beasts’ [Psalm 49: 12]—its breath (spirit) returns to God, 
who gave it spirit, and the breath of animals (the life) goes into the earth” 
(Janse 1923f: 178-179). To return to God is to return to the spiritual 
world, where spiritual substances belong (cf. Janse 1923c: 144).
 Psychology ought “to accept ‘the living soul’ as given datum and 
to study the living being in question according to its inner and outer 
side, according to the spirit operative within, the life that lives in it, etc.” 
(Janse 1923c: 141, note 1). The two sides of the living being may be ap-
proached by means of outer and inner perception (cf. op. cit.: 143).39
 Janse’s inchoate ideas are a bit of a mixed bag, with practical, scien-
tific, philosophical and religious implications that are not all clear. Janse 
later brought more organization to his ideas.40 In the meantime Vollen-
practice it comes down to a close reading of the Bible, against the background of—taking 
stock of Janse’s standing in the Reformed tradition—Reformed theology. As to experi-
ence, Montessori had of course emphasized “seeing the child” as a given living being, a 
direct object of psychology and pedagogy, and accepting that datum.
39   In reply to criticisms, raised by W.H. Vermooten (cf. Vermooten 1923, which 
motivated the writing of the sixth article of 3 December 1923), Janse states what he takes 
to be the aim of psychology as science. It is probably the first statement of the ideal that, 
generalized, came to be known as ‘the reformation of science’. It is in any case close to 
what Vollenhoven came to consider a Christian practice of science. Janse says he “attempts 
to occasion the laying of a foundation, out of which in time a distinct [eigen] psychology 
may possibly blossom, which connects with the Holy Scriptures’ understanding of ‘soul’ ”. He 
also “attempts to find a distinct position in the contemporary currents [of psychology]”. 
The “distinct position”, Janse further explains, in no way “ignores history” nor “lacks 
connection with current science” (Janse 1923g: 225). The criticisms of W.H. Vermooten 
were raised in the latter’s “Letter to the Editor”, dated 20 October 1923.
40   In the foreword to his Om ‘de levende ziel’ [Concerning ‘the living soul’], i.e. 
Janse 1940, Janse mentions his publications related to the ‘living soul’. After referring to 
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hoven, when sufficiently convalescent, read Janse’s work after having re-
ceived the printed articles from him shortly after 1 November 1923 (Vol-
lenhoven’s birthday).41 Not everything that he found here was acceptable, 
but Janse did stimulate him to come to greater clarity on a number of 
important issues.
E. The acknowledged influence
Before discussing the direct effect of Janse’s ideas on Vollenhoven, let 
us first see what Vollenhoven, late in his life, acknowledged as to Janse’s 
influence on him. It concerned in the main questions related to anthro-
pology, but it was also broader. Vollenhoven nonetheless remains elusive 
about the points involved. From what Vollenhoven says, the influence 
would appear to have been liberating rather than (re)constructive. It is 
only proper to look at the nature of this influence more closely. There are 
two sources.
 The first source is a short commemorative article on the occasion of 
Janse’s death in 1960 (cf. Vollenhoven 1960d). In it Vollenhoven states 
that he felt Janse’s influence most strongly when he was minister in The 
Hague. Janse, he says, had by then “come to a more biblical view of ‘the 
living soul’, which liberated me from a considerable amount of unfruitful 
traditional speculation” (op. cit.: 1). Vollenhoven does not go into more 
detail. Instead, he relates Janse’s emphasis on the Bible’s language being 
concrete and not scientific, which in turn is said to have dusted the Word-
revelation of a layer of scholasticism. A consequence that at least touches 
the articles of 1923 in Paedagogisch Tijdschrift he mentions De mensch als levende ziel [The 
human being as living soul], i.e. Janse 1934a (46 pgs); Ikke [My Self ], i.e. Janse 1934b 
(16 pgs.); and Van idolen en schepselen [On idols and creatures], i.e. Janse 1938 (147 pgs.). 
In the decade between the initial articles and the titles of 1934 Janse came to accept the 
main contours of Vollenhoven’s Calvinistic thought. In 50 short articles he introduced 
“Calvinistic philosophy”, based in the main on Vollenhoven 1933a. These articles were 
later republished in Janse 1982. Janse’s brochure, De mensch als levende ziel, was one of 
the targets of V. Hepp’s criticism in the (rather bitter) dispute that raged at the Free Uni-
versity and in the Gereformeerde Kerken in the mid-30s about the status of the human 
soul. Cf. Hepp 1937a.
41   In Vollenhoven’s first letter to Janse after his recovery, dated 19 February 1924, 
Vollenhoven mentions the receipt, among other things, of the articles. “Of course the ar-
ticles attracted my attention the most, all the more so since I found much that was known 
to me from your writing at the end of 1922. You asked me then for my assessment and 
I was busy with that when I could not go on.” The last phrase, “toen ’k niet verder kon”, 
is ambiguous. Vollenhoven could not go on either because Janse’s letter stumped him or 
because the collapse intervened. I believe he means the latter, for he is describing his situ-
ation when working on Janse’s letter, not specifically referring to that letter as the cause of 
his breaking off the writing. 
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on anthropology is Vollenhoven’s appreciation of Janse’s “warning against 
substituting childlike faith with inner experience” (ibid.). Inner experi-
ence—or “innerlijke ervaring”, a term that for Vollenhoven and Janse 
has overtones of mystical experience—is related to Vollenhoven’s use of 
‘intuition’ in the early years of this contact, so here we have at least a clue.
 A second reference to Janse, which is in Vollenhoven’s autobio-
graphical remarks in “Problems of time in our circle” (cf. Vollenhoven 
1968b), largely confirms what he had stated earlier. Janse, Vollenhoven 
claims, helped him to see that in the Bible the living soul is the full 
human being (op. cit.: 206). When he was in The Hague, Vollenhoven 
continues, it was through Janse’s influence that he had come to the point 
of being able to remark from the pulpit “that the term ‘immortal soul’ is 
definitely to be rejected” (dat de term ‘onsterfelijke ziel’ er beslist niet mee 
door kon) (op. cit.: 207). Here, too, the reader is told what to avoid, but 
not given a tangible replacement, except to abide by the concrete lan-
guage of Scripture.
 Some of the information in the above remarks can be pinpoint-
ed more closely, some other features require discussion. The first point, 
namely as to when the influence of Janse was felt most strongly, must 
refer to the period in The Hague after Vollenhoven’s collapse in Janu-
ary 1923. In his letter of 7 November 1922 Vollenhoven had tried to 
dissuade Janse from pursuing the novel path he was then taking. Also, 
Janse’s having “come to a more biblical view of ‘the living soul’” points 
in the same direction. Janse had come to this view, which Vollenhoven 
at first frowned upon, in the course of 1922, after completing the Mon-
tessori paper, in which paper, Janse, as we saw, still held to a dualism of 
body and soul. The pulpit remark about the term ‘immortal soul’ also 
most likely dates from after Vollenhoven’s collapse and recovery. The term 
is still cherished in the said letter of 7 November 1922.42 It is unlikely 
42   There is somewhat confusing evidence here. Stellingwerff reports: “When K.A. 
Bril asked Vollenhoven on 13 December 1968 when the theory of the functions first 
arose, he replied that it was in 1921. He had changed the word ‘soul’ in the offprints of 
the German article on Driesch to ‘the psychical [function]’, and he received these off-
prints in August 1921”; Stellingwerff 1992: 53 (my translation). Stellingwerff dates the 
beginning of the development of reformational philosophy from this point. Stellingwerff 
implies that Vollenhoven made the said change very soon after receiving the offprints (at 
least in the same year) and that presumably the change was made in all the offprints. The 
latter is certainly not true. Of the numerous offprints I have been able to consult, I have 
not found any switch of ‘soul’ to ‘psychical’. There is one offprint of the German text in 
the Vollenhoven Archives (405, Box 4, folder 1921) which has evidence of having been 
reread by Vollenhoven, in virtue of two markings in the margins (on pp. 349, 354), and 
the addition of a bibliographical title (namely Görland 1921) in footnote 43, p. 357. But 
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that Janse’s draft article, that Vollenhoven referred to in that letter, and 
Janse’s lengthy epistle in response to this letter, dated 30 December (the 
text Mrs. Vollenhoven later returned to Janse), could have swayed Vol-
lenhoven away from his view of the immortal soul prior to his collapse 
two weeks later. (We don’t know which way he was swayed while work-
ing on his initial response at the time of his collapse; cf. the quote from 
the letter of 19 February 1924 in footnote 41 above.) But the term ‘im-
mortal soul’ is so intimately connected to deeply lying convictions, that 
Vollenhoven could probably only think the matter through over a longer 
period of time, e.g., in the later stage of his recovery, and when he could 
read what Janse had in the meantime published after receiving his articles 
in November 1923.
 So if the period in which the Janse influence was felt most strongly 
marks the transition from Vollenhoven’s initial ‘theistic intuitionism’ (in-
cluding the more metalogical characterization as ‘concept-idea dualism’ 
in 1921, or the alternative of ‘critical realism’) to what he considered 
a more ‘Calvinistic’ turn of thought—I believe that this is indeed the 
case—then that turn began in the course of 1923, during his recovery, 
in the wake of Janse’s critical proddings. (Presumably the draft article of 
Janse, that Vollenhoven asked him to hold back, was the first prod in that 
direction.) How the rethinking took place is difficult to surmise, for Vol-
lenhoven’s publishing in philosophy only resumed, as already mentioned, 
in 1925. But the chief evidence for the change are two letters to Janse in 
it does not have the change in question. One cannot be sure when Vollenhoven reread 
this offprint. But in the top-right corner of the cover page Vollenhoven placed the date 
“Aug. ’21” and the remark “Geschreven Dec. ’20” (Written December 1920). On the 
basis of this data, this offprint could possibly be the first one Vollenhoven received. He 
would then have read it to check the printed content and dated it before filing it away. 
Be that as it may, it is safe to say that the evidence adduced does not support the date 
of “August 1921” as marking the beginning of the development of reformational phi-
losophy. In fact the correspondence with Janse contradicts this. More to the point is the 
question where in the said article the change might be expected. There is one sentence 
(constituting a distinct paragraph) that would certainly have gone by the board once soul 
and psyche were more carefully reviewed and distinguished. In view of the terminology 
used, it is also of interest for Vollenhoven’s later development. The sentence is: “Hence 
the entelechy in Driesch is another name for the immanent teleology, it is direction, not 
thing, also not an impersonal thing, but conflicts with the most primary supposition 
of comparative biology and certainly with the substantialistic view of the soul, one of 
the characteristics of Christian psychology”; Vollenhoven 1921b: 345-346 (translation 
mine), also Vollenhoven 1920a; offprint p. 20. As compared to the original Dutch article, 
some of the content was reworked in the German translation, but this passage was not 
affected.
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February and March of 1924.43 In his rethinking, Vollenhoven integrated 
into his new view the novelty that is evident prior to 1923 (especially the 
letter of 7 November 1922), namely the inclination to grant biology a 
more independent status as science,44 and what appears to be the release 
of monadism, so characteristic in his early thought. In themselves these 
two points cannot be placed in a direct correlation to the Janse influence 
concerning anthropology, for they were prior to it.45 In other words, there 
are more things on Vollenhoven’s mind in late 1922 than Janse’s prod-
ding alone. To see the broader scope we need to include Dooyeweerd’s 
presence in Vollenhoven’s early development, which is given separate at-
tention below (cf. in particular section III.G.2).
F. The Janse effect
So what was the effect of Janse’s novel work of 1923 on Vollenhoven? I 
summarized Janse’s work of that year under three heads: (1) living soul 
and scientific explanation; (2) worldview attitudes towards living souls 
(subjectivity); and (3) towards a biblical understanding of living souls. 
Let us review Vollenhoven’s reactions under the same heads.
43   The resumed correspondence between Janse and Vollenhoven after Vollenhoven’s 
recovery is not revealing as regards the question of the soul. In the letter to Janse of 19 
February 1924 Vollenhoven does say: “As to your critique against the dualistic metaphys-
ics I completely agree with the result, not the argumentation used.” I believe we may 
interpret this as stating that Vollenhoven had come to his own rejection of the immortal 
soul as substantia incompleta, though he does not give his own reasons for this rejection 
here. He goes on to argue that Scripture is of no help here, for it has at least three ‘notions’ 
of the soul, none of which is completely satisfactory. As to the term ‘Calvinistic’, in a fol-
lowing letter to Janse, dated 21 March 1924, Vollenhoven writes: “with sufficient effort 
and available time one can achieve the goal of a Calvinistic [understanding of ] science 
that can withstand [neo-]Kantianism and not avoid it–of that I am no longer in doubt. 
And while it used to be more [a matter of ] hoping and praying that it might succeed, I 
now see more [clearly] its possibility.” (Both letters are in the Janse Archives 157, Box 8, 
Folder 32.)
44   In that same letter to Janse of 19 February 1924, Vollenhoven reports: “Hav-
ing worked on mathematics and physics, I am now especially occupied with the logical 
foundations of biology and must get this behind me before I can tackle psychology.” Vol-
lenhoven did not publish the results of this work in biology, though he came to a more 
‘biological’ characterization of the relation between the individual and the environment 
(cf. below). He did make his later work in psychology available, viz. the privately pub-
lished lecture given on 9 November 1929, “De eerste vragen der psychologie” [The first 
questions of psychology]; cf. Vollenhoven 1930b. 
45   As already stated, there is the possibility that Janse’s Montessori paper played a 
role in getting Vollenhoven to reconsider the question of biology’s status as science. But 
even if this were the case, Vollenhoven did not come to a Montessori-like understanding 
of biology; cf. below.
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1. Living soul and scientific explanation
Janse’s view that psychology and pedagogy need to take a living being 
as given datum in scientific explanation combines different points. In 
Janse’s new view, body and soul are two sides of a single whole being, and 
he appealed to this body-soul holism to block reductionism in scientific 
explanation. Vollenhoven concurs in criticising reductionism, but for a 
different reason. For Vollenhoven “[e]ach science has its distinct [eigen] 
primary method, its distinct differentiation” (Vollenhoven 1926d: 59). 
Scientific understanding takes place within a pluralism of methods. A 
physicalistic approach, say to psychology, or a mathematical approach 
to economics, must necessarily leave aside matters of psychological rel-
evance in the first approach or economic relevance in the second simply 
because the method used is itself devised in relation to other kinds of 
states of affairs. The scientific concern for method, calling for discussion 
in the philosophy of science, is not directly met by appealing to a holistic 
anthropology.
 In fact, for Vollenhoven the criticism of scientific reductionism is 
independent of the holism of a living being, as Janse has it. Vollenhoven 
has no place for ‘wholes’ or ‘things’ in the special sciences at all. E.g., 
physics does not investigate things, but energy interactions (cf. op. cit.: 
193). “The cancellation of a ‘thing’, an object of perception, is prior to 
all science” (op. cit.: 188; emphasis added). Things are present in fields 
of inquiry only to the extent that they functionally participate therein, 
i.e. one investigates a relevant function of a thing in connection with 
the relevant functions of other things, in their mutual lawfulness, after 
having discerned the distinct character of such a field.46 In that sense the 
holism of body and soul, or the presence of an entire ‘living being’, is not 
a datum of any special science.
 There is a source of confusion here in the use of ‘wholes’. Experi-
ence confronts us with living beings and human ‘living souls’. Also one 
addressed wholes in philosophy—in connection with the ‘thing con-
46   In direct response to Janse, Vollenhoven states, in his letter of 19 February 1924: 
“That the soul is an other side of the biological I deem incorrect. At least, if psychology 
is to remain an independent science, it needs as foundation not another manner of view-
ing an object that it shares with another science, in this case biology, but [it needs] its 
own discerned [geschouwd] field–away with the Ding an sich, etc.–which it shares with 
no other science.” He adds the metalogically important remark, that attests to a direct 
development of the view of 1921: “For only in this way can we investigate what its cat-
egories and synthetic a priori judgments are. In this way each science can be integrated in 
the whole, in the framework of logic and epistemology.” In the meantime, Dooyeweerd 
referred to this ‘framework’ as the “metalogical Gegenstand-sphere”; cf. the discussion of 
Dooyeweerd below.
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cept’—and in pedagogy, which is concerned with the development of a 
(whole) human being. Also ‘caring for the soul’ (zielkunde) involves the 
whole human being when in distress, or in need of pastoral counselling, 
or psychiatric aid or whatever the appropriate attention might be. In all 
such cases Vollenhoven agrees that it is entirely inappropriate to approach 
wholes in terms of constituent parts, e.g., the human being as body + 
soul, consciousness as thinking + willing + feeling, etc. But such refer-
ences to wholes needs to be distinguished from the specific object of a 
special science, in particular psychology. (The latter focuses on ‘psychical 
functioning’, and it studies states of affairs, such as suggestion, awareness, 
sensibility, pain, emotion, etc., as he states in Vollenhoven 1930b: 16.) 
In 1926 Vollenhoven distinguishes, in his philosophy of science, differ-
ent ‘fields of inquiry’ in light of different ‘law-spheres’ (to be discussed 
below), whereby ‘things’ or ‘wholes’ are not the primary data but rather 
the functioning that becomes discernible when considering the ‘intersec-
tion’ of law-spheres and wholes/things. Janse, it would appear, evinces 
the influence of Montessori in his emphasis on given wholes as object of 
psychology. On the other hand, Janse’s urging that psychology treats only 
of matters of fact and does not touch on norms, fits well in Vollenhoven’s 
own revised view. However, all told, there is more for Vollenhoven to 
criticise than to endorse with regard to this first topic.
 
2. Worldview attitudes towards living souls (subjectivity)
The question of the attitude in which science is conducted stimulated a 
development in Vollenhoven that was far-reaching. The point of endors-
ing humility as opposed to scientific hubris is entirely well taken. Scien-
tific understanding is possible only when conditions of knowledge and 
the world are accepted. Whatever transcends these conditions is specula-
tive. Vollenhoven could only agree. He had himself rejected the scientific 
‘study of God’ already in his dissertation (cf. the discussion of theism at 
the beginning of chapter 4). But Janse took a further step in distinguish-
ing between Indo-German worldviews and Semitic realism.
 Janse gleaned the distinction itself from Paul Deussen, a German 
expert in Indian philosophy and an enthusiastic follower of Schopenhau-
er.47 While Deussen sought to combine the Indo-German and Semitic 
(or biblical) views, Janse seizes on the distinction to emphasize their dif-
ferences, in preference of ‘Semitic realism’. The latter’s biblical ‘dominion 
over nature’ is incompatible with the former’s bonding with nature. Janse 
takes dominion as involving a task, stewardship—naturally, ‘dominion’ is 
47   Cf. Janse 1932g: 228; on Paul Deussen, cf. Loemker 1967. 
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not to be confused with ‘domination’—while bonding involves participa-
tory understanding through feeling. In the latter approach one looks for 
meaning and substance in “life itself ” as felt, leading to the speculative 
construal of idealistic philosophy. In Semitic realism, on the other hand, 
attention is placed on the execution of a task, and this elicits questions 
as to what needs to be effected, by what means and which results accrue. 
The two ‘worldviews’ have entirely different mind-sets.48
 We cannot say for certain whether this distinction between Indo-
German and Semitic had a direct effect upon Vollenhoven, but a sig-
nificant change in his thinking is remarkably consistent with it.49 The 
distinction also seems to reflect (as already quoted) what Vollenhoven 
later referred to as Janse’s “warning against substituting childlike faith 
with inner experience”. For, after his recovery, Vollenhoven attests to a 
revised understanding of mentality or subjectivity. He undoes it of its in-
dependent, inner worldly status that had characterized it as (incomplete) 
substance. Let us look at this more carefully.
 Mentality (in Vollenhoven’s early work, which we here review brief-
ly) had been deemed to have an inner independence—which was conso-
nant with its foundation in an immortal soul—in virtue of the intuitive 
certainty of experiencing what goes on in the mind on the occasion when 
that activity takes place. The Self is not only certain that the mental ac-
tivity occurs, when it occurs, but also that there is a mental result—the 
content that stands in correlation with an act of occurring—which that 
activity achieves. This certitude is, of course, characteristic of what Vol-
lenhoven had called the ‘concrete intuition’, and the immediate aware-
ness of the distinction of act and content justifies the extension to the 
analytical intuition. This Self, active in this sense and when once mentally 
sure of itself—after all, the intuition is a mental awareness involving an 
immediate Self-certainty, without the guidance of any norm—is then 
able to determine the attitude of mind in terms of which it (freely) choos-
es to obey norms, such as the logical norms and also norms of ethics and 
48   Thus Janse summarizes (Janse 1923f: 179): “The Creation does not stand be-
tween the human being and God—a typical Indo-Germanic thought—but the human 
being stands directly over against God, . . . hiding himself . . . or praising Him. . . . He [/
she] stands in between God and the other creatures on earth.”
49   Vollenhoven did keep the terms “Indo-German” and “Semitic” in mind for 
a number of years. The term “Indo-German” occurs in Vollenhoven’s lecture notes of 
1926-1927 (Vollenhoven 1926msA; Epistemology; section 22.d) at the point where he 
criticizes mysticism and refers to naturalistic mysticism as “Indo-German mysticism”. 
John Kok referred me to the lecture notes of 1927-28 (Vollenhoven 1927ms) where, in 
several places (cf. pp. 55, 106-108, 118, 120), the term “semitic” is used. The terms are 
not retained in later writings. 
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aesthetics. The Self acquires ‘qualities of being a subject’ when submitting 
to norms. One may, of course, also choose to disregard norms, though 
one then forfeits the safeguards against confusion and error provided by 
the norms. In these “qualities of being a subject”, two things are presup-
posed: norms, posed by the Spirit, and a Self that it is mentally certain 
of its inner awareness through the concrete and analytical intuitions. The 
norms and the Self ’s mentality are mutually independent, for the Self ’s 
mental state may be epistemically submissive or dismissive with respect 
to norms.50 The will has an autonomous effect here.
a. ‘Subject’ as office
But in 1926, seemingly out of the blue, Vollenhoven formulates a revised 
use of the term ‘subject’. He now insists that when speaking of a subject 
(in the sense of a human agent) of knowledge or knowing subject, the 
term ‘subject’ should be taken as denoting an office [ambt] or a post, 
which calls for an operating practice. Being a subject is a matter of being 
‘called’ to execute a task, of being ‘instated’ [ingesteld-zijn] in an office. 
This calling or being instated is not selective as to the person actually 
instated in a post, as in society, say, that of a judge in a court of law, or 
a country’s president when elected, or a professor to his/her chair. Every 
human being is instated in the office of ‘being a subject’. Vollenhoven 
links this ‘call’ of all human beings to basic human mental conditions, 
an important class of which are epistemic conditions. For he now states 
the view that the human being is a knowing subject in virtue of being 
instated in “the domain of truth”. ‘Acquiring knowledge’ or ‘getting to 
know’ involves performing a task ‘set by truth’ (as it were). Knowledge 
is only had when the human being has acquired the state of ‘possessing 
truth’, upon having exercised or actualized this ‘office’.51
 Now how are we to understand this? To keep the explication brief at 
50   We take it that the same would hold for aesthetic or ethical norms, in which 
case the qualification is not typically epistemic but evaluative or prescriptive, as the case 
may be. On the whole Vollenhoven limits his discussion to epistemology, as has been the 
case since 1918, but he often intimates the possibility of a wider application (e.g. in cor-
respondence). 
51   Consider: “acquiring knowledge presupposes that the human being is instated in 
the domain of truth [’n ingesteld-zijn van den mensch op het gebied der waarheid], whereby 
it is possible, by actualizing this being instated into an actual attunement/attitude [actu-
aliseren tot instelling]—thus by exercising its office [ambt] of being subject—it comes to 
possess truth, to have knowledge.” “Truth . . . is completely independent of anything psy-
chical, which can get to be possessed by some human being when it fulfils its task in this 
regard.” Mankind has “a task to fulfil: exercising the office of being subject”; Vollenhoven 
1926b: 381-382.
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this point (the theme returns in chapter 4), there is a religious motivation 
here. Vollenhoven speaks explicitly of thinking and knowing as being 
exercised in the context of the human being’s ‘prophetic office’ (Vollen-
hoven 1926d: 55)—in passing he adds: “both of the other offices” (op. 
cit.: 62), without being specific. There is no doubt that what he has in 
mind here are, as the Reformed view has it, the three offices of a human 
being in his/her response to God, namely as prophet, priest and king. 
In 1930 Vollenhoven expresses this as follows: “In its highest function 
the human being, as priest, answers the divine claim through praise and 
prayer; he [/she] is prophet in speaking with fellow human beings about 
God’s glory; and on the basis of his [/her] superiority in all functions he 
[/she] is king over the non-human creature” (Vollenhoven 1930d, §80; 
or 2010, Appendix I). In spirit we have here what Janse expressed as the 
‘Semitic’ life-view. Janse does not mention these offices in his writings 
of 1923, but on the basis of the Reformed tradition Vollenhoven would 
certainly have more readily recalled these three offices, when reading of 
Janse’s ‘Semitic’ appeal, than letting himself be taught by Paul Deussen’s 
uncritical syncretism.
 But motivation is not sufficient to account for a change of view. We 
need to pick up on what these offices suggest. The offices focus on and 
emphasize the ‘place’ of the human being in life, or rather, they charac-
terize human living in its actual religious response (priestly office), in its 
interaction between human beings (prophetic office),52 and in the hu-
man dominion over all non-human creatures (kingly office). They point 
to general responsibilities. It is in this sense that these ‘offices’ indicate 
factors that human life is involved in, not by choice but by being already 
situated in life. At the same time, depending on how we respond in this 
situation and accept or ignore our responsibility, we make a heaven or a 
hell of life in how activity within these offices is carried out.
52   It is not immediately obvious that knowing and thinking can be associated with 
the prophetic office. But the clue lies in the phrase “God’s glory” that occurs here (cf. the 
prior quote). The world that surrounds us witnesses to God’s power (as the Psalmist of 
Psalm 19 attests). But those who fail to see this, says Vollenhoven, turn it into a revelation 
of something else. In that way they offer instead a theory of essences (Plato) or forms of 
subsistence (Aristotle); cf. Vollenhoven 1926msA, §7. Vollenhoven’s own early metaphys-
ics was of the same order, being predicated on the distinction between substance/essence 
and appearance. God’s ‘glory’ or ‘power’ became a more explicit presupposition of Vol-
lenhoven’s revised theory of knowledge, it being the basis of reality’s being ‘know-able’ or 
‘intuit-able’ (cf. chapter 4). In Vollenhoven 1926a: 10-15, the metaphysics of Plato and 
that of Aristotle are discussed along these lines.
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b. Self-certainty undercut
We get closer to Vollenhoven’s actual change of view in noting a confu-
sion with respect to these offices. In the Calvinist tradition itself they 
are not always distinguished from the roles attributed to thinking, will-
ing and feeling. “Were not even recently the three offices identified with 
thinking, willing and feeling, and an attempt hazarded to subsume un-
der this humanistic triad faith as understood by Calvin?” (Vollenhoven 
1926d: 61-62). Vollenhoven must have had a special case in mind that 
would be known to his immediate readers. But, on looking back, his 
concern has a note of autobiography as well. Thinking, willing and feel-
ing have a certain autonomy in his early thought. Thinking stands in 
polarity to being. It is the thinking pole that makes consciousness and 
the concrete intuition possible. Feeling is generally related to the psycho-
physical body and the latter’s sensibility, from which the will must distin-
guish itself so as to avoid becoming too attached (cf. chapter 2, VII.D.). 
The will is also present as determining factor with respect to the attitude 
taken towards norms.
 In other words, on consideration, Vollenhoven may be implicating 
himself—at least this would not be self-contradictory—in being self-crit-
ical of his former ‘occasionalism’ and of the self-certain intuition that the 
occasion of an occurrence of consciousness affords. Naturally, this attests 
to allowing a degree of psychologism, even though he had expressed the 
need to curb this. (Recall, Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie was attractive 
for its anti-psychologism.)53 So Vollenhoven would have been inclined 
towards criticism. Part of his current criticism stems from the realiza-
tion that certainty is not a substitute, not even a criterion, for truth. The 
intuitive certainty of being in the know, no matter how irresistible or 
convincing that certainty is, does not as such guarantee that the Self can-
not be wrong. (The ‘that I sense something’, however undeniable when 
concretely intuited, is no guarantee that what I sense is as I take it to be; 
say: the stick, though straight when out of water, is quite certainly(!) seen 
to be bent when partially in water). Hence Vollenhoven’s former ‘con-
crete intuition’, and the self-consciousness that it makes possible, needs 
to be reviewed. In his now placing knowledge squarely on truth, the con-
crete intuition’s epistemic relevance will diminish. At best, it has undeni-
53   Such an intention is apt to take on its own momentum of radicalization. When 
Logos en Ratio was in press, Vollenhoven wrote to Janse and explained: “In my inaugural 
[i.e. Logos en Ratio] . . . you will find a more keen struggle against rationalism, a total 
break with all psychologism.” (Vollenhoven to Janse, 25-10-1926). In Vollenhoven’s case, 
the momentum stems from avoiding subjectivism, the avoidance of which helps to un-
dercut the religious humanism that is based on inner experience.
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able psychological features, and so it is best relegated to psychology. (The 
truth that I sense what I sense is properly speaking a psychological truth, 
even when the judgment based on this is quite erroneous.)
 In line with the above, we now find Vollenhoven drawing a clear 
distinction between perception and knowing, between on the one hand 
what I learn through experience, and on the other what I know in vir-
tue of grasping truth; “to perceive is not [yet] to know”.54 Vollenhoven’s 
former ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ as well as the effects of the concrete 
intuition are also now relegated to psychology. The knowing he retains 
is the knowing of truth. It is in the ‘domain of truth’ that the knowing 
subject is assumed to be instated. The ‘office of being a subject’ is pre-
supposed by the knowing subject. To get into a better rapport with this 
point we need to see more clearly what other considerations (besides anti-
psychologism) are relevant to Vollenhoven’s change of position, especially 
as pertains to norms.
 Vollenhoven’s early position has a certain analogy to that of (South-
west German/Baden/Freiburg) neo-Kantianism. We noted earlier how, 
in the ‘qualities of being a subject’, two things are presupposed: norms as 
posed by the Spirit and a Self that is mentally certain of its inner aware-
ness. The latter is predicated on the pole of thought. What Vollenhoven 
takes to be ‘posits of the Spirit’, neo-Kantianism takes to be simply objec-
tive values, and the latter act as the objects that are investigated in the 
value sciences by the thinking Self. It is through reflecting on values that 
evaluation takes place, i.e. values are ‘valued’ in relation to the valuing 
subject. The values that are valued in this way come to act as norms. 
Hence, in neo-Kantianism, norms have their normative efficacy in virtue 
of the evaluating subject. Now in the early Vollenhoven, the duality of 
‘posits of the Spirit’ (i.e. norms) and the Self is not itself defined as a rela-
tion of object to subject. The Self is a substance, and its mentality has a 
substantial basis that is ‘addressed’ by norms through the Spirit. Norms 
originate with the Spirit, not the evaluating Self. But that said, the Self is 
still in an independent position as compared to norms, capable of being 
either submissive or dismissive, which is also to regulate, or at least influ-
ence, a norm’s ‘normative efficacy’. The intuitive self-certainties provide 
their own context here. They are not themselves regulated by norms, be-
54   Vollenhoven 1926a: 10. In this same work he no longer speaks of “kennen” (ac-
quaintance) and “weten” (knowing that), but of “weten van”, which is ‘knowing about’, 
and “weten dat”, i.e. ‘knowing that’. The ‘knowing about’ is primarily psychological, for 
it concerns a psychological situation of being ‘in the know’ (cf. op. cit. : 20, 39, 64). The 
second form, “knowing that”, implies the awareness of truth (irrespective of the sense of 
certainty).
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ing simply based on ‘the reality of succession’ in the Self.
 Everything comes into focus when we reckon with the possibility 
that the basis of mentality in the Self is no longer a basic given. Janse’s 
questioning of the ‘immortal soul’ would appear to have had critical ef-
fect here in that, without that substantial soul, the independence (self-
certainty) of subjectivity totters. For, without a basis in a mental/spiritual 
(incomplete) substance, the certainty would be psychological at best. 
However if subjectivity now (as revised) attests to being ‘instated’ in of-
fices or general tasks, we can also expect the ‘norms of the Spirit’ to be 
readjusted as well. That is indeed the case. Vollenhoven retains the notion 
of norms that hold for subjectivity, but he generalizes and relocates them. 
Norm are reinterpreted to be part of the ‘creation or cosmic order’, which 
order is an order of cosmic law. Vollenhoven retains the theistic origina-
tion of laws and norms, only we no longer hear that this is in virtue of 
the Spirit, specifically directed to the human being. The law-order holds 
with respect to everything creaturely, and only in the specific human 
creaturely situation does Vollenhoven retain the term ‘norm’. This means 
that the ‘qualities of being a subject’, which signal the submission to 
norms by a human being, now too is generalized. Everything creaturely 
‘stands in subjection’ to the law-order. It is the way everything creaturely 
is ‘instated’. It is only in virtue of a basic pluralism in the law-order that 
there is differentiation in the qualities of standing in subjection. In chap-
ter 4 we will return to this theme of norm and subject.
 All told, the influence of Janse, as this pertains to his advancing 
a ‘semitic worldview’ and the human being’s having a task of steward-
ship with respect to the world, was much like a prod with surprising 
effect. In his letter to Janse, 19 February 1924 Vollenhoven expressed his 
agreement with the criticism directed to the body-soul problem, but he 
found fault with Janse’s alternative. But that was not the (negative) end 
of the matter. Vollenhoven felt the evident immediate need to first revise 
the notion of subjectivity before discussing, at the end of the 1920s, the 
anthropological problem head-on (cf. our discussion below). We find 
that by that time Vollenhoven has come to a closer agreement with Janse 
than he could admit to in 1924. That facet of the influence had had 
to grow. The more immediate effect was re-interpreting subjectivity as a 
‘tasked’ subjectivity. The self-security of ‘inner experience’ is reworked in 
a way that calls for response on the part of the human being—response 
to norms—without assuming an fixed basis of subjectivity. Janse had not 
envisaged this as such, but he did influence Vollenhoven to pursue this 
path.
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3. Towards a biblical understanding of ‘living soul’
The implications of “Semitic realism” for anthropology and the appeal to 
Scriptures were to be a definite influence on Vollenhoven, though these 
took a little while to ‘take’. We quoted Vollenhoven as having said that 
Janse had “come to a more biblical view of ‘the living soul’, which lib-
erated me from a considerable amount of unfruitful traditional specu-
lation.” This admission gains in significance against the background of 
Vollenhoven’s mind-set at the time. In his letter of 7 November 1922 
Vollenhoven had been quite dismissive about the relevance of an ap-
peal to Scripture in discussions pertaining to soul and spirit. “Calling 
upon Holy Scriptures to decide in such questions must be challenged 
[gewraakt]. The Holy Scriptures speak in the language of daily experi-
ence. Otherwise we return to Ptolemaeus on the basis of Judges or Joshua 
(Joshua 10: 12)”.55
 Vollenhoven’s first letter to Janse after his recovery (19 February 
1924) continues in the same vein. “If the Scriptures had a definitive no-
tion of the soul throughout, then it could be analysed and formulated, 
however without being binding. For in these things the Scriptures have 
no authority other than a historic-ethnological one.” In fact, continues 
Vollenhoven, there are at least three notions of the soul in Scripture. In 
a scientific sense, only a single meaning can satisfy [note the ‘one word 
one meaning’ principle here], but at the moment of writing, Vollenhoven 
says, no one option does completely satisfy, so he is unable to decide. 
He agrees that the “current dualistic view” of body and soul should be 
opposed, including the “dualistic metaphysics”, but he also expresses dis-
agreement with the view (of Janse) of “the soul [as being] the other side of 
the biological” body. Vollenhoven says that he prefers to defer the matter 
until he has come to consider psychology, after first finishing his research 
of the foundations of biology.
a. Logos-revelation vis-à-vis philosophy
But Vollenhoven soon took a position that displays considerable agree-
ment with that of Janse. In the first place he modified his dismissive 
attitude towards the relevance of the Scriptures for our understanding. 
To be sure, the Scriptures make use of everyday language, as he had em-
phasized, and the Scriptures should never cancel or replace scientific in-
quiry. But in 1926 he insists that the Scriptures are irreplaceable when it 
comes to conveyed truth about “the whole”, i.e. about creation in general 
and the general situation of humankind, that transcends science (Vol-
55   Vollenhoven to Janse, 7 November 1922, in Stellingwerff 1992: 62.
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lenhoven 1926b: 388). 
 Vollenhoven was able to come to a rapprochement with Janse on 
the basis of a shift in his own basic position. He has come to realize that 
“knowing resorts under being” (ibid.). This realization undercuts a basic 
distinction of Vollenhoven’s early work. He had assumed the polarity of 
thought and being. On thought is predicated the Self and the intuitive 
awareness that takes place in the Self; the world or cosmos is predicated 
on being. This distinction is also a key factor in the scholastic formulation 
of the problem of knowledge. The Self ’s continual striving to know is an 
attempt to come to an adequate concept of reality, which, if achieved, 
would constitute a “complete knowledge” of the object of knowledge in 
question. For the subjective order of thought and the objective order of 
being are assumed to be in harmony.
 But Vollenhoven has come to see this to be basically flawed. If 
thought constitutes the basis of the order of the Self and of consciousness, 
then surely this is to acknowledge its being. True, it is a being as changing 
subject or consciousness, but its being assumes the “reality of succession” 
(cf. chapter 2). Thus thought certainly involves a form of being. But then 
it is illicit to draw a distinction of being and thought, for thought, being 
a form (species) of being, cannot formally be distinguished from it. (E.g. 
one cannot distinguish mothers and humankind, for mothers necessar-
ily belong to humankind.)56 So if thought is separated from the cosmos, 
what remains of the cosmos is fractured and not capable of being treated 
as a whole.
 Vollenhoven comes to a basic reorientation of his standpoint. If 
thought is of necessity a part of being, then so is knowing, for knowing 
is what thought drives. But then one needs to presuppose an intrinsic 
connection of thought and knowing on the one hand and the cosmos 
as a whole on the other. These connections cannot be knowingly inves-
tigated by thought, for they are evidently presupposed in any exercise of 
thought. The problem is one of contextualization: whatever is part of a 
greater whole, and dependent on it, cannot be entertained in separation 
from that whole.
 Now where is this leading to? It introduces Vollenhoven’s ‘layered’ 
account of philosophy and science. Thought is possible only when con-
ducted within the ‘essential connections’ that link thought to the cosmos. 
These essential connections are worked into general scientific procedures, 
56   Vollenhoven argues this in connection with the terms ‘being’ and ‘validity’ 
(1926b: 388), as illustrating the situation of ‘cosmos’ and ‘(created) logos’, the latter 
being the term for ‘(human) thought’ (op. cit. : 389). The ‘created logos’ is part of the 
cosmos. 
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hence thought takes place in a structured context of either a general, pro-
cedural pursuit of knowledge in philosophy (sec) or a specific, procedural 
pursuit of a special science. The essential connections concern on the one 
hand the link of the Self, as knowing subject, to the knowledge enterprise 
(human logos)—this is a participatory link of executing a task—and on 
the other hand the connection by which the reality of the cosmos is rep-
resented in this enterprise. (We return to this in chapter 4.)
 At this ‘level of thought’ (or procedural activity executed in the 
context of the ‘created logos’) knowledge and truth are sought through 
the procedure of thought (which, as described earlier, involves resolution 
and composition). One cannot, it appears, come to know the whole in 
this way, for a connection to the whole is always already assumed. Now 
two things are important here. On the one hand the notion of ‘the whole’ 
is certainly one that is entertained in the mind. It is like what Kant said 
of metaphysics, the “need for completeness of insight” is ineradicable, 
but it cannot be satisfied through the concepts of the understanding.57 
On the other hand, the procedured pursuit of thought and knowledge is 
itself actually carried out by the human being in the context of the world, 
which calls for its own guiding truths. The latter relate to the ‘layer of 
worldview’, in that here many truths (and falsehoods) are brought to 
bear that have been conveyed through upbringing, education, tradition 
and group interests, which de facto pertain to ‘the whole’ of the human 
being living in the world. This is no less a level at which reflection takes 
place, but not a specimen of ‘scientific resolution and composition’. It is 
a reflection of practice, where means are linked to ends, where knowledge 
is taken in its role of leading to results that satisfy or raise discontent. Life 
experience is on the one hand informed and confirmed by tradition and 
successful practice, on the other hand, that very experience also sifts out 
‘supposed truths’ that turn out to be erroneous in leading astray. Hence, 
there is a ‘determination of knowledge’ at this level, involving truth, but 
in a way that is geared to life-practice.
 But we need to reckon with yet a third ‘layer’. What is it that gives 
for satisfaction and what for discontent? Here deep-seated attitudes and 
interests are at work. Whatever one might think as to their accessibil-
ity and the relevance of addressing them—peacefully or (all too often) 
violently—this topic concerns ‘the whole’ in its meaning as implemented 
and striven for. There is an intuition of ‘the good life’ as longed for, that is 
57   In Kant, this calls for the ideas of pure reason. “Pure reason does not in its ideas 
point to particular objects which lie beyond the field of experience, but only requires 
completeness of the use of the understanding in the complex of experience.” (Kant 1977: 
§44, p. 73) 
Philosophy in the Making
256
not decided on the basis of a determination of knowledge, although that 
can be brought to bear in support of basic convictions. This third level is 
ineluctably religious. This is not to be understood as raising the human 
being beyond the cosmos, but as implementing the ideal of the good life 
that is hoped for by the human being in living in the world. The religious 
factor is not of the world but for the world. In other words, at this level, 
the ‘good life’ is intuitively marked by what effects redemption and fulfil-
ment. 
 The situation of philosophy, as sketched, might be described as phi-
losophy being ‘fed’ by worldview (life-experience) and religious attitude 
(life-fulfilment), but that philosophy ‘digests’ these in terms of its own 
limited possibilities. Philosophy’s food is meta-philosophical, but what it 
stomachs is philosophical. At the meta-philosophical levels of worldview 
and religion there is much diversity in what constitutes these, including 
prized writings of wisdom and guidance. A human being makes religious 
choices and has worldview preferences in view of what each involves, 
without first reasoning this out in (legitimating) philosophical argument. 
(Could all conveyed truth be reconstructed? Can the intuited sense of 
redemption and guidance be conceptualized?) Vollenhoven had a firm 
choice in the Christian religion and had a definite worldview preference 
in the tradition of neo-Calvinism. This brings with it an acceptance of 
the factor of Revelation, of Word/Logos revelation. The Scriptures and 
the main Reformed documents serve to orientate a life-practice that is 
part of the Reformed tradition. In orientating a life-practice, it is not in 
competition with philosophy—except when philosophy itself is thought 
to offer orientation and life-fulfilment, basing it all on ‘thought’ in denial 
of any accepted knowledge and the intuitive sense of importance. What-
ever is seriously held to meta-philosophically, implements the whole of 
Self and World in a way that serves as background for the basic notions 
of philosophy; for example, this gives relevance to the notion of archè, 
the unity or source of reality, and to the necessitation factor (deon) that 
effects or warrants the order of the world. 
 Thus philosophy is not to merge with religion nor with worldview. 
It operates, i.e. conceptualizes, in terms of its own method, but does so in 
a practice that is linked to life. Every philosophy, so Vollenhoven claims, 
proceeds from a “a non-scientific basis”; “but not every philosophy ac-
counts for that fact” (Vollenhoven 1953l: 103). Naturally, it is important 
to philosophy to meta-philosophically reflect on its own basis. The dif-
ferences in method that this involves prevents the philosophical discourse 
from merging with that of life-view and religious experience. But in be-
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ing narrower than these methods, philosophy can still benefit from the 
encompassing effect of these discourses. Vollenhoven included an appeal 
to the Scriptures and the Reformed tradition in his religious and world-
view choices, in the hope that this basis would have a beneficent—he 
spoke of ‘reforming’—effect on philosophy.
 So Vollenhoven came to practice philosophy in a way that comports 
with the Scriptures, viz. a way that accepts the orientating truth to be 
found there. The Scriptures are interpreted by Vollenhoven against the 
background of the Reformed tradition, which he took as providing their 
best interpretation, namely the Calvinian interpretation. Hence he char-
acterizes his thought as “Calvinistic philosophy”. (The right way to read 
this is: ‘philosophy as practised in the light of Calvinistic presuppositions 
but according to the ‘scientific’/academic method of thought’.) Vollen-
hoven nowhere simply quotes Scripture in his practice of philosophy, as 
circumscribed within the limits to which he restricts proper philosophy. 
But as regards meta-philosophical reflection, he feels that it is clarifying 
to be open about one’s worldview and religious sources. Naturally, when 
speaking and writing for his ‘home base’, he avidly practiced that open-
ness. 
 Science that proceeds from a view of reality as illuminated by the 
Reformed presuppositions and outlined in Reformed philosophy is de-
scribed as “Christian scholarship”. A different meta-philosophical context 
influences a different qualification of scholarship. To insist on the impor-
tance of Scriptures in Christian scholarship is not to take it as a source of 
data for a particular science, but to reckon with its meaning-orientating 
role (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 173; 2010, 173). Here we are back to 
Janse, though now generalized. In connection with psychology, Janse had 
spoken of the laying of foundations that are also in rapport with “the 
Holy Scriptures’ understanding of ‘soul’” (cf. footnote 39 above). This is 
in line with what Vollenhoven came to see as correct and desirable, from 
his standpoint. Here a consonance with Janse’s more detailed statements 
is noticeable.58 
b. Biblical anthropology
So the spirit of Janse’s appeal to Scripture is recognizable in Vollenhoven’s 
58   We should not overlook the fact that Vollenhoven places the Scriptures against 
the background of the Logos: the Scriptures are a result of Logos-revelation. Janse did 
not make this distinction. Janse lies more open to the charge of maintaining a ‘naïve 
hermeneutics’ with respect to biblical statements. In Vollenhoven’s case there is always 
the ‘history of revelation’ to take into account when he appeals to Scripture. Admittedly, 
Vollenhoven’s ‘child-like faith practice’ tended to minimize this difference with Janse.
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own reformulation of his position after 1923. Vollenhoven no longer has 
the dismissive attitude he first had, once he could tie the appeal to Scrip-
ture in to his revised view of the Logos: not Logos as principle of rational-
ity but as source of life-direction. When he could define for himself the 
role that does justice to the Scriptures, he was more than willing to seri-
ously consider basic features of Janse’s biblically inspired anthropology. 
Vollenhoven expressed himself in this vein for the first time in the lecture 
“The first questions of psychology” (Vollenhoven 1930b).59 It would ap-
pear that, in the first place, he simply came to agree with Janse’s inter-
pretation of the biblical use of “living soul”, namely that this denoted a 
human being (or an animal) as concrete, living, breathing body (or flesh). 
In the Bible, he says, “‘soul’ denotes the breath-through-the-nose of ani-
mal and human being . . . and in that sense they stand in relation to the 
earth’s atmosphere. . . [and] the word ‘body’ denotes in the Holy Scrip-
tures things as such, hence inter alia also souls ( = animals and human 
beings), although the use of ‘body’—other than the word ‘soul’—lacks 
the emphasis on breathing. Hence the words ‘soul’ and ‘body’, while not 
being precisely equivalent, can still be used for the same thing. . . . Ac-
cordingly, the Holy Scriptures can attribute eating, drinking and dying 
to the soul.”60
 In tandem with this admission Vollenhoven emphasizes that this 
is concrete language use, in line with everyday speech—such as when we 
speak of “that poor soul”, meaning a concrete person who suffers some 
serious setback.61 What Janse had failed to do adequately, in Vollen-
hoven’s view, was to distinguish this use from that of the object of psy-
chology as science, which investigates “pain, awareness, memory, etc. and 
hence does not analyse the whole human being” (Vollenhoven 1930b: 
59   Janse was present when Vollenhoven gave the lecture on 9 November 1929. 
Although he is not mentioned by name, Janse readily recognized the effect of his own 
earlier writings. In his dairy he noted for that day: “Fortifying — what has[n’t] all hap-
pened since my writing of 8 November 1922. The Lord has worked wonders.” Cf. Janse 
1929-1946. 
60   Vollenhoven 1930b: 13. This ‘nose breath’, which contrasts with the breath 
through the mouth, is meant to emphasize the difference between breath or air as life 
function and breath as bearer of speech, the latter being indicative of distinct mental 
activity. Vollenhoven notes that the Greek word “psyche” originally meant “breathing, 
by which we are related to the atmosphere” (op. cit. : 11). Notice that, despite the near 
equivalence of ‘body’ and ‘soul’, Vollenhoven does not (at this point) resort to Janse ter-
minology of inner and outer sides of a whole. 
61   In daily speech, says Vollenhoven, “‘soul’ is approximately the same as ‘human 
being’, and there is not only nothing against this but everything in its favour”; Vollen-
hoven 1930b: 11.
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11). When one fails to make this distinction in language use—between 
everyday language use and scientific discourse—the aim of doing good 
scientific or theoretical work in psychology would appear to require that 
one advance a theory about the total makeup of psychic creatures, hu-
man or animal. The unity of an animal or human being is then anal-
ysed as composed of basic parts: organism + animality or psycho-physical 
body + soul/mind/rationality, respectively. But if the scientific practice of 
psychology is directed towards “the psychical function” of an animal or 
human being, rather than to the whole object or being, then there is no 
scientific requirement to split an animal or human being up into basic 
components beforehand. In the context of science, such an anthropologi-
cal or zoological theory would even be speculative, and such speculation 
is best not introduced into the practice of science. Here we see something 
of the “liberation” from “unfruitful traditional speculation” that Vollen-
hoven spoke of in this connection.
 Vollenhoven also went along with Janse in distinguishing an earthly 
and a spiritual or heavenly world. In many ways this remained a torso, 
never worked out in a way that makes the reader sit up and take notice. 
He claims that our main source for speaking of the heavenly world is, 
again, the Scriptures. Heaven is the abode of angels and spirits, of both 
the good and the evil ones (cf. the brief account in Isagoge, par. 19-21, 
also 137-140). They influence conduct on earth, but, in not specifying, 
let alone analysing, this effect, he failed to indicate how this illuminates 
the human condition or gives insight into understanding our cosmos. 
Perhaps part of the problem was the tension that would result from tak-
ing data of Scriptures and apply them in a scientific context.
 However there is a feature that at least locks this doctrine in with 
the mainstays of Vollenhoven’s thought generally. In the heavenly realm 
the distinction between good and evil seems to be an accomplished fact. 
Its effect on human life makes itself felt in the necessity for a human 
being to choose between good and evil. Thus the problem of direction, 
so prominent in human life, acquires added importance upon realizing 
that the struggle between good and evil is influenced, according to Vol-
lenhoven, by the effect of good or evil spirits in the heavenly realm. There 
was only a partial agreement with Janse here. Janse thought of spirit as an 
animating factor in the human being, over and above the unity of body 
and soul and distinct from both, which returns to the heavenly realm at 
death. Vollenhoven never added a distinct factor of spirit to the duality 
of body and soul.
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G. Conclusion
As we overview the ‘Janse effect’ on Vollenhoven, we can only conclude 
that it was more effective for what it initiated than conclusive in what 
was posited. Thus the extent and specific format of the influence in Vol-
lenhoven were due more to his own professional grasp of philosophy than 
to Janse’s enthusiastic but somewhat inchoate initiatives of 1922-1923. 
Janse did not adequately distinguish between the living soul and the psy-
chical function, and this created extra confusion in connection with the 
sciences of biology and psychology. Vollenhoven brought clarity here by 
continuing in the line of his metalogical reflections of 1921.62
 Janse got a better hearing with his emphasis on the difference be-
tween ‘Indo-German and Semitic worldviews’. It was not the ‘biblical 
view’ of the latter, as such, that first attracted Vollenhoven, rather the dif-
ferent human attitudes towards the world and the human being’s place. 
He saw that his own ‘concrete intuition’ was at least like the Indo-Ger-
man view of participation, which has deeper moorings in the substance-
phenomenon metaphysics. Vollenhoven accepted the Semitic view of the 
subject’s dominion, in answering to a task, as making more sense than 
mentality as substance, founding the self-certainty of inner experience.63 
This required an overhaul of the metaphysics of the Self and its “substan-
tiae incompletae”. (In its extension came revisions in the understanding 
of perception and knowing.) A ‘tasked subjectivity’ became a hallmark of 
Vollenhoven’s thought, what he referred to as the subjectivity of ‘standing 
in subjection’.
 Janse’s most effective influence was in anthropology and his insis-
tence that there is a distinct biblical view of ‘living soul’. Vollenhoven 
came to an almost total agreement, but only after having settled for him-
62   In Vollenhoven’s discussion of “psychology as a science”, in Vollenhoven 1930b: 
esp. 10-17, he seems to have (implicitly at least) Janse in mind. The confusion of ‘soul’ 
and ‘psyche’ is central to his discussion (p. 11, 16), and he specifically mentions the “West-
ern-Eastern” bedding of our anthropological thoughts (p. 15), a reminder of Janse’s use 
of “Indo-German worldviews”, for the reference to “Eastern thought” is in itself quite 
unexpected here. In line with Janse, Vollenhoven is very dismissive with respect to any 
“substantia incompleta” construction. This is of course in self-criticism of his own prior 
position.
63   It is not coincidental that Vollenhoven reconstructs the substance-phenomenon 
metaphysics in his Logos en Ratio (1926a), pointing to Plato as an important actor here, 
with his distinction between essence and appearance, and the analogy he introduced 
between a thing and its (eternal) essence and a human being and its (immortal) soul; cf. 
op. cit. : 10-11. In “The first questions of psychology” he states it to be “a first demand of 
Christian thought to break totally with this substance-phenomenon metaphysics” (Vol-
lenhoven 1930b: 15), this metaphysics being indicative of what the Apostle Paul speaks of 
as the “natural human being” who “does not understand the things of the Spirit of God”. 
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self the relevance of the Logos-revelation, of which Scripture is a result, 
for philosophy. Here the problem of ‘the whole’ demanded attention in a 
way that got Vollenhoven to reject his own prior ‘qualified scholasticism’ 
of the harmony between subjective and objective rationality. What the 
Logos reveals must be understood in the context of the love command, 
which is direction determining and aims to reveal and to guide, it does 
not reveal, or appeal to, a realm of ideas by which reality is structured 
(‘objective rationality’). The structure of reality is noticeable, but can-
not be fathomed, let alone understood. In the context of that structure 
one must recognize a ‘created logos’, enabling distinctions to be made 
and connections to be laid by the human being in its ‘logical quality of 
subjection’ (‘subjective rationality’). The need for a scholastic ‘harmony’ 
is now completely redundant.
 The metaphysics of Vollenhoven’s view of the world/cosmos needs 
a more careful scrutiny than has been given so far. But the clarification 
of the Logos, as itself the source of conditions that enjoin a trusted faith 
in the text of Scripture, removed whatever scruples there were—such as 
Vollenhoven had had in the early 1920s—in accepting the relevance of 
Scripture’s authority. Apart from the specific point about ‘spirit’, Vollen-
hoven was, practically speaking, in agreement with Janse’s formulation of 
a Scriptural anthropology.
 The revision of ‘inner experience’, the removal of a ‘layer of scholas-
ticism’, and the acceptance of a ‘biblical anthropology’, these being the 
main points Vollenhoven recalled in later years of Janse’s influence, can 
indeed be given a place in Vollenhoven’s development in the early and 
mid-1920s. Janse deserves mention here, even though at that time he 
lacked Vollenhoven’s level of sophistication. Through Janse’s prodding, 
Vollenhoven came to creatively formulate the basics of a ‘Calvinistic phi-
losophy’.
H. Additional note
When Janse reformulated his anthropological ideas a decade later in the 
brochure, “The human being as ‘living soul’” (1934)64—a work that was 
aggressively criticized by Valentijn Hepp (1879-1950) in the heated dis-
pute in the mid-1930’s in the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, 
along with the views of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd65—he expressed 
64   Janse 1934a. 
65   In 1936-1937 Hepp published four brochures under the general title, Dreigende 
deformatie [Threatening deformation], the second of which is Het voortbestaan, de onster-
felijkheid en de substantialiteit van de ziel [The continued existence, the immortality, and 
the substantiality of the soul]; cf. Hepp 1937a. 
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essentially the same ideas, except that some points are made more explicit.
 His main point is that the Scripture proceeds from an understand-
ing of the human being that is essentially different from that of Greek 
philosophy (Janse 1934a: 5). In the latter the predominant anthropologi-
cal view is that of an immortal soul within a mortal body. To the soul 
are attributed spiritual and typically human values and personality, to 
the body physical corruptibility (op. cit.: 14). Janse challenges the un-
derstanding of anthropological terms that occur in the Scriptures, that 
makes explicit use of this schema of Greek anthropology. (The first and 
longest of the two chapters is devoted to this challenge; op.cit.: 7-29.) 
 In the Scriptures the use of ‘living soul’ refers to the whole concrete 
person as a living, active being. The presence of soul and body is so in-
timate, that the soul can be said to hunger and thirst, and when dead, 
the ‘dead person’ is a ‘dead soul’ (op. cit.: 13). Janse ventures to be more 
exact in his biblical explication. He opts for three terms: ‘body’, ‘soul’, 
and ‘spirit’. The spirit is an animating factor, a ‘wind’ (op. cit.: 45), which 
comes from God, and returns to God at death (ibid.). Spirit is what a 
human being has. But soul and body are the two sides of the human be-
ing, viz. the human being as outward and inward, respectively. The chief 
characteristics of soul in the living human being are breath, blood and 
consciousness (op. cit.: 41). An animal has the same make-up, but God 
has introduced a difference, namely that the human being accords with 
the image of God, which the animal lacks. The difference involves the 
much greater complexity of functioning of a human being as compared 
to an animal, and also the human being’s having dominion (op. cit.: 38-
39).
 Janse’s view is that at death, when the spirit returns to God, the in-
ward and outward presence of the human being comes apart. Dying is a 
loosening from all of the life-spheres (op. cit. : 43), but it also involves the 
living being. The inward presence leaves the outward via the last exhala-
tion or the flowing blood when mortally wounded. The outward pres-
ence that is buried is to us not ‘the remains’ but still the person, only now 
inanimate; slowly it returns to dust and bones and is forgotten (ibid.). 
The inward presence is said to be ‘naked’, lacking the outward presence 
with which it was cloaked. But this inward presence, being now in the 
realm of the dead (ibid.), still has all the parts and functions it had when 
‘clothed’, such as hands, feet and fingers (ibid.). The inward presence has 
shape and figure, and is able to think (op. cit.: 46). It awaits the resurrec-
tion, when it will again be clothed, only now with a new body (ibid.) for 
eternity.
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 The outward-inward presence of the human being is the main an-
thropological distinction Janse makes. It becomes alive when God’s ani-
mating breath gives it spirit. Vollenhoven too accepted the distinction of 
inward and outward. But, unlike Janse, he refrained from giving this any 
distinct representation, preferring to confine his terminology to more 
philosophically loaded meaning.
  For Vollenhoven, the body is, as is any individual thing, a ‘unity 
of subjection’, meaning that its (functional) acting and being acted upon 
takes place in a way that is coherently structured, ‘unbroken’ (Vollenhoven 
2005d/e, 139) inclusive of both so-called ‘bodily and mental’ functions. 
At death this structure of the ‘outward human being’ dissolves. Soul is 
the “direction determining” principle in virtue of which personal life is 
conducted “for good or evil”, whereby the Self, as ‘inward person’, bears 
responsibility in the full diversity of bodily and mental functionality. To 
the extent that soul involves will, choice and resolve, it is something that 
is more or other than the bodily and mental function; in its influencing 
the functions it is itself “pre-functional” (op. cit., 91-93). While alive, the 
unity of body and soul is intrinsically dynamic. At death the soul parts 
from the body but is not thereby annihilated.
III. the dooyeweerd contact: from adequate concePt to modally 
qualIfIed law 
A. Introduction
The second person who is conspicuously present in Vollenhoven’s life 
as his philosophical thought develops is Herman Dooyeweerd. The lat-
ter, born 7 October 1894, was almost two years Vollenhoven’s junior . 
They went to the same high school in Amsterdam, and both registered 
with the Free University, Vollenhoven in the Faculty of Theology and the 
Faculty of Arts (which included the study of philosophy) in 1911, and 
Dooyeweerd in the Faculty of Law in 1912. Both wrote and published 
student essays, Vollenhoven on philosophical topics, while Dooyeweerd 
shows a particular interest in literature and music, in particular Rich-
ard Wagner.66 On 2 July 1917 Dooyeweerd defended his Ph.D. thesis, 
66   Vollenhoven was one of the editors of the student magazine Opbouw, a “monthly 
in the service of the Christian life- and worldview, of and for young people”. It had a 
short existence—1914-1916—perhaps on account of its taking itself too seriously. He 
published well-formulated pieces, such as: “Abaelard en het scepticisme” [Abaelard and 
scepticism], (Vollenhoven 1914a); “Het persoonlijke in den oorlog” [The personal in 
the war], (Vollenhoven 1915b); “Henri Bergson”, (Vollenhoven 1915a); “‘Zijn’ is ‘den-
ken’ èn ‘doen’” [‘Being’ is ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’], (Vollenhoven 1916b). Of Dooyeweerd 
we mention: “Leekengedachten over Richard Wagner en zijn Tristan” [Layman thoughts 
concerning Richard Wagner and his Tristan], (Dooyeweerd 1914); “De troosteloosheid 
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entitled De Ministerraad in het Nederlandse Staatsrecht (The cabinet in 
Dutch constitutional law). Vollenhoven often preached during the time 
he worked on his dissertation, and in the final year he preached weekly 
to stem financial need (cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 23, 26). He defended his 
Ph.D. thesis somewhat later than Dooyeweerd, on 27 September 1918. 
On 10 October 1918 Vollenhoven married Dooyeweerd’s older sister, 
Hermina Maria Dooyeweerd.
 It is probably on account of their having become familial that im-
portant information about their contacts, especially early contacts, is so 
spotty. The one letter that is extant from Dooyeweerd to (the family) Vol-
lenhoven is dated 7 December 1920. From its content one can surmise 
that it was part of a more extensive correspondence. But the letter, which 
will be discussed below, also shows the mixture of private family corre-
spondence combined with academic ‘shop talk’. We may assume that on 
account of their being, for an important part, private, these letters were 
not saved with other academic correspondence and were subsequently 
lost. An important part of their contact had to be by correspondence 
after Dooyeweerd moved from Amsterdam to Harlingen in Friesland, 
in December 1916, when his Ph.D. studies were near completion. Reg-
ular face-to-face discussion was resumed four and a half years later, in 
The Hague, as of late May 1921, when the Vollenhoven family moved 
there; Dooyeweerd himself had already moved to The Hague in 1919. 
The contact which then took place was direct and the discussions deep. 
Of this period Vollenhoven has said: “Both authors had a very searching 
contact”.67 During the five years in The Hague—both moved to Amster-
dam in 1926 when they were simultaneously appointed to their chairs 
at the Free University—the foundation of their joint philosophical en-
deavour was laid. Vollenhoven being our main topic, we are especially 
interested in the contact of these men seen from his perspective.
 Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have left reminiscences, late in 
life, of their early contact. These reminiscences are of uneven quality, 
some published, some private, and taken as a whole not entirely consis-
tent. What complicated the memory are the motives and interests, that 
are not always explicit. There were philosophical differences that each 
recognized, but which were long kept private on both sides in the in-
van het wagnerianisme” [The desolateness of wagnerianism], (Dooyeweerd 1915a); 
“Neo-mysticisme en Frederik van Eeden”, (Dooyeweerd 1915b). This last piece has been 
translated by J. Glenn Friesen and placed on his internet site [www.members.shaw.ca/
hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html]. 
67   The Dutch reads: “Beide auteurs hadden een zeer diepgaand contact”; Vollen-
hoven 1953o. The passage was deleted in the 5th edition.
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terest of maintaining a united front to avoid jeopardising the outreach 
of ‘Reformational philosophy’.68 Then there is also—one tends to think 
‘inevitably’—the matter of who, when partners are completely matched 
in knowledge, ability and qualification, is the leading man. There was a 
‘practical’ allotment that long alleviated this ‘problem’. Vollenhoven was 
the leading man in virtue of his being the first chairman of the Associa-
tion of Reformational [formerly: Calvinistic] Philosophy from 1935 till 
1963, while Dooyeweerd had the leading role as first editor of Philosophia 
Reformata and, particularly in his later years, also in virtue of the interna-
tional recognition he gained.
 But when both looked back at the roots of their movement, a pecu-
liar sketch of the situation emerges. Vollenhoven pointed to features of his 
early thought that he had had to overcome, and, as we saw, he acknowl-
edged Janse’s influence in his coming to take a position that comported 
better with the neo-Calvinist strain of the Reformed tradition he wished 
to emphasize. Janse had no recognizable effect on Dooyeweerd whatso-
ever. Dooyeweerd, in his published tribute to Vollenhoven in 1973, hon-
oured him as “cofounder of the reformational trend of thought” (Dooye-
weerd 1973: 5). But he singled out an earlier “pre-reformational phase 
of his philosophical thought”. What he especially had in mind was the 
constructive part of Vollenhoven’s dissertation, which, in Dooyeweerd’s 
characterization, was still “quite bound to the traditional metaphysics of 
realist scholasticism” (ibid.: 6). This characterization is somewhat broad 
and diffused,69 but Dooyeweerd’s implication of a change is essentially 
sound, as we saw. Regretfully, he mentions no date when he thought the 
change in Vollenhoven took place, nor what he considered to be distinc-
tive about that change that supports his characterizing it as co-founding 
the Reformational trend of thought. As we shall see, Dooyeweerd began 
to have constructive philosophical contact with Vollenhoven as of 1919. 
On Vollenhoven’s own evidence, we found that the important change 
in his thought begins to take place in late 1923, in the aftermath of his 
illness. But, because Dooyeweerd is silent about the details of the trans-
formation in Vollenhoven, there is no indication how this change in Vol-
68   We stated this about Vollenhoven earlier. That Dooyeweerd was of like mind is 
attested to by M.E. Verburg, Verburg 1989: 88.
69   For example, one wonders whether Dooyeweerd means to say that there is also 
a metaphysics of ‘non-realist scholasticism’ or even a ‘non-traditional metaphysics of real-
ist scholasticism’. This is of some importance in connection with the characterization of 
Dooyeweerd’s own early work. For Vollenhoven the problem is, as we saw, the ‘scholastic 
harmony’ between subjective and objective rationality. This is more specific than Dooye-
weerd’s locution. 
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lenhoven affected him, or even whether it affected him.
 Instead, in the said tribute, Dooyeweerd goes on to describe what 
his own ‘founding role’ had been, and it is from that perspective that 
he situates Vollenhoven.70 Important in this connection is what Dooye-
weerd says about Kuyper and about his own appointment to the position 
of deputy director of the Dr. Abraham Kuyper Foundation in October of 
1922,71 a position he held until 1926. (He says he needs to broach this, 
for “it throws light upon my cooperation with my brother in law [sic] 
during our stay in The Hague” (op. cit.: 7).) This appointment enabled 
him to give ample time, as he explains, to study philosophical theories of 
law and the state, social philosophies, and to delve “ever more deeply into 
the study of universal philosophical systems and their historical interre-
latedness” (ibid.: 7)—all this being “necessary to come to an understand-
ing of Kuyper’s neo-calvinistic conception of anti-revolutionary politics 
in contrast with other political views” (ibid., p. 7). Should the idea occur 
that this is a rather tortuous way to study politics, Dooyeweerd explains 
himself immediately. “Such a study alone, moreover, could clarify the 
nature of the conflict in Kuyper’s thought” (ibid., p. 7). Kuyper embraced 
a “philosophical ‘Wissenschaftslehre’”, developed in the first volume of his 
Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, that was not in line with Kuyper’s “refor-
mational basic conception of Calvinism as world and life view but, instead, 
opposed its consistent elaboration” (op. cit: 8). Dooyeweerd targeted as 
being truly Reformed the Kuyper who had said (on the occasion of the 
opening of the Free University in 1880): “There is not an inch in the whole 
of temporal life of which Christ, as Lord of all men, does not say ‘mine’,” 
(op. cit.: 7). It is also the Kuyper of the Lectures on Calvinism of 1898.72
 It is this (supposed) conflict in Kuyper that set the agenda of the 
discussions with Vollenhoven, according to Dooyeweerd. He describes 
70   Dooyeweerd fills many pages of this tribute to Vollenhoven with an account of 
his own thinking and development. It is difficult to see why Dooyeweerd did not suppress 
this, as being inappropriate for the occasion. While Dooyeweerd throughout his career 
mostly used a terminology implying equality between himself and his brother-in-law—
cf. Dooyeweerd 1935-1936, vol. I: viii—he sometimes lapsed into a different mode, as 
when, clearly implying Vollenhoven, he spoke of “some adherents of my philosophy”—
Dooyeweerd 1953-1958, vol 1: 31 note 1—and when calling Vollenhoven “my first ally” 
(mijn eerste medestander / mijn medewerker) in discussion with a journalist, as reported 
in Verburg 1989: 89 (cf. also Dooyeweerd 1935-1936, vol. I: 33). Possibly Dooyeweerd 
said the latter in jest, though Verburg speaks of a “charming answer”. But Dooyeweerd’s 
speaking of “my philosophy” raises serious questions about the enterprise of the brothers-
in-law being a joint venture, and also what “co-founding” means in this context. 
71   Henderson 1994: 29.
72   Cf. Dooyeweerd 1939: 211.
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this in the following three sentences:
My brother in law [sic], Vollenhoven, had come to the same conclusion in 
his own way, as I was soon pleased to discover. Therefore our discussions in 
The Hague centred on the necessity of a reformational epistemology and 
ontology that would be able to match itself against both the neo-thomism 
dominant in reformed scholasticism and the Humanistic neo-kantianism 
which still dominated epistemological theories during the twenties. We 
were also agreed that a veritable reformation of philosophy would have to 
be understood in the spirit of Kuyper’s basic conception of Calvinism as 
a world and life view that was to be clearly distinguishable from both the 
Roman Catholic and the Humanistic ones. (Ibid.: 8)
There is something seriously skewed in this account. When did these dis-
cussions take place? Dooyeweerd’s explicit reference to his appointment 
to the Kuyper Foundation puts this between October 1922 and (mid-
)1926, the timespan of his deputy directorship of the Kuyper Founda-
tion. Given the implication of the time he needed for the research, the 
said discussions could not have taken place immediately. But in January 
of 1923 Vollenhoven had his break-down, which incapacitated him for 
most of that year. So the discussions referred to by Dooyeweerd could 
have begun at the earliest towards the end of 1923. There is nothing said 
about the relevance of the prior contact from the time of May 1921, 
when Vollenhoven too moved to The Hague. Dooyeweerd does speak 
of “the close spiritual contact” they enjoyed during their joint residence 
in The Hague (ibid., p. 5), and Vollenhoven’s own statement of “very 
searching contact” supports this. But nothing is made explicit about this 
contact prior to Dooyeweerd’s deputy directorship. This is odd, to say the 
least. If the discussions really did only get underway towards the end of 
1923, then this takes place at a moment—as Henderson reports and we 
will confirm below73—when Dooyeweerd first begins using the terminol-
ogy of “law-idea” and “law-spheres”, a use that was to become standard. 
So Dooyeweerd already had some fundamentals of his thought in place 
when the said discussions with Vollenhoven proceeded.74 But nothing is 
said about Vollenhoven’s own thought here nor his possible role.
 The fact that Dooyeweerd speaks of “discovering” that Vollenhoven 
had come to “the same conclusion” about a more radically Reformed 
trend of thought does not go well with the attestations of a prior “close 
contact”, unless indeed that contact was interrupted. Now because there 
73   Henderson 1994: 30.
74   Indeed, Dooyeweerd reports that he “had been convinced already as early as 
1922 [presumably in connection with his appointment to the Kuyper Foundation] that 
Kuyper’s deepest intentions had been voiced in the statement referred to above”, i.e. the 
Christo-centric statement. (Dooyeweerd 1973: 7.)
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was the interruption of Vollenhoven’s long illness, we would appear to 
have a confirmation that the discussions Dooyeweerd has in mind were 
conducted after Vollenhoven’s convalescence in late 1923. When we con-
sidered this from Vollenhoven’s side, we found that from late 1923 on, 
Janse’s influence and stimulus are having an effect. The academic contact 
between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd during Vollenhoven’s convales-
cence (about which no information has been found to date) must have 
had to be subdued, if it existed at all, to spare the possible stress on Vol-
lenhoven. When serious discussion did resume, Vollenhoven could report 
some changes in his thought.75 These would quite likely have been novel 
for Dooyeweerd. And naturally Dooyeweerd could now report about the 
progress he made in 1923.
 But let us return to the quotation above. Dooyeweerd states in the 
second sentence that it was consequential to the ‘discovery’ of their mu-
tual Reformed intentions that discussions on epistemology and ontology 
took place. This statement suggests that it was the principled stance with 
respect to the “more radically Reformed trend of thought” that now oc-
casioned the discussions on epistemology and ontology. Anyone familiar 
with the history of Reformational thought will tend to agree. But what 
the statement is silent about are the discussions prior to 1923. We will 
show below that such discussions did take place, with a focus on epis-
temology and methodology in the context of cosmology, were indeed 
conducted with vigour and are amply documented. If they took place 
before the Reformed stance was explicit, what were the initial motiva-
tions and leading ideas? Was there a break when the Reformed stance was 
consciously accepted, or were prior elements of epistemology and ontol-
ogy taken up in the new stance? These questions are not without merit. 
For we found that Vollenhoven himself at first accepted a realist construal 
of (adequate) concept and (realist) idea, expressive of the scholastic har-
mony of subjective and objective reason, over against the idealist neo-
Kantian understanding of this distinction and that he broke with this 
in the revision of his thought after 1923. But Dooyeweerd continued to 
use the terminology of concept and idea. Is he continuing Vollenhoven’s 
earlier use, or does he have another meaning in mind? We need at least 
to look at these early discussions to get clarity on this important phase of 
75   In his first letter to Janse after his recovery, 19 February 1924, Vollenhoven wrote 
that he agreed with the critique of “the dualistic metaphysics [of body and soul]” but not 
with Janse’s argumentation, implying that he had made up his mind on this indepen-
dently of Janse’s sending him copies of his articles of 1923 in November 1923. Cf. the 
earlier discussion of the Vollenhoven-Janse contact. 
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the development of the two reformed thinkers.76
 The third sentence of the quote above asserts that both men agreed 
that the required reform of philosophy would have to be in the spirit 
of Kuyper’s (Neo-)Calvinism, understood as worldview, and contrasting 
with that of Roman Catholicism and Humanism. This touches on the 
ideological context of their endeavour. On the face of it there seems little 
to broach. But there was a difference of implementation from the start 
that Dooyeweerd is silent about. Dooyeweerd emulated the Kuyper who 
spoke of the unity of consciousness as lying deep in the human heart, 
where a human being, in retreat from the diversity of life experience, 
discloses itself to God. Dooyeweerd called this the non-theoretical “re-
ligious centre”, and he himself described it as “the full concrete unity of 
consciousness of Self and of God, the Selfhood of a human being. . . .”77 
It was in connection with such a consciousness that Dooyeweerd used 
and applied the term “law-idea” in the 1930s. (We return to this at the 
end of our discussion of Dooyeweerd below.) Vollenhoven, on the other 
hand, jettisoned the very notion of idea in the overhaul of his thought. 
The (to him) ‘mystical’ notion of a unity of consciousness of Self and 
God is incompatible with the ‘boundary’ to which the Self is subject in 
its awareness of God. The notion of a ‘tasked subject’ does not answer to 
an idea of law, but to law in its actual impingement that conditions ‘stand-
ing in subjection’. Such impingement, one might now say, ‘deconstructs’ 
any supposed “unity of consciousness of Self and of God”. At least, the 
76   M.E. Verburg, availing himself of private material belonging to the Dooyeweerd 
family, asserts that, as regards these discussions, Dooyeweerd explicitly stated that they 
had “not the least influence on the direction in which his philosophy developed.” The 
source is a tape recording of what Dooyeweerd said in August 1964 while visiting his 
oldest daughter living in Vancouver, B.C., Canada. In the same context Dooyeweerd is 
taped as saying: “In the beginning I had these evenings with Uncle Dick [= Vollenhoven] 
that we talked together because we both found that such a philosophy [i.e. a Calvinistic 
one] was needed. But that was actually just beating the air somewhat [eigenlijk een beetje 
gepraat in de ruimte], about neo-Kantianism and so forth.” Verburg situated this last 
remark in the time prior to Vollenhoven’s illness, in other words at the time when Vollen-
hoven said “very searching contact” took place! (Verburg 1989: 88, 87 resp.) Dooyeweerd 
expresses a very selective memory here. Stellingwerff quotes from a letter of Dooyeweerd 
to Colijn (no date given, but written while Dooyeweerd was still with the Kuyper Foun-
dation): “You might remember how he [Vollenhoven] and I worked together from the 
start and are completely of one mind. The evenings and nights that we talked together 
and inspired each other, are unforgettable for me”; Stellingwerff 2006: 33. For a larger 
part of this letter, see Puchinger 1994: 17-18.
77   The passage in Kuyper is in the first Stone Lecture on “Calvinism a life-system”, 
Lectures on Calvinism, p. 20. H. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyper’s wetenschapsleer”, Phil. Ref. 4 
(1939), p. 204. In this same article Dooyeweerd recommends, on page 211, that the pas-
sage in Kuyper be learned by heart!
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alternative to such a ‘mystical unity’ would certainly be important for an 
‘other way’ of practising Reformational philosophy.77a Perhaps the tribute 
was not the place to enter into this kind of a discussion. But one might 
have expected Dooyeweerd to at least hint at some of the factors that 
embody Vollenhoven’s “own way”, deserving at least the respect as befits 
a “co-founder”. Instead he is silent about the nature of Vollenhoven’s 
own contribution.78 Stellingwerff, when reviewing the general relations 
between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, concludes: “One is forced to 
conclude that Dooyeweerd applied his own philosophy as measure in 
judging Vollenhoven.”79 In the above we have a case in point.
 So, in the quoted reminiscences, Dooyeweerd is writing history, as 
seen from his perspective. He lets it start from the point where, for him, 
a Kuyper inspired religious motive becomes operative and gives urgency 
to a ‘reformation’ of philosophy. At that point in time he ‘discovers’ that 
Vollenhoven, in his own way, shares that concern. This common history 
could have begun only in late 1923. Thereby Dooyeweerd passes over the 
prior years of actual history, when the relation between Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd was intense and consequential. We shall pause to review 
what that contact actually was.
B. The early contact
As already stated, the information about the early contact between Vol-
lenhoven and Dooyeweerd is fragmentary. However our aim is not to 
be complete. We want to see something of the drift of this contact, and 
also to search for those points where the contact was influential and ben-
77a  The qualification “mystical” first appeared in connection with Kuyper through 
Vollenhoven’s introduction of the term “semi-mystical” in 1959 in the context of the 
problem-historical method. In that context, the term ‘mystical’ refers to the ‘mystical 
bond’ between the godhead and the universal mind or spirit, in which the higher part 
of the human being participates and with which it remains bonded at death, when the 
human body, being temporal, falls away. Cf. Vollenhoven 2005c: 377-381. Vollenhoven 
himself preferred to speak of “life-unity”, in which the human being serves God by striv-
ing to life according to the whole law. Cf. Vollenhoven 1955i in Tol and Bril 1992: 122. 
78   Dooyeweerd does comment on the work of 1933, Het Calvinisme en de reforma-
tie van de wijsbegeerte, expressing appreciation of its historical part, and the first volume 
of Vollenhoven’s Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte (1950), in which Dooyeweerd mistrans-
lates Vollenhoven’s characterization of that work as “consequent probleemhistorisch”, viz. 
“consistent problem-historical method”—Vollenhoven means to say ‘consequential prob-
lem-historical’ i.e. tracing what historically changes and what remains constant in the 
conceptions (problems) of philosophers as history progresses—and then criticises Vollen-
hoven for “overestimating the part that logic is to play in historical research”; Dooyeweerd 
1973: 6. There is no acknowledgement of Vollenhoven’s own program. 
79   Stellingwerff 1992: 57. 
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eficial. We shall, in the main, limit our search to information that is 
published, though occasionally we have had to turn to archival material.
 The information about what appears to have been their first philo-
sophical contact is from Vollenhoven. In preparation of G. Puchinger’s 
interview with him, published in 1961, Vollenhoven gave him some 
autobiographical notes. Thus Puchinger could report: “Already in the 
beginning of the summer of the year 1919 Dr. Vollenhoven, in Oostka-
pelle, had received a letter from his brother-in-law, Dr. H. Dooyeweerd, 
who wrote that he too felt the need for a deeper foundation in the area 
of philosophy and science in general”.80 The letter is no longer extant, 
and there is no way to corroborate the date and the content reported. We 
have no option but to accept the information as it stands — but that has 
its implications.
 As Verburg and Henderson report and discuss,81 Dooyeweerd was 
very much aware of philosophy in his student days, but there was no 
planned interest in its study at the time. In his dissertation, which is fo-
cussed on Dutch jurisprudence and was published and defended in 1917, 
Dooyeweerd’s Introduction evidences acquaintance with the theories of 
law of Grotius, Locke, De Montesquieu, Hegel, Puchta, Kant and Jell-
inek. Also, the question of the source of law in the face of parliamentary 
rules and practice is discussed at length in this work. However he refrains 
from subjecting the theories about this question to a critical discussion, 
claiming this to be inappropriate in the work at hand, but also because, 
in his judgment “the problem [as to the nature of parliamentary norms] 
cannot be resolved apart from any connection with the philosophy of 
law”.82 We cannot say whether this announces a plan of later study, or 
whether it is only meant to explain the absence of discussion in this work.
 Between finalizing his Ph.D. dissertation and his appointment as 
deputy director of the Kuyper Foundation in October 1922, Dooye-
weerd was practically employed, first in Harlingen, Friesland, where he 
worked for the national revenue, then in Leiden as of January 1918, 
80   Puchinger 1961: 90.
81   Cf. Verburg 1989: 20-28; also Henderson 1994: 22-25. The biographical data 
related to Dooyeweerd in this and the following paragraph are taken from these works.
82   Dooyeweerd 1917: 31. It is not without interest to add, in light of Dooyeweerd’s 
later thought in which law (norm) and subject (fact) play an important role, the follow-
ing. Dooyeweerd states that with regard to the parliamentary system, which is distinc-
tive for the modern government cabinet, two sides need to be carefully distinguished: a 
formal-normative side and a material-factual side. The formal-normative side is deter-
mined by written laws, supplemented by unwritten norms of the parliamentary system; 
the material-factual side has no rigorous determination but simply rests on the political 
structure of a country. (Cf. op. cit. : 25-26)
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where he served as legal adviser for the city authorities, finally in The 
Hague, from the beginning of 1919, where he was appointed to a posi-
tion in the Health Office of the Department of Labour. In a letter, dated 
15 May 1922, written in connection with the possible appointment to 
the Kuyper Foundation, Dooyeweerd stated: “Since completing my doc-
torate in 1917 I have devoted my free time entirely to methodological 
studies and studies in the philosophy of law”.83 The generalization is per-
haps a bit of an overstatement. In Harlingen Dooyeweerd was also active 
in the Literature and Art Society, and he gave a talk there on “Religion 
and Beauty” that was well received according to the local press. So ini-
tially study was tempered with organized relaxation. It is this ‘free time 
study’84 that needs a more careful perusal.
 Dooyeweerd gives important information in the first lecture he gave 
to the students as the newly appointed professor of jurisprudence in the 
fall of 1926. He states: “When my interest first began to be focussed on 
the philosophy of law, I began to study one book after another quite hap-
hazardly. First of all I wished to know what was actually understood by 
‘philosophy of law’. The result was a hopeless confusion in my mind”.85 
We cannot be sure when this first focussing of his interest took place, 
perhaps already while in Harlingen. Anyways, it can only be after some 
period of (spare time) study that he discovers the confusion of his read-
ing and comes to feel the need to bring more organization into it. So it 
would be reasonable to expect him at this point to shift his attention 
to foundations and, accordingly, to more explicitly philosophical topics, 
especially methodological matters. But when did this take place? And did 
Dooyeweerd make this shift entirely on his own?
 I believe that at this point Vollenhoven’s information concerning 
the letter he received from Dooyeweerd in mid-1919 is relevant. (Dooye-
weerd had by now settled in The Hague, Vollenhoven is still in Oostka-
pelle, Zeeland.) Dooyeweerd is said to have indicated to Vollenhoven (as 
we quoted above) “that he too felt the need for a deeper foundation in the 
area of philosophy and science in general”. This ‘need’ fits the experience 
of confusion Dooyeweerd confessed to. So with this first letter to Vollen-
83   Letter to J.J.C. van Dijk, Minister of War and Secretary of the Kuyper Founda-
tion, along with the “Nota” of Dooyeweerd’s proposed work program and implementa-
tion, in Van Dijk 1961: 47-52. The quotation is on p. 48.
84   For what it’s worth in connection with the ‘scope’ of this spare time, Dooyeweerd 
had full-time employment but was a bachelor until 19 September 1924. (Vollenhoven led 
the wedding service.)
85   Verburg 1989: 418. The entire lecture, which is in many ways illuminating (we 
return to it below), is reprinted in Verburg 1989: 415-427.
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hoven, Dooyeweerd would appear to be reaching out to his brother-in-
law for intellectual contact. Now why would Dooyeweerd have expected 
contact with Vollenhoven to be beneficial at this stage?
 I want to enter an assumption into the discussion that was long 
never even entertained. It is the assumption that Dooyeweerd acquired 
(probably was given) a copy of Vollenhoven’s dissertation on the phi-
losophy of mathematics, and that Dooyeweerd actually read that book 
to his own benefit soon after receiving it.86 We quoted Dooyeweerd in 
an earlier chapter, when, in his 1973 tribute to Vollenhoven, he referred 
to this dissertation as “an enormous achievement”. The earliest reference 
to it found to date is from 1925, in Dooyeweerd’s series on ‘the struggle 
for a Christian policy of state’ (started in 1924, cf. Dooyeweerd 1924, 
I), where he refers to it as “the excellent dissertation” (het voortreffelijk 
proefschrift).87 Now this earliest reference does not link Vollenhoven to 
Dooyeweerd’s need, expressed in mid-1919 towards investigating “deeper 
foundations”. But at least it does put Dooyeweerd’s reading of it at a 
fairly early date and, of more importance, that he thought highly of it.88
86   M.E. Verburg gives no indication that Dooyeweerd had any acquaintance with 
Vollenhoven’s early work at all. He brings Vollenhoven into his biography of Dooye-
weerd at the point when the brothers-in-law gain their academic appointments in 1926. 
This negligence is to his own detriment. He fails to see the mind of Vollenhoven behind 
Dooyeweerd’s early work, thus he misinterprets the very texts he quotes extensively to 
indicate Dooyeweerd’s own originality, and he even feels obliged to correct Dooyeweerd’s 
statement about Vollenhoven being a co-founder of Reformational philosophy, preferring 
to emphasize Dooyeweerd’s off-hand remark to a journalist about Vollenhoven being his 
first ally. Cf. M.E. Verburg, Herman Dooyeweerd, pp. 87-90. R.D. Henderson, in his Il-
luminating Law, is aware of the early contact between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, but 
he fails to show acquaintance with Vollenhoven’s early work. Cf. R.D. Henderson, op. 
cit., pp. 29, 32-34. Both Verburg and Henderson failed to pick up the conjecture of A.M. 
Wolters: “On the basis of Vollenhoven’s early publications, a good case can be made for 
the thesis that he in some significant ways shaped the developing systematic philosophy 
of Dooyeweerd,. . .”, in “The intellectual milieu of Herman Dooyeweerd”, in The Legacy 
of Herman Dooyeweerd: Reflections on critical philosophy in the Christian tradition, ed. by 
C.T. McIntire (Lanham: University of America Press, 1985), p. 16. J. Stellingwerff does 
more justice to the available data. He points to Vollenhovian insights present in Dooye-
weerd’s unpublished work at the time. He also gives a fine general assessment of their rela-
tions, early and later. However, on numerous points of detail and general philosophical 
evaluation, further discussion is in order. Cf. J. Stellingwerff, D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, pp. 
55-56.
87   The reference in Dooyeweerd’s tribute is in Dooyeweerd 1973: 5; for the 1925 
reference, cf. Dooyeweerd 1924, VI: 235, n. 3 and 238, n. 2. Regrettably, the latter foot-
note references are only historical. The first note reference is in the context of a discussion 
of Pythagorean naive-mystical speculation, and the second in discussing Plato’s relapse to 
number mysticism in the Timaeus. 
88   We want to point to the timeframe here. Vollenhoven defended the dissertation 
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 We find a further clue in Dooyeweerd’s letter sent to the family Vol-
lenhoven, dated 17 December 1920.89 A main part of this letter is specifi-
cally for “Dik”, about neo-Kantianism. This part of the letter continues 
their on-going critical discussion about neo-Kantian thought. (Dooye-
weerd thanks Vollenhoven “for his last letter”, which is no longer extant.) 
Dooyeweerd offers some philosophical thoughts, which we shall refer to 
presently. But he ends by saying: “in the meantime, I ought not to depend 
too much on my philosophical schooling [to date], maybe my view of the 
matter is entirely wrong. Write this to me sometime . . . .” Clearly, the less 
experienced Dooyeweerd is open to the guidance of the more experienced 
Vollenhoven. If Dooyeweerd is so open towards Vollenhoven about his 
own uncertainty at the end of 1920, then the letter to Vollenhoven of 
mid-1919 would very likely have expressed not only Dooyeweerd’s need 
for insight in foundations in the area of philosophy and science, but also 
contained a request, perhaps stated explicitly or at least implied implicit-
ly, to Vollenhoven to be willing to lend him that more experienced ear in 
discussion. In mid-1919, the only basis for approaching Vollenhoven in 
this way was the latter’s dissertation. (Of course Vollenhoven and Dooye-
weerd would have known in a general way what the one could expect 
from the other. But Dooyeweerd left for Harlingen already in December 
1916,90 so much of Vollenhoven’s philosophical position, as developed in 
the dissertation, would not have been common knowledge.) When we 
now also find that Dooyeweerd freely avails himself of Vollenhoven’s ter-
minology in his early work, the conclusion can only be that Dooyeweerd 
consciously aligned himself to Vollenhoven and accepted the latter’s more 
knowledgeable authority as context to develop his own thinking in the 
area of the philosophy of law.
 One final remark about a peculiar feature of this early Dooyeweerd-
Vollenhoven contact. Dooyeweerd had from the start his own interest, 
which was focussed on the area of the philosophy of law. Vollenhoven 
had, apart from his general interest in philosophy and its history, a partic-
on 27 September 1918, so his book would have become available some time during the 
summer of that year. Dooyeweerd changed his employment and residence (now moving 
to The Hague) in the beginning of 1919. Between his receiving the dissertation and his 
writing to Vollenhoven in mid-1919, Dooyeweerd would have been able to study Vol-
lenhoven’s book, which cannot be well-understood without careful study. Also it doesn’t 
seem reasonable to expect Dooyeweerd to write to Vollenhoven about his interest in 
pursuing philosophical questions without being up-to-date about Vollenhoven’s own 
thought and stance!
89   This letter is published in full in Stellingwerff 1992: 47-48.
90   Cf. Verburg 1989: 28.
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ular interest in the philosophy of the natural sciences.91 It is something of 
a surprise to see Vollenhoven also immerse himself in the literature of the 
philosophy of law. In 1920 and 1921 there is correspondence between 
Vollenhoven and the professor of jurisprudence at the Free University at 
the time, W. Zevenbergen, correspondence to which Dooyeweerd was 
privy.92 The material in the Vollenhoven Archives related to this work 
is very incomplete. But one can make out that Vollenhoven subjected 
work on the philosophy of law of men like E. Lask, G. Radbruch and 
H. Kelsen to a close reading. In 1922 (perhaps already in 1921) Dooye-
weerd himself (again?) picks up the works of these men, along with that 
of R. Stammler and others, and writes extensive studies on them.93 No 
doubt Vollenhoven read these men to be personally up-to-date in this 
‘normative area’. But, viewed from the point of view of the contact with 
Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven seems to have been prepared to go the extra 
mile in this contact, in taking the trouble to be knowledgeable in the 
current literature of Dooyeweerd’s area of special interest at that time. 
Vollenhoven’s coaching had general philosophical scope but it also had 
a relevance for the philosophy of law, enabling their contact to be close. 
Perhaps that is relevant to Vollenhoven’s remembering so specifically: 
“From October 1921 till the fall of 1922 we often had these late evenings 
when we talked and exchanged ideas with each other”.94
C. Dooyeweerd in Vollenhoven’s world of thought
Dooyeweerd entered into Vollenhoven’s world of thought prior to the 
latter’s temporary collapse and the influence of Janse. So it should be ben-
eficial to pause to see how Dooyeweerd is moving about in the world of 
the early Vollenhoven, a world which Dooyeweerd himself later claimed 
(as quoted earlier) to be “quite bound to the traditional metaphysics of 
realist scholasticism”.95 And of course it is of interest to see what happens 
91   Vollenhoven to Janse, 19-02-1924: “Having dealt with mathematics and phys-
ics, I am now specifically occupied with the logical foundations of biology, and this first 
has to be completed before I can tackle psychology”. 
92   In the one extant letter to Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd says that he finds Vollen-
hoven’s correspondence with Zevenbergen “very interesting”. Cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 47. 
93   Cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 54. R.D. Henderson discusses this material of 1922 in 
“Chapter 3. Unpublished manuscripts” of his Henderson 1994. We discuss some of this 
material below.
94   Stellingwerff 1992: 52. It must be in this period that they realized they could 
stimulate each other, giving rise to discussions, then and later, that each valued. This is also 
why each, in print, expressed appreciation of the other’s appointment when they were simul-
taneously appointed to chairs at the Free University in 1926; cf. chapter 1, footnote 2.
95   Dooyeweerd 1973: 6.
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when Vollenhoven makes the definitive shift, after his illness in 1923, 
to his self-termed ‘Calvinistic thought’. We propose offering a synopsis 
of Dooyeweerd’s writings of most of the 1920’s, the period in which 
he himself undergoes rapid development. We shall be especially on the 
lookout for tell-tale signs of affinity or distance between Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven as they work on what is evidently a common cause.
1. “The problem of municipal monopolies in the interest of public health, 
considered mainly in the light of new views on free enterprise” (October 
1920)96
 This is Dooyeweerd’s first publication after completing his disserta-
tion. As Henderson reports, the work is related to Dooyeweerd’s legisla-
tive work in the Health Office in The Hague.97 There is little to discern 
of the contact between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven in this article, 
assuming that Vollenhoven is correct in stating that Dooyeweerd first 
sought contact in mid-1919. It is clear that Dooyeweerd is pursuing the 
topic of law of his own interest. But we do see something of philosophy 
in the background.
 The leading question here, says Dooyeweerd, is not whether mu-
nicipal authorities may interfere with a business’ free enterprise, but what 
the extent of its interference should be, especially when matters of pub-
lic health are involved (op. cit.: 126). The freedom of enterprise can no 
longer be construed on the basis of ‘subjective right’, expressive of an 
individualistic view of society. Society has become much more socialized, 
especially due to the effect of the first World War (op. cit.: 139). This calls 
for a new view of the freedom of enterprise. The out-dated ‘subjective 
right’ needs to be replaced by “the so-called fact that freedom of enter-
prise is nothing other than a social function” (op. cit.: 126). He adds the 
intriguing remark that this introduces “a new concept taken from the 
metaphysical world”, something not generally recognized in the current 
positivistic, anti-metaphysical climate. However enticing it is, he states, 
to subject this new concept to a “critical evaluation” (ibid.), he feels he 
must refrain from this as falling outside of the scope of the article (cf. op. 
cit.: 127). The article indeed restricts itself in the main to practical mat-
ters of municipal interference in specific business enterprises.
 However, at one point Dooyeweerd does stop to remark about the 
96   H. Dooyeweerd, “Het vraagstuk der gemeentemonopolies in het belang der 
volksgezondheid, hoofdzakelijk beschouwd in het licht van de nieuwe opvattingen in 
zake de bedrijfsvrijheid”, in Dooyeweerd 1920. Cf. also Henderson 1994: 25-26, and the 
brief remark in Verburg 1989: 29.
97   Henderson 1994: 26. 
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“philosophical impossibility” (ibid.) of maintaining the view of the sub-
jective right in the context of the current freedom of enterprise. In recog-
nition of the changed societal circumstances, one must ask which idea of 
justice offers the best interpretation. In the modern juridical conscious-
ness, though not itself a source but certainly a touchstone of positive law, 
the doctrine of freedom of enterprise as subjective (individualistic) right 
is no longer relevant (op. cit.: 138-139). Current juridical practice no lon-
ger addresses malpractice in enterprises in terms of subjective right but 
sees it as a social function in light of the demand of the common interest.
 The view of freedom of enterprise in terms of a social function is to 
be preferred over that of individualistic subjective rights. The idea of jus-
tice itself calls for a social will. When the ideal of this will is not ethically 
attainable, then the law must step in and offer protection in terms of ob-
jective right (op. cit.: 140). This does mean that the interpretation of the 
freedom of an enterprise in terms of its social function is one-sided, in 
being only concerned with matters juridical (ibid.). However this should 
not be seen as disqualifying the individual. Individual freedom ought 
itself to function in the light of the common interest, and the latter is 
an ethical notion. “The common interest, as ethical notion, is served by 
honouring individual freedom, so long as this individual freedom justi-
fies itself through social functioning” (op. cit.: 141).
 Dooyeweerd’s dubbing this ‘social function’ in the strong realist 
terminology of a ‘metaphysical concept’ suggests a context of ‘objective 
validity’. The latter also has meaning in Vollenhoven’s early thought. 
But since Dooyeweerd does nothing here to substantiate or explain this 
characterization, it remains at best a tenuous thought. Telling is the 
subservience of juridical matters to ethics, something prominent in the 
neo-Kantian positions at that time, which Dooyeweerd will soon quite 
strenuously oppose. The relation of matters juridical and ethical is an 
important problem in Dooyeweerd’s subsequent early work. 
2. Letter to Vollenhoven, 17 December 192098 
About three quarters of this letter, directed to Vollenhoven and his wife 
in Oostkapelle, is concerned with philosophy. In it Dooyeweerd asks for 
98   Published in Stellingwerff 1992: 47-48. Three small editorial corrections are in 
order: (i) 10th line from the bottom of the letter: read “beteekenissen scherp uit elkaar” 
instead of “beteekenissen uit elkaar; (ii) 9th line from bottom: read “van den kenvorm” 
instead of “van een kenvorm”; (iii) 6th line from bottom: read “niet te veel” instead of 
“niet veel”. M.E. Verburg ignores this letter; R.D. Henderson mentions it in passing, op. 
cit. : 27-28. 
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a copy of Vollenhoven’s lecture on Bergson,99 and he finds the correspon-
dence of Vollenhoven with Zevenbergen especially interesting. In other 
words, Dooyeweerd is privy to the academic work and correspondence 
Vollenhoven is putting out, as is to be expected when, as of mid-1919, 
there is a concerted interest in investigating (as quoted above) “a deeper 
foundation in the area of philosophy and science in general”. Dooye-
weerd also thanks Vollenhoven for his last letter. Thus there was an on-
going correspondence between them, of which only the present letter is 
extant.
 Dooyeweerd is particularly interested in the ‘human sciences,’ 
which he refers to as ‘value sciences,’ and his first statement is of special 
interest. “To approach the value sciences in terms of transcendental real-
ism is also in my opinion a must in order to save Calvinistic metaphys-
ics”.
 To my knowledge, this is the earliest mention of ‘Calvinistic meta-
physics’ in their contact to date. We note that Dooyeweerd here expresses 
his agreement with the concern to ‘save’ it, implying that Vollenhoven has 
already expressed that interest. (Recall that Dooyeweerd also sided with 
Vollenhoven earlier, when writing to him, in mid-1919, that “he too felt 
the need” [emphasis added] for a deeper foundation.) There is no hint as 
to what the term means here. But given Vollenhoven’s context of thought 
at the time, it may be taken as at least referring to the ideational extra-
mental realm. Whether this includes the monadological cosmology is 
uncertain.100 Dooyeweerd proceeds to recount a feature of ‘transcenden-
99   Vollenhoven had lectured on Bergson from notes on several occasions, in 1919 
and 1920. The lecture was finally written up in 1921, but it was never published; cf. Vol-
lenhoven 1921ms. 
100   When both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven turn self-consciously to the work of 
John Calvin, they focus on what they see to be central in Calvin, namely the distinction 
between divine sovereignty—expressed in Calvin more usually as ‘omnipotence’ and ap-
plied as providence*—and the concomitant creaturely dependence. This is metaphysi-
cally secured in God’s essence, which is inter alia infinite, implying finitude on the part 
of the creature. Thus Dooyeweerd says, in Calvinism and Natural Law: “Both systems 
[of Thomism and Stoicism] wrong the sovereignty of God, who does not tolerate any 
abating of the boundary between himself and the finite.” There is a “concept of boundary 
between the infinite and the finite, the Absolute and the creature who is dependent on 
him in everything.” H. Dooyeweerd, Calvinisme en Natuurrecht (Amersfoort: Wed. W. 
van Wijngen, 1924), p. 12. And Vollenhoven: when God reveals himself in his work, 
“then the Infinite grasps the finite, never the other way around: ‘finitum non est capax 
infiniti’.” D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, Logos en Ratio (Kampen: Kok, 1926), p. 31. Thus the 
early understanding of ‘Calvinistic metaphysics’ may have focussed on this distinction 
between divine infinitude and creaturely finitude. That could then also serve as correction 
to Vollenhoven’s use of the actual infinite in his dissertation, this being there a character-
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tal realism’ in connection with value sciences. And this account is vintage 
Vollenhoven.
 Dooyeweerd raises the problem of the origin of norms. In idealis-
tic systems (i.e. of neo-Kantianism) each norm “hangs in the air” (in de 
lucht hangt). For, one must accept spiritual realities from which, taken 
from the human side, norms proceed. Thus a formal function of faith is 
required, for which idealism has no place. In idealism norms become the 
object of theorizing, over against the theorizing subject. But this merely 
accentuates the problem of grounding the norm, thus making a thorough 
“fiasco of every critical idealistic theory of values”.
 What Dooyeweerd here expresses is entirely consistent with Vollen-
hoven’s view of norms, as expressed in his dissertation, about God (the 
Holy Spirit) being their source (transcendent condition) and warrant 
(transcendental-immanent condition). Norms can never be the object 
of theorizing, for their ‘reality’, from the human side, is their impinging 
on the human subject, as transcendental condition. The transcendent 
origin of norms calls for “the formal function of faith”, i.e. acceptance of 
the “spiritual reality” of the Holy Spirit. All told, this defines a form of 
transcendental realism, not a (neo-)Kantian transcendental idealism.
 One can be more specific when compared with the Baden school 
of neo-Kantianism. In this school values are taken to be transcendent, 
and in relation to the human being or culture values ‘hold’ as norms. So 
here norms find their origin in values that subsist in and of themselves.101 
Values are formally in the position where the early Vollenhoven speaks of 
the Holy Spirit.
 The second part of the letter’s discussion with Vollenhoven is 
Dooyeweerd’s response to a question Vollenhoven had posed: what in 
‘critical realism’ (presumably an alternative for ‘transcendental realism’) 
would be the relation between the value of the knowing of being (say, in 
the natural sciences) and the values that are the object of the value sci-
ences? Dooyeweerd says that we “need to clearly separate two meanings 
istic also of the World. (Such a correction need not affect the acceptance of the potential 
infinite of select domains, such as the unending number series, spatial forms, etc.)  Upon 
realizing that such a notion of the World is incompatible with a ‘Calvinistic metaphysics’ 
the motive to ‘correct’ it could come from a desire to ‘save Calvinistic metaphysics’. This 
could have consequences for maintaining a monadology, but whether this would defi-
nitely count against it is difficult to say. If the above guess is anywhere near the mark, then 
it could explain why Vollenhoven said that “already quite soon” after 1918, an unchanged 
second printing of his dissertation was out of the question (cf. the quote in the Introduc-
tion to chapter 4).
* Cf. Calvin 1960, Book I, Chap. XIII, 1: 120-121, n. 1, and Book I, Chap. XVI, 3: 200. 
101   Cf. Henderson 1994: 66, 77. 
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in the concept of value in the value sciences,” viz. the values that the value 
sciences are about (i.e. investigate) on the one hand, and the value of 
value sciences as to their form of knowledge. It is only the latter meaning 
that can be compared with the sciences of being, for value is relevant here 
only in connection with their form of knowledge, the object here being 
material facts not values. This remark is sensible, though one suspects 
that it was not the final word in their continuing correspondence.
 The fact that Dooyeweerd compares ‘value sciences’ and ‘natural 
sciences’ in a matter of course way, would appear to suggest that the dif-
ference in kind between these types of sciences does not affect the general 
reflection on the philosophy of science in Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven’s 
discussions. In other words, the ‘value sciences’ would also appear to be-
long to the ‘organism of science’ (whether or not in a distinct compart-
ment). There is no textual backup for this assumption in Vollenhoven’s 
dissertation—of course that work doesn’t call for a discussion of the ‘val-
ue sciences’—but the context of Vollenhoven’s thought does permit their 
inclusion.102 For, if the natural sciences conceptualize the phenomena of 
the world against the background of ideas of being (‘thing-laws’), then the 
human sciences conceptualize human normative/evaluative experience (of 
cultural life), whether logical, aesthetic, juridical, ethical, etc. within the 
range of the Self, against the background of ‘ideas’ of values (i.e. objec-
tive values warranted by the Holy Spirit).103 A value science may be seen 
as conceptualizing the norms that hold in human experience and soci-
ety, doing so in a way that clarifies relevant objective value, a complete 
knowledge of which would be an ‘adequate concept’ of value. (In the next 
section there is an example of such a use of ‘concept and idea’ with respect 
to legality in Dooyeweerd.)
 This inclusion of value sciences in no way strains Vollenhoven’s con-
text of thought. In a letter to F.W. Grosheide (16 November 1921) Vol-
lenhoven explicitly compares and contrasts the natural sciences and the 
value sciences. He writes: “logic is, along with ethics, aesthetics etc. pre-
cisely as science of norms distinguished from the explicative [i.e. descrip-
tive or natural] sciences (to which belong not only those that formulate 
causal laws, such as natural science, but also those that need to make do 
with the principle of causality, such as [the science of ] history . . .)”104 
102   One expects the correspondence between Vollenhoven and the professor of juris-
prudence, W. Zevenbergen, threw light on this point. 
103   We add that it is the Self ’s own practice (of description, valuation, etc.) that calls 
for norms, but through the Self ’s being itself cosmic, there will be ideas that secure this 
practice extra-mentally. 
104   Vollenhoven to Grosheide, 16-11-1921. 
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Causal laws are part of the metaphysics of the world, while the value 
sciences are predicated on the validity of norms as holding for human 
life. (Vollenhoven includes a diagram in the same letter, showing the ‘Re-
formed standpoint’ to involve the distinction of causality and validity of 
norms [gelden van normen].) The Self-World distinction, so characteristic 
of Vollenhoven’s early thought (cf. chapter 2), is clearly an operative as-
sumption here. Scientific knowledge, being a ‘reality’ in its own right, 
includes not only the natural sciences but also the value sciences.105 And 
both kinds of science presuppose ‘the dualism of concept and idea’, es-
sential to maintaining a critical or transcendental realism.
 Dooyeweerd ends with a question: “can one attribute reality to the 
value of a form of knowing?” This question goes in the direction of a 
metalogical consideration of validity. Valid knowledge no doubt has its 
value. But what is the status of that value? Can or should it too be reified 
in a way similar to cultural values studied in the value sciences? Dooye-
weerd expresses “great interest” here, “because it is so fundamental for 
advancing reflection.” But at this point he expresses little confidence in 
his philosophical advance to date.
 By July of 1921 Vollenhoven has finished his “Hegel in our elemen-
tary schools?”,106 in which he outlines his metalogical reflections in the 
context of his own theism. He now puts more emphasis on the “epis-
temological dualism of concept and idea.” (Cf. the metalogical discus-
sion in section IX of chapter 2.)  We find this emphasis also reflected in 
Dooyeweerd’s subsequent writings.
3. Response to G. Scholten  
On 8 April 1922 the Society for the Philosophy of Law held a meeting 
in The Hague in which the Dutch neo-Kantian legal scholar, dr. Gerben 
Scholten, presented a paper, entitled “Staatsbemoeiing en individueele 
vrijheid” (State interference and individual freedom). There were pre-
105   The ‘scope’ of the distinct sciences and the problem of what counts as a science 
were much discussed at the turn of the twentieth century. Freiburg neo-Kantians tended 
to group sciences in two classes, natural and cultural, with basic characteristic differ-
ences as to their methods, e.g. generalizing vs. individualizing, respectively, as in Rickert. 
W. Dilthey drew a basic distinction between the natural sciences and the ‘Geisteswis-
senschaften’, the latter including human studies and the sciences of society (history, juris-
prudence, sociology, economics, etc.). For him the natural sciences are explanatory, the 
Geisteswissenschaften interpretive, appealing to understanding, ‘Verstehen’ . Cf. Makkreel 
1975. In general, the attempt was to fit the sciences in a view of reality as a whole. Vol-
lenhoven and Dooyeweerd also do this, not only with their (early) ‘critical realism’, but 
also their later definitive view of the plurality of methods. 
106   Vollenhoven 1921c. 
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pared responses, one of which was Dooyeweerd’s. This is the first time 
Dooyeweerd went public with his burgeoning ideas of legal philosophy 
and method. The paper and the responses were published in the Society’s 
“Handelingen” (Acts).107
 On reading Dooyeweerd’s response to Scholten’s paper, one finds 
considerable intellectual advance in Dooyeweerd’s work, both as to con-
tent and philosophical expression. The response is sufficiently coherent 
to be understood without requiring explicit knowledge or explanation of 
Scholten’s paper. The content of Dooyeweerd’s response is in line with 
his own special interest in the philosophy of law (legality) and its broader 
context in connection with the methodology of the ‘value sciences’. In 
philosophical expression we find him using the terminology of Vollen-
hoven’s metalogical outline (July 1921). The substance of that outline 
would probably have formed an important topic of their discussion at the 
time. It cannot be a mere coincidence that the period that Vollenhoven 
recalls of intense, late evening discussions—October 1921 till the fall 
of 1922 (i.e. until Dooyeweerd becomes deputy director of the Kuyper 
Foundation)—commences when the metalogical reflections have just ap-
peared. They can now stimulate each other and together wrestle with the 
dominant neo-Kantian climate of the time.
 Dooyeweerd opens his response with a remark that he intends to 
focus primarily on questions of method. This is important to keep in 
mind when, in the course of the response, terms are used that recur in a 
later context of his philosophical development.
  Scholten’s topic of discussion is state interference and individual 
freedom, which comes down to a problem concerning the relation be-
tween legality and morality. Scholten, who is a representative of Freiburg 
neo-Kantianism in the philosophy of legality (1922a: 32), begins with a 
discussion of legality. In this school legality is taken to be a feature of cul-
ture, which is a “relation sphere” (1922a: 32), i.e. its meaning is gauged 
in relation to human valuation practice. Here a distinction is made with 
respect to legality between its being, viz. factual presence, psychical will, 
etc., and its meaning (zin), namely as norm. Accordingly, the science of 
legality, as Scholten has it, avails itself of two methods: a causal psycho-
logical-sociological method, to account for the knowledge of the being 
107   Cf. Dooyeweerd 1922a; also Verburg 1989: 29-31 and Henderson 1994: 40-46. 
In this section I shall refer to Dooyeweerd’s text simply as ‘1922a’. For matters juridical 
in this text, Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘recht’—as in ‘recht en moraliteit’, ‘rechtsbegrip’, 
‘rechtsidee’. To avoid confusion with ‘law’ (in Dutch ‘wet’) I shall, following Henderson, 
use the term ‘legality’ throughout as translation of ‘recht’, such as ‘legality and morality’, 
‘concept of legality’ and ‘idea of legality’, respectively. 
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of legality from its factual, psychical-imperative side, and a teleological 
method, which deals with the knowledge of the meaning of legality, as 
norm.
 This “dualism of method” (1922a: 33), or “two methods of order-
ing” (1922a: 32), elicits Dooyeweerd’s first criticism. For him, the first 
condition of a science is that its object of knowledge conforms to ‘the 
postulate of uniformity’ (postulaat van de Einheitlichkeit). This precludes 
there being two juridical methods. To avoid the possible misunderstand-
ing of taking Dooyeweerd’s denial of a pluralism of method as favouring 
Marburg idealism (in view of the latter’s monistic procedure of allowing 
for only one method for all of the sciences), he states this explicitly, and 
then immediately adds the remark that the postulate of uniformity re-
tains its validity from “the standpoint of transcendental realism” (1922a: 
32). This is the characterization of his own and Vollenhoven’s position, 
as we saw. In “Hegel in our elementary schools?” (1921), Vollenhoven 
had replaced his initial (Marburg-like) view of a general unity of method 
for all the (natural) sciences, with a view that reckoned with “diverse do-
mains of validity of logical norms” (op. cit.: 85). We interpreted this (cf. 
chapter 2) as underscoring a fundamental diversity of domains of science, 
most naturally secured by specifying a metalogical ideal for a science in 
regard to its specific domain, pursued by a fitting method. Dooyeweerd’s 
mention of a ‘postulate of uniformity’, as requirement of a specific sci-
ence, is precisely in line with this interpretation of Vollenhoven, even 
though Vollenhoven does not expressly speak of a ‘postulate’ in this con-
nection.
 Scholten’s distinction between the two senses in which ‘legality’ is 
taken, viz. as being and as meaning, in correlation with his dualism of 
method, occasions another flat disagreement on the part of Dooyeweerd, 
who had forewarned that he would have “immanent criticism” (1922a: 
32) to offer. Dooyeweerd states categorically: (i) when legality is taken to 
be at once fact and norm, this sins against the logical principle of identity; 
(ii) ‘being’ and ‘meaning’ (Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘ought’ (behoren) at 
this point, but the context suggests this is meant as a synonym for ‘meaning’) 
are “two exclusive forms of thought, which, in my opinion, correspond to 
two exclusive primal forms (oervormen) in the objective sphere of the divine 
Cosmos” (1922a: 33); and (iii) one needs to make a choice, “conditioned, 
in my opinion, by metaphysical objectivity”, the choice being in favour of 
holding legality to be exclusively norm (1922a: 33). On each point a brief 
remark.
 The first point, about the double meaning of ‘legality’ being con-
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trary to the principle of identity, must be more than a merely semantic 
criticism. For that would hold for most words used in a language. Dooye-
weerd voices the said objections in connection with the “weak spot” in 
working with two “juridical methods” (1922a: 33). In other words, a 
consequence of the methodological postulate of uniformity is that the 
characterization of the domain in which the method is applied calls for 
a basic unity of meaning. In that sense a dualism of methods, such as 
Scholten defends, undercuts the logical identity of ‘legality’.108
 The second disagreement raises two points. In the first place it 
proceeds from the difference between ‘thought forms’ and ‘forms in the 
objective sphere’ to which the former are correlated. This reminds one 
immediately of Vollenhoven’s distinction between thought and being, 
whereby the former involves (psychical) thought processes calling for the 
guidance of norms, and the latter is the given that is foreign to thought, 
hence is extra-mental. In the second place, Dooyeweerd holds that the 
distinction in thought forms between ‘being’ and ‘meaning’ (or ‘is’ and 
‘ought’), corresponds to ‘two primal forms in the objective sphere’. The 
fact of dealing with two ‘thought forms’, i.e. two concepts—or, more ac-
curately, two forms of adequate concepts—has been argued in connec-
tion with the distinctness of the two methods of studying legality. The 
‘primal forms’ to which these concepts correspond must be the relevant 
extra-mental ideas in the metaphysical world. The objective sphere, after 
all, is that of the “divine Cosmos” (1922a: 33). And this metaphysical 
world has an ideational part, involving the mind (or ‘Counsel’) of God 
108   It may be useful to comment on the use of ‘logic’ here. Vollenhoven, from the 
start, correlates logical norms to psychical acts of knowing. In his long letter to F.W. 
Grosheide, 16 November 1921, he states: “Logical over against aesthetical, ethical etc. 
‘means’ everything that can be examined according to the norms of our thought in the 
broad sense of consciousness . . . [according to truth and falsehood].” This is consistent 
with his early thought in general. Examination that takes place according to norms in-
volves an essential factor of (formal) organization that is applied to content entertained 
in thought. But the examination is scientific only if the organization itself makes use of 
carefully chosen categories and forms of judgments, and the content is not psychically 
fleeting but consists of terms representing distinct meanings (mental material), such as 
Vollenhoven advanced by means of Gegenstandstheorie. The latter provides for terms and 
complexes (propositions). In logic norms hold for concept formation, the predication 
of judgment and the drawing of conclusions, and in its methodical organization merges 
with scientific method. To illustrate: Christoph Sigwart’s Logik, (cf. also footnote 110 
below) consists of two volumes; the first is entitled “The doctrine of judgment, of concept 
and of conclusion”, the second, “The doctrine of method”. Given the contact between the 
brothers-in-law at the time, there is no reason to expect Dooyeweerd to have had a differ-
ent understanding of logic. In the manuscript discussed in the next section Dooyeweerd 
states: “we limit genuine pure logic to the logical system of pure categories and pure forms 
of judgment.” This locks pure logic into the formal side of knowledge.
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and a factual cosmological part. Dooyeweerd’s characterization suggests 
the ideational part, the idea of legality.
 We will come across the term ‘divine Cosmos’109 in other early 
work of Dooyeweerd, in contexts that are not as explicit as is the case 
here. In speaking of “primal forms in the objective sphere” (1922a: 33) 
one is hard put to suggest an interpretation other than the metaphysical 
one that is also in the early Vollenhoven, especially since Dooyeweerd 
here also speaks of “metaphysical objectivity” (1922a: 33). There will be 
occasion below to remind ourselves of the metaphysics operative here, 
and also that besides this evidence of ‘metaphysical realism’, there is also 
a metalogical realism of knowledge in what Dooyeweerd will call ‘the 
Gegenstand-sphere’. However, the latter term does not occur here in the 
discussion with Scholten. 
 The third point of disagreement is a follow-up of the other two, viz. 
to choose which of the two uses of ‘legality’ is appropriate. In Dooye-
weerd’s opinion that choice falls to norm. He appeals to the condition 
of metaphysical objectivity, without saying what that is. Again, if we fol-
low a Vollenhovian train of thought we get a very viable interpretation. 
The alternative is between an understanding of legality as something fac-
tual as over against something normative. If the idea of legality controls 
something factual, then legality is naturalized, and the science of legality 
would be ‘denatured’ to be a natural science or a psychology (1922a: 
33). This is “absolutely impossible” (1922a: 33) for Dooyeweerd. But 
if the idea of legality controls something normative, then it is relevant 
to the human agent, and hence to human culture. There is an alterna-
tive of choice here, and the choice falls to the human being, not to the 
non-human natural world. This hard ‘metaphysical’ difference is part and 
parcel of Vollenhoven’s early thought.
 A final remark is relevant in this connection. The phrase ‘idea of le-
gality’ (that we used above) does not actually occur in this part of Dooye-
weerd’s text. So perhaps we are guilty of a biased reading. But further on, 
Dooyeweerd makes a puzzling statement. He states that he “repeats again, 
. . . that he acknowledges, without reservation, a valuation of legality 
according to the idea of legality” (1922a: 35; emphases added). Looking 
back, the only point in his response where the idea of legality could have 
been implied (since the phrase does not occur there) is where we have 
109   The expression “divine Cosmos” is not unambiguous. The Reformed tradition 
precludes its being interpreted as holding that the cosmos is a divinity in its own right. 
Our ‘Vollenhovian’ interpretation takes it to mean the world’s being upheld by the extra-
mental ideas, which implicate the mind of God. But to my knowledge, the expression 
itself never occurs in Vollenhoven.
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made it explicit in the above discussion in connection with metaphysics.
 Continuing his response, Dooyeweerd now pursues the choice 
made for legality as norm, whereby the teleological method is the ap-
propriate method for the science of legality. This method makes essential 
use of the means-end schema, whereby legality as means serves ethics 
as end (cf. 1922a: 34). (This is how Scholten gets the part of ethics and 
freedom into his discussion.) The teleological method serves to explicate 
the concept of legality. But behind the logic of this method, “behind the 
whole Freiburg logic of legality” (1922a: 35), there is “the view of the 
concept of legality as being a relation concept” (ibid.). This is consistent 
with the Freiburg view of culture as being a “relation-sphere” (1922a: 
32). An unsuspecting reader would probably pass this somewhat ‘formal’ 
topic by. But here the term modal also occurs for the first time. In light 
of later developments this term ought not to be ignored. So let us review 
Dooyeweerd’s discussion here more carefully.
 How does one attain a concept of legality when the term ‘legality’ is 
interpreted as a meaning, not a fact? Scholten advances, in line with the 
Freiburg approach, the relation of legality as being a ‘modal relation’. The 
term is taken from Christoph Sigwart, says Dooyeweerd, whereby “the 
subject places legality as a value in relation to itself ”.110 This view is, in 
110   The work of Christoph Sigwart here meant is his Logik, 2 volumes, 4th edition 
edited by Heinrich Maier (cf. Sigwart 1922), which was popular at the time. Vollenhoven 
had quoted Sigwart in his dissertation to endorse his interpretation of the principles 
of logic as norms (cf. Vollenhoven 1918a: 15). Sigwart speaks of modal relations as fol-
lows. All predicates of modal relations are such as express a relation to one’s knowing 
(op. cit., I: 131). Modal relations themselves are unique, in being other than causal rela-
tions. “Mit keiner andern Relation vergleichbar ist diejenige, in der die Objecte unseres 
subjektiven Tuns, unseres Anschauens und Denkens wie unseres Begehrens und Wollens 
zu uns selbst, als dem Subjekte geistiger Tätigkeit stehen.” (ibid., 48) In other words, a 
modal relation concerns that relation in which the objects of our mental acts stand to 
us, i.e. objects of discerning, thought, desire etc. We see at once that this concerns intra-
mental acts and their intra-mental objects. “Nennen wir diese Klasse von Relationen 
mit einer Erweiterung des kantischen Sprachgebrauchs die modalen: so fallen darunter 
alle Beziehungen, in welche wir Objecte zu uns setzen, sofern wir sie vorstellen, und als 
vorgestellte begehren, wünschen, in ihrem Werte für uns beurteilen” (ibid., 49). So it is 
difficult to see any important difference between these ‘modal relations’ and the aware-
ness (via the concrete and the analytical intuition) of Gegenstände that is so prominent in 
Vollenhoven’s early thought (cf. the discussion in chapter 2). Though prominent, they are 
not exclusive. Vollenhoven’s ‘realism’ does not deny a place to transcendent (extra-mental) 
objects that can be correlated to Gegenstände, though there are Gegenstände that lack such 
correlation (such as ‘wooden irons’, ‘square circles’, etc.). So if ‘modal relations’ are taken 
to be the end-all and be-all in any specific context, then one’s standpoint is intra-mental, 
i.e. ‘idealist’ (in some sense), not realist. As long as the extra-mental is acknowledged, the 
intra-mental is not exclusive, and so the intra-mental ‘modal relation’ needs to reckon 
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Dooyeweerd’s relentless judgment, “a subjective view of legality as rela-
tion” (1922a: 35)—in other words, difficult for a ‘realist’ to accept—but 
also logically untenable and even self-destructive for the science of legal-
ity. How does Dooyeweerd argue this?
 To refer to the meaning of legality as being (essentially and exclu-
sively) a ‘modal relation’ makes it rather tenuous. For then, indeed, it is 
only in relation to the subject in the context of culture that legality has 
value, with the character of norm, of ‘holding for,’ as valued. The ‘subject’ 
that is relevant here is the culturally valuing agent who intuits values. 
In line with this valuation, the concept—i.e. the adequate concept—of 
legality is then based on this ‘modal relation’ of agent and intra-mental 
content. If I may venture an illustration, traffic laws have meaning or sta-
tus of legality only for the culture (the culturally valuing subject) that has 
a need for roads and vehicles. Do traffic laws then have validity/legality 
only as shared values in the specific situation in which they are relevant?
 Dooyeweerd now argues: if I think of the relation of legality as 
holding between a ‘subject of legality’ and another ‘subject of legality’111 
(in our illustration: two persons driving on the road) or if I think of the 
relation of legality as holding between ‘objects of legality’, such as a con-
nection of goals (again in our illustration: traffic lights that signal when 
to stop and go) or if I think of the relation of legality as holding between a 
‘subject of legality’ and an ‘object of legality’ (our driver, who is expected 
to behave on the road as indicated by the traffic lights), then “in each of 
these [three] forms the two terms [whether the subjects or objects] of the 
relation must lie outside of [the scope or meaning of ] legality” (1922a: 
35). Dooyeweerd now expects the reader to understand why this is so, 
for he does not say so explicitly. But it follows from the interpretation 
of legality being a ‘modal [and hence intra-mental] relation’. For, then, 
only through the valuing of legality on the part of the meaning attrib-
uting subject (the valuing agent) is there an impinging norm here; in 
other words, the specific persons (car drivers) or the distinct goals (traffic 
lights) as such have nothing of legality about them. For Dooyeweerd this 
is tantamount to considering these specific persons and distinct goals as 
“terms of the relation that lie outside of [the modal relation of ] legality” 
(ibid.). But if such participating persons and things cannot be considered 
terms of the relation of legality, then their characterization as ‘subjects of 
with something other than what is present in its own context. We will see, in subsequent 
discussion, that this is important to Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd as they develop ‘Re-
formed philosophy’. 
111   These ‘subjects’ clearly cannot merely be the culturally valuing subjects, but must 
also be specific participants of culture.
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legality’ and ‘objects of legality’, respectively, goes by the board. It is in 
that sense that Dooyeweerd speaks of a ‘logically untenable’ situation.
 Dooyeweerd also states that this destroys the science of legality. This 
science, he maintains, needs to be able to refer to the ‘positivity of legal-
ity’. The science of legality does not exhaust itself in contemplating legal-
ity only as modal relation of valuing, which is metalogical in its focus 
on valuation. It needs to address cases (‘positivities’) of legality (like our 
example of traffic laws), so as to come to an (adequate) concept of legal-
ity. But then one needs subjects and/or objects of legality to embody the 
‘positivities’ of legality. The view of legality as ‘modal relation’ does not 
adequately allow for this (cf. ibid.). The destruction of the positivity of le-
gality is also to destroy “its logical independence, its sovereignty” (ibid.).
 This logical independence or sovereignty of legality is also not 
explained directly. But when compared to ethics, it gains in meaning. 
Scholten links ethics to legality in the teleological approach of linking 
ends to means. The moral norm is freely posited, Kantian-wise, by the 
autonomous subject, but for Dooyeweerd this is tantamount to “destroy-
ing the objective character of the [moral] norm” (1922a: 36). Autonomy 
in this sense cannot be maintained (1922a: 37). Dooyeweerd concludes 
that there is an ethical standpoint and there is a standpoint of legality, 
but one cannot be positioned on both standpoints at once. “Both systems 
[stelsels] are each in itself sovereign, and can never be such simultaneously. 
For the moralist, who positions himself on an ethical standpoint, legality 
as a logically independent order does not exist, and vice versa” (ibid.).
 The echo of a Kuyperian ‘sphere sovereignty’ should not be taken 
as leading clue here. Now I do believe that it would have been difficult 
not to think of Kuyper when the phrase ‘sphere sovereignty’ occurs, at 
least given Dooyeweerd’s time and place. But it must have been accom-
panied, so I tend to think, by a sense of (remarkable) coincidence, viz. 
that Kuyper’s phrase, itself used only in a practical and societal context, is 
usable in a scientific, methodological one. This ‘coincidence’ first came to 
expression in Vollenhoven, when, in developing his metalogical outline, 
he spoke (in 1921) of “the ‘sovereignty (of regulation, not of creation) in 
its own sphere’.”112 He there defends a ‘dualism of idea and concept’. An 
idea is an extra-mental essence, while a concept represents the knowledge 
of the idea, in process of becoming adequate with respect to it, and this 
‘becoming adequate’ takes place in its own sphere according to an ap-
propriate method. Thus, applying this to Dooyeweerd’s discussion, when 
the idea of legality is acknowledged—as he explicitly does (cf. 1922a: 
112   Vollenhoven 1921c: 80. 
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35)—one is in a position to develop conceptual knowledge of legality, 
being guided by the metalogical intuition of the adequate concept of this 
idea. But when the idea of morality is acknowledged, one is in a position 
to develop ethical knowledge, being in turn guided by the metalogical 
intuition of the adequate moral concept. Distinct ideas control, through 
the corresponding adequate concepts, distinct conceptual procedures of 
thought. These ideas are the warrant for the “metaphysical objectivity”, 
spoken of earlier, “in the objective sphere of the divine Cosmos” (op. 
cit.: 33). Hence these procedures are sovereign only in the light of the 
relevant idea and adequate concept. Thus, while there is (as Vollenhoven 
expresses) a “certain autonomy in its own sphere”,113 this is not due to an 
activation or evaluation by an autonomous subject, nor is it here directly 
theistically grounded—as in Kuyper, in being divinely delegated—but 
it is in virtue of the transcendental realist acceptance of the heteronomy 
of idea and adequate concept. Dooyeweerd does not specifically men-
tion any intuition (metalogical or metaphysical) in his response, but this 
would appear to be implicit in the use of ‘concept and idea’. The agree-
ment with Vollenhoven is hard to miss once one is aware of the main 
features of his early thought.114
 The concluding point of Dooyeweerd’s discussion merits mention. 
Over against Scholten’s fear that legality (as represented by the state) and 
113   Vollenhoven 1921c: 80 (emphasis added).
114   M.E. Verburg maintains: “It was in this response that Dooyeweerd for the first 
time put in the spotlight immanent criticism and modal sovereignty.” Verburg is prob-
ably correct about Dooyeweerd’s emphasizing immanent criticism (1922a: 32), but it 
comes as no surprise. Vollenhoven had applied it very explicitly in the historical parts 
of his dissertation. In its introduction Vollenhoven said: “history will have to render its 
always to be appreciated guidance” (Vollenhoven 1918a: 3) in connection with tracing 
the metaphysical roots of mathematical empiricism, formalism and intuitionism. Also 
Vollenhoven emphasized the lack of immanent criticism in T. Hoekstra’s Geschiedenis der 
Philosophie I [History of Philosophy I] (cf. Hoekstra 1921) in his critical review of it, pub-
lished in January 1922; cf. Vollenhoven 1922a: 293-301. Perhaps this review stimulated 
Dooyeweerd to make a statement of his own about immanent criticism (cf. Dooyeweerd 
1922b1), such as is found in the first of the three unpublished manuscripts, referred to in 
the next section below, and published in Verburg 1989: 32-33. But Verburg’s reference to 
“modal sovereignty” (here in its characteristic sense) in Dooyeweerd, is quite untenable: 
(i) the phrase as such does not occur; (ii) ‘sovereignty’ needs to be interpreted within the 
present context and period, which strongly suggests the limited meaning of: ‘objectively 
founded scientific method’; (iii) ‘modal’ occurs in the phrase “modal relation” that is criti-
cised by Dooyeweerd, as being too subjective and logically untenable as the provenance 
of norms, in the very quotation given by Verburg at this point (cf. Verburg 1989: 31); 
and (iv) as long as Dooyeweerd avers adherence to (transcendental or critical) realism, it 
is inconsistent to privilege anything ‘modal’. Dooyeweerd’s criticism of ‘modal relation’ 
returns in the next document discussed below.
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morality might conflict, Dooyeweerd maintains quite strongly that “a 
conflict between legality and morality is impossible” (1922a: 37), at least 
as concerns the critical-logical problem of Scholten’s paper. Dooyeweerd 
does allow for the possibility of a psychological conflict in the individ-
ual person regarding moral duty and legal duty. But this conflict can be 
‘eliminated’ when a specific conflict is considered in the light of one’s 
conscience, or perhaps by accepting a higher authority (such as “divine 
revelation”; 1922a: 38) and one makes a choice. One must not let psy-
chology dictate a relation between legality and morality, for that would 
only ‘naturalize’ the whole area of norms. The personal-psychological 
choice must be kept distinct from metalogical-conceptual understand-
ing. This distinction too is present in Vollenhoven, viz. between the Self 
and organism of science. Dooyeweerd concludes: the religious norm, 
namely, “One ought to obey God rather than men”, has higher authority 
than either legality or morality. This reminds one of the religious (theis-
tic) concern present in the background of the early common endeavour 
of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd.
 The above discussion has, I believe, removed any reasonable doubt 
about the early intellectual relation between Vollenhoven and Dooye-
weerd. Dooyeweerd is conditioning and testing his wings in the context 
provided by Vollenhoven. We emphasize again that Dooyeweerd has his 
own focus and pursues his own topical interests. This is what gives even 
this early work its distinct value. But the recognizable philosophical strat-
egy is that of the early Vollenhoven. We shall continue to survey Dooye-
weerd’s remaining early work, only this will now be more selective. We 
shall highlight the relevant factors that bear upon the continuing intel-
lectual relations between these men.
4. From the third of three unpublished manuscripts
In 1921 and 1922 Dooyeweerd worked on three studies in which he 
researched the works of prominent legal theorists of the time. This work 
was never published, though parts of the second and third study did 
find their way, where necessary adapted, into later publications. In the 
first study,115 the work of Rudolf Stammler, a legal theorist of the Mar-
burg neo-Kantian school, is the main focus of attention. In the second 
115   This first study is entitled: “Een methodologische inleiding in de geschiedenis 
der rechtsphilosophie in het begin der XXe eeuw” [A methodological introduction to 
the history of legal philosophy in the beginning of the 20th century] (cf. Dooyeweerd 
1922b). It is dated (presumably its completion date) 14 April 1922. Cf. Henderson 1994: 
55-64; also Verburg 1989: 32-33.
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study,116 the attention shifts to the Freiburg or Baden school of neo-Kan-
tianism. Mention is made of Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, 
Emil Lask, and finally Gustaf Radbruch, to whom the greater part of this 
second study is devoted. The third study117 discusses (in the main) the 
work of the school of Hans Kelsen. Dooyeweerd’s chief aim is to take a 
stand in the philosophy of legality by means of a critical discussion of the 
works of prominent theorists at the time. At the same time this entailed 
a confrontation with neo-Kantianism in general, which was the main 
philosophical influence in the Netherlands after the first World War.
 The third of these three studies, “Normative legal doctrine”, at-
tained the most definitive form. It was stencilled, with intentions to pub-
lish (at least Dooyeweerd refers to it in his inaugural address as “not yet 
published”; cf. the last footnote above). Whatever its exact date (again, 
cf. the last note above) it falls close in time to the discussion with Schol-
ten. For example, on pp. 53-54 we find a more explicit criticism of the 
view of norms as grounded in ‘modal relations’ (to which we will return 
below) and references to ‘legal positivities’, ‘legal concept’, ‘legal idea’, 
the ‘Einheitlichkeit [uniformity] of legality’, etc., much in the spirit of the 
discussion with Scholten.
 Now “Normative legal doctrine” contains an extensive section on 
epistemology, from which Verburg has selected and published a chief part 
in his biography of Dooyeweerd.118 We shall pause to review this text 
fragment, to see what it implies as to the Vollenhoven-Dooyeweerd con-
tact. We should also get a heightened sense of their use of “Gegenstand” in 
this period, especially when placing the cited passage in a larger context.
116   “De Badensche School” [The Baden school] (cf. Dooyeweerd 1922c). Parts or all 
of pages 33-34, 42-46, 88, 93-97 and 100 of this Baden manuscript were used, adapted, 
on pages 43-49 (discussion of details) and 101-104 (corresponding endnotes) of Dooye-
weerd’s inaugural address, The Significance of the Law-idea for Jurisprudence and Legal 
Philosophy (Dooyeweerd 1926d). Cf. Henderson 1994: 64-78. 
117   “Normatieve rechtsleer. Een kritisch-methodologische onderzoeking naar 
Kelsen’s normatieve rechtsbeschouwing” [Normative legal doctrine. A critical method-
ological investigation into Kelsen’s normative view of legality] (stencilled; cf. Dooyeweerd 
1922d). Cf. Henderson 1994: 78-86; Verburg 1989: 33-39. Henderson reports that this 
text was stencilled by the Kuyper Foundation, probably in 1923. The text also refers to 
a work by Felix Kaufmann that appeared in 1922 (“this year”; cf. this text: 43). Dooye-
weerd mentions this third study in his inaugural address, and dates it 1921 (Dooyeweerd 
1926d: 91, note 5). This same date occurs in the Dooyeweerd bibliography in Van Dijk 
1961: 71. But Verburg dates the work 1922. (I take this to be essentially correct.) The 
pages 74-88 were used in Dooyeweerd 1926c, i.e. “Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme”, 
Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 20 (1926), 29-74 (namely pp. 34-59). 
118   This is Dooyeweerd 1922d1; the passage translated here is on pp. 34-35; the 
original typescript, p. 45. 
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 The first part of this passage can be quoted in full. It reads as fol-
lows (in my translation, with paragraph numbers added to facilitate refer-
ence).
(§1)  It now remains to give an account of our view. The cosmic sphere 
of that which is foreign to thought is after all a postulate of realism itself, 
which, being a critical epistemological position, is grounded in a view of 
life [levensbeschouwing], that does not lend itself to further proof.
(§2)  However, the assertion that the foreignness is controlled by cosmic 
categories is not commonly accepted in realism, as far as I know. It [the as-
sertion] arises through a critical awareness, that in the so-called “metaphys-
ical” sphere, logical distinctions are not to be accepted on pain of com-
mitting the old, naive mistake of the [inwardly] repeating [verdubbelende] 
“copy theory”. The Gegenstand-sphere, defended above, is a different case. 
Contrary to the neo-Kantians, including Lask, the Gegenstand-sphere is 
taken to be a-logical, for we limit genuine pure logic to the logical system 
of pure categories and pure forms of judgment.
(§3)  The psychologically oriented epistemology in the first place asks: 
“Why [posit] a Gegenstand-sphere?” We reply, in agreement with the Kan-
tians: “Because we cannot and may not withdraw reality, with all of its 
problems, from the control of pure thought, [and] because we must find a 
foundation for the logically immanent meaning of judgments, which can-
not lie in the psychology of experience.
(§4)  But, the idealism that is oriented to Kant asks: “Why do you deny 
that the Gegenstand-sphere has a logical character? What other characteris-
tic, other than a logical one, could the Gegenstand-sphere have, when you, 
rightly, pluck it away from the entanglement of psychology?”
(§5)  Our reply is: The reason why we deny that the Gegenstand-sphere has 
a transcendental-logical character is because we reject the dogma of the 
autonomy of thought, because we attribute to Kant’s Copernican turn not 
a universal but only a limited meaning, namely for the logic of relations.
(§6)  Furthermore, [we deny that the Gegenstand-sphere has a transcen-
dental-logical character] because the Gegenstand, taken up in thought in 
the system of the logos by means of the logical categories, would [then] 
have to be allotted—were it to lack an a-logical ideal origin—either to the 
creative power of thought itself (Marburgers), which we reject, or to ex-
perience (Hume, Locke, etc.), which would undermine the foundations of 
logic, or to metaphysics, which would rob logic of its transcendent mean-
ing (Aristotle) and lead to naive realism. 
(§7)  The ideational Gegenstand-sphere is necessary for us as material for 
the judgment of logic, which [judgment] postulates a transcendent Gegen-
stand according to its immanent meaning, which cannot itself in turn be 
of a logical nature. We reject Kant’s and Lask’s distinction between formal 
and transcendental logic; not however to accede to logic, as do the Mar-
burgers, a Gegenstand creating function, but only to grant the material of 
thought as non-psychological, a-logical and non-metaphysical, its place in 
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a metalogical Gegenstand-sphere.
 The first paragraph speaks of “our view” being that of critical real-
ism, and we have found enough indications to know that this is how 
the early position of Vollenhoven, and Dooyeweerd who sides with it, 
is characterized by them. Intrinsic to the position is the thought-being 
polarity that was basic to Vollenhoven in his dissertation. Being is that 
which is other than thought, hence foreign to thought. It concerns the 
extra-mental reality that transcends consciousness, which any critical 
realism needs to accept, as grounded in concrete existence or a life-view.
 The reference to a life-view is precisely to motivate the acceptance 
of a ‘cosmic sphere’. There can hardly be a significant difference between 
Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on life- and worldview and Vollenhoven’s pen-
chant for metaphysics, a term which Dooyeweerd too (as we found) 
does not eschew.119 In the first of the three studies, mentioned above, 
Dooyeweerd also emphasized the fundamental position of a life-view, to 
which is correlated a worldview. 
 The foreignness to thought hangs together with the ‘cosmic sphere’, 
in connection with which ‘cosmic categories’ (§2) are accepted as en-
tailed by the ‘postulate of realism’. Dooyeweerd’s meaning here is not 
immediately clear. How can foreignness be controlled by categories? But 
the sentence about the ‘copy theory’ throws light on the situation. One 
speaks of ‘naïve realism’ when, as in empiricism, knowledge is taken to be 
a direct reflection of the facts. But this simply duplicates content without 
being distinctive in terms of truth (predication). That is why in criti-
cal realism, as Vollenhoven had insisted in his dissertation, knowledge is 
taken to be a result of an assimilation or working over of the given, which 
means that the role of the knowing subject is more than merely being 
receptive. There must be an exercise of thought, but this is not to apply 
‘logical distinctions’ to the cosmic or metaphysical sphere itself. Logical 
principles apply to and hold for the knowledge (judgments and concepts) 
that result from the working over of the given (as we found in chapter 2). 
They don’t hold for the given as such. In its own cosmic or metaphysical 
sphere, the given (as that which is foreign or other) is governed by ideas.
 Dooyeweerd’s meaning here is ‘Vollenhovian’, all the more so when 
he says that realism is not commonly taken in a sense that includes for-
eignness or otherness. This echoes Vollenhoven’s statement about the dif-
ficulty, in neo-Kantianism, of accepting ideas in the cosmically relevant 
119   Cf. our earlier remark at the end of section III.C.2 above, and also the discussion 
with Scholten [‘divine Cosmos’] in section III.C.3. For more on ‘worldview’ (to use the 
more standard expression) in Dooyeweerd, cf. Verburg 1989: 32-33. 
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sense, for doing so implies accepting “thoughts of God”.120
 The discussion then shifts to the topic of a ‘Gegenstand-sphere’. The 
Gegenstand concerns the ‘material of thought’ (§7), and this material is 
such that the Gegenstand-sphere is said to be of a ‘metalogical’ charac-
ter (§7). We need hardly repeat that Vollenhoven from the start worked 
with a ‘Gegenstandstheorie’, and that he outlined further metalogical de-
velopments with regard to it in his “Hegel-article” of July 1921. What 
needs discussion is grasping Dooyeweerd’s meaning and comparing this 
to what we know of Vollenhoven at the time.
 The discussion is considerably aided by having available a succinct 
overview of Vollenhoven’s early position in the context of critical realism. 
We give the following overview, which is in close agreement, though in 
an adjusted format, with the last two figures given in chapter 2. 
 
The chief parameters of critical realism121 
Holy Spirit Logos Counsel of God
Principles of 
validity
Ideal reality of 
norms or values Source of rationality
Ideal reality of 
general ideas
Transcen-
dental
Mentality, 
qualities of subject 
of obligated Self 
(real)
Organism of the 
sciences 
(metalogical)
Thing-laws control-
ling coherence and 
development (r.)
Empirical
Psycho-physical 
organization with 
forms of sensibility
Interaction of subject 
and object; knowledge; 
judgments and con-
cepts (logical forms)
Things and forces, 
physical and psy-
chical; abs. sp.-time
Self (human beings) Knowledge/Science World (Metaphysics)
 
From the start Dooyeweerd takes the Gegenstand-sphere to be a-logical 
(§2), that is to say, the material content of thought is not itself of a logi-
120   Vollenhoven 1921c: 86. Of course Dooyeweerd’s referring to ‘cosmic categories’ 
and Vollenhoven to ‘ideas’ (of distinctive being) may imply a difference in connotation. 
Vollenhoven’s early use included both ‘essences’ (general ideas) and ‘thing-laws’ (individu-
ated ideas). It may be that Dooyeweerd is especially thinking of the determination of 
‘domains’ of reality or of culture, which could then be in terms of ‘cosmic categories’, in 
correlation with the adequate concepts of a science (whether this be natural or value sci-
ence), as discerned by the metalogical intuition. But this of course does not constitute a 
difficulty for Vollenhoven.
121   The reader may wish to consult section III.G.1. below for a summary explana-
tion of what the diagram intends to portray. 
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cal nature. Logic, at least ‘genuine pure logic’, is limited to “the logical 
system of the pure categories and pure forms of judgment” (§2). Logic 
is oriented to knowledge (concepts and judgments) to the extent that 
knowledge accords with logical principles. This does not as such deter-
mine the ‘material of thought’ that is ‘worked into’ knowledge, for that 
content is ‘critically produced’ in the merging of the (objective) factor 
of the given and its (subjective) organization by the knowing subject. 
Logic on the other hand deals with categories and forms of judgments. 
Now, though Vollenhoven does not use the term ‘Gegenstand-sphere’, 
the latter’s ‘a-logical’ character and its characterization as ‘metalogical’ by 
Dooyeweerd does place it where Vollenhoven speaks of the ‘organism of 
the sciences’. As will become clear, the Gegenstand-sphere embodies the 
content of scientific knowledge. 
 Dooyeweerd then makes certain statements, in reaction to possible 
epistemological objections, which clarify his meaning. First, from the 
(imagined) side of psychologism (§3), the question is raised about the 
very need of a Gegenstand-sphere. Dooyeweerd’s two-pronged response 
emphasizes the relevance of both the objective and the subjective sides 
that come together in knowledge. Psychologism is oriented to the expe-
riencing subject. But such an approach does not allow thought to tackle 
problems of reality. On the other hand, the logically organized immanent 
meaning of a judgment, i.e. the objective content of knowledge, calls 
for a foundation that the psychology of experience cannot provide. In 
other words, the Gegenstand-sphere is required to account for a feature 
of knowledge that cannot be identified with the mere psychological pres-
ence of the subject nor with the mere cosmological presence of the given 
object (that is foreign to thought)—though both are present and ‘come 
together’ in the knowledge situation—nor is logic able to provide for this 
feature, for logic concerns the form of thought and does not directly af-
fect the epistemic character of its content or material. Hence, in reference 
to the diagram above, the Gegenstand-sphere belongs neither to the side 
of the Self nor to that of the World. It is relevant to knowledge or science, 
but not to its logical side, which is formal, but to the content or material 
of knowledge.
 The second imagined objection comes from Kantian idealism (§§4, 
5 and 6). They are said to agree with the critique levelled at psycholo-
gism, but they object to denying that the character of the Gegenstand-
sphere is logical. But what other character could it have? (§4)  
 Dooyeweerd’s reply here is again two-pronged. In the first place, the 
characterization of the Gegenstand-sphere as being logical, is linked by 
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Dooyeweerd to Kant’s so-called Copernican turn. Kant held that knowl-
edge of the world is not acquired merely through the confrontation with 
the world, but knowledge is validated only in virtue of certain structures 
of the mind or of consciousness, which structures are grounded in the 
transcendental unity of apperception of the Self. This supports, or rather 
is the very expression of, the dogma of the autonomy of thought, and nat-
urally, through it, the logical characterization of the Gegenstand-sphere is 
turned more specifically into a ‘transcendental logical’ one. Dooyeweerd 
does give the Copernican turn partial support, which is perhaps difficult 
to appreciate, for he is not explicit in his reasoning. But if we bring in 
Vollenhoven’s characterization of the Self and thought, an explanation is 
forthcoming. The denial of the autonomy of thought lies in the denial of 
the Self being an autonomous source of knowledge. For, if the Self is to 
fulfil its role of embodying and executing thought, then it first needs to 
take on the quality of knowing subject, and that calls for submission to 
(transcendent) norms. (Recall Dooyeweerd’s letter to Vollenhoven, dis-
cussed above.) Only then is the knowing process validated, when there 
is submission to norms. The limited meaning Dooyeweerd does however 
recognize for the Copernican turn has to do with the experiential basis 
of representations. Here representations are influenced in their formation 
by the forms of sensibility of the human psycho-physical organization. 
This is the level of Vollenhoven’s ‘acquaintance’ (kennen), and the interac-
tion of the organizing subject and the given object. Here a ‘logic of rela-
tions’ has a useful application, in which the Self, from its psycho-physical 
side, has a determining role (§5).
 This reply (§5) to the objection from the side of Kantian idealism 
(§4) focussed on denying the supposed ‘transcendental logical’ charac-
terization of the Gegenstand-sphere. It is followed up by a second reply 
(§6), which asks, where, when the Gegenstand-sphere is so characterized, 
it is to be allotted. Dooyeweerd discerns three options: (i) allotment to 
the creative power of thought itself (the option of the Marburgers); this 
is rejected when rejecting the autonomy of thought; (ii) allotment to 
experience (such as in Locke and Hume); but that undermines the foun-
dations of logic, presumably (so we add) because it allows only for induc-
tive logic, which lacks a priori principles; (iii) allotment to metaphysics. 
The latter is objected to, for it “rob[s] logic of its transcendent meaning 
(Aristotle) and lead[s] to naïve realism” (§6). I take Dooyeweerd to mean 
that this entails a copy-theory (of naïve realism) all over again, which is 
contrary to logic’s own (transcendent) significance (in terms of a priori 
principles). And of course, à la Vollenhoven, the logical principles have 
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no determining role in metaphysics (as opposed to ideas and/or ‘cosmic 
categories’).
 So the Gegenstand as ‘the material of thought’ cannot be ‘placed’ ei-
ther in direct rapport with the knowing subject and the forms of knowl-
edge (it is a-logical) nor is it metaphysically given (it is non-metaphysical) 
and also it does not arise at the experiential level of empirical subject in 
contact with given phenomena (it is non-psychological; cf. §7). One glance 
at the overview of Vollenhoven’s early thought, as given above, and we see 
immediately how Dooyeweerd’s options dovetail with the three realities 
Vollenhoven identified, viz. in connection with the Self, in connection 
with the World, and in connection with the knowledge relation (of ac-
quaintance) between these. The only remaining ‘place’ for a Gegenstand-
sphere is in connection with the organization of knowledge, in terms of 
the organism of the sciences. It is precisely here that Dooyeweerd allots this 
sphere, for he brings in the ‘logos’.
 The organism of the sciences is a ‘reality’ situated ‘between’ that 
of the Self and the World. It is the reality that Vollenhoven sees as war-
ranted by the (divine) Logos.122 Dooyeweerd also brings in the Logos when 
he turns to characterizing the Gegenstand’s ‘a-logical ideal origin’ (§6). 
Knowledge must clearly abide by logical categories and accord with logi-
cal principles. Hence knowledge content is organized by the logical cat-
egories. But the content is still other than the formal means by which it 
is organized, hence it calls for its own determining principle. That con-
tent, as Gegenstand, is “taken up in thought in the system of the logos by 
means of logical categories” (§6; emphasis added). Content, or mate-
rial of thought, has a status that calls for its own recognition, not being 
‘produced’ (whether logically, experientially or metaphysically). It has 
its own ‘categories’ by which knowledge content, as entertained in hu-
man cognition, is itself systematically organized. (This is specified more 
particularly below.) Thus the very material that logic organizes necessi-
tates, ‘according to its immanent meaning’, the ‘postulating’ of a distinct 
(Dooyeweerd speaks of ‘transcendent’; §7) Gegenstand. This is an ‘ide-
ational Gegenstand-sphere’, a ‘metalogical Gegenstand-sphere’ (§7), that 
stands in direct relation to the (divine) Logos. Presumably it is in virtue of 
the connection with the Logos that the Gegenstand-sphere is attributed, 
by postulation, its (own) ‘transcendent’ status.
 So much for the quoted passage. The account of the ‘Gegenstand-
122   As has been our practice throughout, we emphasize again that ‘Logos’ with a 
capital L always refers to the divine Word-revelation, the second Person of the Trinity, in 
its specific meaning for knowledge. When written with a small l, ‘logos’ refers to human 
cognition or subjective rationality. 
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sphere’ is what is most prominent here. The context that Dooyeweerd as-
sumes for this account conforms to Vollenhoven’s outline, which we also 
found to be relevant for the closely contemporaneous discussion with 
Scholten. To clinch the ‘Vollenhoven connection’ we give the following 
two-sentence quote.123 This summarizes the main roles of the three-some: 
thought, Gegenstand and cosmos. The quotation also invites reviewing 
some matters in more detail. 
And so the categories of judgment do not appear [to be], contrary to what 
the Marburgers assert, a creation of pure autonomous thought, but rather 
the means by which the Gegenstand can enter into thought, although the 
Gegenstand itself, determined according to the categories of essential con-
nection, finds its a-logical origin in the thought-foreign cosmos, which is 
itself ordered according to the cosmic categories of thought-foreignness. 
Thus, posed in this way, critical realism consciously adduces the cosmic 
thought-foreign (less correctly called ‘metaphysical’) form-material as sub-
strate (hypokeimenon) of the ideal Gegenstand and the latter in turn as ma-
terial of the categorial synthesis in the judgment of pure logic.
To summarize: logic (judgment) is required so as to enable the Gegen-
stand, as knowledge content, to be thought, while this knowledge content 
itself originates from the cosmos, which is itself other than or foreign to 
thought. Each of these three ‘stations’ has an input or efficacy, expressed 
as or controlled by ‘categories’. The (subjective) execution of thought is 
structured according to categories of concepts and judgments. Then, the 
Gegenstand is said to be determined by ‘essential connections’. We will see 
immediately, in the more detailed discussion below, that Dooyeweerd ap-
peals to the (metalogical) intuition by which essences, that enter into es-
sential connections, are viewed (cf. op. cit.: 44). But the main presupposi-
tion of critical realism is the cosmos as foreign to thought. The categories 
here are those of “the cosmic unity of connection, wherein no logical 
distinguishing can enter” (ibid.). The cosmos, being ‘foreign to thought’ 
and thus to be accepted as given, is also Vollenhoven’s way of character-
izing it. Then we can safely assume that the ‘unity of connection’ here is 
that of the idea, although this term does not occur here. The categories 
of this unity, in turn, refer to the basic diversity that is controlled by the 
idea. The thought-foreign cosmos is the substrate of the Gegenstand, as 
grasped meaning, which is in turn worked over by thought in categories 
of concepts and judgments. 
 Dooyeweerd continues the longer text quoted above with the re-
mark that he has some additional referential observations to make about 
logic in connection with “the system of the sciences” and “the doctrine 
123   Dooyeweerd 1922d: 44. 
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of the logical categories”.124 Here we discover details that are taken up—
sometimes only temporarily—in later published work of both Dooye-
weerd and Vollenhoven. We will cull some relevant information from 
these observations. This may be material that is original to Dooyeweerd, 
or it may reflect what came up in the discussions of the brothers-in-law. 
In any case Dooyeweerd is the first to record it.
a. Gegenstand-theory and logic.
The ‘critical realist view’ that he has defended, says Dooyeweerd, allows 
for a sharp distinction between logic and theory of knowledge (Dooye-
weerd 1922d1: 35). Having rejected the ‘autonomy of thought’ on the 
part of the Self, on the basis of which transcendental logic, i.e. (non-em-
pirical) ‘material logic’ as over against ‘formal logic’, serves as foundation 
of the theory of knowledge, the latter needs to be accounted for in an-
other way. ‘Pure logic’ is relevant to theory of knowledge only as regards 
its formal side (the form of judgments and concepts). The content of 
knowledge calls for ‘Gegenstand-theory’ (ibid.). In the critical realist view, 
the Gegenstand is aligned not with the Self but with the Logos. Here, 
however, “the Gegenstand is not, and cannot be, an element of the Logos 
[which would have the effect of appealing to a ‘higher logic’, or perhaps 
even ‘Logos speculation’?; A.T.], but only the in itself a-logical material 
of the Logos” (ibid.).125 
 So form and content are the two cardinal foci here. (Recall the two 
124   Verburg 1989: 35. The continuation of the text discussed so far and directly 
quoted above is on pp. 35-38. 
125   One may well note that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd will, in time, argue 
against the Logos doctrine they upheld in their early thought. Vollenhoven motivates 
a ‘Christian logic’ negatively through his criticism of ‘logos-speculation’—cf. his De 
Noodzakelijkheid eener Christelijke Logica [The necessity of a Christian logic] (Vol-
lenhoven 1932b: 1-2)—and Dooyeweerd criticises Kuyper’s appeal to the Logos as this 
occurs in the latter’s general view of scientific knowledge—cf. Dooyeweerd 1939. It was 
part of the climate of the times—encouraged by the scholastic strain in the Protestant Re-
formed tradition—to honour this scholastic understanding of the Logos. We find it in A. 
Kuyper, J. Woltjer, H. Bavinck, W. Geesink and V. Hepp, to name but the more promi-
nent, though they did not always hold to nor formulate it uniformly among themselves. 
The appeal to the Logos in this tradition is clearly theological, against the background 
of metaphysics. But the term is also used in a more ‘secular’ or methodological sense, to 
denote objective meaning (or, to be more exact, the principle of rationality of objective 
meaning) as is evident in Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s use. Because their development 
includes an important feature of self-criticism, it seems more advised to focus on the de-
tails of their own understanding rather than on the scarce attestations of affiliation with 
the older generation. Besides, one would still need to understand their own use to be able 
to appreciate the relevant affiliation.
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sides of the organism of the sciences, formal and material, in Vollen-
hoven.) Form concerns arrangement, which is achieved by means of cat-
egories of concepts and forms of judgments. Thinking is unthinkable 
without such a function of determinate arranging. Content, in turn, is 
what is understood, and what comes to be arranged by applications of 
categories and forms, but it has an ‘a-logical’ source. What then is the 
relation between form and content?
 Dooyeweerd takes logic to be “the system of the categorical deter-
minations of the Gegenstand in the judgment” (ibid.). This is applicable 
as long as there is content to determine. But there is also ‘pure logic’. It 
adjudicates over the ‘pure categories and pure forms of judgment’ used in 
logic. In other words, the categories and forms of thought, pure (or for-
mal) though they be, now serve in pure logic as content or Gegenstand of 
a higher consideration (ibid.). Pure logic treats of the forms of form. So: 
“Pure logic, as systematic science, needs to be preceded by a Gegenstand-
theory of the categories and the forms of judgment themselves” (ibid.). 
Is (pure) logic then dependent on Gegenstand-theory so as to be provided 
with its own content of forms?
 That would be a hasty conclusion. For Gegenstand-theory has a 
structure, calling for its own categories and judgments. But then logic 
would appear to precede Gegenstand-theory. We end up in a vicious circle 
of each preceding the other. We break the circle when taking into ac-
count the aim of Gegenstand-theory, as over against that of logic. The aim 
of pure logic is that of truth, and to that end one needs to retain distinc-
tion and difference in relation. But the aim of Gegenstand-theory is un-
derstanding “the factual [zakelijke] unity of the Gegenstand, [while] that 
of pure logic [is grasping] the formal unity of the truths about the Gegen-
stand” (op. cit.: 36). This factual unity of the Gegenstand, over against the 
formal unity of pure logic, would appear to emphasize connections in the 
Gegenstände that ‘belong together’ (so to speak), “essential connections”. 
Thus Dooyeweerd says: “The Gegenstand-sphere is . . . the cosmic-form-
material, in its ideality, that is predisposed to agitate thought. It is not 
the relation, the logical basis of the system, that dominates the structure in 
the Gegenstand-sphere, but the essential connection of the simple in each 
other” (Dooyeweerd 1922d: 50).126
 Dooyeweerd offers (elsewhere in “Normatieve rechtsleer”; i.e. in 
1922d) an example taken from Edmund Husserl. A triangle is a Gegen-
stand, which can enter into different (logical) judgments, such as “This 
126   The distinction of relation and connection is later consolidated in Vollenhoven in 
two different ‘determinants’, the ‘individual’ and the ‘modal’, respectively; cf. chapter 4. 
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triangle is equilateral” and “This triangle is equiangular” (Dooyeweerd 
1922d: 43). There is logical diversity, but a single Gegenstand. Now the 
triangle, as Gegenstand, delineates an “essential connection”, for “it marks 
off a gamut of synthetic judgments a priori” (Dooyeweerd 1922d: 49) in 
virtue of the togetherness of lines and angles in the triangle. The category 
of the highest unity that is relevant for the essential connection here is that 
of space. Space is an example of a region category or modality. 
 Having different aims, Gegenstand-theory and pure logic each op-
erate according to a different method. In Gegenstand-theory one can 
only “become conscious of the factual unity of the highest categories 
of thought through viewing [schouwen; or: discerning by beholding in-
tuitively]” (Dooyeweerd 1922d1: 36). This viewing is an apperceptive 
method of a fundamental kind of ‘seeing’ or ‘discerning’. It should be 
taken as implying acknowledgment. One apperceives what one under-
stands as belonging together, and so one is able to come to acknowledge 
the relevant factual unity in the highest categories of the Gegenstand-
sphere. Following the Freiburger, Emil Lask,127 Dooyeweerd calls these 
unities ‘region categories’, and, through the intuition of viewing, each 
such regional unity is acknowledged to be of distinct modality. In pure 
logic, on the other hand, the method is different. Here the unity of the 
categories only counts formally, and one will attempt to come to “the 
truths about the categories and forms of judgment in a system” (ibid.) by 
taking into account distinction, synthesis and the like.128 
 In the above account we again surmise Vollenhoven’s metalogical 
outline in the background, though details here may be original with 
Dooyeweerd. At least there is a consistent interpretation if one takes the 
‘viewing’ or ‘discerning’ (schouwen), in Vollenhoven’s sense of the metalog-
ical intuition, the apperceiving of an endpoint of thought—the ‘adequate 
concept’—as focussing on the unity of a ‘domain of validity’ (alias ‘region 
category’). M.E. Verburg ventures to guess that the use of “schouwen”, 
that occurs here in Dooyeweerd (“for the first time”, he states), was prob-
ably borrowed from Husserl. Now Husserl’s name, as we saw, does occur 
here, but it is often in criticism (cf. op. cit.: 37). Would Dooyeweerd then 
attribute the same meaning to the term as found in Husserl?
 Apart from the general unlikelihood, in view of Dooyeweerd’s ad-
127   Verburg makes note of the fact that Dooyeweerd felt an affinity towards the work 
of Emil Lask, who died in 1915 at the age of forty, a casualty of World War I; cf. Verburg 
1989: 38. 
128   Elsewhere in this paper Dooyeweerd lists, as formal categories: identity, diversity, 
relation, continuity and system; as pure forms of judgment he lists: analysis, synthesis, af-
firmation and denial, hypothesis and categorical explanation; cf. Dooyeweerd 1922d1: 37. 
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herence to ‘critical realism’, there are at least two specific counts against 
this guess. In the first place, there is a much greater likelihood that its 
meaning is ‘borrowed’ from Vollenhoven, who introduced it explicitly as 
metalogical intuition in 1921. In the second place, Vollenhoven’s intro-
duction of the term includes a remark about a difference from Husserl’s 
use. Husserl’s ‘Wesensschau’ is the viewing of an intended correlate of an 
act, a phenomenal content not requiring support of any transcendent ob-
ject. When Husserl’s thought took an idealist turn, as first became evident 
in his “Philosophy as rigorous science” (cf. Husserl 1911), his notion of 
a phenomenon merged appearance and representation. Now while there 
are ‘fulfilled’ phenomena, as over against ‘unfulfilled’ ones, there are no 
objects independent of consciousness. (In comparison to Sigwart, it is 
as if Sigwart’s ‘modal relation’ has taken on primary significance in Hus-
serl; Dooyeweerd, we will see presently, continues to criticize this use 
of ‘modal relation’.) Thus Husserl’s intuition is for Vollenhoven “purely 
formalistic”.129 Vollenhoven, contrary to Husserl, does recognize the 
transcendent object, considering it to be foreign to thought, warranted 
by ideas, and as a factor relevant to the content of thought. Dooyeweerd’s 
being so forthright about ‘cosmic categories’ and ‘foreignness’, puts him 
in league with Vollenhoven, not Husserl.130 (However, in Dooyeweerd’s 
next paper we will indeed recognize a more distinct influence of transcen-
dental phenomenology.) 
b. Cosmic Selfhood; ‘modal relation’
The emphasis on the Selfhood as being cosmic, as over against a tran-
scendental or empirical subjectivity (or other qualities of subjectivity), 
is another point that underscores agreement with Vollenhoven. Dooye-
weerd remarks that, from the realist standpoint, the intuitive viewing 
(apperception) needs to precede any logical thought or logical distinc-
tion, when acquiring systematic knowledge. This naturally needs to be 
129   Vollenhoven 1921c: 81, note 1. As to Husserl, see De Boer 1966, especially 
his discussion of the transition in Husserl from descriptive psychology to transcendental 
phenomenology in the period 1901-1910, pp. 353 ff. 
130   Dooyeweerd even makes a specific point of this in “Normatieve rechtsleer”. Hus-
serl, he says, “rejects the cosmically ordered foreignness” and “confuses the Gegenstand-
sphere with pure logic” (Dooyeweerd 1922d: 44). The latter is particularly apposite in 
connection with the intuition, confirming the characterization given by Vollenhoven, 
namely of its being “purely formalistic” in Husserl. We add, what is stated explicitly in 
chapter 2, that the acknowledgment of the cosmos, as foreign to thought and warranted 
by the idea, itself calls for a ‘metaphysical intuition’. In a critical remark about relativism’s 
dynamism of thought, Dooyeweerd censures maintaining “that there does not exist a rest-
ing metaphysical and metalogical sphere” (op. cit. : 72).
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actually carried out. Just as there needs to be a knowing subject in logic 
and knowledge, so there must also be a ‘viewing subject’, or a ‘centre of 
viewing’ relevant to the Gegenstand-sphere. “The unity of viewing, think-
ing and knowing is, in our view, rooted in the cosmic Selfhood [kosmische 
ikheid]” (Dooyeweerd 1922d1: 36). Dooyeweerd states he will not de-
velop this thought. But even as it stands, one recognizes Vollenhoven’s 
use of the Self, which is indeed a ‘cosmic reality’. The Self ‘becomes’ a 
distinguishing subject or a knowing subject only upon submission to 
(logical) norms. In this way, a quality of being a subject has no indepen-
dent or autonomous status. Dooyeweerd here adds the ‘quality of view-
ing’, something not expressly stated in Vollenhoven.
 This is an appropriate place to add a remark about the term ‘modal 
relation’, first met with in the Scholten discussion. Dooyeweerd’s inter-
pretation of it, in “Normatieve rechtsleer” (1922d), is that it consolidates 
an autonomous status of subjectivity, and is on that account culpable. 
But first a formal remark. Dooyeweerd’s positive use of ‘modality’ here 
(as synonym for ‘region category’) does not automatically signal accep-
tance of ‘modal relation’. In fact, there is a choice for Dooyeweerd: in a 
general sense, either something is a relation or it concerns modality (cf. 
1922d: 55, in connection with ‘the ought’). When a relation is relevant, 
then there is intrinsic diversity, and logic has a relevant role to fulfil. But 
modality is different. When modality is appropriate, this concerns a uni-
tary characterization that can only be intuited (viewed). So what is one to 
make of ‘modal relation’? 
 Dooyeweerd here repeats Sigwart’s characterization of the ‘intra-
mental’ nature of the relation involved (being as indicated above in the 
discussion with Scholten). A modal relation is one whereby “we bring 
objects in relation to ourselves insofar as we represent them, and, as rep-
resented, desire or want them for their value as judged” (op. cit.: 53). 
Hence the modal relation is a “relation of valuation” (waarde-relatie), 
whereby thought evaluates according to a “value that is accepted a priori 
as measure” (ibid.; emphasis added). This a priori acceptance signals the 
autonomy of the evaluating subject. In the neo-Kantian context, the 
evaluation of values, as conducted by the evaluating subject, leads to the 
evaluated value’s becoming a norm, to which one is subsequently subject. 
Here is “autonomy” (ibid.) in operation, and it is explained as predicated 
on the modal relation’s role in valuation and norm acknowledgement. 
There are no norms for neo-Kantians apart from the evaluating subject.
 Because Dooyeweerd does not discuss what he means by ‘subject 
of viewing’ we cannot be sure of his own meaning here. But clearly he 
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is sceptical of the term ‘modal relation’. It could of course be used sim-
ply to factually indicate the intra-mental relation between the Self, in 
its subjective acts, and its representational content. As long as this rela-
tion is not privileged or taken to be authoritative (autonomous, as in the 
Freiburg context), there is little to object to. This intra-mental relation is 
close to what Vollenhoven originally called the ‘concrete intuition’, with 
the analytical intuition as allied to it. But with the increased attention 
accorded metalogical matters as of 1921, the concrete intuition has re-
ceded, in part due to the realignment of the analytical intuition (now as 
logical categories) to the metalogical intuition. So there is little reason for 
Dooyeweerd to honour the term ‘modal relation’ as being of special value 
for him at this point.
c. The system of the sciences
Dooyeweerd also remarks about the possibility of ‘a science of the system 
f the sciences’. Each science has a formal and material side, calling for 
logic and Gegenstand-theory, respectively. Logic and Gegenstand-theory 
together form the context of the system of the sciences. The Gegenstand-
sphere is the factual realization of the ‘Encyclopedia of the sciences’, or 
what Vollenhoven called the ‘organism of the sciences’. This ‘system of 
the sciences’ is an essential, if not central, topic in the philosophy of sci-
ence. The main thought of the science of the system of the sciences is for-
mulated succinctly by Dooyeweerd as follows (Dooyeweerd 1922d1: 36):
 The assumption of a factual Gegenstand-sphere leads moreover to the 
necessity for a science of the system of the sciences, to a “Wissenschaftslehre” 
of the “Wissenschaftslehren”, in which the order of the distinct sciences, 
[each] with its appropriate logic, is systematically determined according to 
the degree of Gegenständlichkeit of its modalities or region categories, and 
whereby pure logic, with its simplest determination of Gegenständlichkeit, 
is given the ordinal position of first element in the well-ordered series [of 
the sciences]. We require some such systematics of the sciences before we 
are in a position to create the correct ordering in the doctrine of the cat-
egories.
 This passage has historical importance. It contains elements that 
will find a permanent place in Reformed thought, be it after some whit-
tling and refitting. In the first place, there is the occurrence of modality, 
used in a positive, constructive sense. Secondly, there is the statement 
that the sciences form a well-ordered series. And thirdly, there is the view 
that pure logic itself is in the position of being the first science in this 
series of the sciences. Let us take each point in turn.
 The term modality, as we saw, is a synonym for Lask’s term ‘region 
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category’. The term is used in Gegenstand-theory to indicate the char-
acterization of the most basic ‘factual unity of the Gegenstand’ within 
a science, as determinative for its terrain. Lask’s term ‘region category’ 
is suggestive in this regard. Dooyeweerd illustrates this as follows (op. 
cit.: 37): for arithmetic the modality is quantity; for geometry, space; for 
natural science, it is ‘being or reality’ (het zijn, het werkelijke); for the 
normative sciences, it is ‘so-ought’ (het zo behoren). The feature of modal-
ity fits in snugly with the intuitive viewing (schouwen, or metalogical 
intuition) spoken of earlier, when Dooyeweerd said: “The [Self involved 
in] Gegenstand-theory can only become conscious of the factual unity of 
the highest categories of thought through viewing” (op. cit.: 36). In this 
way, the Self as ‘viewing subject’, in discerning the modality of a science, 
grasps the most basic unitary feature of that science. In other words, this 
feature of modality focuses on (emphasizes, points to) the unitary feature 
of the adequate concept of a domain of thought. 
 We have indicated above that one should not confuse the intui-
tive nature of ‘viewing the modality’ with ‘modal relation’ as used in the 
Freiburg context (as indicated by Sigwart). That would privilege things 
intra-mental. The alternative of critical realism, as held to by Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd here, is that behind the factual unity of a domain intu-
ited (i.e. the modality that qualifies, in the adequate concept, the unitary 
feature of a science) there is the idea. Thus the ‘subjective’ moment in 
the viewing of the modality, as the unitary characteristic of a science’s 
content, is indeed present, but it is hemmed in by ‘realist factors’, viz. the 
cosmic Self and the idea of being. In not privileging the adequate concept 
(just yet), the realist context prevents an ‘idealist turn’ to a possible ‘mo-
dalism’ that could otherwise (in theory) be prepared by it.131
 The second point concerns the order of the sciences. This systematic 
feature of the sciences is also influenced by Lask, who suggested that the 
different sciences differ among other things by the ‘degree of Gegenständlich-
keit’ of the modality of the science. Modalities do not only differ intrinsi-
cally, each also has a distinct measure of ‘content opposition’ that the 
science in question has to deals with. For that reason, each science will 
have its own ‘applied logic’ (op. cit.: 37) in conformity with its distinct 
131   This is not just fanciful. To anticipate later developments, in the late 1920s 
Dooyeweerd relinquishes the realist moorings of his earlier thought. He accepts an ontol-
ogy of meaning and the cosmic Self becomes a religious Self. The modalities of meaning 
then take on the role of serving as the horizon of experience, the ‘sounding board’ for all 
distinctions and references. We touch on this at the end of our current discussion of the 
early Dooyeweerd. 
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‘grade of Gegenständlichtkeit’ (ibid.).132
 Dooyeweerd does not indicate what the order of the sciences is. 
In the one sequence he gives—which is: natural sciences, normative sci-
ences, arithmetic, and geometry—it is hard to see any intrinsic order, and 
undoubtedly it was not meant to suggest this. But what the phrase “well-
ordered series of the sciences” does mean to suggest is that “each of the 
basic modalities can specify itself [zich specificeeren] by adopting a higher 
grade of Gegenständlichkeit” (ibid; emphasis added). When a modality 
is encumbered with more Gegenstand, a more specific science results. 
When space (the modality of geometry) is encumbered with (the modal 
categories of ) motion, force and matter, we have the science of motion 
(phoronomy); when being, as modality of natural science, is encumbered 
with (the modal categories of ) quality and ‘organity’ (organiteit), we have 
biology; and in connection with the normative sciences, the basic modal-
ity of ‘so-ought’ can be encumbered to get the moral ought in ethics, the 
juridical ought in jurisprudence, the aesthetic ought in aesthetics, etc. (cf. 
ibid.).133
 The notion of the order of the sciences will take on central sig-
nificance in Reformed thought. In Vollenhoven the order of the sciences 
becomes the chief indication of the structure of cosmic reality. The deter-
mination of the order, as here suggested by the ‘specification’ of the basic 
modalities, will give way later to a more considered view of ‘analogies and 
anticipations’ between the modalities.134 But the notion of specification 
132   In Vollenhoven 1926d: 154, Vollenhoven opposes this suggestion of Lask about 
there being ‘grades of Gegenstand’ quite vigorously. “Number may be a Gegenstand [of 
arithmetic] that stands lower than energy [the Gegenstand of physics], [but] both are, 
despite the difference in ordinal position, nevertheless Gegenstand. This being-Gegenstand 
is incompatible with gradual difference.” At this point there is the theory of the cosmic 
law-spheres, whereby each sphere is the context of a field of inquiry of a Gegenstand. This 
allows one to say that the Gegenstände of the sciences are gradated, i.e. placed in an order, 
without acknowledging ‘grades of Gegenstand’ in virtue of ‘gradual difference’. Very likely 
Vollenhoven also has his former opinion in mind (cf. his 1918a: 434-437), when he did 
defend gradual differences within the organism of the sciences, due to the inverse ratio 
between the form and the content as characteristic of a science (cf. chapter 2, section 
VIII.C.3.c). 
133   These are all rather inchoate ideas. The distinction between a ‘basic modality’ 
(grondmodaliteit) and ‘specified modality’ was short lived. The ‘essential connections’ are 
also ‘categories’ within a modality. They come to be worked into the analogical structure 
of the modalities. 
134   This appears in the work of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd in 1926—Vol-
lenhoven in his “Kentheorie en natuurwetenschap” (1926d, as concerns analogy) and 
Dooyeweerd in his inaugural address, De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en 
Rechtsphilosophie (1926d, as concerns both analogy and anticipations). 
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attests to a realization that there is some measure of relevant coherence or 
connection between the domains of the sciences. In the discussion with 
Scholten, Dooyeweerd had emphasized that the standpoint of ethics and 
that of legality are mutually exclusive. Though their modalities are and 
remain distinct, we now see that Dooyeweerd recognizes a link between 
them via the notion of specification in the context of the normative sci-
ences.
 The third point concerns pure logic, in particular its place of ‘first 
science’ in the order of the sciences. This point may seem inconsequen-
tial in light of the later ‘canonical’ view of the (near) middle position of 
‘the logical’ in the series of the modalities. But in Vollenhoven’s work 
published in 1926—his first formulations of the more Reformed posi-
tion—it is basic.135 So what does this point involve?
 Pure logic is the ‘first science’ because its Gegenstand, which con-
cerns the general categories and forms of judgments themselves that are 
applied in the other sciences, is relevant to the whole terrain of the sci-
ences. As Lask had it, pure logic centres on validity, and Dooyeweerd 
appears to agree. That would mean, though Dooyeweerd does not say 
so explicitly, that validity is the modality of pure logic (as science). At 
least one can then make sense of Dooyeweerd’s critical remark regarding 
Lask, when he expresses his disagreement with Lask’s attributing validity 
also to the other region categories of being (natural sciences) and ought 
(normative sciences). Dooyeweerd attributes validity only to pure logic as 
such, otherwise there would be a violation of the modalities involved—
‘being’ (as modality of natural science) would have to be ‘being-validity’ 
(or a ‘specification’ of the modality of ‘validity’); and also ‘so-ought’ (of 
the normative sciences) would have to be ‘so-ought-validity’ (here too 
a ‘specification’ of ‘validity’) (cf. ibid., p. 37). In fact this would define 
a ‘logicism’—where each science is a specification of pure logic’s valid-
ity136—but this is inconsistent with critical realism. For Dooyeweerd, va-
lidity is relevant in the sciences (other than pure logic) only to the extent 
that each science has a formal side, and thus each makes use of relevant 
135   Vollenhoven changed this (as a visible correction) in his first lecture notes at the 
Free University in 1926-1927 (cf. Vollenhoven 1926msA). Dooyeweerd criticized the 
view of the ‘created logos’ being “the most simple law-sphere” in Dooyeweerd 1928a: 37. 
136   An (at least partial) example of this is Bertrand Russell’s early (naïve realist) logi-
cism. In his The Principles of Mathematics (Russell 1903) terms and axioms are laid down 
(pure logical validity) from which he derives the truths of the main parts of logic, of pure 
mathematics and of physics (insofar as this is pure). It is through definitions, appropri-
ately formulated, that content is brought within the sway of logic. One could interpret 
the latter (the definition of new terms on the basis of accepted terms) as specifying ‘grades 
of Gegenstand’.
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forms of judgment (ibid., p. 37). But validity does not, and should not, 
dominate the non-logical modality as highest material characteristic of 
the Gegenstand of a science (apart from pure logic). 
 So pure logic, as the science of the sciences, itself has content and 
form. Its content (Gegenstand) is the primary forms that are applied in the 
logic of each science, as relevant to its categories and forms of judgment. 
The form of pure logic involves the “formal unity of the truths about 
the Gegenstand” (Dooyeweerd 1922d1: 36). This is the study of validity 
in connection with the degrees of encumbrance of the Gegenstand, and 
the requirement that a science needs to have an adequate applied logic 
in agreement with the degree of encumbrance involved. This essentially 
returns in Vollenhoven in 1926 when he speaks of the logical schema, 
as the simplest (‘first’) modality, the primary system of truth, and every 
encumbrance as defining the logical ‘states of affairs’ relevant to a science.
 Dooyeweerd relates his own disagreement with Lask, as reported 
above, to his realist position, which Lask does not share. Lask has logic 
dictating to every science, so that he takes being and the ought (as mo-
dalities or region categories of the natural and the normative sciences 
respectively) to be forms (or ‘specifications’) of validity. “According to 
realist opinion, [however,] validity is also already encumbered with Ge-
genständlichkeit [this being logical forms]. And being is not a validity 
modality, but a basic modality as equally independent as is ‘validity’.137 
Also the ‘ought’ is such an independent modality and not a modality of 
‘validity’” (op. cit.: 37). In Dooyeweerd’s emphasizing the independent 
status of being (warranted by ideas) and the ought (grounded in norms) 
we have again an indication of the Vollenhovian context of Dooyeweerd’s 
thought. The whole Gegenstand-sphere is neither grounded in the Self 
nor in the World, but, as these critical realists would have it, in “the in 
itself a-logical material of the Logos” (op. cit.: 35).
 At the same time this underscores something the brothers-in-law 
soon come to feel as not being satisfactory. If a science’s validity is only a 
matter of the adequate logical form of the judgments of a science, while a 
science’s content is warranted by, or has a ‘substrate’ in, the cosmic reality 
as governed by the idea, what does this mean for the “a-logical material of 
the Logos”? Does it merely answer to the desire to know, to attain a pure 
and ideal rationality, under the aegis of the divine Logos, the principle 
of rationality? Such could be the motive behind the focus on modality, 
137   The typescript (Dooyeweerd 1922d: 47) and the text as printed in Verburg (cf. 
Dooyeweerd 1922d1: 37) have “being” here. The sense of the passage clearly calls for 
“validity”. 
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as the basic unitary feature of scientific content. But in his defence of the 
relevance of the Gegenstands-sphere, Dooyeweerd had referred to “real-
ity” and “all of its problems” (op. cit.: 34), problems that should not be 
withdrawn from pure thought. But reality or the cosmos has remained 
a rather elusive, thought-foreign element in the discussion so far. The 
‘next move’ in their discussions is to bring the Gegenstand-sphere and the 
cosmos into closer proximity of each other. 
D. Interlude
The early work of Dooyeweerd that we have discussed so far is written 
prior to his joining the Kuyper Foundation on 1 October 1922. In this 
new position, he was expected to write advisory reports, based on re-
search that related to practical political work relevant to the political par-
ty which Kuyper had formed, the ‘Anti-Revolutionary Party’ (in short: 
the ARP).138 Hence Dooyeweerd’s area of attention nominally shifted 
considerably. But he was able to put his prior research to good use. In 
a memorandum that he had written, when applying for the position of 
deputy director of the Kuyper Foundation, he sketched a program of 
work that coincided with his own interest and the expertise he had by 
then gained.139 The advisory capacity of the Foundation, he held, needed 
to be more securely founded on systematic and principled research, i.e. 
“clear insight in the foundations of the so-called neo-Calvinistic life- and 
worldview in its application to legality, economics and politics” (Dooye-
weerd 1922e: 49). To that end, he suggested, the first task was to develop 
the method by which the research would be conducted, and only then 
could attention be given to the “fundamental problem of the whole Cal-
vinistic view of legality and society”, namely the problem of sovereignty 
(op. cit.: 50).
 Both counts relate to Dooyeweerd’s prior research. The technical 
part of his research, as we saw above, had been focussed on methodol-
ogy. The way he formulates the importance of method is interesting. He 
states: “This method cannot be neutral but must be guided by the prin-
138   The ARP was the first political party in the Dutch parliamentary system. It was 
founded in 1879 and was an independent political factor until 1980, when it merged 
with two other parties to form the ‘Christen Democratisch Appèl’ (CDA; Christian dem-
ocratic appeal). 
139   The memorandum, which consists of two parts, the program of work and the 
implementation, was an attachment to his letter of application, dated 15 May 1922, to 
the position of deputy director of the Kuyper Foundation, sent to J.J.C. van Dijk, who 
was Minister of War but also the secretary of the Kuyper Foundation; cf. Dooyeweerd 
1922e.
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ciples of the brilliantly erected epistemology of Dr. Kuyper. Beside this, 
in my opinion one ought to make critical use of the newer methodologi-
cal researches, to the extent that they can contribute to conceptual clar-
ity” (op. cit: 49). The latter—the newer methodological researches—no 
doubt involve the sort of suggestions Dooyeweerd found useful in Lask. 
But this is set off from the reference to Kuyper. Perhaps the context moti-
vated the somewhat exuberant—and unexpected—reference to Kuyper; 
unexpected, for his name had not occurred in the epistemological discus-
sions to date. Dooyeweerd must have had ‘critical realism’ uppermost 
in mind. Kuyper’s epistemology is no doubt also a version of critical re-
alism.140 But it is Vollenhoven’s template of critical realism that is more 
directly relevant for Dooyeweerd. The broadening of reference to include 
Kuyper was strategic.141
 The reference to the problem of sovereignty reminds one of the dis-
cussion with G. Scholten, conducted in the prior month of April. In that 
discussion we found that the emphasis was on the difference between the 
standpoints of legality and ethics. They being mutually exclusive, each 
has its own sovereignty. Their sovereignty is defended on the basis of a 
prior methodological or value-scientific clarification of the relevant do-
mains, i.e. adducing the distinct ideas and the corresponding (adequate) 
concepts of legality and ethics. So Dooyeweerd’s suggestion that the dis-
cussion of scientific method be prior to the discussion of sovereignty, has 
in the background the notion of the Gegenstand-sphere (the part relevant 
for the value-sciences) and the divine Logos that is its warrant and prin-
ciple. I believe that this puts a stamp on Dooyeweerd’s statement in the 
memorandum that “from out of the Calvinistic doctrine of sovereignty 
lines need to be drawn for the relation of church and state, state and 
society, government and laity, and the [parts of ] laity mutually” (op. cit.: 
140   Dooyeweerd’s later negative assessment of Kuyper’s epistemology includes this 
realism. He finds in Kuyper, as well as in J. Woltjer and H. Bavinck, a philosophical 
influence that is “in part of scholastic, in part of modern epistemological origin”, which 
is incompatible with the religious basic view (religieuze grond-conceptie) of Calvinism. 
He summarizes: “The scholastic line comes especially to expression in the traditional 
philosophical view of soul and body, in the doctrine of the logos and the realism of ideas, 
the modern [line] in different parts of Kuyper’s philosophical epistemology, that have a 
so-called critical realist stamp”; Dooyeweerd 1939: 197. 
141   This was before Dooyeweerd ‘rediscovered’ the importance of Kuyper when 
reading meditations by him, as reported by R. Henderson on the basis of information 
Dooyeweerd recorded late in life. The references in this report to ‘offices of the Kuyper 
Foundation’ and ‘landlady responsible for meals’ situate this rediscovery between 1 Octo-
ber 1922 (the beginning of his employment for the Foundation) and 19 September 1924 
(his wedding day); cf. Henderson 1994: 113-114. 
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50). These areas need to be studied methodically, as domains of sciences, 
so as to clarify what does and what does not belong to each, before com-
mencing with the study of the sovereignty relevant to each. The latter 
would no doubt involve practical applications and historical parameters 
of content assessment. To that end the works of Stahl, Groen and Kuyper 
are recommended for study, as well as those of Augustine and Calvin. But 
the encompassing approach is delineated by the critical realist scientific 
methodology. 
 Dooyeweerd was given the green light. The recommendation for 
study that he had formulated became his own study plan. Four very fruit-
ful years ensued. Up to this point he had written quite extensively but 
published little. His first aim had been to achieve clarity with respect to 
problems in the philosophy of legality and to develop a viable position 
for himself. Vollenhoven, we saw, had provided the groundwork for this 
search.142 Dooyeweerd could now apply himself full-time to academic 
work. He continued to develop, but he was now more his own man.143
 It does not seem likely that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven contin-
ued their late evening contact during Dooyeweerd’s new employment. 
Vollenhoven’s specific remark, that their “searching contact” lasted till the 
fall of 1922, seems to suggest that it terminated at about the time when 
Dooyeweerd began working for the Foundation. The new employment 
did not involve a change of residence outside of The Hague. But Dooye-
weerd (still unmarried for another two years) invested even his free time 
(evenings) in this unique opportunity of study and writing. But whatever 
contact there was, it was put on hold during Vollenhoven’s long illness 
that suddenly set in in mid-January of 1923. Vollenhoven was institu-
tionalized in Amsterdam till the end of June 1923. Contact between the 
brothers-in-law could not have been very frequent in light of the distance 
between The Hague and Amsterdam. Vollenhoven did not resume his 
pastoral duties till the end of 1923, but one tends to think that academic 
discussion could and would have resumed some time before the end of 
142   Here too Dooyeweerd’s recollection is problematic. He speaks of this period of 
contact with Vollenhoven as their “transitional period”, between the completion of their 
academic training and their later university careers. Vollenhoven had completed formal 
studies in philosophy, so he “was philosophically better equipped than I was.” Thus, 
continues Dooyeweerd, “I, after completing my studies in law, still needed to undertake 
my philosophical formation on my own authority. . .”; Dooyeweerd 1973: 5 (emphasis 
added). This is formally correct, but materially it holds only for Dooyeweerd’s period at 
the Kuyper Foundation. It is not the whole truth as regards the period up to the fall of 
1922. 
143   Cf. Verburg 1989, chapter 2: 42-82, for a full discussion of the period of Dooye-
weerd’s employment at the Kuyper Foundation. 
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that year,144 though now there would be much less time to invest in it.
 We found that the period of Vollenhoven’s illness forms a watershed 
in his contact with Janse. While recuperating, Vollenhoven subjected his 
previous position to serious scrutiny, being stimulated by Janse’s anthro-
pological questions and remarks. The contact with Dooyeweerd will also, 
as we shall see, lead not only to revisions in their common view but also 
to certain contrasts. But Vollenhoven does not begin to publish in phi-
losophy until 1925/1926, and we lack other material evidence from his 
side. We get a much fuller picture from Dooyeweerd’s side. In the latter 
part of 1923 we find in him the first occurrences of terminology that is 
more representative of ‘Reformed thought’ than had previously been the 
case, namely the terminology of ‘law-spheres’ and ‘law-idea’. Vollenhoven 
fully shares in the use to the first term, but studiedly avoids the latter 
term.
 But before continuing to discuss further work we pause to note 
Dooyeweerd’s earliest recollections of his work prior to his becoming 
deputy director, and also to look for hints as to their mutual relations in 
late 1922 in light of a planned joint project.
1. Rudimentary conception and ‘humanistic philosophy’
How did Dooyeweerd himself look back on the early work we have dis-
cussed when he had himself moved beyond it? He makes an autobio-
graphical remark in the Foreword of his De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (vol. 
1, 1935) that is apropos here. He states that “the first, still very rudimen-
tary conception of [the system of the philosophy of the law-idea] had 
already ripened with me before my arrival at the Kuyper Foundation in 
The Hague” (Dooyeweerd 1935-1936, I: v). This statement is difficult 
to interpret on account of the vagueness of “rudimentary conception”. 
If Dooyeweerd’s work prior to his period at the Foundation can be said 
to contain a conception, then it can be none other than a ‘critical realist’ 
one. But it is difficult to see how that could be interpreted as a rudimen-
tary version of the later system. So perhaps we are not properly attuned 
to what Dooyeweerd means to say. Strictly speaking he only says that a 
rudimentary form of his later system was already present in his work prior 
to his joining the Foundation. For the rest he does not say anything dis-
tinct about that work.
 Now there is something prescient or lasting (in a “very rudimen-
tary” sort of way) about the domains of distinct modality—logic, nature, 
144   Cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 63-65, for more information about Vollenhoven’s period 
of illness. 
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culture, number, space—each of which invites a distinct methodologi-
cal approach in view of the “(adequate) concept and idea (of distinctive 
being)” characterization. It is in virtue of this methodologically distinct 
feature that each domain is said to safeguard its own sovereignty, a sover-
eignty that is in fact a “sovereignty . . . in its own sphere”, as Vollenhoven 
had emphasized (Vollenhoven 1921c: 80).145 So perhaps it is this metal-
ogical feature of the early work that falls within Dooyeweerd’s meaning. 
Then it is “very rudimentary” not only in lacking the modal analysis that 
will lead to the distinction of more than a dozen modalities, but also in 
how the domains of appropriate modality are founded. As to the latter, 
there is nothing explicit about modal law as yet, and the role of the Logos 
retains a scholastic-dogmatic understanding of rationality.
 In the above interpretation, we have had to surmise Dooyeweerd’s 
meaning. But at one point, in 1928, Dooyeweerd makes a direct auto-
biographical statement related to his early work. An opponent of Dooye-
weerd, Leo Polak, had said: “mixing things ethical, juridical, religious 
etc. is incorrect on any standpoint”; so why, he asks, should Calvinism 
be advanced as having a special priority here?146 Dooyeweerd claims to 
understand the objection “very well, for there was a time, when I was 
myself of the opinion that the distinguished scientific terrains could be 
kept correctly separated without the help of a law-idea. Logical analysis 
. . . should alone be adequate here. But, this was exactly the postulate 
of humanistic philosophy, wherein its rationalistic character so strongly 
reveals itself.”147 
 If we take Dooyeweerd at his word here (and it would be inap-
propriate not to) then he seems to be saying that his work of as recent 
as five years ago—‘law-idea’ is introduced in 1923—could not really be 
sufficiently distinguished from humanistic, rationalistic philosophy. By 
implication, this judgment devolves on Vollenhoven’s efforts as well. It 
is difficult to know what to make of this. Certainly Vollenhoven’s early 
theism has rationalistic traits; but this, being in a theological setting, is 
difficult to qualify as humanistic. And the critical realist setting of their 
common position also does not really evidence a patent humanism. The 
role of the Self would have to be more determinative than allowed in 
the critical realist setting. So perhaps Dooyeweerd has something more 
145   As stated earlier, this is not “sphere-sovereignty” as later understood. Missing is 
the essential feature of law, including the role of ‘modal laws’. Thus the use of ‘modali-
ties’ here is still primarily that of indicating the highest material categories of scientific 
content. 
146   As related by Dooyeweerd in Dooyeweerd 1928b: 422. 
147   Dooyeweerd 1928b: 422-423. 
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specific in mind. In speaking of “distinguished scientific terrains” the at-
tention shifts to methodology. We are reminded of Dooyeweerd’s memo-
randum to the Kuyper Foundation, in which he had emphasized that the 
study of the methodology of the value sciences was to precede the research 
of the topic of (societal) sovereignty. There is something ‘rationalistic’ in 
this procedure, for it is the (meta-)logical analysis of the different sci-
entific terrains that is expected to warrant the results. But that warrant 
is provided by the Logos, not the Self. So the humanistic provenance 
of this ‘rationalism’ is still difficult to confirm. And we should not for-
get Dooyeweerd’s specifying the context of the “neo-Calvinistic life- and 
worldview” (Dooyeweerd 1922e: 49). The latter is not what a humanist 
would applaud. Hence Dooyeweerd’s qualifications remain uncertain as 
regards his pre-1923 work.
 Now when taking a closer look at the function of a life- and world-
view, we do find a rather ‘rationalistic’ orientation, at least initially, 
though to my knowledge Dooyeweerd nowhere refers to this. Verburg 
has quoted an interesting passage from the manuscript, dated 14 April 
1922 (just after the discussion with Scholten),148 in which Dooyeweerd 
relates how life-view and worldview is set to work in epistemology. 
Dooyeweerd emphasizes the importance of immanent criticism, namely 
following a line of argument in terms of its own “epistemological prem-
ises” to discover whether unsatisfactory conclusions follow. When this 
is the case, then this indicates that there is something unsatisfactory in 
the premises. One may then present one’s own alternative premises and 
show that they lead to more satisfactory results. The use of premises, says 
Dooyeweerd, is “propelled by waves of life-view” (Dooyeweerd 1922b1: 
32). A life-view cannot itself be demonstrated as to its logical correct-
ness. But if one holds to the “objective validity of truth”, then one should 
admit that “every objective error in the life-view” necessarily leads to an 
“objective error of thought” (an error of fact). Immanent criticism is the 
way to reveal the need to review life-view considerations when errors in 
the conclusions are made logically patent.
 There is more than one problem with this account, not least of 
all how life-view related to argumentation. Dooyeweerd seems to take 
‘life-view’ to denote a belief structure of statements in a hermeneutical 
context.149 An unsatisfactory hermeneutical context will harbour ob-
148   The passage is from the first of the three unpublished manuscripts—Dooyeweerd 
1922b, 1922c and 1922d—mentioned at the beginning of section III.C.4. above. Cf. 
Verburg 1989: 32.
149   At this point, as Verburg points out, Dooyeweerd distinguishes life-view and 
world-view; Verburg 1989: 33. Whatever the precise distinction is, the latter pertains to 
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jectively false statements. The recognition of this fact—which calls for 
logical analysis—legitimates proceeding from a life-view that is herme-
neutically more satisfactory. This procedure depends in an important 
sense on ‘logical analysis’. We will see shortly that the introduction of 
a ‘law-idea’ (in 1923) is meant to mediate between life- and worldview 
considerations and cosmology (the domain of facts), which at least indi-
cates that Dooyeweerd too soon felt there was something unsatisfactory 
in this connection. The importance attributed to ‘logical analysis’ would 
appear to evidence the ‘rationalism’ of his early work that Dooyeweerd 
may perhaps have in mind here. But the characterization as ‘humanistic’ 
remains problematic. 
 
2. Vollenhoven’s due?
A question quite naturally arises at this point in the discussion con-
cerning the contact between the early Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. 
Dooyeweerd provides more textual (manuscript) evidence of the intrin-
sic development of their thought during the period we have discussed 
than Vollenhoven does. So isn’t Dooyeweerd already ‘on his own’, and 
shouldn’t we simply credit the burgeoning theory of modalities and 
methodology of science, as discussed above, to him?
 Now it may well be that there is material original to Dooyeweerd, 
though we shall probably never be in a position to be able to attribute to 
each his due. But it seems to be against the spirit of their early contact to 
make any such apportioning. As long as both see and interpret their work 
in a way that they characterize as ‘critical (or transcendental) realism’, 
then it is a project that Vollenhoven initiated. He gave it a sufficiently 
delineated outline in his dissertation, along with the metalogical adjust-
ment of 1921, so as to make mutual discussion fruitful and promising. 
Other ‘critical realists’—if we may so characterize the philosophical input 
of Kuyper, Bavinck or Woltjer—are simply not referred to in the written 
evidence of their discussions, neither in points of detail nor for doctrinal 
support. The brothers-in-law are working ‘on their own’ as it were, within 
the outline provided by Vollenhoven.
the context of content (facts and values), the former to the context of thought; that is why 
I interpret this as a “belief structure of statements in a hermeneutical context”. A certain 
‘rationalism’ is then intrinsic to ‘life-view’, which attaches itself directly to the believing 
human being. In Dooyeweerd’s subsequent work the two terms are united in the way 
that is common in Dutch: “levens- en wereldbeschouwing”. In my discussion of this 
early work, I retain the direct translation: “life- and worldview”. The more current use of 
simply “worldview” could be interpreted as one-sided.
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 The fact that Dooyeweerd published so little of his early work150 
could be indicative of the acknowledgement (by common courtesy) that it 
was not original enough to be attributable to him in print. There is at least 
evidence, not hard and fast, but nevertheless telling when carefully con-
sidered, that can be interpreted as implicitly acknowledging Vollenhoven’s 
leading role, namely in the plan of a publication. Dooyeweerd raised this 
plan, in which he, along with Vollenhoven and Josef Bohatec of Vienna (a 
Calvin scholar) were to contribute. But this plan ultimately failed, though 
there were two attempts to realize it, in 1922 and again in 1925.
 In a memorandum to the board of the Kuyper Foundation, dated 16 
September 1925, Dooyeweerd recommends “the annual publication of 
collections of essays entitled ‘Calvinistic philosophy’”.151 The first volume 
was to contain essays by himself, Vollenhoven and Bohatec. He adds the 
detail that there had been a plan made several years ago “to publish on the 
significance of Calvinism for philosophy and epistemology” (op. cit., p. 
34), but that that plan had to be postponed on account of Vollenhoven’s 
illness. The latter detail puts this initial plan prior to mid-January 1923 
(when Vollenhoven became ill), probably late 1922, when Dooyeweerd 
had started his work for the Kuyper Foundation. In fact, this earlier ‘1922 
plan’ meshes with Dooyeweerd’s proposal, raised in his memorandum to 
the Kuyper Foundation of May 1922, of initiating a continuing series of 
publications, the first of which was to deal “in basic contours with the 
question of method and the problem of sovereignty”.152 The proposal 
of May 1922, the plan of late-1922 and the plan of September 1925 all 
hang together. For in the 1925 memorandum Dooyeweerd adds: “From 
the beginning of my connection with the Kuyper Foundation . . . I have 
had a work plan in mind which included developing Calvinistic prin-
ciples in the areas of philosophy, epistemology, jurisprudence, politics 
and history.”153
 From the start Dooyeweerd had had a concerted effort in mind. In 
his proposal of May 1922 he expressed the hope that the Kuyper Founda-
tion would become a centre from which work initiated in which different 
150   We pointed out earlier that material from the second and the third of the un-
published manuscripts were used (sometimes with adapted terminology) in later publica-
tions. The third, “Normatieve rechtsleer”, was even stencilled in early 1923. The reference 
to it, in Dooyeweerd 1926d: 91, note 5, includes the remark “not yet published”, raises 
the question why this was forestalled.
151   This information is in Henderson 1994: 34-35. I have not been able to see this 
memorandum. 
152   Dooyeweerd 1922e: 50. 
153   Henderson 1994: 35. 
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scholars would participate, particularly jurists of the Free University.154 
Thus it comes as no surprise that the first concrete proposal of late 1922 
concerns a publication in which different authors participate.
 It is uncertain what Bohatec would have contributed.155 Vollen-
hoven’s contribution was to be (in the wording of the 1925 memo) on 
“the general perimeters of an epistemology from a Calvinist standpoint”. 
This description does not conflict with what we know of the early Vol-
lenhoven. The ‘Calvinist standpoint’ is not likely to differ much from 
what Dooyeweerd, in his letter to Vollenhoven of 17 December 1920, 
had referred to as Vollenhoven’s interest in ‘saving Calvinistic metaphys-
ics’. But to date no evidence has been found that throws light on what 
Vollenhoven’s contribution in late 1922 might have been. We have only 
Dooyeweerd’s description to go on, which, in speaking of “general perim-
eters”, hints at it’s being quite basic. Dooyeweerd gives as the title of his 
contribution (also in the wording of 1925), “The meaning of the Calvin-
istic law-idea and sphere sovereignty for epistemology and philosophy”. 
This wording, we note, depends on his own development as of late 1923, 
so it cannot be representative, in a direct sense, for what Dooyeweerd had 
planned to contribute in the late 1922 initiative.156
 The rather basic nature of Vollenhoven’s planned contribution must 
reflect the actual situation of the time. That situation would appear to 
place Vollenhoven close to the heart of the enterprise. Dooyeweerd en-
dorses this, for he here presents himself as the ‘editor’ of the project, 
knowing the nature of Vollenhoven’s planned contribution. I believe that 
this reflects a certain authority enjoyed by Vollenhoven at that time, one 
which cannot be divorced from his role in connection with critical real-
154   Dooyeweerd 1922e: 50. 
155   Josef Bohatec, an Austrian theologian and philosopher, was a frequent contribu-
tor to Philosophia Reformata, and from its inception in 1936 was on its editorial board. 
In 1950 he received an honorary doctorate from the Free University; cf. Berkelaar 2007: 
45-47. 
156   In 1923a, in what is probably Dooyeweerd’s first study that he undertook at 
the Kuyper Foundation, he refers in a footnote to the epistemological ideas, discussed 
in its chapter two (entitled “Cosmos and Logos”) of that study. These ideas, he says, are 
“explained very schematically” here. But, he continues, “they form the foundation for a 
study [verhandeling] to be brought out by the Kuyper Foundation within several months, 
in which the points raised will be elaborated more specifically.” (1923a2: 37). On p. 42 he 
anticipates, “hopefully soon to appear”, offering ‘a specimen of the theory of modalities’ 
that he adumbrates in “Cosmos and Logos”. One expects these two statements to refer 
to the same planned project. There is no mention of other authors, but this may possibly 
be, or be related to, what, Dooyeweerd initially planned to contribute to the ‘late 1922 
initiative’. Cf. the discussion of “Cosmos and Logos” in section E below.
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ism. So this volume, as planned in 1922, would, I believe, have given 
Vollenhoven his due had it materialized.
 But Vollenhoven’s illness placed the planned volume on the back 
burner. In 1925 (as we said) the project is resuscitated by Dooyeweerd, 
though it again fell through, now on account of Bohatec’s having fall-
en ill! Dooyeweerd expected this plan to definitely materialize. For, in 
a footnote to his “Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme” (Dooyeweerd 
1926c: 29, note 1), he announced a publication—which must be the 
one in question—to appear “within some months” by the Kuyper Foun-
dation, that would contain contributions of himself, Vollenhoven and 
Bohatec. Dooyeweerd also gives the title of his contribution, this be-
ing “The meaning for philosophy of the Calvinistic law-idea and of the 
principle of sphere-sovereignty that follows from it”.157 Nothing is said 
about Vollenhoven’s or Bohatec’s contributions. But, in Vollenhoven’s 
case, the general wording of his expected contribution, as formulated 
in the memorandum of 1925, namely on the general perimeters of an 
epistemology from a Calvinist standpoint, comes very close to that of 
the first of Vollenhoven’s three publications of 1926, entitled “Contours 
of the theory of knowledge” (Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie) (April 
1926). If this was indeed Vollenhoven’s planned contribution to the vol-
ume announced by Dooyeweerd—it is difficult to doubt this—then (i) 
this volume’s realization was postponed after Dooyeweerd had submit-
ted his article “Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme” with the quoted 
footnote, but before April 1926, when Vollenhoven’s article appeared 
elsewhere, and (ii) Vollenhoven (and Dooyeweerd) evidently could not 
wait for Bohatec’s convalescence, for Vollenhoven published his planned 
contribution separately almost immediately. Now why this sudden haste? 
After all, Dooyeweerd’s own planned contribution was not yet in press.
 Crucial for the argument here, I believe, is the fact that Dooye-
weerd’s “Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme” (1926c) contains a sizable 
chunk of “Normatieve rechtsleer”,158 (1922d, stencilled in 1923), in par-
157   The Dutch title is “De beteekenis van de Calvinistische wetsidee en van het 
daaruit voortvloeiende beginsel der Souvereiniteit in eigen kring voor de Wijsbegeerte”. 
To my knowledge, this text is no longer extant. But its content may well have been ab-
sorbed into other publications, such as Dooyeweerd’s inaugural address of October 1926, 
entitled “De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie” [The 
meaning of the law-idea for jurisprudence and the philosophy of law]. 
158   Pages 34-59 of the published article are from the stencilled typescript of “Nor-
matieve rechtsleer”, pp. 74-88. There are minimal adaptations of the long passage in order 
to be at least somewhat in step with post-1922 developments. The term ‘region category’, 
as synonym for ‘modality’, is retained even though the term ‘field of vision’ (cf. discussion 
below) is now the preferred description and also occurs in the more recently written parts 
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ticular an epistemological section dealing with the Gegenstand-sphere and 
its methodological relevance in terms of ‘viewing’ and thought, particu-
larly in application to Marburg neo-Kantianism. (This is in tandem with 
the discussion of material from the same document in section III.C.4. 
above.) Vollenhoven gives a concomitant epistemological discussion 
in the said article, though with more attention to fundamentals. (He 
develops this more expansively in the other two publications of 1926: 
“Kentheorie en natuurwetenschap” [1926d] and Logos en Ratio [1926a].) 
One might well find nothing peculiar here, namely that Dooyeweerd is 
the first to publishing on epistemology in the critical realist vein of the 
brothers-in-law. Now the announcement in the first footnote of Dooye-
weerd’s article, 1926c, not only raised expectations about the joint pub-
lication and Vollenhoven’s contribution to it, but also would have served 
(so I seriously believe) to justify Dooyeweerd’s making public work that 
called for the recognition of Vollenhoven. In announcing (in 1926c) the 
imminent appearance of Vollenhoven’s contribution on ‘epistemological 
basics’, Dooyeweerd would have felt he had given Vollenhoven his right-
ful due. But when that joint project was again delayed after Dooyeweerd 
had submitted his “Calvinisme contra-Neo-Kantianisme”, the only al-
ternative was—and no doubt Dooyeweerd would not have wanted it 
otherwise—for Vollenhoven to publish elsewhere as quickly as possible. 
So Vollenhoven offered his article to a journal.159 This of course also sig-
nalled the termination of the planned joint publication.
 It must have been frustrating for Dooyeweerd to have to hold 
back, when the initial plans for publication were made already in late 
1922. In Dooyeweerd’s Calvinisme en Natuurrecht (1923d; written in 
1923/1924)160 there are two paragraphs devoted to epistemology, consti-
tuting less than half a page. This short (and somewhat cryptic) discussion 
is entirely out of character with Dooyeweerd’s otherwise expansive discus-
sions in this booklet. He says that he can only “indicate in passing” (op. 
cit.: 13) what Calvinism can mean for epistemology. He ends the passage 
by saying: “We cannot say more on this topic here” (op. cit.: 14). While 
he does not explain his reticence, clearly Dooyeweerd felt that there were 
constraints with respect to his public handling of this topic. This accords 
with my assumption that he felt an obligation towards Vollenhoven. The 
latter, still convalescing in late 1923, would not have been able to plan his 
of the article. 
159   Vollenhoven 1926b. 
160   Dooyeweerd 1923d. The publication is not dated. It was published in 1924; cf. 
footnote 187 below. 
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work as yet, hence further specifics had to go unmentioned.
 
Now looking ahead, there is still one unpublished study that deserves 
separate discussion before we turn to published material that is indicative 
of a distinct development in Dooyeweerd in the mid-1920s. When that 
has been discussed we can round off our discussion of Dooyeweerd’s early 
thought. We reserve for the following chapter the discussion of Vollen-
hoven’s thought, in which his own revisions will be highlighted.
E. Cosmos, logos and faith
An unpublished study of Dooyeweerd, entitled “Roman Catholic and 
Anti-revolutionary policy of state” (c. February 1923; our code: 1923a), 
has several important features that are worthy of mention in the present 
context. The introduction of this text (1923a1) is in Verburg 1989: 48-
50. Chapter two has a section (folio-sized typescript 1923a2) on epis-
temology, entitled “Cosmos and Logos” (Kosmos en Logos) that calls for 
discussion; only its final section, “Transition to cosmology” (De overgang 
tot de kosmologie) (1923a3), is available in print (cf. Verburg 1989: 59-
61). Verburg is not definitive about the date of this study, but he states 
that it represents Dooyeweerd’s thought at the end of 1922 and begin-
ning of 1923 (op. cit.: 48). On the basis of this information, this study is 
probably the first one undertaken by Dooyeweerd as deputy director of 
the Kuyper Foundation. 
1. The Introduction
The introduction is entitled “Idealism, realism and life- and worldview” 
(cf. 1923a1: 48). It mentions two divergences. The first is the opposition 
between idealism and realism. Idealism in its modern variant is described 
as embodying “the haughty demand of the autonomy of thought” (ibid.), 
while realism seeks a foundation outside of thought. This divergence is 
briefly illustrated in mentioning mathematics and natural science. Ide-
alism takes the fundamental notions (number, space, motion, energy, 
atom, etc.) to be creations of thought, while realism takes them to be 
founded on something outside of thought. Also in the normative sci-
ences the difference between idealism and realism is an important fac-
tor. The second divergence mentioned by Dooyeweerd is one within the 
realist camp itself, where there is “a desperate confusion in problem and 
method” (op. cit.: 49). This confusion attests “in the main to a sad lack of 
insight in the correct boundaries and the correct methods of the special 
sciences” (ibid.).
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 As it stands, the situation as sketched is familiar, though Dooye-
weerd has not been so explicit about a divergence on the part of realism. 
This takes on significance for his actual topic. He posits that “in the last 
analysis the conclusive stand also taken in the conflict of method is one 
of life- and worldview” (ibid.). Christianity, he says, “obviously sides un-
conditionally with the realists over against the idealists” (op. cit.: 49-50). 
A Christian maintains on the one hand the creation as fact and on the 
other hand the fundamental difference between creator and creature (op. 
cit.: 50). This is of itself a quite ‘Calvinistic’ statement of Christian real-
ism, though Dooyeweerd does not describe it as such.161 In fact, he gives 
the description of realism an even finer point in the following novel state-
ment. Realism, he says, “accepts for the logos of thought a divine cosmos, 
of which thought constitutes only a part and out of which thought also 
derives both its typical logical forms and the ideal material to be worked 
over”.162 Several points call for separate mention here.
 First of all, differences and divisions “everywhere in the domain 
of thought” (op. cit.: 48) are taken to be accountable in terms of life- 
and worldview issues. This holds for the two divergences mentioned 
above, namely between idealism and realism, but also the stated diver-
gence within realism itself. The latter divergence brings the relevance of 
life- and worldview close to home. In “Normatieve rechtsleer” (1922d) 
Dooyeweerd had linked the “postulate of realism” to a view of life, one 
that one either accepts or rejects (Dooyeweerd 1923d1: 34). This is how 
the “thought-alien cosmic sphere” is broached, this being accepted as the 
postulate of realism that is concomitant to the view of life one proceeds 
from. Thus, a life- and worldview has direct relevance for metaphysics (as 
we have noted before; cf. footnote 55 above), and accordingly a Calvinis-
tic life- and worldview may be expected to prescribe a relevant metaphys-
ics or understanding of realism. (To anticipate: in the course of 1923 
161   This may be taken to be in line with the “Calvinistic metaphysics” spoken of 
in Dooyeweerd’s letter to Vollenhoven of 17 Dec. 1920, discussed above. But at this 
point there appears to be a greater sense of antithesis. Dooyeweerd’s opening sentence of 
this introduction reads: “There is a deep philosophical meaning hidden in the slogan of 
Calvinism: the acknowledgment of Gods sovereignty on all terrains of life; it [Calvinism] 
proceeds from the only correct fundamental thought, namely that the difference in life- 
and worldview should be unconditionally determinative for both thought and action, 
and that a neutral zone can nowhere be selected in which belief and unbelief can cooper-
ate (elkander de hand kunnen reiken) (Dooyeweerd 1923a1: 48).
162   The Dutch reads: “realisme, dat voor den logos van het denken een goddelijke 
kosmos aanvaardt, waarvan het denken slechts een onderdeel uitmaakt en waaruit het 
denken ook zoowel zijn eigenaardig logische vormen, als de ideëele stof ter bearbeiding 
put.” Dooyeweerd 1923a1: 48.
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Dooyeweerd introduces a notion—‘law-idea’—that mediates between 
life- and worldview and cosmology or metaphysics. This turns the rela-
tion between the two into a topical problem.) 
 In the second place, in this study Dooyeweerd no longer used the 
phrase ‘thought-alien cosmos’. Thought and cosmos are brought into 
a much closer proximity to each other than had previously been the 
case. Realism is now said to accept “a divine cosmos . . . for the logos of 
thought”. The latter we may equate with what was previously termed the 
‘Gegenstand-sphere’. The “logos” here is that of human rationality, not 
that of the warrant of the divine Logos, for “the logos of thought” spoken 
of is a part of the “divine cosmos”, from which that logos draws both the 
logical forms and the ideal material, these being the two prime features 
of the Gegenstand-sphere, alias “the logos of thought”. The Gegenstand-
sphere was formerly said to be grounded neither in the Self nor the World 
(the cosmos), but rather, as critical realism then had it, in “the in itself a-
logical material of the Logos” (Dooyeweerd 1922d1: 35). In the present 
document, however, the Gegenstand-sphere or the logos of thought does 
appear to be grounded in the world/cosmos. Not that the world is a con-
struct of thought—it remains a presupposition, its existence accepted. 
But it is no longer ‘thought-alien’ (perhaps one could think of it now 
as ‘thought-familiar’). If human rationality—which avails itself of “the 
logos of thought”—is now a “part of” the “divine cosmos”, with the lat-
ter being the source of the former, then clearly human rationality is de-
pendent on the “divine cosmos”. This ‘divine cosmos’ is in a position of 
conditioning “the logos of thought” quite directly. (We will see below 
that this “logos of thought” is now itself said to have a ‘cosmos character’; 
Dooyeweerd 1923a2: 37.)
 Then, thirdly, there is the phrase “divine cosmos”, also met with pre-
viously. This phrase no doubt can be read as meaning “God’s creation”, as 
Dooyeweerd himself does in this introduction (cf. Dooyeweerd 1923a1: 
50). But Dooyeweerd’s re-emphasizing that Christianity unconditionally 
takes the side of the realists, also suggests the continuity of the realist’s 
understanding of the World/Cosmos as ‘objective sphere’ whose ‘primal 
forms’ are extra-mental ideas (in God’s Counsel or the mind of God; cf. 
the discussion with Scholten in III.C.3 above). We find a substantiation 
of this interpretation in the present study, and there is no suggestion of 
any retraction or change of meaning. We will find it to be continued in 
later (published) texts as well (cf. III.F.5 below). Hence we may assume 
the continued presence of this metaphysical import in the use of ‘divine 
cosmos’ here.
323
Reforming Revisions: From Monadology to Law-spheres
 It may be that the sense of continuity overrides the feeling of dis-
continuity that takes place in the shift towards the ‘thought-familiar’ cos-
mos. For Dooyeweerd gives no indication that his description of thought 
being a part of the cosmos is novel or unusual as compared to earlier 
statements.163 He gives more forthright attention to the possibility of 
Christian realists still being able to wander with regard to questions of 
methodology. Christianity itself needs to be thought through more philo-
sophically, and one needs to focus on the distinction among realists, of 
those who accept “the Christ of Scripture” and those who reject him 
(Dooyeweerd 1923a1: 50). It is this facet of the divergent life- and world-
views of Calvinism and Roman Catholicism that is up for discussion in 
this paper. We shall return to this later. But we wish to emphasize that 
the current document is probably the first to contain an explicit ‘Christo-
centric’ statement.
 It is the novel statement of realism, about the logos being part of the 
cosmos, that first calls for discussion. It is difficult to exaggerate its im-
portance for Reformed thought. It is a characteristic feature of the latter 
to accord the logic (or rationality) of thought its own cosmic structure, a 
structure that itself is not logically organized,164 and which is the source 
of the content of thought as well. Vollenhoven too endorsed it, as we said. 
It is a central feature of his work of 1926 and later, expressed as “knowing 
163   There is an earlier statement in “Normatieve rechtsleer” (Dooyeweerd 1922d, 
p. 44) that seems to anticipate the idea of thought being a part of the cosmos, when 
Dooyeweerd announces that critical realism first of all assumes: “a thought-foreign cos-
mos, encompassing the whole of God’s creation, thought included, organized according 
to categories.” He immediately adds that these categories are not logical but cosmic, being 
that of “the cosmic unity of connection”. Above we identified the latter as being of the 
order of ideas. The ‘encompassing’ character of God’s creation does not, I believe, make 
thought a ‘part of the cosmos’ in a strict sense, for that would contradict the description 
of the cosmos as being ‘thought-foreign’/’thought-alien’. There is the cosmic substrate 
that thought ‘works over’ and organizes in logical categories; also the ‘cosmic Self ’ has 
the capacity of thought. These would appear to be the ways in which thought is here 
said to be ‘encompassed’ by God’s creation, while its content is organized in the distinct 
Gegenstand-sphere. 
164   Dooyeweerd writes: “de door God kosmisch – niet logisch geordende schep-
ping” (Dooyeweerd 1923a1: 50); i.e. “the creation cosmically not logically arranged/
organized by God”. The meaning of the contrast between ‘cosmic’ and ‘logic’ is not im-
mediately evident here. (We return later to a suggestion that occurs at the end of this 
section of Dooyeweerd’s text.) Vollenhoven associated the term ‘cosmic’ with its aesthetic 
root, meaning that the creation is a work of the divine Artisan, a product of his will (cf. 
Vollenhoven to Janse 7-11-1922, section II.C. above; also Vollenhoven 1926msA, §1). 
Thus the cosmos is a “harmonious whole” in which logical understanding, knowing and 
methodological treatment are interwoven, and without which logic would lack context 
(order) and relevance (meaning). 
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‘resorting’ under being”. (In fact, it is this feature that kept Vollenhoven’s 
definitive thought congenial to realism.) This entails a rejection of the 
polarity of thought and being, at least in the way this has been worked into 
texts up to this point of time. Also, when viewed against the background 
of Vollenhoven’s initial Trinitarian theism, there is a shift with respect 
to the role of the divine Logos. The role of warranting knowledge now 
comes to be allotted more in connection with the world. Perhaps this 
provides the opportunity of a more ‘Christo-centric’ and less theological-
dogmatic emphasis of the Logos. In other words, there is a quite impor-
tant revision of philosophical orientation involved here. So what does 
Dooyeweerd now make of ‘cosmos and logos’? What does the reorientation 
involve?
2. Logos as the realm of meaning
‘Cosmos’ and ‘logos’ are quite loosely referred to as two realms, areas, 
worlds; they interpenetrate, but need to be clearly distinguished. The lo-
gos “is the realm of meaning” (het rijk van de zin), and it is included in the 
cosmos: “The cosmos encompasses the whole well-ordered world of cre-
ation, including the logos, the realm of meaning” (Dooyeweerd 1923a2: 
37). Accordingly, the logos has a “cosmic character”.165 But this must be 
understood as suppositional. All individual knowing takes place on the 
basis of the (cosmic) logos and thus presupposes it. Our consciousness is 
walled in by this logos and we can never transcend it and view its connec-
tion—“essential connection” (wezensverband; ibid.)—with the cosmos 
generally. All that the human being is able to know is the (essential) con-
nection within this cosmic logos.166 So Dooyeweerd discusses this first. At 
the end of this epistemological discussion he returns to the question of 
cosmology.
 What is the ‘essential connection’ within the (cosmic) logos? And 
what are the ‘essential connections’ between this logos and the encom-
passing cosmos? Dooyeweerd now avails himself explicitly of a Husserlian 
idiom, more so than had previously been the case. Three factors stand in 
mutual opposition in the logos: “meaning-giving (noèsis), meaning-having 
object (noèma) and the meaning itself (noumenon), as the lawfully secured 
165   This ‘cosmic logos’ is clearly not the ‘divine Logos’. The latter can hardly be 
thought to be, given the Reformed tradition, a ‘realm’ that ‘intersects the cosmos’ and 
is included in it. As ‘realm of meaning’ this logos is a ‘small-l logos’, relevant to the 
Gegenstand-sphere. This cosmic or created logos will in time soon be transformed into 
‘the logical law-sphere’.
166   Dooyeweerd will however relativize this. Cf. the last part of our discussion of this 
document below. 
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referent prior to every individual meaning-giving”.167 This somewhat id-
iosyncratic terminology can be brought to intelligible proportions if we 
note the description of each of these three factors.
 (i) Meaning-giving is said to be “nothing but consciousness” (ibid.). 
As such, it is not yet knowledge but the precondition of any knowledge. 
It is a “viewing of meaning” (schouwing van den zin; ibid.), in the sense of 
discerning intuitively a given or available meaning. This “given meaning” 
is also as viewed: the water we see on the road may be real but could also 
be a mirage. I believe we can use the term ‘act’ here. Mental acts signal 
an active consciousness, and this also accords with the phenomenological 
use of ‘noèsis’, which is active cognition, intelligence.
 (ii) The meaning-having object is “the rough material of all our sub-
jective experiences” (ibid.) that accrues in virtue of being individually 
conscious of it. This is the ‘content’, and it has an inseparable essential 
connection with acts within consciousness. It is, as the term ‘noèma’ also 
suggests, the content of the “individual activity of the viewing conscious-
ness” (ibid.), the thought or what is intended upon and grasped in the 
viewing.
 (iii) The meaning itself is what is presupposed throughout. In the 
correlation of act and content, the meaning is that which comes to con-
sciousness, hence ‘becoming conscious’ has something ineluctably sub-
jective about it (ibid.). But the act could not be a conscious viewing 
unless there is something given to view, something that is simply present 
and that is ‘picked up’ (so to speak)—or an aspect of it—in conscious 
acts. This “given meaning” (gegeven zin) is therefore the objective-primary 
meaning, which is presupposed by act and content alike. It is “noumenon” 
that becomes “phenomenon” in mental intellection. It is this noumenon 
that links logos to cosmos (ibid.) 
 This ‘given meaning’ (noumenon) itself is very nearly identical to, 
or strongly suggests, the term Gegenstand of former discussions. But it is 
not likely to be an accident that the latter term is practically absent in the 
current text. (It occurs once in the last section, in brackets, after, and as 
alternative to, “objective meaning”; Dooyeweerd 1923a3: 60). The oc-
currence of act and content calls up the mentality of the Self as used by 
Vollenhoven in his dissertation. It should also not escape us that act and 
167   The Dutch reads: “Binnen den logos dan staan tegenover elkander zingeving (no-
esis) [sic], zinhebbend voorwerp (noema) [sic] en de zin zelve (noemenon) [sic] als de wet-
telijk vaststaande beduidenis voorafgaande aan iedere individueele zingeving” (1923a2: 
37). The term ‘meaning’ would appear (to anticipate the discussion of this matter) to refer 
to anything that affects the conscious Self in a measure that is sufficient to allow it to be 
noticed and named, whether as act or as content. 
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content are ‘intra-mental features’, and that their relation falls within 
what Sigwart described as a ‘modal relation’. But let us first stop to com-
pare Dooyeweerd’s discussion with that of the early Vollenhoven discus-
sion (studied in chapter 2).
 Vollenhoven made particular mention of three acts: sensation (or 
sense-awareness), memory and representation. To each act there is cor-
related a fitting content, viz. that which is psychically enjoyed—perhaps 
only fleetingly—as relevant to the act. All this occurs within the confines 
of the Self. Via the psycho-physical body, the mind is affected by outer 
experience in sensation, whereby it calls up sense-data. The mind uses 
these to form representations, or, accruing in memory, to recall this con-
tent as remembered. In order to be more profitable in connection with 
thought and cognition, the Self is able to turn this content into more 
definitive meanings, namely Gegenstände. But this requires that the Self 
take on the quality of distinguishing subject, which is achieved by a will-
ing submission to the extra-mental norm of identity. In this attitude, as 
controlled by the norm of identity, the psychically enjoyed content can 
be compared and differentiated as to its own intrinsic identity. This is the 
process of Gegenstand formation, yielding objective meanings that can be 
communicated and applied in securing knowledge and scientific under-
standing.168 
 There is little difficulty in recognizing the similarities between this 
early Vollenhoven account and Dooyeweerd’s use of act (meaning-giving) 
and content (meaning-having object) (in “Cosmos and Logos”; 1923a2). 
But Vollenhoven’s ‘Gegenstand formation’ is more difficult to place. This 
takes place through subjective submission to a norm, the result (a formed 
Gegenstand) having objectivity in virtue of the norm’s being extra-mental. 
It all takes place on the part of the Self in disjunction from the World. For 
that reason there is the prior step of psycho-physical mediation, for the 
mind has nothing to enjoy unless data enter through the body. (There is 
also the metaphysical intuition, but that is the immediate awareness of 
otherness and identity, acknowledged in the idea, preventing sense-data 
from being interpreted as mere figments of the mind.) 
 Now if we exchange the ‘Self-beside-World’ model of the early Vol-
lenhoven for a ‘Self-attached to-World’ model,169 we see how the media-
168   These Gegenstände are Objects (terms) and Objectives (complexes or proposi-
tions). In the context of the Gegenstand-sphere, as discussed so far, they delineate the 
‘essential connections’ that are themselves organized in modalities, or the domains of the 
highest material categories of thought. 
169   This ‘model’ is suggested by Dooyeweerd’s description of consciousness being 
“walled in by the (cosmic) logos” (ons bewustzijn in den logos is ingemuurd) (1923a2: 37). 
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tion of the psycho-physical body can be circumvented. An act can then be 
interpreted as taking place in rapport with something that is immediately 
present to the Self. We then have a purer cognition or intellection than 
is the case when representations first have to be shaped by the psycho-
physical forms of sensibility. Act and its intentional content then bring 
to consciousness what is already there for consciousness, a noumenon. 
It is as if a Gegenstand’s extra-mental determination (by the principle of 
identity in the early Vollenhoven), in virtue of which it is deemed ‘mental 
material’ as based on an available act and content, is now itself turned 
into and taken to be a precondition—“primary-objective meaning”—for 
consciousness, with act and content now being the (subjective) means of 
actually acquiring an (immediate) consciousness of it. The Gegenstand is 
then no longer ‘formed’, but is already there for the sake of consciousness 
and given with the world. It only needs to be focussed on (in an act) and 
attended to (as content). At the same time this primary meaning is the 
warrant for the ‘essential connections’ that the human being is able to 
know, namely those between act and content within the logos. Implicit, 
too, though Dooyeweerd does not state this as such, is that the primary-
objective meaning has absorbed within it the (former) role of the ‘norms’ 
(warranted by the Spirit), so that the Gegenstand, now said to be giv-
en for consciousness, has a quality of norm- or law-impingement. This 
would appear to be implied in the expression that meaning itself—the 
noumenon—is the ‘legally secured referent’ (wettelijk vaststaande bedu-
idenis) (Dooyeweerd 1923a2: 37; on p. 38 he speaks of ‘legally secured 
meaning’).
 The foregoing makes clear that the terminology of a ‘thought-alien 
cosmos’ is no longer suitable. But we are left in the dark as to why the 
shift in understanding, reflected in the revised terminology, took place at 
all. Part of the reason could be the realization that acts and Gegenstand 
formation, on Vollenhoven’s early view, were still too much ‘quasi-auton-
omous’ processes of thought, despite the appeal to extra-mental norms 
here, particularly in light of the Self ’s context as being separated from 
the World.170 This had perhaps become an embarrassment in light of the 
Of course, the Self is not identical to consciousness, so the Self is not thereby submerged 
in the world, though the Self ’s consciousness is. 
170   What is here described as the shift to the ‘Self-attached to-World’ model is con-
sonant with Vollenhoven’s shift to a ‘tasked subject’, described in Vollenhoven’s reaction 
to Janse’s questioning; cf. the Janse discussion in the first half of this chapter. This does 
not mean to say that there could not have been a preparatory move in light of an en-
hanced awareness of Calvinism. Vollenhoven, looking back later, wrote about a “discov-
ery” somewhere about the summer of 1922. We return to this at the end of this chapter 
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“slogan of Calvinism” with which Dooyeweerd opened (cf. footnote 96 
at the beginning of this section E.). Consciousness is now taken—more 
phenomenologically—to depend on the very reality that one becomes 
conscious of. There are ‘essential connections’ involved. There is an in-
tensification as to what consciousness is about, including a feature of 
demand on consciousness. Thus, it is not as if Dooyeweerd is simply 
‘switching models’ regarding the Self and the World. There is an element 
of reformation, of reworking former (or accepted) work and reshaping 
this to answer to a view with more satisfactory worldview implications.
3. Modality – Field of vision – Region category 
Distinctions and terms, such as ‘modality’, ‘region category’, ‘viewing’, 
etc., we came across earlier are now incorporated into this newly formu-
lated view, a view that is predicated on certain ‘essential connections’. 
Basic to the new view is the ‘given meaning’, as the ‘objective-primary 
meaning’. Because this meaning is ‘for consciousness’, the first thing to 
expect is that it be ‘accepted’ and ‘held’. When consciousness is essential-
ly the accepting and holding of (given) meaning, then our subjective con-
sciousness always involves both. One accepts in acts and one holds their 
content. Acts and content are always ‘essentially connected’ in conscious-
ness. This is because the connection is one of (metalogical) intuition, of 
“viewing”. “The meaning-having object [content] entirely hangs together 
with the meaning giving [acts] as individual activity of viewing” (1923a2: 
37). Such viewing is the essential requisite for thought and knowledge. 
Therefore this viewing of content in an individual act is the ‘essential con-
nection’ within ‘the logos of thought’: there is no act (meaning giving) 
without content (meaning-having object), and vice versa. 
 Consciousness is ‘walled in’ in the logos. This is not to deny it great 
diversity. One may always, in a new act, reflect on content that is held 
and grasp, and now seize on new content on the basis of it. (Dooye-
weerd’s example: in the twilight one might take a tree to be a person, 
and only on second thought does one recognize a tree; ibid. 37.) The ini-
tial act and content are subjective with respect to the ‘objective-primary 
meaning’ (noumenon) of person-like shape. The second act and content 
are also subjective. But, in being based on the former act and content 
connection, the latter is now part of the primary objective meaning of 
this second act and content. This ‘intra-conscious viewing of viewing’ 
needs to be secured, and this calls for ‘essential connections’ of the logos 
with the cosmos.
(cf. III.G. Overview). 
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 Determinative for all or any viewing is that the act (meaning giv-
ing) of viewing has distinct forms, these being “primary functions of con-
sciousness” (1923a2: 38). Dooyeweerd now uses the term ‘modality’ to 
denote a primary function of consciousness (primaire bewustzijnsfunctie). 
When in an act of consciousness we grasp one or more numbers or spatial 
figures or moments of time or consider physical objects, etc., such acts 
presuppose that we grasp number as meaning, space as meaning, time 
as meaning, ‘reality’ as meaning, respectively. In each case this is a form 
of consciousness, enabling one to grasp the relevant specific essences in 
concrete acts. This is said to be “an absolute prerequisite . . . for these con-
crete acts [concrete zingevingen]” (ibid.). So when viewing, one attends to 
concrete content, and thereby one presupposes the ‘form’ or ‘modality’ 
relevant for the viewing. “All these forms of viewing, without which con-
crete meaning giving would be impossible, must, in themselves, (as ob-
jective meaning) therefore stand in an essential connection to the viewed 
meaning itself [den geschouwden zin zelve]” (ibid.). In other words, any 
specific act of consciousness (meaning giving) cannot take place without 
answering to a prerequisite of meaning as such, namely the adequate 
form of the viewing. Modality is this ‘form of viewing’, and thus it is 
presupposed in or for any consciousness. It cannot be viewed as such, 
for any viewing requires its own adequate form of modality. In this sense 
modality represents an ‘essential connection’ between consciousness and 
(its) reality, that is, between the logos of thought and the cosmos. Because 
“viewing, the meaning giving, is the primary function of Self-conscious-
ness [ik-bewustzijn]” (1923a2: 43), the cosmic reality here is that of the 
Self.
 It should be evident that this use of ‘modality’ is different from its 
former use, in which it served as synonym for ‘region category’. In that 
use, it denotes the highest material unity of the Gegenstand of a science. 
Of course, such a characteristic can only be grasped or acknowledged in 
an intuition or metalogical “viewing”. But previously this did not call for 
fundamentally different modes of viewing, as is now argued in the text at 
hand (1923a2). In other words the term ‘modality’ has now acquired a 
more ‘subjective’ primary use.171
 Dooyeweerd sets this ‘subjective use’ off by retaining the term ‘re-
gion category’ as analogue for this subjective use. There is undiminished 
need to acknowledge the highest material unity of content. Dooyeweerd’s 
171   The use of ‘subjective’ is not meant in a psychological sense. Dooyeweerd states: 
“Meaning-giving is often confused with psychological sensibility, representation, feeling 
etc. (1923a2: 40). Rather, it suggests a link with the Self. 
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own words are clear. “To the modality as primary form of the viewing 
consciousness [act], there must be something that answers in the world of 
the meaning viewed, other than the concrete character [geaardheid] of the 
meaningful essences themselves [content]; this analogue we call the essen-
tial connection of the region in the world of the meaning viewed, or simply 
region category” (1923a2: 38-39). Of course regions differ as to modality 
or the nature of the highest unity grasped. Here too, much as any view-
ing presupposes a form of viewing, so any content grasped presupposes a 
unity of characterization. The essential connection with respect to region 
categories is what links the content of the “the logos of thought” to the 
world. This too is a connection that cannot be brought to consciousness 
on account of its being presupposed in all consciousness.
 In short: “The modality is [a] subjective form of the meaning giv-
ing, in objective sense [it is] a form of the essential connection of the 
region within the world of the meaning viewed” (p.39). So the term ‘mo-
dality’ is now used in both a subjective sense and an objective sense. If we 
focus on its relevance in the context of scientific methodology – which 
is its primary context – leaving out its ramifications in other areas, then 
I believe one can interpret the statement of modality as a defence of the 
synthetic a priori. Modality is intrinsic to objective necessity (within a re-
gion), and at the same time calls for (subjective) apodictic acknowledge-
ment (within a form of viewing). The problem of the synthetic apriori 
was certainly on the minds of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven at the time. 
A solitary statement of Vollenhoven, after his recovery, at least points in 
this direction. In his letter to A. Janse of 19 February 1924, he writes that 
each science needs to have a distinct field that can be viewed, for “only in 
that way can we investigate what its categories and synthetic-aprioristic 
judgments are.”172 
 There is yet a third term, itself new, that Dooyeweerd introduces. 
That is the term ‘field of vision’: “gezichtsveld” (1923a2: 38).173 There is 
172   The modalities that Dooyeweerd actually mentions in “Cosmos and Logos” 
(1923a: 38) are virtually the same as those of “Normative legal doctrine” (1922d), namely 
number, space, matter/energy, reality, the psychical, normativity and ‘(logical) system (or 
validity)’ (cf. section III.C.4.c). 
173   It is difficult to choose an adequate translation for all the intuitionist terms. In 
Dutch the terms ‘gezichtspunt’ and ‘gezichtsveld’ form a quite natural pair, i.e. ‘point of 
view’ and ‘field of view’, respectively. But the latter is not idiomatic English. Now as to 
their meaning, over against the meaning of ‘point of view’, which is a viewing from a 
particular position or angle, a ‘field of view’ is meant to express the range or scope within 
which viewing can or actually does take place. But, because the word “viewing” is already 
in use in translating “schouwen”, I resort to ‘field of vision’ to translate “gezichtsveld” (the 
‘vision’ being that of (in)sight, not of dreaming). John Kok translated the term, when this 
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need to keep the viewed content—Dooyeweerd speaks of “viewed mean-
ing essences” (geschouwde zinwezens; ibid.)—together. It is relevant to 
keep specific content together only if they agree as to modal characteris-
tic. They need to belong to the same (objective) region or to result from 
one and the same form of viewing. So in the term ‘field of vision’ we have 
the essential connection within the logos or consciousness itself, between 
act and content, as anticipated earlier. This term will acquire, at least in 
Vollenhoven, a permanent place among the furniture of his thought. In 
Dooyeweerd, later, it merges with (that much overworked term) ‘aspect’.
 We add the remark that the relation between modality as a form of 
viewing and the content of a field of vision falls within the scope of the 
relation that Sigwart calls a “modal relation”. Dooyeweerd objected to 
this term (as we saw) on account of the autonomy of (evaluative) viewing 
it entails. The term does not occur in the current document. Were it to 
be used—after all the relation between act and content is explicit—then 
‘modal relation’ would not be autonomous in Dooyeweerd’s use, in vir-
tue of the essential connections with the objective-primary meaning, as 
lawfully secured, in which the cosmos is there for consciousness. Dooye-
weerd’s realism would ‘hold back’ an explicit autonomy in this regard.
 The Gegenstand-sphere, met with in former work, is redefined in 
the current work as a cosmic domain of rationality (cosmic logos). It is 
cosmic because the inner workings of this rationality presuppose con-
sciousness as the medium that reflects essential connections with reality. 
At this primary level cosmic reality is present as intuit-able by the ‘view-
ing consciousness’. In the diversity of its forms (modalities), the viewing 
consciousness draws objective meaning (content) into its fields of vision 
(1923a2: 42). The (created) logos, in its most general sense (= the former 
Gegenstand-sphere), is this world of objective meaning (ibid.).
 Knowing and thought are now ‘fitted into’ this intuitive conscious-
ness. The region categories organize intuited content according to each 
region’s own essential connections and differences. Such an organizing of 
content is a prerequisite for knowing. For, in its relation to knowing, the 
logos “is the world of known meaning” only when “with respect to the 
knowing consciousness, the logos is constructed in the perspective of its 
region categories, that are encompassed by the viewing consciousness in 
its modalities” (1923a2: 42). Knowing presupposes intuitive viewing in 
the diversity of its modalities. Then, as to thought, ‘logical thought’—this 
occurs in Vollenhoven’s work of 1926, as “intellectual horizon”; cf. Kok 1992: 248 ff. This 
opts for a term (‘horizon’) that gets a firm place in Dooyeweerd’s (later) thought, but not 
in Vollenhoven.
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taken in the sense of ‘applied scientific methodology’—operates within 
the scope of both intuitive consciousness and knowing consciousness. It 
introduces systems into the regions that are distinguished in the knowing 
consciousness; e.g. the ‘region’ of nature is turned into the scientific sys-
tem of nature (cf. the next section) in physics as science.
 So, in summary, whereas the former Gegenstand-sphere has the two 
sides of content and logical structure, with content organized in region 
categories of distinct modality, and intuited as such, the current ‘created 
logos’ proceeds from a broader intuitive base. It introduces, as new ele-
ment, the modes of viewing of intuitive consciousness, with attendant 
fields of vision. Another important difference is that, whereas the Gegen-
stand-sphere is warranted directly by the divine Logos, belonging to nei-
ther the Self nor the World, the created logos has essential ties with cosmic 
reality, both as regards the Self (to which the modal forms of viewing are 
linked) and the World (represented in region categories). This puts the 
role of the ‘divine Logos’ in a new light. The qualification of the cosmos 
as ‘thought-alien’ no longer applies. But the cosmos is still a ‘divine cos-
mos’ (cf. section 5 below).
 In this document Dooyeweerd avails himself of a more phenom-
enological approach in visualizing how knowledge of the world can be 
accounted for, through an immediate contact with the world to the ex-
tent that the world can be intuited, the world as ‘given meaning’. The 
world we can know is the world insofar as the world becomes the con-
tent of consciousness. This, however, is to be realistically understood, 
not idealistically, for it presupposes the existence of cosmic reality. This 
would appear to definitely place the world as a whole beyond the human 
rational reach. For meaning is the “lawfully secured referent prior to every 
individual meaning-giving [act]” (1923a2: 37; emphasis added). It turns 
out though that this is not the last word. But before continuing the dis-
cussion in connection with the transition to cosmology, we first need to 
review logical thought more specifically within the range of the created 
logos.
4. Logical thought
‘Logical thought’ warrants separate mention, for certain features of it 
recur in later writings of both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. We will 
briefly make note of what Dooyeweerd asserts in the current text.
 Dooyeweerd begins—in “Cosmos and Logos” (1923a2: 40)—by 
distinguishing arbitrary thought from systematic or logical thought. Ar-
bitrary thought is given with the diversity of the modalities, in the sense 
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that the diversity to which the ‘viewing of meaning’ is subject, attests 
to the different ways in which intellectual attention can be focussed. In 
other words, arbitrary thought is as broad as the intuited range of the 
cosmic logos itself. One is able to attend to what is psychically present 
in sense-experience, but equally one could turn one’s attention to the 
theorem of Pythagoras, to the memory of yesterday’s copious meal, or to 
one’s duty or promises, etc. Each such attitude is a context of meaning 
in which one comes to formulate a judgment. “I direct my attention to 
a given meaning and form for myself a judgment about it” (ibid.). This 
is the context in which knowing takes place, its scope being as broad as 
that of ‘arbitrary thought’. But logical thought is “entirely different”. It is 
systematic thought, and that concerns being involved with the systematic 
logical connections between judgments within a field of vision of spe-
cific modality. These systematic logical connections define the method of 
thought (ibid.).
 Systematic thought, as method of thought, is directed towards the 
content within a modally specific field of vision. Systematic thought in-
volves its own acts of logical viewing. Logical viewing is itself a modality 
within the cosmic logos. To be more specific, logical viewing is viewing 
content with a view to the logical categories of unity and diversity. These 
categories impose fundamental conditions on the content viewed. They 
guarantee that everything that enters into logical thought, as belonging 
to the (logical) field of vision, has “identity with itself and diversity with 
everything else” (1923a2: 41; this reminds one of Vollenhoven’s initial 
account of Gegenstand formation, though now transformed). When so 
defined, the systematic connections (between logical viewing and con-
tent viewed) become the subject of investigation. The imposition of the 
logical categories secures the content of a field of vision in such a way 
that the content becomes a “field of thought” (denkveld) (ibid.). (I shall 
refer to this as ‘field of inquiry’.) What this says more plainly is that the 
logical viewing represents the intention of organizing the content viewed 
into a system. To that end the categories of unity and identity serve to 
mark this goal of arranging into a system. The systematic connections 
that become explicit are indicative of validity, the latter being itself the 
modality of logical thought, now applied to a specific field of inquiry. 
Thus “the fundamental modality of logical thought is the system as form 
of thought” (1923a2: 42), i.e. the discerning of validity as relevant for a 
field of inquiry.
 In practice, the identity condition by which a field of inquiry is laid 
out, takes on the form of well-defined terms, concepts and judgments. In 
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arranging these systematically, one arranges them methodically; say: one 
takes stock of which terms are general, which specific, which concepts are 
complex, which simple, which judgments follow from which other judg-
ments, etc. The logical viewing this calls for, i.e. the viewing that has the 
mode of the logical modality, is, indeed, the intention of organizing terms, 
concepts and judgments into a system of thought.
 So the relation between logical viewing and a field of inquiry also 
exemplifies, in a more restricted or controlled sense, the essential connec-
tion between act (meaning-giving) and content (meaning-having). The 
methodical-systematic intention of inquiry directs the logical viewing. At 
the same time the essential or cosmic connections between the logos (as 
meaning for consciousness) and what is beyond the logos, a connection 
always assumed but not knowable in itself, can still be studied method-
ologically in the measure that this is reflected in the content of a field of 
viewing and grasped in terms of region categories. The differences be-
tween the fields of viewing will call up different relevant categories within 
a field. The region categories make evident the boundaries between the 
fields of viewing and hence also between the fields of inquiry.174 
 Systematic thought is scientific thought, as over against the ar-
bitrary thought of everyday knowing. The latter takes place through a 
directed (intended) viewing attitude. Scientific knowledge on the other 
hand is based on the synthesis of viewing and thought, for the viewing of 
a field of vision now needs to be transferred into a logically fixed content 
of a field of inquiry. The problem of synthesis will recur in Dooyeweerd’s 
‘transcendental critique of theoretical thought’. In Vollenhoven, what is 
here termed ‘arbitrary thought’ versus ‘logical thought’, becomes the dis-
tinction between knowing and thinking. Dooyeweerd will attempt to 
validate the synthesis in terms of conditions that are of a religious char-
acter. However Vollenhoven offers an analysis of ‘logical thought’ that 
makes evident its multiple links with cosmic structure and human direc-
tion.
174   When executing systematic organization through logical thought, the content 
itself comes to be known as a system. Thus, thought that is focussed on the physically real 
field of vision, results in our acquiring a knowledge of physical reality as a system of nature 
(cf. p. 41). Dooyeweerd adds that, as regards logical thought, not only does it consider 
non-logical content, but it can also focus on logical thought itself as well, i.e. thought in 
its organizing activity (as logical meaning-giving) within diverse fields of inquiry. One 
then becomes aware of the different methods required to do justice to the differences 
between fields of inquiry. In other words, in the context of logical thought one gains an 
encyclopaedic knowledge of the sciences; thus logic itself is also the science of the ency-
clopaedia of the sciences. 
335
Reforming Revisions: From Monadology to Law-spheres
5. Transition to cosmology
In order to bring the theme of the cosmos into the discussion, Dooye-
weerd first discussed two applications of logical thought as encumbered 
by the content of a field of vision. In the first place there is the science 
of physical reality. Here it is typical (for it involves an ‘essential connec-
tion’) to treat the content (phenomena) of the physical field of vision 
in terms of the relation of causality, with its own necessity. Every effect 
has a cause, but not every effect need have only one cause. But an effect 
without a cause, or a cause without an effect, has no place here. Thus, in 
connection with physical reality, “it is foolishness to speak of a first cause 
or a last effect”. Objectively seen, causality is a necessary connection, and 
in a subjective sense, it is an ordering of a modally encumbered form of 
thought. In other words, because the category of causality cannot be ap-
plied outside of physics—this is because physics is the science of the es-
sential connection of causality, to the extent human beings can be aware 
of it—questions as to whether God is the first cause of the world, or how 
mind can affect matter, are logically absurd (cf. 1923a2: 43-44).
 The second application is that of the teleological relation of means 
and goal. This relation occurs in biology and in the sciences of culture (or 
normative sciences). Biology is the field of inquiry of which the modal 
field of vision is that of organic reality. The logical relation here is the ‘es-
sential connection’ of means functionally connected to ends in an organi-
cally relevant sense. In the normative sciences the ‘essential connection’ is 
that of accountability, which is a normative way in which means are re-
lated to ends in a way practically relevant to active, willing persons. (Here 
too the sciences in question are erected on the basis of these connec-
tions, as experienced in terms of data for consciousness.) The conclusions 
drawn are similar to those concerning causality: (i) the applications of 
the teleological relation are limited; (ii) one should not confuse organic 
teleology and practical teleology, nor pass from one to the other; (iii) 
there is no first means nor final goal, hence the teleological connection is 
a modally encumbered relation (cf. 1923a2: 44-45).175 
 The final section on the transition to cosmology (cf. 1923a3) is brief 
175   Causality and teleology, being necessary connections, allow for and actually re-
quire, an infinite series of phenomena, so as to forestall the ‘absurdity’ of a first or a last 
member. This means that the fields of inquiry presuppose an infinite complexity in the 
modally qualified fields of vision they are based on (cf. 1923a2: 44, 45). We may add 
that this holds for arithmetic and geometry too, viz. the unending series of the natural 
numbers and the unending variations in spatial forms. One suspects, what was also stated 
in section 3 above, that the ‘essential connections’ are the basis for formulating synthetic 
a priori’s for the sciences involved.
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but rich in content. It is immediately made clear why the applications of 
causality and teleology preceded. Traditional cosmological thought seems 
to have the ineradicable urge of placing everything in connection with a 
final goal or a first cause.176 Kant subjected this thought to a critique that 
exposed the cosmological antinomies. Since then, everything is placed in 
a relation, idealistically, to human reason, the latter taken to be autono-
mous. The Marburgers see in thought the origin, out of which arise both 
the problems of thought and the categories with which to think them. In 
reaction to this, various forms of ‘life philosophy’ (Henri Bergson, Georg 
Simmel) jettison, rather naïvely, along with the autonomy of thought, 
“the independent right of thought, the forms themselves” (1923a3: 59). 
In other words, though he finds the autonomy of thought to be unten-
able, Dooyeweerd is not rejecting the legitimate right of distinct forms of 
thought.
 The thought forms he does take to be legitimate are those that are 
connected to intuitive viewing. Edmund Husserl and Emil Lask are men-
tioned as examples of a similar trend, despite their adherence to idealism, 
namely of those “who award a primary value to objective meaning (to 
the Gegenstand) over against formal thought” (1923a3: 60). This inspires 
Dooyeweerd to summarize his own position as follows (1923a3: 60-61):
He who posits objective meaning as primary must assign to consciousness, 
as its chief task, that of viewing. Proud thought must surrender its throne 
to the humble viewing of objective meaning. Viewing and thinking them-
selves become objective meaning, standing in an essential connection to 
the whole world of objective meaning.
Everything that exists lies bound to its objective meaning, that determines 
its essence. Viewing is bound to its fields of vision, thought [is bound] to 
its categories.
In this connection of viewing and thought lies their objective meaning. 
Now where consciousness no longer posits anything as autonomous, but 
has received  everything, is posited in everything, as objective meaning, —
now that the law of heteronomy comes to rule unlimited in all that exists, 
also in the meaning-giving consciousness, [there] the question arises of 
its own accord concerning the law-giver, the arranger [de ordenaar], the 
creator. . . .
When everything that exists is determinate meaning [vaststaande zin], such 
176   The typescript reads: “laatste doel, resp. laatste oorzaak”, (1923a2: 45), which 
may be a slip of the pen in light of what Dooyeweerd means to say. On page 47 of the 
typescript Dooyeweerd speaks of the view of God being “laatste doel en eerst bewegende 
oorzaak” [reading ‘bewegende’ for ‘bewezende’ here, hence: final goal and first moving 
cause]. In any case Dooyeweerd refers to the dual context of teleology (“means to end”) 
and causality (“cause and consequence”); cf. 1923a2: 48. 
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is the case only in virtue of divine meaning-giving. Nothing exists in itself, 
nothing exists ‘apo-state’, disconnected from the divine meaning-giving, 
everything exists in and through this divine noesis [sic]. Between all that 
exists there is the divine cosmic essential connection.
Our subjective logos is intercalated in this essential connection, and thus 
is also essentially connected to the meaning viewed, known, willed. We 
cannot however comprehend the essential connection with our thought, 
for it lies outside of our fields of vision themselves. We cannot express the 
connection between the fields of vision in logical relations, for the [logi-
cal] relation only has meaning within the field of vision that is attentively 
fixed [ingeklemde gezichtsveld]. Likewise we are incapable of specifying in 
relations the connection between our meaning-giving and the meaning 
viewed. We can only know logically the essential connection within the 
field of vision. Both our meaning-giving and our thought are discontinu-
ous. But that this essential connection between all that exists and our Self-
consciousness is an unassailable reality, and that the whole cosmos, includ-
ing our logos, is ‘given’ by the Divine Noesis [sic], by the Divine word, 
must be the alpha and the omega of every veritable epistemology. 
Sin makes our thought, our viewing and our willing apostate, unfaithful. 
We no longer view the world of objective meaning in the divine meaning-
giving. And whoever relinquishes this divine noesis [sic] relapses in a series 
of antinomies and heresies: consciousness, thought, will, feeling becomes 
‘Ding an sich’ disconnected from God, autonomous, sovereign. With that 
the cosmos falls and [also] the world of objective meaning, in which our 
Self-consciousness is only a link. 
By the special grace of redemption through Christ Jesus, our viewing and 
thought are again directed towards the divine meaning-giving, and we 
again view the world “sub specie aeternitatis”, “in the light of eternity”.
 This interesting statement calls for several comments. In the first 
place, the priority of ‘humble’ intuitive viewing to ‘proud’ thinking is 
motivated by the anti-humanistic drive to undercut autonomy, the lat-
ter including the urge to ‘create God in the human image’ (cf. 1923a3, 
p. 59). Here is an effect of the Calvinistic life- and worldview position 
becoming explicit, that Dooyeweerd had announced in the introduction 
(1923a1; cf. E.1 above). Dooyeweerd implements this by maintaining 
that the logos (subjective reason) is cosmos-embedded. Any individual 
expression on the part of the human being is first of all a matter of ‘be-
coming conscious through viewing’, which in turn is an acceptance of 
meaning (i.e. anything one can become conscious of, as being intuit-able 
or ‘view-able’), and applying this in subsequent acts of thinking, willing, 
feeling, etc. and their respective content.177 The perspective of intuition 
177   Dooyeweerd states: “Viewing, the meaning-giving [i.e. act], is the primary func-
tion of Self-consciousness. We could characterize this function as region category of 
Self-consciousness (as objective meaning). Thinking, willing, feeling, empathy etc. are 
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encompassing knowledge, and the latter in turn encompassing thought, 
is motivated by the Calvinistic life- and worldview, as here understood.
 That worldview understanding, secondly, advances notions that af-
fect the whole context of understanding. In speaking of “the divine cos-
mic essential connection”, the recurrence of the implicated ‘divine cos-
mos’ here reminds one of the metaphysics still in operation, namely of a 
realism of being, as warranted by the idea in the divine Counsel. This is 
not spelled out here, but the reference to “essential connection between 
all that exists . . . an unassailable reality” at this level makes it hard to 
interpret the phrase other than in the metaphysical-scholastic sense we 
found in the prior documents.
 New, and not continuous with prior work, is the reference to the 
divine Logos here. It is referred to in the idiom of meaning and meaning-
giving, divine meaning-giving, divine noèsis (thinking, intelligence), etc. 
Here is the principle of divine rationality. Familiar is the appeal to the 
divine Logos, as independent divine Person and as warrant for knowledge 
(the Gegenstand-sphere). But the divine Logos is now given the role of 
warranting the primary objective meaning. Objective meaning is “pos-
ited”, which suggests the metaphor of ‘giving’, but in a way that is lawful, 
securing, holding. This turns the primary human role into one of pas-
sively receiving, submitting, of grasping the objective-primary meaning 
for human consciousness. So the divine meaning-giving is what makes 
the cosmos intuit-able for human consciousness. The divine Logos here 
‘acts’ within the context of the (divine) cosmos, making the cosmos in-
telligible for human beings—recognizing essential connections—to the 
extent that this falls within the scope of the created logos’ capacity in 
terms of human intuitive consciousness.
 Thirdly, unless the human being can relate to the divine Logos, there 
will not be a proper awareness of the source of the objective-primary 
meaning for human consciousness. This leads and is attested to by the 
endless difficulties by way of antinomies, heresies, etc. One needs to ac-
cept on faith and as special grace (for no other option is viable) that 
everything exists in and through this Logos—the link to Self-conscious-
ness makes this an “unassailable reality”. Our limited subjective logos, by 
means of the “redemption through Christ”, can then again be directed 
secondary functions of consciousness, in that sense that they presuppose the viewing of 
the meaning willed, the meaning felt, the meaning empathized with. They are as it were 
the modal categories of Self-consciousness” (1923a2: 43). Dooyeweerd here suggests that 
self-consciousness might be approached as being a modality in its own right, with a re-
gion of its own. Little became of this proposal, but it does emphasize the Self-attached 
to-World position that Dooyeweerd now defends. 
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to the divine meaning-giving and thereby gain access to a viewing of the 
world from the point of view of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis).
 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Dooyeweerd is here tak-
ing over a feature of Catholicism, that he otherwise critically reviews in 
this study. If the term ‘faith’ is taken generically to stand for accepted 
belief, special grace, redemption, and the like, then it is such faith that is 
needed to supplement the limitation of human reason. The limitation of 
human reason intuiting meaning is, of course, not itself due to human 
fallacy; only the lack of orientation to the divine Logos is religiously cul-
pable. But redemption, which relieves the human being of this censure, 
is also thought of as putting the limited human logos in a right relation 
to the divine Logos, permitting the human logos to overcome its inherent 
limitation and see the world as God sees it, viz. in the light of eternity. 
This makes sense only when the divine Logos and the human logos are 
significantly congruent or in harmony, otherwise faith’s orientating us to 
the divine Logos would not have the effect of supplementing our human 
viewing. This is, of course, a variant of the scholastic view of the relation 
between subjective and objective reason we also found in the early Vol-
lenhoven, and it is now still in effect in what is new in the current docu-
ment.
 We add the remark that it is not clear how faith effects this, un-
less this supplementing is within and part of faith’s own function. We 
quoted Dooyeweerd as stating: “Thinking, willing, feeling, empathy etc. 
are secondary functions of consciousness . . .” (cf. footnote 112 above). 
Faith is not mentioned as a ‘function’. But in light of “the special grace of 
redemption through Christ Jesus” (1923a3: 61), faith would appear to be 
more directly relevant for the connection of the Self and the divine Logos 
(in Christ).178
178   In the typescript of the current text (1923a), Dooyeweerd has a summary state-
ment near its end that is worthy of quote.
  Calvinistic cosmology takes a stand when confessing that the whole world of 
objective meaning exists only in and through the divine meaning-giving (noè-
sis), and that everywhere essential connections exist, which we however can 
only know within the fields of vision. Thought ought to subject itself to the 
divine revelation, but [it] cannot bridge a gap between our fields of vision by 
introducing a relation which can only be applied within particular fields of vi-
sion.
  Nature and grace remain divided, in Calvinistic thought, by a deep chasm of 
the different fields of vision and can only be reconciled in the divine noèsis (the 
divine meaning-giving) of regeneration, rebirth. (op. cit. : 52) 
The redemptive moment of life experience (in Christ) is essential to appreciate the Logos’ 
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 One might wonder whether this text does not announce Dooye-
weerd’s later explicit view of meaning as ontological principle, found in 
De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935-1936). Meaning is there stated to be 
‘the being of all creaturely reality’.179 Thus understood, it undercuts the 
question as to what has or carries meaning. That meaning is channelled 
through the diversity of the modalities—‘meaning’ here too is ‘meaning 
for consciousness’—but it takes on definiteness in terms of the coher-
ence, totality and unity of meaning.180 I believe it would be a mistake 
to read this 1935 view into the current text. For the current text has its 
locus in the philosophy of science. The essential connections between the 
fields of vision (that limit the scientific consciousness) would appear to 
presuppose a foundation in a cosmology. The text, which speaks of the 
transition to cosmology, does not actually indicate what that cosmol-
ogy is. But when, in connection with the (religious) fall, he speaks of 
“the [divine] cosmos and the world of objective meaning, in which our 
Self-consciousness is only a link” (1923a3: 60; emphasis added), this as-
sumes a cosmos apart from “the world of objective meaning”—the latter 
(the intuit-able cosmos) is in fact an alternative formulation of what was 
formerly termed ‘the Gegenstand-sphere’. This agrees with the character-
ization of the creator as “the arranger” [“de ordenaar”] (1923a3: 60) and 
the Christian’s “holding to the fact of creation” (1923a1: 50). Meaning 
is here taken as portraying the arrangement inherent in the cosmos. Our 
being participants of the cosmos—through participation we are a part of 
the cosmos, not a pole of thought over against being—secures the law of 
heteronomy, on which depends the primary viewing of consciousness. 
And, as emphasized in the introduction (section E.1), Dooyeweerd holds 
that the Christian chooses resolutely for realism over against idealism in 
that viewing. Realism is not relinquished (as yet).181 
cosmological role of meaning-giving. 
179   Dooyeweerd 1935-1936, I: 6. The Dutch reads: “De zin is het zijn van alle crea-
tuurlijk zijnde. . . .” 
180   The terms ‘totality of meaning’ and ‘unity of meaning’ are given religious deter-
minations in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935-1936). Thus it is not a priori certain that 
the ‘scholastic problem’, signalled in the current text, does not continue to have an ef-
fect in Dooyeweerd’s later work. Also the metaphor of the ‘lookout tower’ (uitzichttoren) 
from which, as ‘Archimedean point’ for philosophy, a standpoint can be taken above the 
temporal diversity and coherence of meaning (op. cit. , I: 10, 14-15), retains something 
of the ‘seeing in the light of eternity’. Naturally, all this deserves careful discussion of its 
own, which is out of place here, though we will return to this at the end of this chapter. 
Cf. the parallel reference in Dooyeweerd 1953-1958, I: 8, 12.
181   Note that in this document of Dooyeweerd the Self is not explicitly said to be 
‘cosmic’. There is too little textual evidence to be clear on the anthropology here. But 
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 Important features of this text recur in Vollenhoven’s work of 1926. 
Central is the resorting of knowing under being. With him too the cosmic 
connections between what are then called “law-spheres” are not open 
to inspection. But the analogies (once they are seen) between the fields 
of inquiry are themselves indicative of the cosmic structure. The Self ’s 
connection to the activity of thought is also one that cannot be brought 
entirely to consciousness. But there is no hint in Vollenhoven’s work of 
the introduction of ‘faith’ as somehow warranting a view of the world 
‘sub specie aeternitatis’. That had not been part of his ‘qualified scholasti-
cism’182 in his early work either. 
F. Law-idea
We have now reached a point where we can begin to round off the dis-
cussion of Dooyeweerd’s early work. The signal for this is the appearance 
of the term ‘wetsidee’—law-idea—in (about mid-)1923, a term central 
to Dooyeweerd, which Vollenhoven hardly ever used.183 We can bring 
together numerous writings of Dooyeweerd that all centre on this theme. 
In fact, we now reach a point where Dooyeweerd does indeed publish 
work, meaning that he considers it suitable to be published and for which 
he accepts responsibility. The theme of law-idea focuses on a cluster of 
Dooyeweerd does say that viewing is the primary function of Self-consciousness, with 
thinking, willing, feeling, empathy, etc. as secondary functions (1923a3: 43). What is 
thought, willed, etc. first needs to be intuited through viewing (ibid.). Thus, while for 
example thinking takes place in direct rapport with the cosmic primary meaning, the 
viewing subject has a ‘deeper’ basis in Self-consciousness. If we include the relevance of 
the sub specie aeternitatis then the Self could already here appear to have ‘supra-temporal’ 
significance. 
182   Vollenhoven’s early ‘qualified scholasticism’ is the view that, though there is a 
harmony between subjective and objective reason, this harmony is not sufficient to act as 
foundation of knowledge. A (metalogical) intuition that supports ‘synthetic a priori’s’ is 
also required; cf. chapter two. 
183   It is only in the late 1930s and early 1940s that Vollenhoven temporarily used 
the term “philosophy of the law-idea” in application to his own thought; cf. Vollenhoven 
1939k: 5; also Vollenhoven 1942m, in which he switches between “philosophy of the 
law-idea” and “Calvinistic philosophy”. I can’t help thinking that part of the reason is 
the opposition that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were subject to in the 1930s, which 
was then coming to a head. A united front was strategically essential. But 1938-1941 
also evidences development. For from that time the law, as boundary between God and 
cosmos, is no longer simply taken by Vollenhoven to be predicated on their difference, 
but also includes its own moment of connection, and as something knowable in its own 
right. This change is worked into the text of Isagôgè Philosophiae in the editions of 1939 
and later, though without using the term ‘wetsidee’; cf. chapter 4 and also my “Algemene 
inleiding” [General introduction] to the text-critical edition of Isagôgè Philosophiae, i.e. 
Vollenhoven 2010.
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notions that help characterize the distinct position that Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven have sought within the tradition of Calvinism and is also 
indicative of a distinguishing feature of philosophical understanding.184
 In a study (unpublished, 1923b), dated October 1923, entitled 
“The doctrine of the sovereignty of legality and of state sovereignty in 
its consequences for the relation of government and laity”, there is men-
tion of notions that are identified as being explicitly Calvinistic. They 
are: “the absolute sovereignty of God over the whole terrain of his cre-
ation” and “between God and his creation [Calvinism] posits everywhere 
the law as boundary concept, that human reason cannot transcend”.185 
Dooyeweerd is now, more explicitly than before, reflecting on the roots 
of the Reformed tradition so as to give more security to his basic life- and 
worldview stance from which he operates. The very term ‘Calvinism’, 
as he (again) emphasizes—as had Abraham Kuyper in his Lectures on 
Calvinism—is used “not merely as a theological system, but rather as a 
view that encompasses all the terrains of life” (Dooyeweerd 1923c: 63). 
184   There are numerous works of Dooyeweerd relevant to the discussion. To facili-
tate reference, the following system of bibliographical codes is used.
- 1923d: Calvinisme en Natuurrecht. Referaat voor de Calvinistische Juristen Vereeniging. 
Amersfoort: Wed. W. van Wijnen, [not dated, but published in 1924]; 32 pages.
- 1923e1-5: “Het Calvinistisch beginsel der souvereiniteit in eigen kring als staatkundig 
beginsel.” Nederland en Oranje 4, (1. October 1923; 2. March 1924; 3. April 1924; 4. 
May 1924; 5. August 1924.
- 1924, I: “In den strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde. Proeve van een fundering der 
Calvinistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing in hare wetsidee.” Antirevolutionaire Staat-
kunde 1 (no. 1, Oct. 1924), 7-25 (Introduction and first of fifteen instalments).
- 1924, VI: “In den strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde; VI”, Antirevolutionaire Staat-
kunde 1 (no. 6, March 1925), 228-244.
- 1925: “Leugen en waarheid over het Calvinisme.” Nederland en Oranje 6, 81-90.
- 1926a: “Tweeërlei kritiek. Om de principieele zijde van het vraagstuk der medezeggen-
schap.” Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde 2 (no. 1, Jan. 1926), 1-21.
- 1926b: “Het oude probleem der Christelijke staatkunde.” Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde 
2 (no. 2, Feb. 1926), 63-84. (Summary of the instalments I-XII of 1924)
- 1926c: “Calvinisme contra neo-Kantianisme. Naar aanleiding van de vraag betreffende 
de kenbaarheid der goddelijke rechtsorde.” Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 20, 29-74. (Note: 
pp. 34-59 are from the typescript “Normatieve Rechtsleer”, 1922d.)
- 1926d: De beteekenis der wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie. Kampen: 
Kok. Inaugural lecture, 15 October 1926.
- 1928a: “Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in ’t licht der wetsidee”, Antirevolutionaire 
Staatkunde n.s. 2 (no. 1, 1928), pp. 21-121.
- 1928b: “Naschrift. Inzake het recht der Calvinistische wetenschapsbeschouwing, en het 
misverstand eener ‘neutraal-wetenschappelijke’ kritiek”; “Beroepsmisdaad en strafvergeld-
ing in ’t licht der wetsidee” Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde n.s. 2 (no. 4, 1928), pp. 419-
436. 
185   Cf. Verburg 1989: 62; a quote from 1923b. 
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In securing this, he now speaks of a ‘law-idea’ that is typical of Calvinism, 
a term he found in the German theologian, Matthias Schneckenburg-
er, who used it to typify Calvinism’s Christology and ethics, but which 
Dooyeweerd now generalizes to cover all terrains of life.186 But the most 
explicit statement of “Calvinism” is in a booklet, entitled “Calvinism and 
Natural Law”.187 It includes a discussion in which the term ‘law-idea’ is 
introduced and defended. It would appear to be the first statement on 
Calvinistic thought that was actually published.
 In setting the tone of his discussion, and in confirming Kuyper’s 
view of Calvinism as embodying a unitary view of life and the world, 
Dooyeweerd claims that Calvinism “contains in itself a deep philosophi-
cal view of life, offers the contours for a distinct [eigen] epistemology, a 
distinct philosophy of science, a distinct psychology, a distinct view of 
history, a distinct doctrine of legality, a distinct state policy [staatkunde]” 
(Dooyeweerd 1923d: 3). The root of this vitality lies not in Calvin but in 
the “unfathomable word of God [“Gods woord”], in Calvin’s acknowl-
edging of divine sovereignty in the very distinct and pregnant sense over 
the whole of creation” (ibid.). In other words, Dooyeweerd now takes 
Calvinism to be more pregnant in meaning than had been the case be-
fore, though ever since his letter to Vollenhoven (17 December 1920) 
there has been an appeal to Calvinism in a positive and (depending on 
how ‘metaphysical’ is used there in this letter) broad sense.
1. Law-idea as ‘organon’
In order to get a handle on this richer meaning, Dooyeweerd turns to his-
tory in search of how classic thinkers brought a synthesis to bear in their 
life- and world view. One then discovers, as “‘the organon’188 of every self-
186   Cf. Dooyeweerd 1924, I: 9, note 1. 
187   1923d. The text is a presentation Dooyeweerd planned for the first annual meet-
ing of the Association of Calvinistic Jurists on 3 June 1924. Lack of time led to Dooye-
weerd’s presentation being postponed to the next annual meeting a year later. But the 
text was already in print in 1924, for Dooyeweerd refers to it in the fourth of a popular 
series on Calvinism, in Nederland en Oranje, August 1924 (1923e4, 72). Cf. also Verburg 
1989: 70. Henderson states, without offering any support, that the text was written in 
1923; cf. Henderson 1994: 117, n. 209. Evidence supporting this early composition is 
Dooyeweerd’s letter to J. Ridderbos of Kampen, dated 16 January 1924. About half of 
this letter is an explanation of the “Reformed law-idea” (gereformeerde wetsidee), and it 
reads as a direct summary of the relevant part of Calvinism and Natural law (prior to the 
parts about natural law).
188   John Kraay used this term to characterize Dooyeweerd’s early thought (1924-
1926). Because he limits himself to the published work, no connections are laid with 
Dooyeweerd’s prior texts, for which this term is less suitable. Kraay interprets shifts in 
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contained system of life- and worldview a leading cosmological principle 
that one can call the idea of law [or “law-idea”, wetsidee]” (1923d: 4). In 
ancient philosophy one finds a lex naturalis (natural law), which serves 
as a principle of arrangement (ordeningsprinciep), an architectural “design 
plan” for the whole of creation. It is variously expressed, being idealistic in 
Plato, entelechistic in Aristotle, materialistic in the Stoa, etc. In each case 
there is a distinct way in which the main features of life and the world 
come together, features of nature, of the human being, of natural life, or 
social life, of politics, ethics, cultic life, etc. And in that coming together 
a cosmological principle serves as blue print. In the Stoa everything is caus-
ally determined; hence a ‘prima causa’ is the principle of determination, 
operating through the cause-effect connection. In Aristotle, everything is 
oriented to ends, hence here the ‘ultima finis’ is the privileged principle, 
operating through the means-end relation. (Plato, perhaps tellingly, is 
not mentioned further.) Important for Dooyeweerd is that these two dif-
ferent connections also serve as models of rationality. Via a cause-effect 
structure reason attempts to understand how everything comes to be, via 
a means-end relation reason asks why.
 In Christianity it is “Augustine who, in a vigorous attempt, ventured 
to formulate a law-idea from out of the Christian life- and worldview” 
(1923d: 7). With him the law-idea is expressed as a lex aeterna (‘eternal 
law’; the “lawful plan of God”; 1923d: 9) not a natural law (the latter is 
implicated in the former). This eternal law is predicated on “the absolute 
sovereignty of God and the boundary division between the finite and 
the infinite” (1923d: 8) Augustine availed himself of elements of Philo’s 
‘Logos doctrine’ and the Neoplatonic layered arrangement of hypostases 
of being to fill-out his law-idea. In Neoplatonism’s vertical arrangement, 
God is the highest unity, from which emanate intellect (nous), which 
includes the (Platonic) Ideas, then the Soul and finally Nature or mat-
ter in its infinite forms. Augustine replaced the emanation with creation 
and the Neoplatonic nous with the Philonic Logos, and there we have “in 
rough form the content of Augustine’s law-idea” (1923d: 8).
 But this lex aeterna of Augustine does not completely satisfy. In 
emphasizing creation, there is the “Christian-theistic strain” in which the 
will of the personal God is central, the creator of Heaven and Earth, as 
predicated on the boundary division between the infinite creator and the 
finite creature. (This is central to the theological doctrine of providence 
and predestination; see below.) But there is also the “Neoplatonic strain” 
Dooyeweerd’s terms, and in their meanings, to be indicative of “successive conceptions” 
in his development; cf. Kraay 1979. 
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in which this boundary is relativized. The hierarchical structure of be-
ing makes it possible to descend and lose oneself in the lower diversity, 
but also to ascend to the highest region and gain mystical union with 
the Godhead. But this “identifies the eternal law with God’s essence, 
whereby that law is made to be binding on God” (1923d: 8). So this 
“Augustinian-Platonic law-idea” (1923d: 9) is idealistic, in the sense that 
“it posits the dominance of the spiritual over the material, the soul over 
matter, the idea over its concretization” (1923d: 8). The net effect is that 
the Christian-theistic boundary distinction between the infinite God and 
the finite creature was accommodated to support cosmological interpre-
tations of the Neoplatonic descent and ascent, namely in application of 
either a ‘prima causa’ doctrine or a ‘ultima finis’ one, respectively. Thomas 
Aquinas, by working an Aristotelian entelechism into a nature-grace doc-
trine, offered Catholicism such a ‘synthesized’ (mediated) law-idea.
 Luther broke with the Thomistic arrangement of nature and grace. 
He rejected the view of the church as the warrant and dispenser of grace, 
replacing this with a more personal, soteriologically oriented life- and 
worldview. But this still entailed a split view, for it lacked a unifying 
cosmological law-idea. It was Calvin who came with a clear and unifying 
law-idea, that Dooyeweerd characterizes as a divine “uniform providen-
tial world-plan”, which could serve as instrument (organon) for the Prot-
estant-Calvinistic life- and worldview. In basing himself on providence 
and predestination, Calvin conceived of this “providential world-plan” 
as differing toto caelo from Stoic and Thomistic-Aristotelian ones (cf. 
1923d: 11). The Stoic law-idea being causally deterministic, it induces 
a (blind) fatalism, dominated by reason. In Stoicism, reason is a divine, 
active principle that holds sway in the world and acts as a model for 
human reason to follow. The Thomistic-Aristotelian view allows human 
reason to understand the natural world, as the ‘natural component’ (lex 
naturalis) of Gods world-plan—in other words, subjective and objective 
reason are here in harmony—and only for the higher region of grace is 
the supplement of faith required (cf. 1923d: 12).
 Calvin breaks with both views. They are speculative in the sense of 
being uncritical as to the use of reason—causality and teleology are ap-
plied far beyond their proper reach—and they “wrong the sovereignty of 
God, who does not tolerate the slackening of boundaries between him-
self and the finite” (1923d: 12). The cosmological sense of the boundary 
between the infinite and the finite is expressed by Calvin in the notion of 
law. God has ordained everything according to fixed rules (1923d: 12).
 At this point Dooyeweerd’s discussion broaches three topics: that 
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of Calvin’s law-idea, said to be a religious law-idea, its meaning for epis-
temology and philosophy, and the principle of sphere sovereignty that 
follows from it. On each point we offer some discussion.
2. Calvin’s law-idea
The sovereignty of God is basic to the Christian confession. But, accord-
ing to Dooyeweerd, it is only in Calvin that this sovereignty gains a reli-
gious meaning that is free from speculative elements. God’s sovereignty 
is attested to by the notion of law, defined as “the universal boundary 
line between the [infinite] essence of God and the [finite] essence of cre-
ation” (1923d: 13). This is said to be a “formal” moment of Calvin’s 
law-idea. Indeed, it is formal in that this condition draws upon such a 
stark polarity between God and creation, so that a difference of nature 
or essence follows by definition (so to speak). That difference generates a 
boundary line. At the same time, as such, it says nothing about the rela-
tion between God and creation. Hence material conditions need to be 
specifically added.
  Dooyeweerd sees in Calvin’s law-idea also two material conditions. 
The first is, as content, “that of an arrangement/regulation [ordening], 
flowing forth from God’s wisdom in his providential world-plan, in 
which it [the plan] finds its unity, which is beyond [our] understanding, 
also for [our] reason” (1923d: 13). Providence, as usually understood, 
involves both foreseeing and providing. Providence takes place through 
regulation, i.e. through rules that express God’s will and that impinge in 
the sense that they ‘call for submission’. This application of rules or ordi-
nances would appear to emphasize the foreseeing of providence. Its locus, 
theologically expressed, involves the Counsel of God (1923d: 14). In the 
early Vollenhoven, as we saw, this is given a Platonist twist, in his adher-
ing to a realism of ideas, when, in God’s Counsel, ideas are individuated, 
thereby being able to function as ‘thing-laws’, regulating the coherence 
and development of what is thus determined. At this point it is more 
difficult to assume a background of ideas in Dooyeweerd—though that 
will soon be resolved—for here God’s will is central, not his cognition. 
We appear to simply fall back on a ‘God would have it so’, which cannot 
be questioned because of its being beyond our understanding. Indeed, 
“no creature, nothing in heaven or on earth, can call Him to account for 
His deeds, but everything outside of Him is bound to His law” (1923d: 
12). But Dooyeweerd also explicitly denies divine arbitrariness, such as 
found in nominalism (he points to Occam and Occamists). God would 
act arbitrarily if the arranging of the world, according to his will, were 
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independent of the “divine reason and divine wisdom”. That would be an 
assault, says Dooyeweerd, of the very essence of Calvin’s law-idea (1923d: 
13). But, so I surmise, if will is to hang together with reason and wisdom 
in God, one would expect a Trinitarian embedding, with the Logos being 
the warrant for divine reason and the Spirit divine wisdom. But Dooye-
weerd is not explicit on this point.
 The second material condition of Calvin’s law-idea is said to be 
its “positing, also in the Augustinian sense, a continual relation of de-
pendence between the creator and the creature. (God’s maintaining of 
the creation is a continual creation.)” (1923d: 13). It would appear that 
Dooyeweerd here expresses the specific moment of providing. At least 
the addition in parentheses emphasizes the theistic immanence of God. 
This is stated over against deism which, “also posits a boundary of essence 
between God and creature, but denies . . . the relation of dependence of 
creature on God” (1923d: 13).189
 So the two material conditions together appear to say, first, that the 
arranging involves ordinances, which God in his infinite wisdom—hence 
189   There is a point that remains in the dark here concerning how predestination fits 
in. Dooyeweerd takes providence and predestination as belonging together in Calvin, in 
fact he says that predestination “falls under” providence (1923d: 12, 13), and he laments 
their being so often misunderstood. In his letter to J. Ridderbos (16 January 1924) he 
states that the material condition of the Reformed law-idea is “predestination (this taken 
in its inclusive cosmic sense) being the expression of the Reformed view of God’s sov-
ereignty over everything created.” In 1926c: 69, Dooyeweerd states: “In the Calvinistic 
sense, this law-idea coincides with the divine providence or predestination (in its most 
broadest sense)”. Dooyeweerd’s two material conditions would appear to cover provi-
dence, but without touching on predestination in its specific sense of election and repro-
bation. But what does predestination in an “inclusive cosmic sense” mean? Dooyeweerd 
appears to suggest that everything is predestined, and that this is the presupposition of 
the two material conditions of providence (foreseeing and providing). (We have added 
reason to interpret it this way, when we look at the law-idea more closely, in its realist in-
terpretation, below.) It may be that a difference in the editions of Calvin’s Institutes of the 
Christian Religion (Calvin 1960) is a source of confusion. In the editions of 1539-1554, 
Calvin treated providence and predestination in the same chapter. But in the final edition 
of 1559 the two topics are separated. Providence belongs to Book I (chapters 16-18) on 
the knowledge of God the Creator, while predestination is treated in Book III (chapters 
21-24) on the redemptive work of the Holy Spirit; cf. Calvin 1960: 197, note 1. But 
whatever the case, Calvin saw both doctrines, namely that of foreknowledge (providence) 
and that of God’s foreordaining human beings either to eternal life or to eternal damna-
tion (predestination), as being independent of each other (op. cit. : 926: “subjecting one 
to the other is absurd”). The foreordaining is not based on worthiness of the person nor 
merit of works, thus foresight plays no role. Evidently, on Calvin’s view (irrespective of 
what Calvinism has made of it) the eternal destiny of the human soul, as governed by 
predestination, is independent of the events of the world and the human being’s role in 
them, that God governs by his providence.
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unfathomable for human reason—imposes upon the finite creatures of 
his creation, and that, secondly, the creatures are so provided for that 
they are continually maintained as (capable of ) responding to the ar-
ranging. Formulated in this way, we can see that neither causality nor 
entelechism are suitable models to use here. God’s imposing rules or or-
dinances, which hold sway over things, is not a (top-down) causality, nor 
is subjecting things to an order a (bottom-up) meeting of ends. We have 
a condition of ordinances holding for creatures, and one of creatures held 
fit to respond to ordinances. These three conditions, one ‘formal’ (a line 
of essential difference) and two ‘material’ (foreseeing via ordinances, and 
providing for as response) are the conditions of the Calvinistic law-idea.
 Dooyeweerd qualifies this Calvinistic law-idea—God’s world-
plan—as religious (cf. also 1926c: 65). The fact that God’s providence, as 
foresight and provision, is central here no doubt suggests this, in a prima 
facie sort of way. But in a generic sense, a law-idea is a cosmological prin-
ciple, be it of theistic signature, and in that guise it serves as the organon 
of a life- and worldview.190 More needs to be said in this connection. But 
we best first continue with the discussion of epistemology and sphere 
sovereignty. 
3. Calvinistic epistemology
What Dooyeweerd has to say here he states in a short statement (in two 
paragraphs) about the consequences of the Calvinistic law-idea for epis-
temology.191 It is essentially a summary—and a very brief not to say cryp-
tic one at that—of what he wrote in ‘Cosmos and Logos’, discussed in 
section E above. Calvin’s cosmological law-idea—that notion, of course, 
was not yet in the picture in “Cosmos and Logos”, which speaks of ‘di-
vine cosmos’—Dooyeweerd now applies “as transcendental, boundary 
separator” (1923d: 13). The law as boundary holds especially for human 
reason. Thereby any speculative metaphysics is rejected out of hand, for 
such a metaphysics “would always be founded on a speculative law-idea” 
(1923d: 13). The discussion of Stoic and Aristotelian examples of meta-
physics have been cases in point. Here reason avails itself either of a uni-
versal causality (Stoicism) or a universal entelechy (Aristotelianism). But 
Dooyeweerd does allow metaphysics to have a role. Indeed, that is im-
190   It is significant that Dooyeweerd speaks of a life- and worldview having to be 
‘self-contained’ (1923d: 4) or ‘closed’ (1926b: 64; 1926c: 69; 1926e: 425) before a ‘law-
idea’ can be identified that fits it. A law-idea, as cosmological principle, needs to be all-
encompassing.
191   We discussed the possible reason for this brevity in the Interlude above; cf. sec-
tion III.D.3. 
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plied in the very notion of the law-idea, in its being a leading cosmological 
principle serving as ‘organon’ of a well-rounded life- and worldview (cf. 
1923d: 4). It is speculative metaphysics that is countered by the Calvin-
istic law-idea, in the formal condition of the boundary, not metaphysics 
as such.
 So what use of reason is justified? To start with, human conscious-
ness needs to proceed from the given. (Is the giving in this context a 
factor of providence, or divine giving?) And given are “lawful fields of 
vision”, each of which includes a domain of formal categories and essen-
tial properties. It is through intuition not reason that the ‘giving’ takes 
place: “viewing brings them to consciousness” (1923d: 14). (Dooye-
weerd does not use the terminology of “Cosmos and Logos” (1923a2), of 
‘meaning-giving’, ‘meaning-having’ etc., at this point.) But speaking of 
“lawful fields of vision” would appear to imply that, whereas in “Cosmos 
and Logos” the modality is a mode of viewing intuitively, as focussed on 
a corresponding field of vision, now the ‘be-holding’, that takes place 
through intuition, also makes way for the acknowledgement of the factor 
that holds with respect to the field of vision. What holds is the factor of 
law. Hence the ‘modal viewing’, namely the active viewing of the Self, 
now includes more explicitly the acknowledgement of the factor of law 
or regulation that is relevant for the content of the ‘lawful field of vision’ 
viewed.192
 The fact that Dooyeweerd does not emphasize this acknowledge-
ment could be related to the greater interest he places in the discussion 
of ‘law-idea’. ‘Modal law’, as the ‘lawful factor’ of a field of vision, is a 
‘metalogical’ notion. But given the cosmic moorings of the metalogi-
cal, the foundation of law-acknowledgement in the cosmos is of greater 
interest here. That ‘mooring’ is what the notion of ‘law-idea’ sets out to 
achieve in its being a principle of cosmology.
 Dooyeweerd leaves no doubt about the realist nature of his view. 
The “world of creation” stands (as in “Cosmos and Logos”) in two kinds 
of connection. There is first the absolute dependence upon the creator, a 
connection that is not that of reason. Reason is part of the creation that 
stands in the relation of dependence. (‘Reason’ is here a synonym for 
‘created logos’ of “Cosmos and Logos’.) The creation is the terrain of the 
cosmos (which, for intuitive viewing, is what is intuit-able in its own law-
fulness, i.e. what in 1923a2 was dubbed “primary given meaning”.) The 
192   It seems ad hoc to speak of ‘law’ or ‘lawful’. But the thought here is that grasped 
meaning presupposes a norm that warrants the grasping. We found this in “Cosmos en 
Logos”, in which it reflects Vollenhoven’s original account of Gegenstand-formation, as 
calling for the law of identity. 
Philosophy in the Making
350
second connection is within the cosmos, namely between reason and its 
objects. This connection is the terrain of the (cosmic/created) logos. Thus 
there is the same positioning of the (human) logos within the cosmos as 
met with previously. When a field of vision, that comes to consciousness 
in being viewed, is made the object of thought (which occurs through 
the viewing that is modified logically, a viewing of unity, difference and 
relation), then that field becomes a field of inquiry, and the Gegenstand 
that was viewed as belonging to the field of vision now becomes the 
object or assignment of thought in so far as systemic relations can be 
determined here (such as nature as a system) (1923d: 14). The discussion 
is so brief, that its novelty can barely be noticed, and one is hard put to 
grasp it without a knowledge of “Cosmos and Logos”, with its distinction 
between the ‘divine Logos (noèsis) and the ‘created logos’. Yet it is the first 
published statement of ‘Calvinistic epistemology’.
 Calvinistic epistemology holds its own, Dooyeweerd concludes, 
between on the one hand the Thomistic-Aristotelian position, which as-
sumes a common essence of reason between God and the reasonable crea-
ture, and on the other the critical idealism of Kant, who proceeds from 
the sovereignty of the logos or reason and thus makes the Gegenstand to be 
dependent on the creative function of thought. Clearly, the Thomistic-
Aristotelian position sins against the stipulation of the cosmos being a 
creation, thus distinct from God the creator. The Kantian position sins 
against the given character of reason as being dependent on the intuitive 
relation of modal viewing and its Gegenstand. Dooyeweerd qualifies the 
epistemology which he outlines, in line with previous work, as “transcen-
dental realist” (1923d: 14). 
4. Sovereignty in its own sphere
The notion of a ‘sovereignty in its own sphere’ is not new to our discus-
sion. We found it to occur for the first time in Vollenhoven’s metalogical 
outline of July 1921 (1921c). It was a notion that was put to work in 
epistemology, in particular in the philosophy of science. Here in Dooye-
weerd the term again recurs, but now for the first time (I believe, at 
least in print) in a way that is recognizably an assimilation of a meaning 
that stands close to Kuyper’s original societal use, although the name of 
Kuyper does not occur. There is now a ‘sovereignty in its own sphere’, 
said to be a philosophical consequence of, or resulting from (wijsgeerig 
uitvloeisel; 1923d: 14), Calvin’s law-idea. This puts sphere-sovereignty in 
direct rapport with divine sovereignty, as is the case in Kuyper, and it pro-
vides the context for the human viewing of lawfulness. But Dooyeweerd’s 
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discussion remains rather brief and not everything is explicit. 
 Having stated that the law is the boundary holding for the whole of 
creation, when one now considers created reality, the boundary does not 
provide a handle for considering this reality to be a unity. Such would be 
a move of reason,193 but a move in which reason overreaches itself. One 
can only intuitively view the cosmos, in which case one is confronted with 
a diversity. “Under the notion of law as boundary the cosmos unfolds in 
a multiplicity of sovereign spheres” (1923d: 14), each of which has its 
own ordinances. All these ordinances are “grounded only and exclusively 
in the divine sovereignty” (1923d: 14), and reason has no authority to 
construe these into a speculative unity. The ‘spheres’ Dooyeweerd men-
tions are (in line with earlier work) nature, history, the normative field 
of legality and morality. This is no doubt only a prima facie indication.194 
Dooyeweerd’s chief point is to argue that, given subjective reason’s limita-
tions (it being itself part of the cosmos, capable of operating only within 
its limits) what is apperceived, apart from reason, is given by way of a 
transcendental-realist viewing of reality, a reality subject to ordinances. 
Sphere sovereignty involves accepting the right of each sphere of self-
regulation according to its own ordinances. The sovereignty pertains to 
the different spheres mutually, not to persons who participate in these 
spheres. “Divine sovereignty radiates in the sovereignty of his ordinances” 
(1923d: 15). If the essential factor of the Calvinistic law-idea is divine 
sovereignty, then sphere-sovereignty is indeed a direct derivative of it. 
Hence this law-idea is characterized as being theonomic, and in undercut-
ting all human autonomy it is heteronomic as well. It does not invite, let 
alone is it based on, any community of will or of reason between God 
and the creature (1923d: 15).
5. Discussion and assessment
The Calvinistic law-idea is a complex notion. It combines a concept of 
law (as boundary) and the conditions of the law’s implementation (a 
cosmological plan that stands in relation to a life- and worldview). Its 
193   Reason is here identified, without explanation or apology, with the role of es-
tablishing unity. This seems to suggest that Dooyeweerd takes reason’s essence to be that 
of establishing connection and synthesis, ‘synthetic a priori’. This is an idealist view of 
reason, in which difference and the drawing of distinctions is considered to be of a lower, 
or at least a different, order.
194   Here too we notice that the discussion is provisional. Had Dooyeweerd explicitly 
tied the spheres in question in with the fields of vision, that are intuited in modal viewing 
in epistemology—a step no doubt implicitly taken—then the summary indication of the 
spheres could have been suggested by the primary sciences as well. But Dooyeweerd kept 
epistemology here to an absolute minimum. For a possible reason, cf. III.D.2. above.
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introduction, as discussed above, assumes a realist setting (cf. the discus-
sion below). This needs to be said at once, for in the early 1930s (perhaps 
already as of 1928) Dooyeweerd reinterprets the notion of the law-idea to 
be that of a transcendental limiting concept, whereby the realist-cosmolog-
ical context has itself given way to a context that only appeals to objective 
meaning (as modal horizon of experience, with a discernible structure 
of diversity, totality and unity). But this more metalogical emphasis of 
‘law-idea’ is of later date. Originally it is conceived in a realist setting, 
from where our discussion must make its start. In its realist setting, the 
chief characteristics of the law-idea are its being theonomic, heteronomic 
and cosmological, these being predicated on the three listed conditions of 
the law-idea, the formal condition and the two material conditions of 
foresight and providing. We need to establish this more closely. But first 
a preliminary remark is in order.
 Those familiar with the later emphases in Reformational philosophy 
will know that the view of law as boundary was more exclusively under-
scored by Vollenhoven than by Dooyeweerd. One tends to think that the 
very thought must have come from Vollenhoven. He saw it as essential 
to Reformed thought. In fact, in 1968 he states that the relation of the 
creature to God, expressed in the creature’s standing in subjection to law, 
is non-negotiable, “otherwise the basis of all our work crumbles.”195 Now 
the notion of the law as boundary is as such not new in 1923. But the 
way Dooyeweerd implements it in 1923, in terms of a law-idea that me-
diates between cosmology and life- and worldview, is striking. And what 
one cannot fail to notice is the energy Dooyeweerd invests in it, namely 
in his early publications after 1923. There is nothing of the reticence (in 
going public) we found in connection with epistemology and scientific 
methodology. So here one tends to think that, whatever Vollenhoven’s 
role might have been, Dooyeweerd feels no constraints in developing 
this idea in his own way. And he has every right to this freedom. For, as 
already pointed out, Vollenhoven fully accepted the notion of the law as 
boundary, and with it the notion of law-spheres. But he studiedly avoid-
ed the notion of law-idea. Sometime during or just after his recuperation, 
Vollenhoven was no longer satisfied with his former metaphysics of ideas 
(though he did not abandon realism). Dooyeweerd, so we shall point out, 
retains a metaphysics of ideas for some time. The best attestation for that 
is his very use of the notion of the law-idea as originally conceived.196 
195   Vollenhoven 1968b: 200. 
196   When putting this development in a time perspective, we notice that ‘law-idea’ 
is first used by Dooyeweerd in late 1923. This is the time when Vollenhoven is in the last 
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a. Law as boundary
However much the formulation of the law as boundary between God 
and the creature is ontologically loaded, viz. in speaking of an infinite 
and absolute essence on the one hand and a finite and dependent essence 
on the other (cf. also Dooyeweerd 1923e5: 72), its ‘theonomic’ implica-
tion points to the concern here for authority and power, which in turn 
assumes a volitional context of willing. The Calvinistic life- and world-
view is given its full effect here. “Calvinism maintains, with its rigorous 
defence . . . the absolute right of God, which may not be relativized” 
(1923e3: 15). And, in Calvinism the human being has no right to ques-
tion God’s authority, thus it “rejects all theodicy, which places itself as 
judge over God’s world governance” (1926d: 63). Hence, prominent on 
the side of the finite and dependent creature is the human being, for only 
the human being makes conscious use of the will. This will may therefore 
appear to be free, but the human being needs a context to implement 
will. Also the human use of reason is restricted, for it cannot of itself 
fathom the mystery of existence. Both will and reason, while not lacking 
in their own legitimate relevance, are held in check by divine author-
ity, which expresses itself as sovereignty over all that there is. Sometimes 
Dooyeweerd expresses the theme of the boundary entirely in terms of the 
divine and human agents: Calvinism sees “the law as a posed, ultimate 
stage of convalescence. One assumes that there must have been some exchange between 
the brothers-in-law by then, so some influence from Vollenhoven cannot be excluded a 
priori. Now the notion of law-idea is essentially a notion of coherence (as unity of diverse 
spheres). It is predicated on the God-creature difference and constitutes the “lawful plan 
of God” as to how the main features of life and the world hang together (cf. III.F.1 above). 
In former work, the notion of sovereignty tended to emphasize the distinct natures of the 
spheres or domains in question. The concern for coherence, as advanced by the law-idea, 
will lead to what Dooyeweerd later describes as “the modal aspects of the horizon of ex-
perience”. This is the phrase he used to describe what he remembers as having suddenly 
realized, while on a walk in the sand dunes on a warm summer evening while living in 
The Hague. Clearly, the realization was important to him, and the notion itself dear. 
The insight, as described, is formulated in a later terminology than when he lived in 
The Hague. So it may initially have been the insight of the ‘law-idea’, which lies at the 
basis of Dooyeweerd’s descriptive phrase. Whether Dooyeweerd was alone on that walk 
or accompanied by Vollenhoven (as has been attested; cf. Stellingwerff 2006: 33), is not 
really important if, indeed, the insight in question is that of the law-idea, for Vollenhoven 
never accepted it. On the basis of this guess, the most likely year of this warm summer 
evening walk is 1923; cf. Dooyeweerd 1977: 37. Vollenhoven’s reference to a ‘find’ by the 
brothers-in-law about the summer of 1922, concerns “the beginning of a more Scriptural 
way of thinking” and should, I believe, not be confused with what happened during the 
walk in the dunes. (Contra Henderson 1994: 186, also p. 38; cf. the discussion of ‘De-
velopments in 1922’ below.) Stellingwerff puts the walk in the dunes in “1921 or 1922”, 
but his reasoning is unclear; Stellingwerff 1992: 53. 
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boundary between on the one hand human reason and will, on the other 
hand divine reason and will” (1926c: 65; cf. also 1926d: 63, 64). There is 
no question of a “community of will or reason” between the Creator and 
the rational creature (cf. 1923e5: 72) 
 It is in virtue of this bare difference in essence that a boundary line 
comes into view. It is the line of the difference in will power, the differ-
ence of capacity in acting and being; it is a line marking the difference be-
tween sovereignty and subjection. One can understand how ordinances 
come into view here, as being the will of the ‘sovereign’ with respect to 
the ‘subject’. Ordinances are ‘law-markers’ that certify the difference be-
tween and the duality of God and the human being. Divine sovereignty is 
confessed to be the origin of all laws (cf. 1926b: 68). The “Thou shalt. . .” 
marks the divide, it does not act as a bridge. “Only God, who is Eternal, 
Unbegotten and Infinite, stands above the law, [and is] not determined 
by the law” (1923e5: 72).
 Yet there is a difficulty here. To the extent that law is founded in 
the divine will, law has a transcendent origin. But for the human be-
ing, who is subject to this will, the law’s impingement is a transcenden-
tal condition. Accordingly, this calls for recognition on the part of the 
human subject, which recognition includes awareness of the context in 
which laws are to hold. No doubt something like a teaching of different 
‘spheres’ or ‘domains’ is called for—like Dooyeweerd’s tentative domains 
of nature, history, morality, legality, etc. (1923e4: 31)—to enable laws or 
ordinances to be recognized by the human being as (possibly) relevant 
laws and how they are to be applied. But Dooyeweerd does not allow for 
interpretation, which indeed is difficult to fit in when the law as bound-
ary is taken to be a formal condition based on essence. The sovereignty 
of God and the standing-in-subjection of creatures (particularly human 
beings) is then directly synonymous with authority and submission re-
spectively. In this synonymy, the transcendence and immanence of God 
are not adequately accounted for. The transcendence of God calls for a 
careful account of religion—the covenantal meeting of the ‘infinite’ and 
the ‘finite’, which is quite other (as Vollenhoven will emphasize) than a 
‘unity of consciousness between the Self and God’ (see below)—and the 
immanence of God is ‘his present providing’ (of giving, forgiving and ful-
filling) in the context of the human realities, through which the human 
being is able to respond.
 By working authority and submission so markedly into the law-
idea, Dooyeweerd short-changes its basic meaning. In fact it adds to the 
portrait of Calvinism being authoritarian and rigid, precisely in ascrib-
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ing absolute status to laws in virtue of the divine origin of authority. 
The deficiency here is that the transcendental significance of a domain of 
(human) response is taken as a channel or medium of absolute authority 
(cf. 1925a: 88). Dooyeweerd will, in time, significantly nuance his view 
by the introduction of the central law of love. But in the meantime, the 
initial introduction of the law-idea implies a theonomic absolute.
 This is especially noticeable in Dooyeweerd’s discussion of morality 
and legality. Each is a sphere with its own ordinances. For morality there 
is the Decalogue (zedewet) (1923e3: 28-29), and for legality the rules re-
late to retribution. In practice, the ‘divine origin’ of these ordinances lies 
in Scripture. But so long as hermeneutics is not given leeway, an au-
thoritarian use cannot be challenged. (But one then privileges one’s own 
historically bound thought and action, by exempting them from any call 
to account.) Consider: “The doctrine of retribution . . . is the stronghold 
of the principle of sovereignty in its own sphere, as applied to the sphere 
of legality and the state. Here there is no confusion with the sphere of 
morality. Legality must be maintained for the sake of the holiness of the 
divine ordinances of legality themselves and not for any reason that lies 
in the moral personality of the human being or in human society. He 
who maintains the doctrine of retribution, confesses the sovereignty of 
God also in the affairs of legality (rechtsleven). He who relinquishes it, as-
saults the sovereignty of God” (1923e4: 31). This is theocracy in a blatant 
form.197
b. Law-idea as world-plan
The formal condition of the Calvinist law-idea emphasizes the boundary 
condition between infinite essence and finite essence. This provides for 
the ‘concept of law’, this being the understanding of the authority by 
which sovereignty and subjection (of will and reason) are determined. 
This concept of law is clearly theonomic. But there is also diversity of 
law to be accounted for, a diversity calling for recognition, whereby the 
recognition is not itself determinative for the diversity. The laws are het-
eronymous and cosmological. This involves the context of law in the 
realist setting in which the diversity and unity of law is accounted for in a 
cosmological sense. It is here that the law-idea as organon is emphasized, 
197   In this respect Vollenhoven was much more careful. I believe that, in his whole 
oeuvre, there are only two law-spheres for which he hazarded to formulate their law: the 
logical law-sphere and the pistical law-sphere. There ‘having to be a law’ for a law-sphere 
is ‘formally accepted’ as intuitively valid, and calling for responsible response. This leaves 
the actual formulation of a modal law an open question, calling for reflection that in-
cludes a law’s application. 
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enabling it to serve to defend the Calvinist life- and worldview of sphere 
sovereignty.
 The material condition of the Calvinist law-idea is that it is the 
“uniform providential world-plan’. It holds for cosmic life, and as we saw 
it is ‘situated’ and ‘secured’ in the Counsel of God. It is in the Counsel 
of God that divine providence and predestination takes place in the di-
vine governance of the cosmos. It is likewise the locus of the ideational 
realm of ideas in the realist metaphysics of the early Vollenhoven. Is this 
relevant in Dooyeweerd’s use of law-idea?
 It is part and parcel of the realist metaphysics to accept ideas as 
principles of distinctive being.198 The distinctive being that is relevant 
at this point concerns the cosmos in the way it unfolds according to the 
providential world-plan of God’s wisdom. In God’s wisdom it has a unity 
(1st material condition; 1923d: 13), but it also encompasses the main fea-
tures of reality—as to nature, culture, society, history, etc.—hence there 
is also specification in the world-plan that effects a diversification of the 
law into a diversity of ordinances. In that way there can be a transcenden-
tal effect on cosmic life. Thus, formally, what we have here is analogous 
to the individuation of ideas in God’s Counsel in the early Vollenhoven, 
which is also beyond human reason. Hence, this unity and diversity is 
such that human reason has no alternative but to accept it as condition 
of its own rationality.
 An explicit and significant statement in this regard is the following. 
“God’s providential world-plan forms a harmonious unity, but that unity 
cannot be grasped by human reason. Under the boundary of the law the 
unity of the plan of creation unfolds in a plurality, in an endless diversity 
and in that endless diversity only the law, the ordinance of God, creates 
order. But that law itself is not a rigid unity of kind (star enerlei), but it 
unfolds itself according to God’s unending wisdom itself in a plurality of 
law-spheres. Only in that way is the distinctness, what is typical, of diver-
sity preserved” (1923e5: 72-73; emphases added).
 There is a double unfolding here. There is that of the unity of the 
law unfolding in a diversity of law-spheres. This connects the unity of di-
vine authority to the plurality of ordinances, warranting the heteronomy 
198   Contra Henderson 1994: 117, which, in reference to Dooyeweerd’s early use of 
‘realist’ and ‘critical realism’, states: “Realism represents an assertion of the existence of 
things as apart from ideas, which presupposes that the two are not part of one and the 
same reality.” Realism, in the entire context of the early Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, 
concerns ideas, in their Platonic interpretation. After 1922, Vollenhoven has no use for 
the term, and warns: “in Greek thought ideas are said to be true being”, and this is what 
is accepted in critical realist thought; Vollenhoven 1952k: 86. 
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of sphere sovereignty. But there is also the endless cosmological unfold-
ing of cosmic reality itself, according to “the plan of creation”. Here we 
have more than an echo of what in Vollenhoven was general essence that 
individuates (‘unfolds’) in a diversity of thing-laws. The law-idea is the 
providential world-plan, as entertained by God in his Counsel.
 The “Christian law-idea” warrants unity, a unity “not found by fad-
ing the boundaries between divergent arrangements, but by acknowl-
edging an ultimate final law, an eternal divine world-order, wherein all 
diversity of essence is reconciled into a divine harmony, a world-plan 
posed from eternity” (1924, I: 18-19).199 The emphasis on eternity here 
makes the ‘providential world-plan’ hard to distinguish from a ‘predes-
tined world-program’.200
 In case the realist interpretation of ideas, that is here said to be sup-
porting the understanding and use of ‘law-idea’, needs extra support, there 
is the following example of the ‘idea of legality’ that occurs in “Calvinism 
and Natural Law” (1923d, 28). When summarizing his view of “political 
natural legality” (politisch natuurrecht), Dooyeweerd states: “We posit on 
the basis of God’s law itself, with great emphasis, that the only normative 
directive of the government is political natural legality, summarized in 
the idea of legality; and that this idea of legality is absolute, raised above 
human evaluation. . . . [For] in God’s ordinance of legality, every human 
being has been endowed with an independent goal and an infinite value, 
in the context of which the idea of society must be realized” (loc. cit.; em-
phasis added, for the significance of which, see the end of the next section 
c.). Dooyeweerd ‘officially’ limits the human use of reason to the context 
199   I believe that it is not unfair to say that Dooyeweerd’s later distinction in the law, 
between modal laws of sphere sovereignty and thing-laws as individuality structures, is 
prefigured in the original realist understanding of his use of ‘law-idea’. He will drop the 
realist context of his early understanding in favour of an ontology of meaning, but the 
two meanings of lawfulness remain. 
200   Vollenhoven was very disquieted by speculative influences of pagan thought in 
the Jewish-Christian tradition, among which was predestination speculation. This was an 
important motive of his later problem-historical work. On the theological influence of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda he states: “In that work this theology accepted an all-de-
termining divine activity, and in this acceptance this theology lapsed into a deterministic 
semi-mysticism, that would in time also enter into Christian circles: for example think in 
this connection inter alia of the view of predestination as evident in, say, Augustine in his 
last period and by his followers in later centuries, also within Reformed circles”. Kuyper 
too evidences this influence: “the cross of Golgotha, the suffering, the resurrection has 
contributed nothing to our salvation [heil] . . . That we are saved lies prior to our birth 
in the Counsel of God, but for our consciousness this only becomes real when we are 
justified in foro conscientiae [before the tribunal of conscience]”; Kuyper 1910: 71. Both 
citations are in Vollenhoven 2000: 368-369. 
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of the cosmos, but it is more than evident that, in the meantime, a meta-
physical understanding is in effect about the limitations themselves.
c. Law-idea and the ‘central lookout tower’
The Calvinist law-idea is, as cosmological principle of God’s providence, 
the organon of the Christian life- and worldview. So just what sort of an 
‘instrument’ is the law-idea?
 In the Christian life- and worldview the moment of religious be-
lief predominates, in particular the moment of Christian religious belief. 
As such there is no necessity in this. For example, in his Weltanschau-
ungslehre, Wilhelm Dilthey qualified worldviews in different ways. He 
distinguished as basic and irreducible three types: besides the religious 
types, there are also “poetic”, i.e. aesthetic, types and “metaphysical” 
types (whether as favouring naturalism, freedom idealism or objective 
idealism).201 The choice for the religious type in Dooyeweerd may seem 
obvious, given the Calvinist context in which he moves. But Calvinism is 
initially a theological system, and only through Kuyper’s transformation 
did it take on the general significance of a life- and worldview orienta-
tion. More to the point regarding the choice for the religious type is that 
the choice itself involved a principled limitation of will and reason in 
virtue of divine sovereignty. In the Calvinistic life- and worldview, the 
will needs to accept and submit to an authority that is higher or greater 
than itself, and in that limitation reason too is restricted to the human 
reach, a reach that is short of postulating unity. This is not to deny there 
being a unity of experience, or of thought and action. But that unity is 
for Dooyeweerd given as the divine providential world-plan, with which 
one cannot be in rapport apart from a confessional stance. In other words, 
the law-idea is operative and relevant (for the human being) in the unity 
of its meaning only through an active function of faith on the part of the 
human being.
 The following selected quotes give an indication of this function of 
faith. “[The different ordinances] all work together in that one unfath-
omable divine world-plan, the unity of which cannot be grasped by the 
limited human reason, but yet is as secure as the divine wisdom itself. The 
Christian ought to accept that unity on faith . . .” (1925a: 87-88). “The 
divine honour is served according to Calvinistic confession . . . by propa-
gating, in the world, the unity of the divine world-plan as an incisive 
word of faith [slagwoord des geloofs]” (1925a: 88). “Calvinism acknowl-
edges the sovereignty of the law-spheres in the sovereignty of the eternal 
201   Dilthey 1931: esp. pp. 87 ff.
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Creator and seeks worshipfully the highest unity in God’s unfathomable 
providence . . .” (1926a: 6). “There is an irrational connection in cosmic, 
hence a-logical, sense between the different law-spheres, a connection that 
for the believing consciousness is grounded in the law-idea . . .” (1926c: 
69). Finally: “The law-idea that is foundational for the Calvinistic life- 
and worldview is rooted in the two foundations of all Christian thought: 
in the confession of the divine creator’s sovereignty and in the confession 
of the divine providential world-plan” (1926d: 63; cf. also p. 61). 
 Now, while statements such as these can be read as indicative of an 
attitude or motivation, there is an additional significance in that this faith 
function is not only expressive of something, it also serves as means that 
sights on something. The unity of the world-plan that it confesses to is 
made to be effective in and through that active confession. This is the role 
of the law-idea as “central lookout tower”, a term Dooyeweerd first used 
in 1924 (1924, I: 18; centrale uitzichttoren).202  It is from such a ‘lookout 
point’ of faith that the law-idea is seized and understood in its capacity of 
providing perspective and orientation. The Christian law-idea is “the cen-
tral lookout tower, from which one can gain an orientation encompass-
ing all the terrains of the life- and worldview in terms of a fixed point” 
(1924, I: 18). We see at once that this in fact repeats what Dooyeweerd 
had expressed in the unpublished study “Cosmos and Logos” (1923a2-3) 
(cf. section III.E.5) about faith enabling one to view the world “sub specie 
aeternitatis”, from the point of view of eternity. There is a fideism here, 
in that to faith is attributed the unique capacity of sighting the reality of 
the unity of the cosmos, as expressed in the law-idea. The realist inter-
pretation of an idea warrants that there is a ‘distinctive reality’ capable of 
being acknowledged. This acknowledgement is not forthcoming from 
the (free) will, nor from reason, for the latter would have to speculatively 
202   We note here, and return to it later, that the term “uitzichttoren” also occurs in 
H. Dooyeweerd, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, vol. 1 (1935), p. 10. There it is linked to the 
notion of an ‘Archimedean point’ of philosophy (ibid, pp. 14-15), a term first occurring 
in 1928, in a “Postscript” to “Beroepsmisdaad en strafvergelding in ’t licht der Wetsidee” 
[Professional crime and penalty retribution in the light of the law-idea]. We quote: “Re-
garding the question [how the connection and the boundaries of the law-spheres are to be 
determined] the answer is alone forthcoming from the law-idea, for here a transcendent 
standpoint needs to be taken in, [i.e.] an Archimedean point above all the specific law-
spheres of psyche, logos, ethos, legality, beauty, history, etc.” (1928b: 425). Along with 
the Archimedean point, Dooyeweerd then (in 1928) also speaks of a “time transcending 
kernel of the human spirit” (ibid.) (also ‘heart’ or ‘Self ’) that occupies this point and 
commits itself. Though it makes a difference whether one speaks of faith or of the human 
heart (cf. our later discussion), the common construal of a ‘lookout tower’ provides for 
the continuity of the problem at hand.
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construct the unity. But the denial of a community of will and of reason 
between Creator and creature does not mean that there is no community 
for Dooyeweerd. This is the ambience (in light of the faith function, as 
cited above) in which “the full concrete unity of consciousness of Self 
and of God” arises.203 That community, implied by that unity, is what 
the function of faith effects, or at least for which the function of faith is a 
precondition. If the law as boundary is particularly relevant as drawn be-
tween the human reason and will on the one hand and the divine reason 
and will on the other, then in faith this boundary is bridged.
 Accordingly, faith supplements reason. Naturally the content of 
faith needs to be given. This is channelled through the Scriptures; in 
other words, what faith sights on becomes insight of knowledge through 
the revelation of the Logos. We can now only voice the same conclusion 
we came to earlier in connection with “Cosmos and Logos”. There is a 
scholastic effect on Dooyeweerd when he maintains that human insight 
comes into harmony with the structure of the cosmos in virtue of the 
supplement provided by faith’s receptivity to the divine Logos (cf. III.E.5. 
above). The law-idea has given this situation extra point, it has not cor-
rected or eradicated it.
 In the meantime we can point to the lingering early Vollenhovian 
format, of ‘concept and idea’, in the publications of Dooyeweerd of the 
mid-1920s. The concept is the adequate concept that can only be ap-
proached in a rightly oriented metalogical process of reason’s use. Reason 
becomes rightly directed through the supplement of the Logos provided 
through faith. The idea is what governs the reality that there is. Dooye-
weerd’s former use of ‘divine cosmos’ takes on a more developed form in 
his ‘Calvinistic law-idea’ as cosmological principle. Its acknowledgement 
calls for a faith stance. The novelty of “Cosmos and Logos” had been that 
the metalogical viewing (of the adequate concept), whereby the intuition 
of content or ‘meaning-having objects’ answers to modally distinct ‘fields 
of vision’, no longer takes place in its own (Gegenstand-)sphere. What is 
viewed is the objective meaning of the cosmos itself to the extent that 
this is ‘intuit-able’ and given with the reality of the cosmos. This puts 
extra emphasis on the intuitive viewing itself, whereby the modal forms 
203   The phrase is from Dooyeweerd’s discussion of Kuyper’s doctrine of science 
(Dooyeweerd 1939: 204), and is there descriptive of the ‘non-theoretical religious centre’. 
By then, Dooyeweerd has distinguished the function of faith from the significance of the 
‘heart’. But the citations on the function of faith, given above, lay emphasis on faith’s 
grasping the unity that remains out of reach of reason. Its realization through the pistical 
relation is clearly a precursor for the later role attributed to the heart. Thus a ‘unity of 
consciousness of Self and of God’ is what is in fact broached here.
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of viewing, that establish a relation between acts and content, become 
possibly autonomous evaluative ‘modal relations’ (recall Sigwart’s use and 
Dooyeweerd’s initial criticism of it). This possibility is ‘blocked’ when 
taking into account the factor of law as part and parcel of the very real-
ity of the cosmos one acknowledges in the realist mode. So with the 
introduction of the Calvinistic law-idea, one understands that the given 
cosmos—indeed a ‘divine cosmos’—is given ‘under God’s law’, within 
law-bound spheres. What one intuits via the metalogical intuition is law-
bound meaning in ‘fields of vision’, or “lawful [wetmatige] transcendental 
essence of that given which God has assigned/prearranged [toegeordend] 
to our knowing function” (1926c: 68). The epistemological outline is 
now clearly fitted into the organon of the law-idea via the doctrine of 
sphere sovereignty.204
G. Overview: from critical realism to transcendental criticism
Our discussion has sufficiently demonstrated that there was close contact 
between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd in the years prior to their appoint-
ment to chairs at the Free University in 1926. Dooyeweerd approached 
Vollenhoven and aligned himself to his project of critical or transcen-
dental realism. Dooyeweerd sought clarity with regards to topics of his 
interest, which centred in the main on the philosophy of legality. The 
texts he wrote in his ‘free time study’, prior to his appointment as deputy 
204   In Dooyeweerd’s first lecture, as newly appointed professor of jurisprudence (fall 
of 1926), he summarized the ‘foundation’ of his approach as follows: 
  I wish to place before you . . . the central point, the point of departure of all 
legal scientific and legal philosophical thought. All specific regions have their 
own laws. Above these specific region laws there must be a universal law-order, 
in which all the specific region laws are founded, from which they derive their 
specific validity and also wherein each law-sphere’s own area of competence is 
delimited. Each law-sphere has its own concept of law; together they equally 
appeal to a law-idea, a unity of all specific law-spheres, to a cosmic world-order, 
a world-plan.
  In that way, from the start of our philosophical orientation, we distinguish the 
law-concept, as the concept of all specific region laws, and the law-idea, as the 
higher unity of all specific laws. . . .
  Thus, in that way, the foundation of our philosophical thought is the law-
idea, the notion of the deepest ground of validity and mutual coherence of all 
region laws. In referring to the law-idea, we have far superseded the narrow 
scientific terrain and we have placed ourselves in the middle of the region, 
very inadequately called metaphysics. We prefer to replace this word with the 
term cosmology, associating with this expression the meaning of the doctrine 
of the harmonious coherence of the creation in all of its existence-spheres and 
validity-spheres. (1926e: 423-425) 
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director of the Kuyper Foundation, were studies in neo-Kantian works 
on the philosophy of legality. The writers of these works were rationalists, 
in the sense that they held that the philosophy of legality defends the 
advance of reason in the interest of underscoring the validity of legality. 
That meant that the methodological context of reason’s use is paramount 
towards acquiring generally valid ends. These ‘ends’ are insights of valid-
ity as gained through pursuing the ‘value sciences’, and such insights have 
important influence in the cultural practices of politics, jurisprudence, 
ethics, economics, etc. Insights acquired through reason hold promise, 
when applied to culture, to help make cultural practice itself more ratio-
nal. This ‘making culture more rational’ was expressed as living according 
to the sovereignty or autonomy of reason, against the alternatives of re-
ligious bigotry, that enslaves, or irrational power, that seeks domination.
 But for Dooyeweerd this use of reason, by which norms are merely 
applied values, reduces norms to the human measure. The differences 
in insight and even in the methodological accounts of reason—espe-
cially Marburg neo-Kantianism versus Freiburg neo-Kantianism—were 
indicative of differences of a different order, at the level of worldview 
(context, aim, interpretation, etc.) and which differences were not being 
made explicit. Through immanent criticism Dooyeweerd aimed to ex-
pose inconsistencies and difficulties that are indicative of problems with 
the principles from which one proceeds. In the meantime, the brothers-
in-law were in close contact until the time of Dooyeweerd’s appointment 
to the Kuyper Foundation (October 1922). Dooyeweerd wrote up their 
burgeoning views in which the methodological side of their critical real-
ism was further explored and clarified.
1. Vollenhoven’s early thought in review205
In Vollenhoven’s critical realism the subjective rationality of the Self in-
teracts with the objective rationality inherent in the World. Through this 
interaction knowledge arises through the synthesis of judgments. Both 
on the part of the Self and on that of the World there are factual and 
ideal factors. The Self gains factual data that are organized in forms of 
sensibility, and it needs to submit to (extra-mental) norms in the rational 
procedure of knowledge acquisition. The World has a factual side that 
is embedded in the matrix of absolute time and space. But the things of 
the World are governed by (extra-mental) ideas of distinctive being, that 
regulate the structure of things in their appearances, their interactions 
205   The reader may wish to consult the diagram in III.C.4 above, for a schematic 
outline of this early thought. 
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and their species development.
 Knowing takes place by means of the said interaction in judgments: 
representations, had by the Self, are predicated to appearances of the 
things of the World; knowing takes place in a process of understanding 
that becomes progressively more adequate. But there is also the intui-
tive awareness that something takes place in the mind when the mind is 
affected, and also an intuitive grasp of identity in differences of appear-
ances and differences between individuals as to species (or kind). This in-
tuitive awareness is immediate and takes place in the Self in three ways: as 
principle of consciousness (concrete intuition), as awareness of difference 
of content (analytical intuition) and the awareness of the identity of the 
given as appearance and (general and individualized) idea (metaphysical 
intuition). There is a priority of being that is acknowledged in knowing, 
which is dependent on the given as given, i.e. as foreign to thought. But 
in intuition, the concrete intuition of self-consciousness has precedence.
 Now knowledge or science has its own ‘reality’ (as: logically orga-
nized truth content). It is not just produced by the Self, nor is it merely 
a direct reading of the World. It needs to comply to truth, as warranted 
by norms of thought (the principles of logic), and there is the content, 
acquired by working over the givens of the World, that is in principle 
shared, inter-subjective. Content is warranted in terms of a (Meinong-
inspired) Gegenstandstheorie, by which impressions and representations, 
enjoyed by the Self, are fixed in their meaning according to the principle 
of identity. This yields objective meanings that serve as terms (‘Objects’) 
and relational complexes (‘Objectives”) in reference to given phenomena. 
Science has a formal and a material side, namely of logic (truth) and con-
tent (Gegenstand) respectively. In an ultimate sense, the reality of World 
and Self, with that of knowledge/ science distinguished from both, find 
support in a Trinitarian theism: the Father concerns the World, as sup-
ported by ideas, the Spirit addresses the Self, imposing norms, and the 
Son or Logos warrants knowledge in being the principle of the harmony 
of objective and subjective rationality.
 In mid-1921 Vollenhoven formulated a more ‘metalogical’ variant 
of rationality. The sciences, so he had initially held (more Marburg-like) 
in his dissertation, form an organism, in that the sciences partake of one 
method in which the distinction of the sciences are delineated by quanti-
tatively distinct ratios of the formal and the material sides of knowledge. 
But now he comes to recognize (more Freiburg-like) distinct domains of 
validity, each with its own typical content. Within each domain, science 
is conducted in a way that guides the genesis of thought peculiar to that 
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domain. Thus each domain aims to achieve the adequate concept of the 
reality it investigates, a reality that is itself upheld by its idea. Thus, the 
logic of the genesis of knowledge is guided by the metalogical awareness 
of the adequate concept as ideal, which would, if actually had, be the 
full knowledge of the relevant idea. Hence the entire domain of science 
constitutes a ‘Gegenstand-sphere’ with a complex structure of domains or 
regions. But the distinction of ‘(adequate) concept and idea (of being)’ 
aligns the subjective rationality, which aims to increase knowledge, to the 
objective rationality, as warranted by the idea. The analytical intuition, 
which initially took its cue from the concrete intuition, is now more at-
tentive to the side of the idea. It now serves as the ‘metalogical intuition’, 
that determines methodical direction through ‘viewing’ (schouwen) the 
adequate concept as ideal end. 
 This viewing is notable, so we may conclude, in that it calls for a 
distinct quality of the Self as ‘viewing subject’. The Self that views grasps, 
i.e. evaluates, that which is viewed in relation to itself, this being what 
C. Sigwart referred to as a ‘modal relation’ of evaluation. So long as the 
adequate concept operates in a realist context, the possibility of this 
evaluation becoming autonomous, is kept in check. The function of this 
metalogical viewing is discerning the highest unitary material feature of 
the adequate concept of a science. This unitary feature is the modality (or 
‘region category’) of the content of a science, which unity can only be 
grasped intuitively and not by logic (which is dependent on diversity). 
This ‘metalogical standpoint’ is the starting point for new developments. 
2. Developments in 1922
Considering the nature of the evidence, the new developments are easier 
to trace in Dooyeweerd than in Vollenhoven. Initially, in his work of 
1921-1922 , Dooyeweerd focuses on this ‘metalogical variant’ of Vollen-
hoven’s critical realism. He moves searchingly in this context and adopts 
notions that he finds useable in developing a critical realist methodol-
ogy. If Vollenhoven took metaphysics as the anchor of his thought—for 
Vollenhoven at the time metaphysics included an empirical moment—
Dooyeweerd (considering his orientation to the human sciences) placed 
the methodology of the sciences more explicitly in a context of life- and 
worldview. But at this point this hardly counts as an essential difference. 
 The main novelty of 1922 is found in Dooyeweerd’s work. He be-
gins his employment with the Kuyper Foundation in October 1922, and 
among the first things he writes is the text entitled “Cosmos and Logos”. 
With this document he clearly continues his prior research on methodol-
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ogy. But it also evidences an influence, not formerly noticed, from the 
side of phenomenology. He proceeds from the premise that is entirely new, 
viz. of a ‘created logos’, here understood to be human rationality, as being 
a part of the cosmos. 
 This ‘created logos’ embodies the presuppositions required to main-
tain the Gegenstand-sphere but in a changed setting. Whereas formerly 
the Gegenstand-sphere was distinct from Self and World in its having 
its own security in the (divine) Logos, it is now taken as presupposing 
connections to the Self and the World. Without these connections there 
could not be any Gegenstand. For, as to the World, it is now said to pres-
ent an intuitable ‘objective-primary meaning’ which, when focused on 
in acts and selected as to content, yields the constituents (Gegenstände) of 
the Gegenstand-sphere (alias the ‘created logos’). The ‘objective-primary 
meaning’ is for consciousness directly. (Dooyeweerd here makes use of an 
explicit phenomenological terminology; cf. section III.E.2.)  This ‘giving’ 
of objective-primary meaning makes the more circuitous route via the 
forms of sensibility redundant. The former acknowledgement of differ-
ent ‘region categories’, each with a highest material characterization of 
distinct modality is retained, as well as the acceptance of basic ‘necessary 
connections’ between the constituents of a region as being lawful for the 
region in question. Any knowledge of the World presupposes intuitive 
acknowledgment of what the World presents for it to be knowable.
 As for the Self, the intuiting of the region categories and of the nec-
essary connections they include needs to be supplemented by subjective 
‘forms of viewing’, themselves too of distinct modality. This is another 
presupposition, namely of the ‘connection’ of the Self and the Gegenstand 
or ‘created logos’. There is not simply ‘a viewing subject’, performing 
distinct acts, but the viewing (and thus intellectual understanding) itself 
presupposes a diversity of modal forms, in step with the diversity of the 
region categories. A region, as modally viewed, in a ‘field of vision’. 
 In virtue of these presupposed connections of the Self and the 
World to the Gegenstand-sphere, the latter is drawn more closely into 
a cosmic context, which is to say that the Gegenstand-sphere has struc-
tured features in virtue of creation. The human exercise of rationality, i.e. 
the human logos active in acquiring knowledge and spending thought, is 
now taken to be confined to—“walled in” by—the ‘created logos’. This 
exercise of human rationality focuses on connections between act and 
content within a region that is viewed in a modally relevant way. The 
knowledge enterprise takes place against the background of intuited con-
ditions. 
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 Knowledge is not a reading of the world, but arises by assimilating 
the content, made available through the prior intuitive intelligence and 
organized in fields of vision according to region categories. Thought—
scientific thought—is a further working over of knowledge. It is a logical 
viewing, in which unity and diversity are imposed on a ‘field of vision’, 
thereby turning the latter into a ‘field of inquiry’. Scientific thought seeks 
a synthesis of logical viewing and a field of inquiry, resulting in scientific 
knowledge of the field as system. Knowledge arises through ‘arbitrary 
thought’, while scientific knowledge is thought guided by the methodical 
treatment of the content of a field on inquiry. Thought and knowledge 
are not free creations of reason but are enclosed within an intuitive intel-
ligence, “the humble viewing of given objective meaning” (1923a3: 60). 
Self and World being presupposed here, realism is not relinquished.
 A puzzling feature of this writing of Dooyeweerd is that there is no 
apology or explanation for the important difference noticeable here as 
compared to his former work. Of course, that former work was not pub-
lished, so there was no external incentive for explanation or account. But 
if Dooyeweerd felt a certain ‘ownership’ or primary responsibility with 
respect to this development, one might expect a word of motivation for 
the present view over against the former view.
 This raises the possibility of the relevance of Vollenhoven’s pres-
ence, though there is little known of this directly at this point. In his first 
publications Dooyeweerd’s references to epistemology, in the trend of the 
development of 1922, are very brief and guarded. On the other hand, 
Vollenhoven’s first important publication on epistemology, on “Contours 
of the theory of knowledge” (April 1926), with its view of ‘knowing re-
sorting under being’—which was Vollenhoven’s way of expressing that 
the ‘created logos’ is part of the created world—is one of its main props. 
Despite the late date (related to the contingency of Vollenhoven’s illness), 
if we are correct in our surmise of Dooyeweerd’s having been deferent to 
Vollenhoven in this connection (cf. the discussion in III.D.2), then that 
would increase the likelihood that this input of renewal comes from Vol-
lenhoven. 
 Although the noticeable change, as found in Dooyeweerd’s writ-
ing, seems to be a rather technical point of methodology, there are also 
broader ramifications. The theisms of critical realism would appear to be 
directly affected. The three-some ‘World, Science/Knowledge and Self ’, 
stands in direct correlation to Father, Logos and Spirit, respectively. But 
with science/knowledge now meshing in with the cosmos, and with the 
Self ’s viewing as a presupposed condition, that must imply that the (di-
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vine) Logos is no longer seen—at least in the current role regarding ra-
tionality—as being so distinct from the World as was formerly the case, 
and that the Logos also has more direct cognitive relevance for the Self. 
The Logos appears now to be more ‘operative’ in the World, the guardian 
of the meaning-for-consciousness that the World reveals insofar as this is 
intuit-able. We also notice in the same text of Dooyeweerd, as relevant 
for the Self, a more pronounced expression of the role of faith. Sin affects 
our viewing adversely. What we know begins with what we ‘see’ in the 
attentive perspective of our subjective logos. If we see wrongly, we cannot 
appeal to facts, for there is no separate world available to us that is not 
itself channelled through the logos. This calls for a relevance of the divine 
Logos that is additional to that of guardian of rationality. One needs to 
stand right in a more inclusive sense with the divine Logos, meaning not 
merely rational correctness in terms of categories and method, but also a 
more personal rectitude in terms of an existential attitude that affects the 
viewing, with ‘faith’ implications. This role of the Logos is more depen-
dent on “the special grace of redemption through Christ Jesus”. But the 
two meanings need to be taken together, for only then can we see “sub 
specie aeternitatis”, from the view of eternity.
 This reference to eternity would appear to be typical to Dooye-
weerd. At least it occurs nowhere in Vollenhoven. We said above that his 
emphasis on ‘knowing resorting under being’ is relevant to Vollenhoven’s 
way of expressing the way human rationality is structured by cosmic fea-
tures and thus operates in the context of the ‘created logos’. In other 
words, Vollenhoven formulates an analogous shift. The human Self also 
undergoes a ‘change in position’ in Vollenhoven, namely from a position 
of being ‘beside the World’ to a position of always already standing in 
subjection (to law) in the pluralist context of the World. (We referred to 
this change in the discussion of Vollenhoven’s response to Janse’s ideas.) 
 Now there is a remark made by Vollenhoven that would appear to 
have a bearing on this new development. In a letter to Cornelius Van Til, 
dated 4 February 1936, Vollenhoven recalls his early contact with Dooye-
weerd and their dissatisfaction with Christian scholarship. He continues: 
“The intentions were in many cases excellent, but one continually ran 
aground for not daring to think in a consequential Scriptural way, also 
in the area of philosophy. We then began to seek (from about 1920) and, 
God be praised, initially found (about the summer of 1922) [a more 
Scriptural way of thinking]. In 1926 we were appointed on the same day 
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by the Free University. . .”.206 If we can trust Vollenhoven’s memory of 
more than a dozen years, then he at least signals something significant in 
connection with his contact with Dooyeweerd, which took place around 
the summer of 1922, that had implications for their philosophical work. 
As being the beginning (‘initially’) of a more consequential way of think-
ing scripturally, it may be that Vollenhoven signals a realization of the 
relevance of a more direct faith stance, without wishing to be understood 
as implying this to have been definitive. The new development, discussed 
above, is at least consistent with this report of memory. Regretfully, Vol-
lenhoven is not more specific, so we cannot be sure that what was ‘found’ 
is relevant to the change to which Dooyeweerd’s text attests. But in the 
light of that change, it would appear to involve the view of “knowing 
resorting under being”, itself a lasting insight of Vollenhoven’s definitive 
thought. 
 We add to this a more challenging memory of half a century later 
on Dooyeweerd’s part. In his tribute to Vollenhoven in 1973 he men-
tions: “I had been convinced already as early as 1922 that Kuyper’s deep-
est intentions had been voiced in the statement referred to above”, i.e. the 
statement “There is not an inch in the whole of temporal life of which 
Christ, as Lord of all men, does not say ‘mine’.”207 Dooyeweerd would 
appear to imply that he came to this realization from Kuyper in 1922. 
His “Cosmos en Logos” (1923a2) does evidence a new awareness of the 
possible relevance of a faith stance in philosophy. It is in light of that 
evidence that this memory could bear upon this change in Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd.208 
 One might ask whether Vollenhoven’s correspondence with Janse 
throws any light on the change of 1922. On this point that evidence 
(as found to date) is disappointing. The crucial correspondence with 
Janse towards the end of 1922 focuses on anthropology, so in that sense 
a change in philosophical methodology would not be an expected topic 
206   Quoted with permission. The archivist of the Westminster Theological Seminary 
library, Ms. Grace Mullen, kindly provided me with a copy of this letter from the Van 
Til collection. The translation of the quoted passage is mine. (The second sentence of the 
quote echoes the “seek and you will find” of Matthew 7: 7.)
207   Dooyeweerd 1973: 7. 
208   In autobiographical remembrances Vollenhoven recalls having had an influence 
on Dooyeweerd in a way that he had come to regret. The influence concerns Vollen-
hoven’s view of time and number, as defended in the dissertation (Vollenhoven 1918a); 
cf. Vollenhoven 1963c: 173-177 and 1968b: 202-205. Prima facie this is distinct from 
the development of 1922. But there are numerous inconsistencies in these remembrances, 
and a consistent interpretation of all the known facts points to a possible relevance of 
1922 after all. This is discussed in the addendum to chapter 4. 
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of discussion with Janse. What we do have, as mentioned in the discus-
sion of Vollenhoven’s letter of 7 November 1922 in the earlier part of this 
chapter, is that Vollenhoven, in speaking of the “relations of the one soul 
to the distinguished terrains” (cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 62) or worlds (of 
validity, of values, of physical nature), states that the connection of the 
soul to these terrains is determined “by the nature of the relations” (den 
aard der relaties) (ibid.). Viewed formally, this understanding of a relation 
does not agree with the preferred monadic view of a relation, as found in 
Vollenhoven’s dissertation, but—again considered formally—it does agree 
with the way ‘essential connections’ are discussed in Dooyeweerd’s text. 
But without Dooyeweerd’s text, it is difficult to put one’s finger on Vol-
lenhoven’s meaning, as indeed our own discussion of this letter attests (cf. 
section II.D. above). Thus, as supporting evidence, this is very tenuous.
3. Developments in 1923
In 1923 Vollenhoven is out of reach most of that year due to his illness. 
He is institutionalized in Amsterdam until the end of June. He resumes 
his full pastoral work at the beginning of December. One assumes that 
in the second half of that year, when back in The Hague, there would 
have been time and occasion for discussions between the brothers-in-law, 
though probably this had to be subdued at first. In any case the next step 
worthy of mention is the occurrence of ‘law-idea’ in Dooyeweerd in late 
1923 (cf. section III.F.). Here, for the first time, we have a notion that 
can be fully attributed to him, for Vollenhoven did not take to it. Need-
less to say, it is not the Lockean ‘idea’ that figures here, as mental repre-
sentation, but in this case as the representation of law. (Dooyeweerd calls 
the representation of law as boundary “the concept of law”; Dooyeweerd 
1923d: 12.) The term ‘idea’ is still in line with Vollenhoven’s metaphysi-
cal use of a distinctive being, a use that the recuperated Vollenhoven no 
longer underscored. The fuller picture is as follows.
 Dooyeweerd has given new (or renewed) attention to Calvin, prob-
ably in conjunction with a more self-conscious reading of Kuyper.209 Cal-
vinistic metaphysics proceeds from the difference between the Creator, 
who is infinite and sovereign, and the creature, who is finite and stands 
in subjection. The boundary between the infinite and the finite is now 
said to be the law, namely, as that which is posited by sovereignty and 
that to which the creature stands subjected. Sovereignty is empowered by 
God’s will, a will that the creature is not in a position to question. But 
God does not reign by fiat. His wisdom and His reason support His will, 
209   Cf. Henderson 1994: 113-114; also footnote 76. 
Philosophy in the Making
370
so that what God wills can be expected to be good and in application 
wise.210 So God has a ‘providential world-plan’ that governs the course of 
creation. Essential to this plan is that the law, which is a unitary bound-
ary between God and the creation, itself unfolds in a diversity of mani-
festations (things) and of spheres, each with their own sovereignty. The 
law-idea is itself the providential world-plan; hence it involves, as formal 
condition, the law as boundary between the infinite and the finite as well 
as two material conditions, namely the foresight of law, understood as or-
dinances, and the providing for the creature in such a way as to be fitting 
to respond to ordinances. In other words, the law-idea, as providential 
world-plan, is a Calvinistic cosmology in a nutshell, useable as organon in 
life’s practice in the context of a life- and worldview.
 There is no evidence of a similar development in Vollenhoven. He 
did fully accept the law-as-boundary understanding, but he did not en-
capsulate this in an idea. In fact, his very understanding of law-as-bound-
ary arrested the continued use of that notion. From his first statements in 
1926 till late in his career, Vollenhoven limits his basic statement about 
the cosmos to a two-fold confession, without implying that there is any 
‘cosmic unity’ or ‘providential world-plan’ to ‘sight on’.211 (i) “God cre-
ated the cosmos” – a biblical given, but without making anyone privy to 
the ‘mechanism’ of creation. It is at the level of Leibniz’s statement “why 
is there something rather than nothing?”.212 Analysis cannot account for 
all (finite) presences and their determinations; for at some point one ac-
cepts what there is, as a ‘this’, that is not capable of further analysis.213 (ii) 
“God imposed on the cosmos his law”. This is the theistic, providential 
factor—God’s “carrying everything by the word of his power” (cf. Heb. 
1:3)—by which Vollenhoven means the presence of ordinances, of laws 
of modally different law-spheres. While creation as such is ‘beyond our 
210   We would appear to have a full Trinitarian relevance of divinity in connection 
with the law-idea. Because the law-idea is a cosmological principle, its Trinitarian feature 
holds (so to speak) ‘intra-cosmically’. This supports the predestinarian connotation in 
Dooyeweerd’s references to the law-idea. 
211   There is the problem of ‘the whole’, discussed in the Janse section of this chapter. 
It too is approached as a condition one abides by, without being able to acknowledge 
it as idea. Taking ‘cosmos’ in its aesthetic connotation, Vollenhoven did entertain the 
metaphor of the cosmos as a work of art, with God as “the architect and the artisan of 
the cosmos”; cf. Vollenhoven 1930b: 13. In that vein, the thought of cosmic unity would 
point in the direction of a harmony. But even this aesthetic metaphor is dropped in the 
early 1930s. 
212   Leibniz 1976a: 639
213   Cf. “the method of resolution and composition” in section II.E. of chapter 1 and 
section III.B.3.e and f of chapter 4. 
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ken’, laws or ordinances are intuit-able as conditions to be met.214 “These 
laws are not hidden: they resort under the revealed part of [God’s] will 
of decision. . . . To be more precise, these laws differ modally, as do the 
functions that are subject to them.”215  Modal laws govern the function-
ing of things, not their make-up, the latter being in virtue of creation. 
In the realist use of ‘idea’, the emphasis lies with the make-up of a thing, 
and through that make-up one attempts to account for the thing’s law-
ful functioning. Here the two factors of creation and law-subjection are 
merged: the make-up of things is constitutive for their functioning. The 
provenance of ‘modal law’ in Vollenhoven is what he had previously re-
ferred to as the ‘extra-mental norms’ that determine qualities of subjec-
tion. These ‘norms’ are now re-interpreted to qualify as the laws/norms 
of all functioning.
 By denying the relevance of ideas as principles of distinctive being, 
there is in Vollenhoven no longer an operative controlling unity of cre-
ation that is within human reach or for the human being to sight on. This 
underscores the human being’s being a finite creature, hence a creature 
that is completely under the law. Also God’s dealing with the cosmos is 
itself not delimited by any knowable ‘definite unity of the cosmos’.216 The 
prime cosmological feature that Vollenhoven does allow is what might 
be called the ‘intersection principle’. It assumes created things, and it 
accepts their functioning in law-spheres according to modal laws. The 
prime datum for philosophy here is the acknowledgement that things 
214   An early reference is in Vollenhoven 1926d: 190; a later statement is in Vollen-
hoven 1951h: 55. Also, throughout the years 1930-1945, Vollenhoven 2010, section 13; 
also Vollenhoven 1933a: 24.
215   Vollenhoven 1930b: 17. 
216   The net effect is that, in the context of cosmology, Vollenhoven only acknowl-
edged the so-called “modal laws”, these being the “ordinances” that regulate, norm-like, 
cosmic life. Vollenhoven’s former “thing-laws” seem to be continued in Dooyeweerd’s lat-
er “individuality-structures”, for which Vollenhoven had no use. The only question that 
remains concerns the kingdoms. Formally, the latter occur where Vollenhoven spoke of 
general ideas. Vollenhoven always maintained that the things of the cosmos are ‘kingdom 
bound’ in virtue of creation. In his cosmology (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 26), distinct 
things and their general context in kingdoms form an ultimate cosmic contrast. If ideas lose 
their relevance in connection with distinct things (as ‘thing-laws’) then one may expect 
an analogous redundancy with respect to general ideas (as ‘general essences’), and the no-
tions of ‘individual’ and ‘kingdom’ need to be accepted as primitive terms. Individuation 
would appear to be synonymous with the process of genesis, a process that Vollenhoven 
sees as guided by the Spirit (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 22). However, the whole theme of 
law is not thereby settled, for Vollenhoven also distinguishes the law of love, and in 1953 
he speaks of three kinds of law. But there is no recurrence to ideas after their rejection 
(probably as of 1923). 
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and law-spheres always intersect. This needs to be discussed in its own 
right (cf. the next chapter). But this ‘intersection principle’ does not sup-
port a ‘cosmic unity’ such as is promoted by Dooyeweerd’s law-idea. 
 So what does the absence (or rejection) of Vollenhoven’s former 
‘idea’ imply in a more general sense? ‘Idea’ in Vollenhoven’s early thought 
served as thing-laws for things and persons. For persons, that idea is the 
thing-law of the person as complete substance, controlling its appear-
ances and functioning (in body and mind), its interactions with other 
human beings or things, and also its development over time, all of course 
under the auspices of the human essence. By virtue of this thing-law, 
each human being has a controlling unity throughout its states, features 
and changes. In other words, were one to know the idea of this human 
being, then one would know all that will happen to that person, since 
it is ‘programmed’ (as it were) into the person’s substance (idea). The 
substance is not just the sum-total of states and features; its controlling 
power is something in its own right. The future is predestined. Denying 
the relevance of idea in this case implies at least a rejection of this view of 
cosmic necessity.
 Dooyeweerd placed a strong emphasis on providence when he 
launched the notion of ‘law-idea’. It is uncertain what he means to say 
exactly when he links the terms ‘providence’ with ‘predestination’. Some-
times he speaks of predestination falling under providence, sometimes 
he equates the two. In any case, providence as such includes the two 
meanings of ‘foresee’ and ‘provide’. In Calvin this is how God regulates 
events and occurrences. Predestination in Calvin is the Augustinian no-
tion of each human being’s state of eternity, as saved or damned, being 
predestined and fixed, completely apart from any merit of works or the 
worthiness of the person. When Dooyeweerd speaks of predestination 
“in the general sense”, he seems to say that predestination holds not only 
with respect to persons, but for everything within creation, of everything 
under the law. Then indeed it is fitting, in line with Vollenhoven’s early 
metaphysics, to continue to speak of ‘law-idea’, if the law of the cosmos 
is thought to be such that it acts as a ‘thing-law’ for the cosmos, i.e. as the 
governing unity in which everything is predestined that takes place in the 
course of the cosmos’ existence. All that occurs is then ‘intra-cosmic’ (so 
to speak), its destiny predetermined. 
 When Vollenhoven jettisons ‘ideas’ he rejects this (classical and 
frightening) 217 doctrine of double predestination. He allows for election, 
217   For example, Calvin himself said of predestination (of election and damnation): 
“The decree is dreadful indeed, I confess.” Calvin 1960: 955. Not being able to break 
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which is the basis of the church, but is silent about reprobation. We can 
understand that his rejection of a ‘cosmological law-idea’ includes an ‘an-
alytical’ view of development and history. What develops is not already 
completely self-contained. There are concrete and contingent influences 
too; there is nature and there is nurture. Later in his career Vollenhoven 
explicitly claims that God ‘goes along with history’, but the thought was 
not new.218 The cosmic context is a context for development, and this 
takes place under the divine influence that reveals direction, together 
with the guidance towards satisfying ends. The directing and the guid-
ing are attributed to the Logos and the Spirit, respectively.219 These roles 
are not merely intra-cosmic, though naturally they are not disjoint from 
the cosmos either. The cosmos is open-ended, which is why every wrong 
turn of evil is a catastrophe, and every return to good praiseworthy. Di-
rection is not in virtue of creation—that would make it an intra-cosmic 
entelechy, and encourage seeing good and evil as a balance of opposing 
forces—but the reality of the lived present of creation life, in its unceas-
ing appeal to choose: to oppose and undo evil and to promote and sus-
tain good.220
4. Concept and idea
Dooyeweerd writes in the ‘Foreword’ to his De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee 
(1935-1936, I: v): “initially under the strong influence first of neo-
Kantian philosophy, later of Husserl’s phenomenology, the great turning 
point in my thought was marked by the discovery of the religious root of 
thought itself, whereby a new light was shed on the continuous failure of 
all attempts, including my own, of bringing about a synthesis between 
the Christian faith and a philosophy that is rooted in faith in the self-
sufficiency of human reason.”
away from his Augustinian reading of Scripture, Calvin took the doctrine to be biblically 
sanctioned. Recall Vollenhoven’s disquietude in connection with predestination specula-
tion as quoted in footnote 200 above.
218   There was from the start the ‘immanence of God’. In 1968 Vollenhoven spoke 
explicitly of God’s presence in history; cf. Vollenhoven 1968b: 209-210. In 1942 Vol-
lenhoven had stated: “Hence God goes along in the deployment of his world plan, a 
‘concursus Dei’.” Vollenhoven 1942m: 1. Obviously, the use of ‘world plan’ here should 
not be confused with ‘world program’. The very effect of his ‘going along’ is to be relevant 
‘in the present’, now. 
219   Cf. in this regard the first version of Isagôgè Philosophiae, of 1930/1931, sections 
71 ff. in Vollenhoven 2010.
220   Cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 85 ff. , or 2010, 85 ff. I have attempted to express this 
relevance of direction more fully, in a ‘Vollenhovian way’, in my “Time and change in 
Vollenhoven”; Tol 1995, esp. “Time and its meaning”, pp. 117-120. 
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 We have indeed found evidence of the neo-Kantian and the phe-
nomenological influences. The first was especially noticeable prior to his 
employment at the Kuyper Foundation. The latter comes more particu-
larly to the fore in late 1922, when the notions of the Gegenstand and 
the cosmos become more closely wedded together and the Gegenstand 
arises from the objective meaning for consciousness, phenomenologically 
elicited from the cosmos. But the great turning point of which he speaks 
is not noticeable until 1928. If that is the point in time when “his” phi-
losophy begins—if that is what he means to say here—then he leaves in 
the dark the decade of work and effort that preceded it. Or rather, he 
characterizes it as a specimen of the attempt to bring about a synthesis 
between the Christian faith and philosophy based on the self-sufficiency 
of human reason.
 But this characterization may be questioned. The sovereignty of God 
over against the self-sufficiency of human reason is a recognizable concern 
from the start. Self-sufficiency is challenged when the methodological use 
of reason is channelled in domains of validity; and when Dooyeweerd 
formulated his ‘law-idea’, there is the explicit motive to undo human 
reason of any pretended self-sufficient authority as concerns the unity of 
insight or knowledge regarding the cosmos. It may be that Dooyeweerd 
means to point to the ‘critical realist’ context of his early work, which he 
now looks back on as having been a failure. But then his formulation is 
infelicitous. Critical realism depends on the realism of ideas. This realism 
is not grounded in human reason, but in divine reason, in tandem with 
the interpretation of the Logos as principle of rationality as embedded in 
knowledge. This reminds one of the problem of scholasticism. Vollen-
hoven and Dooyeweerd were initially more affected by this problem than 
by adherence—though never a matter of principle—to neo-Kantianism 
or Husserlian phenomenology.
 Dooyeweerd did indeed relinquish (somewhat later than Vollen-
hoven) the realism of ideas.221 The year 1928 seems to be the watershed in 
this regard. Be that as it may, the important question is what he replaced 
it with. A summary indication will have to suffice at this point.
 To start with, there is a telling passage in his inaugural lecture 
where he describes the epistemology he—and by implication, also Vol-
221   Vollenhoven’s realism became a realism of law-spheres. The emphasis on the 
importance of realism increased. In a letter to A. Janse, 24 October 1924, Vollenhoven 
states: “In addition, in my epistemological reflections . . . a sharper turn towards realism 
has taken place.” Also relevant is a statement to Janse in a letter of 25 October 1926: “In 
my inaugural [Logos en Ratio] . . . you will find a sharper struggle against rationalism, a to-
tal break with all psychologism.” Cf. Vollenhoven to Janse 24-10-1924 and 25-10-1926. 
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lenhoven—has worked with to date but which he now finds wanting (cf. 
Dooyeweerd 1926d: 64). There is too much emphasis, he claims, on the 
difference between the law-spheres in the metalogical viewing, and insuffi-
cient recognition of the “organic thought of unity”, which is more appro-
priate to the “organic law-idea”. (The qualification ‘organic’ is new here.) 
The law-idea (i.e. the cosmological principle of totality or world-plan) 
should penetrate the sovereignty of the spheres, so that in each sphere a co-
herence of all the spheres, as warranted by the law-idea, becomes evident. 
He offers examples of this. In a cosmological sense there is the connection 
of a sphere to the spheres that are simpler that it, which constitute its 
substrate; in an epistemological sense there are the analogies of substrate 
law-spheres in the sphere of which they are the substrate. Such analogies 
are reflected in the modality of the sphere in question. Likewise there are 
anticipations in the modality of a law-sphere to the spheres that are more 
complex than it is (1926d: 65). In these ways the cosmic continuity of 
the order of the law-spheres is reflected in each law-sphere in its own way. 
This is what Dooyeweerd calls the universality in its own sphere.222
 There is something remarkable about this universality in Dooye-
weerd. If one takes, say, the logical law-sphere, then in this law-sphere is 
reflected the whole cosmic order. In other words, one can immediately 
assert a ‘harmony’ between ‘subjective’ reason—the logical law-sphere 
that channels subjective functional thought—and ‘objective’ reason, viz. 
the structure of the cosmic whole. One should seriously ask whether this 
is not a reaffirmation of a view that is at least ‘scholastic-like’ all over 
again. One generally does not ask this question because each law-sphere, 
and not just the logical sphere, displays the harmony with the whole. 
One might be more inclined to think of a ‘perspectivism’ in this regard. 
But when considering each law-sphere as the context of a fundamen-
tal science, then the method of development of a science in each case 
follows—or at least ideally ought to follow—the pattern of the cosmic 
whole. Compared to critical realism, the structure of a modality pro-
vides the ‘ideal adequate concept’, intuited by the metalogical intuition 
of ‘modal viewing’, while the pattern of the cosmic whole is what the 
222   It is not superfluous to note that Vollenhoven never accepted this view of modal 
universality. Vollenhoven recognizes a necessary relation of a law-spheres to the spheres 
that constitute its substrate spheres, which is reflected in the analogies (or retrocipations). 
But the anticipations call for mediation in cosmic creatures. For Vollenhoven there is no 
cosmic structure or order apart from the cosmic creatures that are structured in that way 
and exemplify it. (This is related to the ‘intersection principle’ of Vollenhoven’s revised 
metaphysics.) What Vollenhoven referred to as the “universality of the law-sphere” is the 
cross-sectional participation of every subject or object in a law-sphere. Cf. Vollenhoven 
2005d/e, 65, or 2010, 65. 
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law-idea, as ‘world-plan’, captures. The sure path of a science is warranted 
to the degree that it is in step with the cosmos as a whole, as reflected 
within the law-sphere of a science. Hence this reformulates rather than 
undercuts a ‘harmony model.’ In 1926 the distinction of concept and 
idea still serves in the basic way that is prevalent in critical realism; there 
is only some adjusted terminology:
All specific regions have their own laws. Above these specific region laws 
there must be a universal law-order, in which all the specific region laws are 
founded, from which they derive their specific validity and also wherein 
each law-sphere’s own area of competence is delimited. Each law-sphere 
has its own concept of law; together they equally appeal to a law-idea, a 
unity of all specific law-spheres, to a cosmic world-order, a world-plan.223
 But the ‘organic’ feature, both within the law-spheres and the 
world-plan, continues to hold Dooyeweerd’s attention. In 1928 Dooye-
weerd speaks of the whole cosmic order as being a “law-organism”, 
whereby each law-sphere is in itself a modality of the whole cosmic order 
(cf. Dooyeweerd 1928a: 24). (Note: this signals an increased relativizing 
of the diversity of the law-spheres; diversity that Vollenhoven so prized! 
Also the term ‘aspect’ now finds use.) What we have now is that the 
part (a law-sphere) reflects the whole (cosmic order) and the whole is 
reflected in each part. When taking this as a hermeneutical circle—since 
Dooyeweerd concentrates on meaning, the circle can hardly be anything 
else—one can understand how a certain ‘cosmic realism’ can be taken as 
having become redundant. For each part (law-sphere), as a modality of 
‘the whole’, allows the participating (modally viewing) Self to represent 
the whole from the perspective of the modality in question. This is pos-
sible for every modality. But then the (modally viewing) Self is a constant 
factor in connection with the modally changing perspectives in which the 
whole is viewed. So the Self can become the metalogical locus of conver-
gence for all the law-spheres. The cosmic whole can be represented in the 
Self through the ‘modal relation’ (Sigwart) in which the Self stands to this 
represented content.
 The question that arises at this point is: what serves as warrant for 
the ‘proper understanding’ of this (metalogical) modal relation? Consid-
ered against the background of critical realism, there would appear to be 
the alternative of either securing the presence of the representations in a 
cosmic realism—one takes into consciousness what, realistically, there is 
for consciousness (via the metaphysical intuition)—or critically guarding 
the understanding of this content in terms of conditions to which the 
223   Dooyeweerd 1926e: 423 (emphases added). Cf. the larger quote, of which this is 
a part, in footnote 204 above. 
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Self must comply (norms). Critical realism accepted both, but Dooye-
weerd now feels that calling on a ‘realist metaphysics’ is more problematic 
than increasing the emphasis on the conditions that guard criticism.224 
Can a choice for the Self suffice if properly instructed?
 It is of cardinal importance that the Self understands itself in a way 
that does not privilege any one law-sphere. Thus a ‘law-idea’ is called for 
that focuses on coherence, in which the modal diversity is taken up, a 
coherence that reflects the unity of the “law-organism” of the whole. The 
Self can operate with this understanding of ‘law-idea’ only when its own 
position transcends the law-spheres. (Even the law-sphere of faith must 
be transcended.) This suggests the need for an “Archimedean point”, 
viz. a standpoint that transcends the order of the law-spheres. The Self 
can choose this transcendent standpoint only in being self-critical, in 
the sense of not privileging one particular law-sphere or modal function. 
When taking the position in the Archimedean point—which is tanta-
mount to being self-critical (in the sense of being truly modally unpreju-
diced)—the Self finds itself in the open vista of being able to overview 
and understand the whole or the totality, i.e. understand it in terms of the 
Self ’s own deepest participation in this totality. This participation must 
be ‘supra-temporal”—time is for Dooyeweerd a ‘diversifier’ (the way a 
prism breaks up light, so time breaks the unity of meaning). What the 
participation leads one to understand is the religious determination—at 
the ‘supra-temporal’ level, this is the only kind of determination that 
remains—of both the totality and the diversity of cosmic experience.
 In this connection Dooyeweerd refers to the “discovery” of the hu-
man “heart” (first [?] clearly implicated in 1928),225 in its religious mean-
ing, as spiritual principle, and taken as relevant for philosophy. “Well 
224   One can see how Dooyeweerd is tending in this direction in 1926. In 1926e: 425 
(already quoted in footnote 204) he states: “the foundation of our philosophical thought 
is the law-idea [as world-plan], the notion of the deepest ground of validity and mutual 
coherence of all region laws. In referring to the law-idea, we have far superseded the nar-
row scientific terrain and we have placed ourselves in the middle of the region, very inad-
equately[!] called metaphysics. We prefer to replace this word with the term cosmology, 
associating with this expression the meaning of the doctrine of the harmonious coherence 
of the creation in all of its existence-spheres and validity-spheres.” The latter reference to 
“existence-spheres and validity-spheres” is the distinction between cosmic reality and the 
Gegenstand-sphere respectively, in continuation of critical realism. 
225   Verburg 1989: 121 ff., signals 1930 as an important year of new developments 
in Dooyeweerd’s work. Verburg points in this regard to Dooyeweerd’s first indication of 
the appreciation of the notion of ‘cosmic time’. Of course, cosmic time presupposes the 
interpretation of the human heart as supra-temporal. Henderson states, in Henderson 
1994: 115, that there is “only sporadic mention of ‘the heart’ in [Dooyeweerd’s] writings 
in the period 1923-1927”. 
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now, only in its deepest kernel does the human spirit transcend the tem-
poral [i.e. cosmic] coherence of law, only the religious kernel of personal-
ity is the eternal in the human being, not its moral, logical, psychical or 
aesthetic subject-functions, that are rather entirely fitted into the tempo-
ral coherence of law” (Dooyeweerd 1928b: 425; emphasis added). This 
“deepest kernel . . . [of ] the human spirit” is what is new here, but not the 
characterization of the human being as having eternity in its make-up. 
The latter is the “sub specie aeternitatis” we found in the text on ‘Cosmos 
and Logos’ (1923a3: 61). In that text the ‘point of view of eternity’ put us 
in a position to accept the meaning given for consciousness as being the 
work of the “Divine Noèsis” (i.e. the divine Logos), a position realized 
though our faith function. This sets our otherwise distorted understand-
ing of the cosmos, as due to sin, aright. But in 1928 the focus is not on 
understanding the cosmos as such aright, but—a deeper focus—on being 
self-critical with respect to cosmic reality when participating in its total-
ity. The eternity in the human being offers the opportunity for the Self 
to realize that “the view of the meaning-totality is not possible without 
a view of the origin, the archè of both the totality and the diversity of 
meaning” (Dooyeweerd 1935-1936, I: 10). The way through the Self in 
self-criticism has taken priority over the way via the cosmos, when the 
latter is ‘uncritically’ assumed (merely) to be subject to law.
 That Dooyeweerd made a choice for the Self as over against the 
World is clear in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935-1936). There we find 
a definitive cancellation of realism by accepting an ontology of meaning: 
“The meaning is the being of all creaturely beings, the mode being also of 
our selfhood, and has a religious root and divine origin” (op. cit., I: 6)  If 
a modal relation is again taken in its original meaning of “a relation of 
valuation to a knowing subject” (Sigwart), then the transcendent Self is 
able to capture, via the distinct modalities of experience, the structure of 
the whole of what is thus experienced by means of the meaning experi-
enced.226 Rather than having to assume a reality behind the phenomena, 
even a reality for consciousness, the Self, once properly situated in the 
Archimedean point, is able to account for the totality of meaning; that 
is to say, when taking into account the status of the Self and the totality 
of meaning as dependent on the origin of meaning, which is God. This 
226   The acceptance of cosmic reality becomes redundant when meaning (formerly 
the Gegenstand-sphere) is itself given the status of being. This leads to Dooyeweerd’s tor-
tuous use of meaning: ‘meaning-diversity’, ‘meaning-totality’, ‘meaning-structure’, ‘mean-
ing-aspects’, ‘meaning-individual structure differences’, ‘meaning-systasis’, etc. This is 
evident already in Dooyeweerd 1931—e.g. “the meaning-structure of cosmic reality” (op. 
cit. : 84)—when “De wijsbegeerte der wetsidee” was in an advanced stage of composition. 
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is how there can be “the full concrete unity of consciousness of Self and 
of God”, which is the fulfilment of self-critical understanding.227 But at 
the same time this community not only relativizes the boundary between 
Creator and creatures, but also blurs the difference of autonomy and 
heteronomy between them.
 An ontology of meaning is deemed to be adequate to delineate the 
full complexity of human experience, without having to assume what 
it is that bears meaning. This puts an end to any scholastic “objective 
rationality”,228 as warranted by ideas, that regulate things and their coher-
ence, interactions and development, such as is part of critical realism and 
such as was captured in Dooyeweerd’s original use of ‘law-idea’ as world 
plan. But there is still need for the guidance of ‘subjective rationality’, i.e. 
the human involvement in the diversity of the modal meaning aspects. 
In that light, the term ‘idea’ needs to be recast. Dooyeweerd predicates a 
new meaning of the tandem ‘concept and idea’ on the Self in the interest 
of criticism. There is the moment of self-criticism, in which one recog-
nizes (meaning-)diversity, but without prejudicing or ‘absolutizing’ any 
feature of this. The concept is at home in understanding this meaning-
diversity in the distinctness of its modalities. It seizes on modal retroci-
pations, substrate-spheres, object-functions, and the like to understand 
how this diversity coheres. But to warrant the proper view of the very 
context of this diversity, there needs to be an appeal to the Self ’s partici-
pation in the totality of meaning. That view (or metalogical intuition) of 
the totality yields the ideal insight, wrought in the light of the “religious 
root and divine origin”, that is able to orientate conceptual understand-
ing, in the sense of providing direction to conceptual understanding. In 
the idea, conceptual understanding seizes on the anticipatory moments 
of a modal aspect. In its anticipatory structure, a modal aspect reflects the 
totality of meaning, as progressively won when viewed from that aspect. 
Thus the new, non-realist meaning of ‘law-idea’ is now that of a ‘limiting 
concept’. It is direction determining in light of the Self ’s participation in 
227   Dooyeweerd 1939: 204. 
228   Perhaps this is stated too bluntly. The Self, as viewed up to this point, was always 
taken to be itself cosmic (though this is uncertain in Dooyeweerd’s “Cosmos en Logos”). 
Thus an appeal to the Self can still have metaphysical overtones. Dooyeweerd’s predicat-
ing ‘eternity’ in the human being has such an overtone, making one wonder whether this 
isn’t an anthropology of mortal (body) and immortal (soul) all over again, though not 
with the difference falling between lower and higher functions, but between functions 
over against a higher spiritual centre of the functions. One sees the latter duality reflected 
in the new use of concept and idea. 
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the totality of meaning.229
 But in taking this step, one wonders whether Dooyeweerd was him-
self sufficiently self-critical. This use of idea is the very use that Vollen-
hoven had indicated, in 1921, as being typical of neo-Kantian thought. 
He states: “The ‘idea’ is used here [in formalism or idealism] exclusively 
to indicate a direction, not to determine a final goal”.230 In Dooyeweerd, 
concept and idea continue to serve as critical tandem. A concept con-
cerns a restricted meaning, seizing on retrocipations and substrates; an 
idea involves conceptual insight in a progressively transcendental course 
towards fuller meaning, i.e. the totality of meaning, ideally towards the 
full potential of the limiting concept. In the meantime we are left to won-
der why this use of concept and idea does not, despite the Christian con-
text in which it is addressed, in fact reaffirm an essentially neo-Kantian 
construal of rationality.
229   Cf. Dooyeweerd 1935-1936, I: 10; parallel passage in Dooyeweerd 1953-1958, 
I: 8. This (recast) use of concept and idea in Dooyeweerd is subject to historical and criti-
cal study in Strauss 1973. 
230   Cf. Chapter two, section IX above. The full quote is: “The ‘idea’ is used here 
[in formalism or idealism] exclusively to indicate a direction, not to determine a 
final goal; . . . . ‘The Ideal’ of which I spoke . . . includes in the first place the final goal 
as point of rest, and only in the second place [does it include] the connection of this point 
of rest with moving thought [i.e. inferential thinking], whereby it acquires a direction 
determining meaning. This second meaning is more or less equivalent to the whole meaning 
of ‘idea’ with the neo-Kantians.” Vollenhoven 1921c: 85-86, footnote 4 (emphasis added).
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Embarking Within Bounds of Law: 
The Initial Definitive Platform
“When, in our work, we on the contrary clearly acknowledge its 
historical background with its dual dangers [of dualism and monism], 
then we won’t founder on account of the oppositions that divided 
an earlier generation, but together overcome them.”
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1970) 
I. IntroductIon
In an unpublished text fragment, written at the end of 1926 (or very early 
in 1927) Vollenhoven sketched a plan of writing a series of articles on 
the philosophy of mathematics. The immediate occasion was an article 
on the foundations of mathematics by the well-known mathematician, 
Hermann Weyl (1885-1955), in the first issue of the new journal, 
Symposion. Philosophische Zeitschrift für Forschung und Aussprache (1926). 
There was also a more personal reason for renewed attention to this topic. 
An illuminating paragraph of Vollenhoven’s plan is the following:
It is now about eight years ago that I received my doctorate on the basis of 
the dissertation, entitled “De Wijsbegeerte der Wiskunde van Theïstisch 
Standpunt”. It has been sold out for several years, so I could have con-
sidered a new printing; but I could not find the time for its preparation. 
For it was evident to me, already quite soon, that an unchanged second 
edition was impossible; my view as to what is characteristic of Calvinism 
had changed rather drastically, and through that change the possibility first 
dawned on me of making the basic thoughts of a Calvinistic epistemol-
ogy also fruitful in the area [of the philosophy of mathematics] that I had 
previously set foot on with only the wavering glimmer [weifelend schijnsel] 
of theism.1
1   Vollenhoven 1926msC: 2-3; translation mine. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, “De wijs-
begeerte der arithmetiek en der chorologie van Calvinistisch standpunt” [The philosophy 
of arithmetic and of space from a Calvinistic standpoint] (1926/1927). The document is 
a manuscript of three pages, plus seven pages of notes on Weyl and two pages of bibliog-
raphy. Nothing became of the plan, unless Vollenhoven’s “Problemen en richtingen in de 
wijsbegeerte der wiskunde” [Problems and approaches in the philosophy of mathemat-
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 Important for our purposes is Vollenhoven’s report of a recent 
change in his outlook. He is not specific as to details, but the motive 
for the change is a new awareness of what is characteristic of Calvinism. 
This led to “a Calvinistic epistemology”, the basic thoughts of which have 
ramifications for the philosophy of mathematics. His strong wording 
underscores the felt significance of the reorientation: an unchanged 
reprint of the dissertation is “impossible” (onmogelijk) because his view 
had “changed rather drastically” (tamelijk sterk veranderde). His new 
understanding of Calvinism contrasts so favourably with his earlier 
theism that the latter pales to a “wavering glimmer”.
 In chapter three we found that, shortly after completing his 
dissertation in 1918, Vollenhoven’s thought was indeed ‘on the move’. 
There is evidence from Vollenhoven (as we saw) that, already in mid-
1919, there was a felt need to look “for a deeper foundation in the area of 
philosophy and the sciences in general” (cf. above, chapter three, section 
III.B.). Then in December 1920 there is mention of the challenge to 
“save Calvinistic metaphysics” (cf. chapter three, section III.C.2.). We 
cannot be sure how the latter relates to the search for deeper foundations, 
but both factors are mentioned in the paragraph above. In a letter to A. 
Janse, of 21 March 1924, Vollenhoven expresses his growing conviction. 
He writes: “But that with sufficient effort and available time one can 
achieve the goal of a Calvinistic [understanding of ] science that can 
withstand [neo -]Kantianism and not [merely] avoid it—of that I am no 
longer in doubt. . . . I now see more [clearly] its possibility”.2 Certainly 
from that point of time, an unchanged reprint of the dissertation could 
not be entertained.3
ics], (Vollenhoven 1936hh) is the (much reduced) fulfilment of it.
2   Janse Archives 157, Box 8, Folder 32. Amsterdam: Historisch Documentatiecen-
trum, Free University. 
3   Vollenhoven says in the quoted passage that it was already rather soon after its 
appearing that an unchanged reprint had become unfeasible. On the basis of the mate-
rial researched in chapters two and three, we can hazard to detail the changes or shifts 
mentioned above more closely. The shift mentioned in mid-1919 probably pertains to 
the move from a Marburg-like unity of methodology orientation to a more Freiburg-like 
pluralist orientation. Published evidence is in Vollenhoven 1921c. Then there is the urge 
to “save Calvinistic metaphysics”, mentioned by Dooyeweerd in his letter to Vollenhoven, 
17 December 1920. In that letter it sounds like a fresh topic in their contact. This prob-
ably focussed on the distinction between the infinite essence of God and the finite nature 
of everything creaturely. This affects Vollenhoven’s dissertation directly, for he maintained 
the actual infinity of the world in that work. This is probably what Vollenhoven initially 
looked upon as requiring revision (cf. above, in chapter three, footnote 100). Critical 
realist metaphysics as such need not be implicated, apart from an adjustment within 
the bounds of the potential infinite. Only in the aftermath of his illness (in the course 
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 Vollenhoven’s words here, regarding his new understanding of 
Calvinism, intimate changes in scientific methodology and philosophy, 
but also suggest his rejecting what had proven to be a hindrance, namely 
his earlier theism. Then, in the quoted passage of the letter to Janse, 
there is the reference to [neo-]Kantianism, which Vollenhoven now 
feels he can confront head-on. Hence in reference to the same context 
of change regarding a Calvinistic epistemology and/or understanding of 
science Vollenhoven mentions theism (in his quoted plan) and [neo-]
Kantianism (in his letter to Janse). The unsuspecting reader will not 
immediately connect theism and neo-Kantianism in this regard. Yet there 
is a connection.
 Availing ourselves of the research discussed in earlier chapters, the 
broad connection between theism and neo-Kantianism would appear to 
imply the following. We found that the neo-Kantian influence pertains 
particularly in the use of ‘concept and idea’. The ‘concept’ represents 
the growth of knowledge, as empowered by ‘logic’ and guided by 
the ‘adequate concept’. Neo-Kantianism tends to treat the adequate 
concept as ‘limit concept’, this being the ‘idea’, i.e. the anticipation of 
the systematic completeness of the knowledge in question. Accordingly, 
when the ‘growth of knowledge’ is guided by the idea, the (subjective) 
rationality of the knowledge gained becomes increasingly more adequate 
to, or in harmony with, the (objective) rationality of the systematic 
idea. The harmony of the two forms of rationality is warranted in neo-
Kantianism in various ways, e.g. by the transcendental structure of logic, 
transcendental consciousness, dialectic of reason, etc., but it is secured in 
the human personality in its primal rectitude of autonomy.
 In their ‘critical realism’, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd had rejected 
this warrant and security of rationality. They attributed metaphysical 
import to the idea. Thus the ‘adequate concept’ is not equivalent to the 
idea, but the adequate concept reflects the ideal of complete knowledge 
of the idea, as a knowledge of reality. The idea’s objective rationality 
is expressive of the structure of the world and is not as such merely 
secured in the Self. But that calls for a different kind of warrant for the 
harmony of subjective and objective rationality than is accepted in neo-
Kantianism. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd had looked to the (divine) 
Logos as warrant of knowledge; for knowledge has an objective reference 
of 1923) does Vollenhoven reject the ‘dualistic metaphysics’ (of substance and phenom-
enon), along with the substantialistic interpretation of the ‘immortal soul’, as is evident 
in his letter to Janse, 19 February 1924. Only when Vollenhoven’s revised understanding 
of Calvinism includes these shifts in metaphysics and anthropology would there appear 
to be a sufficient motive on his part to combat his earlier theism. 
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to the world while expressive of subjectively acquired meaning, organized 
logically. In this ‘critical realism’ a (traditional) scholastic understanding 
of the Logos, as the warrant of rationality, is operative, over against 
the humanistic warrant of neo-Kantianism.4 This theism of the Logos 
is, of course, not what neo-Kantianism supports. But theism and neo-
Kantianism do share the distinction between subjective and objective 
rationality and the ideal of their agreement. In fact, the common trait of 
their rationalism is such as to relegate the said difference to the status of 
a secondary problem, namely that of a humanistic versus a metaphysical 
interpretation of the idea.
 Vollenhoven’s revised understanding of Calvinism needs to be seen 
against the background of this problem, in particular in the way scholastic 
rationalism and the realist interpretation of the idea are implicated. 
For these ‘now’ stand accused. The timeframe—to gauge this from the 
letter to Janse cited above—is that of the mid-1920s. Vollenhoven’s 
convalescence in 1923 stimulated intellectual renewal as well as health. In 
the meantime Dooyeweerd has also (as we saw) taken a very pro-Calvinist 
stance in positing his notion of the ‘law-idea’ in the latter part of 1923. 
But we found that in him this is combined, initially at least, with the 
continued critical realist understanding of idea. At some point—difficult 
to pinpoint, but in any case related to the novel emphasis on the Self, as 
the central, spiritual personality, that positions itself in the Archimedean 
point (cf. Dooyeweerd 1928b)—the realist-metaphysical understanding 
of idea makes way in him for an ontology of meaning and a shift towards 
a use of ‘concept and idea’ with a more direct neo-Kantian connotation (as 
we concluded). How Dooyeweerd deals with the problem of rationality 
at this point is not our current topic. But we need to mention this, not 
only to be reminded of the problem at hand but also to be prepared to 
look at Vollenhoven afresh. The term ‘Calvinism’ is now (as of late 1923) 
used, in a refined sense, to denote a position from which philosophy is to 
be practised. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd wave the same banner, 
but in their practice of ‘Calvinistic philosophy’ Dooyeweerd remains 
sensitive to a neo-Kantian pull, while Vollenhoven (as will appear below) 
retains a—reformed—theistic stance.
4   At this point we leave unmentioned the role of the intuition. From the start 
Vollenhoven had denied that the harmony of subjective and objective rationality is itself 
an adequate basis for knowledge, insisting on the inclusion of an intuition to account for 
‘synthetic a priori’s’. This complicates the problem but does not essentially change it. We 
add that the distinction between the two forms of rationality led to the prominent dis-
tinction in the philosophy of science in the second half of the twentieth century, namely 
between context of discovery and context of justification. 
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 In this chapter we will discuss Vollenhoven’s revised platform and 
the main contours of what he called ‘Calvinistic philosophy’, as initially 
formulated by him. I shall refer to this as his ‘initial definitive platform’. 
It includes the development from the mid-1920s till the early 1930s. 
The first published documentation of this reform is from 1926. It was 
preceded, in 1925, by a short article, entitled “A plant of our own soil”.5 
The article is nominally a recommendation of a work of elementary 
teaching material in arithmetic, called Book of Arithmetic [Rekenboek] by 
A. Jager and A. Janse. However Vollenhoven takes the opportunity to 
make a brief statement about his own “Calvinistic arrangement theory” 
(Calvinistische ordeningsleer), which he maintains is presupposed in 
the background of this teaching material of Jager and Janse. A much 
fuller statement of Vollenhoven’s renewed thought is contained in the 
three publications of 1926, written prior to his inauguration as professor 
of philosophy and theoretical psychology at the Free University on 
26 October 1926. They are two articles, (i) “Contours of the theory 
of knowledge” and (ii) “Epistemology and natural science”, and the 
monograph on which the inaugural lecture was based, entitled (iii) “Logos 
and Ratio: their relation in the history of western epistemology”.6
 This work of 1925-1926 focuses on epistemology, with consequences 
for the philosophy of science and matters metalogical. Vollenhoven 
also mentions ontological presuppositions, but these are not discussed 
explicitly. We need to include material from his lecture notes in systematic 
philosophy of his first few years as professor to get a glimpse of his more 
explicit ontological reflections. These lecture notes, preserved in the 
Vollenhoven archives, are important in their own right (cf. Vollenhoven 
1926msA, 1927ms, 1928ms). They also offer a background sketch for 
the introductory course in philosophy, for which Isagôgè Philosophiae is 
the syllabus. The latter text is in development in the late 1920s. The first 
complete version of the syllabus for that course is available for student 
use in October 1930 (with a corrected version in January 1931). This is 
5   Vollenhoven 1925c: 391-394.
6   The cited order is their (approximate) order of appearing: (i) “Enkele grondli-
jnen der kentheorie” (Vollenhoven 1926b); (ii) “Kentheorie en natuurwetenschap” (Vol-
lenhoven 1926d); and Logos en Ratio, beider verhouding in de geschiedenis der westersche 
kentheorie (Vollenhoven 1926a). The second instalment of the second article appeared 
after Logos en Ratio. Vollenhoven expected this instalment to appear in the third issue of 
Orgaan—cf. 1926a: 73, footnote 72—but it became the fourth. The extra time allowed 
him to add a couple of footnote references to Logos en Ratio in the second instalment, 
including a proposed change of terminology; cf. 1926d: 178, note 1; 179, note 2; 188, 
note 1. This material of 1926 is discussed in Kok 1992, Chapter 7: “Logos, states of af-
fairs, and knowledge”. 
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our point of termination of this chapter, though we will also glance at 
some later developments.
 This point of termination is somewhat arbitrary, but not entirely 
so. Vollenhoven revised the text of Isagôgè Philosophiae for 1932 rather 
drastically, though the main themes of the initial definitive platform 
are continued. New at this point in time, among other things, is his 
introduction of the body-soul distinction in tandem with a shift in the 
understanding of the relevance of the moral antithesis of good and evil. 
The developments that the entire series of versions of Isagôgè Philosophiae 
evidences are discussed in the general introduction to the text-critical 
edition of that work.7 This gives us added reason to focus on the initial 
definitive platform in this concluding chapter. 
 Perhaps the best point of departure for this chapter is Vollenhoven’s 
criticism of the use of the term ‘theism’. He no longer finds this term 
serviceable in expressing his own position. What does this criticism 
involve and where does it lead to?
II. theIsm’s “waVerIng glImmer”
We should clarify at once that Vollenhoven’s criticism of theism was 
not due to any ‘falling from faith’. In his dissertation he had stated his 
conviction that “being a Christian and a thinker could be combined” 
(Vollenhoven 1918a: 2). This remained unchanged throughout his life 
and career. But it is how the combination is implemented in philosophy 
that calls for consideration. He was convinced that the combination 
should result in the development of a specific ‘Christian philosophy’ (or, 
in his more specific terminology, ‘Calvinistic philosophy’). 
 We found in chapter two that Vollenhoven’s understanding of 
theism is complicated and nuanced. He has a (sequential) Trinitarian 
understanding of God, who creates and sustains life by his Counsel (the 
Father), his Word/Logos and his Spirit. There is relevance for philosophy 
in that this doctrine of God permits the specification of transcendent 
and immanent conditions regarding prime features of the world and the 
human being. This is expressed explicitly for the first and third Persons: 
there are general essences that God (the Father) individuates into ‘thing-
laws’, and there are divine norms (of the Spirit) the validity of which 
is maintained for human knowing. This double pair of transcendence 
and immanence delineates the context of objective and subjective 
rationality, respectively. The second Person (the Logos) is the warrant 
of knowledge, in that it is the warrant for the harmony between the 
7   Cf. Tol 2010a. 
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subjective rationality of the human being’s answering to norms and the 
objective rationality of the world’s law-like features and development.8 
This scholastic understanding of rationality was part and parcel of 
Vollenhoven’s understanding of theism at the time. But his own adherence 
to this theism was on condition that the Logos’ warrant of knowledge be 
supplemented by intuitively accepted synthetic a priori’s of science. For, 
so he held, the scholastic harmony, though necessary, is not sufficient to 
secure the synthesis that is characteristic of the judgments of scientific 
knowledge.
 Theism’s importance for philosophy, as seen by the early Vollenhoven, 
is theism as ideal. Theistic philosophy pursues the ideal of acquiring “the 
philosophy that God wills that we should have” (Vollenhoven 1918a: 2; 
also p. 443 which adds: “of all the given”). The pursuit of this ideal was 
for him from the start not that of ‘thinking God’s thoughts’. For the latter 
effaces the difference between divine thought and human thought, which 
would in turn invite ‘Logos speculation’. It is Vollenhoven’s emphasis on 
the role of intuition, which is secured anthropologically in the dissertation, 
which keeps the human limitation centre stage. The way God wills that 
we should think is a way in which the data (controlled by ideas; objective 
rationality) are worked over in submission to the logical norms, divinely 
given to thought (subjective rationality). In that way the theistic ideal 
is itself an “ideal epistemic system”, bringing subjective and objective 
rationality into harmony. Were it to be realized, it would validate the 
‘adequate concept’, which would then be the complete knowledge of the 
world (cf. Vollenhoven 1918a: 443).
 But the pursuit of the theistic ideal meets with hindrances, in 
particular the ever present tendencies of deism and pantheism. Though 
each expresses a valid moment of truth, namely transcendence and 
immanence respectively, each is also one-sided and thus culpable. Deism 
refers to God but at the expense of his immanence; pantheism too refers 
to God but at the expense of his transcendence (cf. Vollenhoven 1918a: 
443). A popular misconception is to take theism as the saving alternative 
to this opposition. Vollenhoven exclaims: “How often does one not place 
deism and pantheism in polar opposition, and then consider one’s own 
8   We found that it remains uncertain whether the metalogical notions of knowl-
edge progress (directed thought) and rest (the intuition of the adequate concept) are meant 
to indicate immanent and transcendent conditions, respectively, of the Logos; cf. in chap-
ter 2, the discussion of ‘metalogic’ (section IX). Such does appear to be suggested in the 
fact that ‘critical realism’ is also referred to as ‘transcendental realism’, which pertains 
to the transcendental significance that the immanent conditions of divinity have with 
respect to human awareness. 
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position as ‘theistic’ [alternative]!”9 Thus theism, in its early 1918 meaning 
as “ideal epistemic system,” needs constantly to keep the assumptions 
about divinity in balance, if the Logos’ warranting this ideal is not to be 
thwarted.
 Now why question this theism?
A. Theism reconsidered
Vollenhoven states that it was a critical remark in Abraham Kuyper’s E 
Voto Dordraceno that stimulated him to reconsider his use of the term 
‘theism’. Kuyper’s basic complaint is that the term ‘theism’ is too vague 
to serve as antidote against misguided alternatives. The term arose, 
he claims, in reaction to English deism. Deism is a consequence of 
exchanging the confession of God for a “God in case of need”.10 This 
reduces the understanding of God to a minimal “doctrine of God” that 
only reckons with the acceptance of his existence. Germans, finding 
this superficial, responded with a deeper “theistic” concept of God. But 
both are obnoxious to Kuyper, for each takes God as object of inquiry 
instead of confessing to God’s presence in the believer’s experience of 
creation, salvation and sanctification. Besides, there is also the drawback 
that ‘theism’, even when used in a primarily confessional sense, need not 
entail a Trinitarian understanding, as indeed is often the case.11
 Now it is not immediately clear what set Vollenhoven thinking 
here. The stimulus to reconsider the use of ‘theism’ must have taken 
place before 1926, as the first quote of this chapter attests (where he 
speaks of theism as a “wavering glimmer”). But already in his dissertation 
9   Vollenhoven 1931a: 194 [= 1931g1: 399]; same passage in Vollenhoven 1933a: 49. 
10   “God voor het geval van nood”; Kuyper 1892, I: 177. E Voto Dordraceno is 
Kuyper’s commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism. The current discussion is in chapter 
six of his discussion of “Sunday 8; Question and answer 25” about the “one unique Es-
sence of God” and the three divine Persons. 
11   Vollenhoven quotes directly from Kuyper in Vollenhoven 1931a: 194, footnote 
6 [= 1931g1: 400, note 1.] The quote reads (slightly adapted): “And with [the disap-
pearance of ] this ‘doctrine of God’ [by re-emphasizing confession] the fencing with the 
equally Greek-philosophical concept of Theistic [begrip van Theïstisch] will disappear by 
itself. But this says nothing. At best it entails a denial of Deism and Polytheism, but it 
does not hinder in the least the intrusion of Pantheism, and the Unitarians, such as our 
Groningers, who reject the holy Trinity on point of principle, even prefer using the word 
Theistic.” Vollenhoven repeats the quote in Vollenhoven 1933a: 49, footnote 45. The 
quote is from Kuyper 1892, I: 178. The “Groningers” were 19th century liberal evan-
gelicals, who issued the journal “Waarheid in Liefde” [Truth in love], edited by J.F. van 
Oordt, P. Hofstede de Groot en L.G. Pareau of the University of Groningen. Cf. Algra 
1966, chapter 6: “De Groninger Richting” [The Groningen movement]. Kuyper had for 
a while been sympathetic towards the Groningers; cf. Sweetman 2007b: 3 ff. 
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Vollenhoven had agreed to the objection of making God an object of 
inquiry. He even quoted Kuyper in support of this: “[for] the thinking 
human being to think itself as subject over against God as object is a 
contradiction in terms” (Vollenhoven 1918a: 442). The contradiction 
results, in Vollenhoven’s context, when the finite human subject 
attempts, in the progressive steps of thought, to grasp an actually infinite 
being, such as God is presupposed to be. Hence the theological study of 
God needs to focus on the evidences that God has placed of himself in 
“monuments and documents” (i.e. Nature and Scripture; cf. op. cit.: 442-
443).12 Such evidences, being finite, do permit the thinking subject to 
come to a (partial and provisional) conceptual understanding, but never 
apart from acknowledging God’s infinite being. In short, at this point 
there is nothing for Vollenhoven to regret or retract.
 The second point, about ‘theism’ being too vague to discriminate 
between different understandings of divinity, is closer to home. 
Vollenhoven was aware from the start in 1918 (as we saw) of the dangers 
of deism and pantheism in the pursuit of the theistic ideal. In 1926, when 
he characterizes theism as a “wavering glimmer”, he has more to look 
back on and reflect upon. For theism, as ‘ideal epistemic system’, had in 
the meantime shifted. The Logos, as understood in 1918, is the warrant 
of knowledge, for it activates the disposition for subject and object to 
come together. Now, in the dissertation, the prime examples or basic 
forms of synthesis are the synthetic a priori’s of arithmetic and geometry. 
These are founded in the human being, namely in the mind and the 
psycho-physical body respectively. The importance attributed to the 
concrete intuition (or inner awareness) ‘pulls’ the analytical intuition—
and with it the Logos’ synthesis disposition—towards the human 
subject.13 But when Vollenhoven formulates the metalogical variant of 
12   Vollenhoven refers to and quotes from Kuyper 1909, II: 165, 168. (The same 
quote recurs later, in a similar critical context, in Vollenhoven 1938p: 5.) We note that 
the emphasis upon the confessional context does not restrain Kuyper in his speaking 
ontologically of God (JHWH) as “eternal Essence” (eeuwige Wezen). Basing himself on 
Ex. 3: 14—where God’s name is said to be “I am who I am”—the description ‘eternal Es-
sence’ is even a preferred expression in Kuyper. God’s is, was and will be are unchanging, 
while all creatures miss this constancy and are subject to becoming and change. Between 
God and his creatures there is “a gap, a separation, a boundary line”. Cf. Kuyper 1892, 
I: 150. Vollenhoven too (still) used the word “Essence” [Wezen] in reference to God in 
his 1926a: 28; cf. also Vollenhoven 1918a: 134. And around 1930 he spoke of God as 
“substance/ hypostasis”; cf. footnote 33, in section III.A.1 below. We add that the term 
‘essence/being’ also occurs in the “Belgic Confession” (cf. Article 8) and the “Heidelberg 
Catechism” (cf. Question 25). 
13   In this connection the adequate concept and the metaphysical intuition are more 
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his thought, the metalogical intuition of sighting the adequate concept 
comes to play a more central role. In the critical realist understanding, 
the metalogical intuition presupposes the idea, as principle of being. In 
the acknowledgement of the idea (by the metaphysical intuition), the 
adequate concept is divided into various ‘regions’, each of which has, as its 
modality, a highest factual unity of content. In the light of these unities, 
one discerns ‘essential connections’ that are characteristic of the regions’ 
content in question. Thus the principle of synthesis, as predisposed by 
the Logos, now leans towards the World instead of the human Self.14 
Considered together, the Logos’ role of warrant of knowledge synthesis 
has ‘wavered’ between a subjective and an objective fulfilment.
 Admittedly, the above interpretation picks up on the trend in 
Vollenhoven’s early work, not on a direct statement in his text. But the 
‘wavering’ in his pursuit of the ‘ideal epistemic system’ is evident. Telling 
in this regard is the new step Vollenhoven takes in his work of 1925-1926. 
Synthesis, as somehow answering to the Logos’ disposition for subject 
and object to come together, is entirely reinterpreted. In its new meaning 
synthesis (to anticipate this briefly here) is taken to be either a psychological 
feature of knowledge—which feature is now said to lack direct epistemic 
relevance—or as subsidiary to a more ‘structured togetherness’, one that 
Vollenhoven calls ‘systasis’.15 Knowing is then interpreted to be a state 
of mind and not an act of synthesis (cf. Vollenhoven 1926a: 11). This 
entails an overhaul of Vollenhoven’s former position, in favour of a more 
externalist-realist stance. For he now postulates, metalogically, a ‘region of 
truth’, of truth in itself (cf. op. cit.: 22, 29). Knowledge entails ‘possessing’ 
truth, and is no longer seen as ‘forming’ truth through synthesis. Thus 
the divine Logos no longer has the role of ‘disposing’ synthesis. Clearly, 
this puts an end to any ‘wavering’ as to which way the synthesis might go.
 Whether Vollenhoven’s earlier wavering attests to a prior pantheistic 
tendency followed by a deistic influence, is, I believe, secondary. There 
directly relevant to—over against the immediate certitude of the concrete intuition—the 
progressive acquisition of knowledge (by acquaintance), the content of which is subse-
quently secured by Gegenstände. The latter are formed by the concrete and analytical 
intuitions in compliance with the principle of identity. Cf. chapter 2, VI.A. 
14   The most insistent attempt to express this alternative is in Dooyeweerd, “Cosmos 
and Logos” (Dooyeweerd 1923a2 and 1923a3; cf. our discussion in chapter 3, section 
III.E). There the ‘Divine noèsis’ (= Logos) is the principle of ‘meaning-giving for con-
sciousness’, and it enables the human being to know the world through its being put, via 
the (metalogical) intuition, in a direct rapport with it. 
15   This term is not new. It also occurs in Vollenhoven 1921c, when Vollenhoven 
came to place more weight on metalogical features in response, among other things, to 
H. Rickert’s work. 
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was, of course, never an expressed partiality to either. Yet Vollenhoven did 
feel that there was something to confront in line with Kuyper’s remark. 
For the term ‘theism’, he claims, is not decisive enough over against deism 
and pantheism.
B. ‘Theos’ and ‘kosmos’
Vollenhoven felt challenged to clarify the vagueness of ‘theism’ in 
a definitive way, with an appeal to fundamentals. The relevance to 
himself—or perhaps we should say to his former ‘critical realism’—
becomes more evident if we include the features of divine immanence 
and transcendence. His own initial tandem of the concrete and analytical 
intuitions may not have been pantheistic, but it did emphasize ‘immanent 
validity’ of divine norms; also the subsequent weight put on the duality 
of metalogical intuition (viewing) and the idea is not typically of deistic 
design, but there is something here of a dogmatic antenna that pretends to 
gain ‘transcendent insight’ regarding God’s Counsel. These are tendencies 
to which critical realism was prone. In each of these cases (of immanence 
and transcendence respectively) there is a ‘boundary problem’ between 
divinity and the creature. For, when duly considered, divine immanence 
is what conditions in a transcendental-like way; it is not a presence 
within human control. Similarly divine transcendence calls for the most 
primordial sense in which reality deserves respect; it is not a means for a 
human being towards acquiring a higher or privileged knowledge.
 Vollenhoven continued to honour the distinction between the 
divine transcendence and immanence as such. It is the relevance to the 
human condition that needs to be carefully reassessed. Vollenhoven’s 
continued commitment is evident from the following quote of later 
years. In 1942 he emphasized:
The highness of the Lord involves two things: He stands, far exalted above 
the world, [but also] in continual contact with it, so that on the one hand 
every creature is in Him and can neither turn nor move outside of Him, 
and on the other hand He operates in the world and lives in His people. 
Thus Scripture teaches both: the transcendence and the immanence of 
God.16 
16   Vollenhoven 1942m: 1 (emphases added). The article is unsigned, but tell-tale 
signs—terms and turns of phrases—point to Vollenhoven as the author. Vollenhoven’s 
reason for (re)emphasizing the topic of the title lay in the misunderstanding that had 
arisen in consequence of Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s work. Their criticism directed 
against “immanence philosophy”, meant as a criticism of the principle of the autonomy 
of thought, was taken as suggesting a denial of God’s immanence (ibid.). Vollenhoven 
had probably agreed to write also on behalf of Dooyeweerd—is that why the article is 
unsigned?—for he alternates the use of “Calvinistic thought” and “Philosophy of the 
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We see how close this statement is to Augustine’s expression of God’s 
“Excellency of an ever-present eternity”, quoted earlier (cf. Vollenhoven 
1918a: 134; also chapter 2, section VIII.B. above), an “Excellency” that 
does not forfeit but bears upon the more specific forms of transcendence 
and immanence with respect to the creation. When ‘theism’ is understood 
as acknowledging deity, in the sense quoted (which I take to be more in 
line with common usage),17 then obviously Vollenhoven is and remained 
an ardent theist. It is the meaning of theism as “ideal epistemic system” 
that is up for critical discussion. It is in this connection that deism and 
pantheism need to be reviewed.
1. A boundary problem
The way Vollenhoven chose to make headway was to clarify the situation 
of the use of “deism” and “pantheism” in terms of fundamentals. 
Accordingly (now back to the 1920s), Vollenhoven takes the basic 
problem to be that of “the boundary is between God and that which is 
created”.18 He considers this to be the question that “dominates all other 
questions”. I believe that in light of our account of critical realism, one 
can see why this question is put in the centre of attention, in any case as 
calling for a fundamental overhaul of critical realism. But Vollenhoven 
hoped to achieve more. The stimulus from reading Kuyper’s E Voto 
Dordraceno got Vollenhoven to think about “rubricating the basic themes 
of opponents, considered from one’s own standpoint” (ibid.). He devised 
a terminology that, he says, served him well “the last few years” (ibid.). 
(This last remark puts the development of this point in the second half 
of the 1920s, hence in the timeframe of Vollenhoven’s initial definitive 
platform.)
 Vollenhoven himself favours a position in which there is a clear 
boundary between God and the creature. In section III of this chapter we 
will see what this standpoint involves. The general thesis of a boundary 
also serves to characterize positions Vollenhoven criticizes. We shall first 
mention the rubrics he chooses to characterize the positions he opposes. 
These are chosen in such a way as to include ‘theism’ in an ideal epistemic 
context, hence making the latter term no longer serviceable in reference 
to his own position. So here we shall come across his philosophical 
rejection of this term.
Law-idea”. 
17   Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary offers, under “theism”: “Belief in the exis-
tence of one God, transcending, yet immanent in, the universe”. 
18   Vollenhoven 1931a: 194 [= 1931g1: 400]. 
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 To avoid confusing the censurable use of ‘theism’ with the more 
latitudinarian (common sense) use, meaning ‘belief in God’, both in 
his transcendence and immanence, let us state Vollenhoven’s boundary 
problem. The boundary problem is that of determining the line between 
‘theos’ and ‘kosmos’. In resorting to Greek terms we can emphasize that 
neither the existence of God (theos) nor that of the world (kosmos) is in 
question here for Vollenhoven. What the boundary problem is about is 
how the features of divinity and of the cosmos are mutually apportioned, 
in the sense of what may properly be attributed to what, in the light of 
their primary meaning.
 The boundary problem can ‘swing’ two ways. On the one hand, 
there is the possibility of attributing to kosmos what properly belongs to 
theos. There is then (so to speak) ‘too much divinity’ (or too much taken as 
divine-like). This is said to be ‘theistic’ and to engender theism. Similarly, 
on the other hand, one may attribute to theos what properly belongs to 
kosmos, in which case there is ‘too much world’ (or too much taken to 
be world-like). This, in turn, is said to be ‘cosmistic’ (kosmistisch) and to 
engender cosmism. So, in both cases, Vollenhoven takes the suffix ‘-ism’ 
as suggesting excess or exaggeration. The word ‘cosmism’ in itself suggests 
this, but the word ‘theism’ would not normally be taken in this way. Yet 
that is how Vollenhoven now uses this term in the present context.
2. Monism and dualism
So far the discussion is formal. What, now, are the actual positions of 
opponents that Vollenhoven distinguishes?19 There is, to start with, 
the preliminary question about the boundary itself. Is its presence (or 
relevance) denied or is it acknowledged? The first alternative leads to 
monism, the second to dualism. Let us look at monism first.
 Monism’s denial of the boundary may be based on either negation 
or subsumption. The boundary is negated when either the existence of 
God or that of the cosmos is denied, giving rise to a-theism and a-cosmism 
respectively. Accordingly, this negation of the boundary takes place by 
default. Also, the term ‘monism’, as here used, denotes a whole in which 
nothing basic is set off from anything else basic. But of course, ‘atheism’ 
and ‘acosmism’, as negative rubrics, disclose nothing about the actual 
prime features of the positions in question, i.e. they don’t indicate how 
the whole is characterized. Hence Vollenhoven does not consider these to 
19   The following discussion is based on Vollenhoven 1931a: 194-195 [= 1931g1: 
400-401]. It recurs in more expanded form in Vollenhoven 1933a and also in Isagôgè 
Philosophiae of 1932. The latter two versions are taken up in Appendix IIb of Vollenhoven 
2010. 
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be genuine rubrics in their own right. He leaves these forms of negating 
monism aside from further discussion.20 
 ‘Subsuming monism’ (the second form of monism) denies the 
boundary between theos and kosmos, not through denying the existence 
of what either term refers to, but in subsuming one entirely under the 
other, whereby their effects mutually interfere. This also gives rise to 
two possibilities. When the cosmos is subsumed under God, we have 
pantheism; when God is subsumed under the cosmos, pankosmism. The 
pantheism Vollenhoven has in mind here is the view that everything in 
or of the cosmos displays the trait of deity. What comes to mind is, say, 
Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’, where all life-activity is a striving for self-
sovereignty by the continual overcoming of obstacles in the environment. 
Pancosmism, on the other hand, is the view (as here meant) of the ‘block 
universe’ (as, say, in Parmenides) in which everything is determined, 
and even divinity is subject to the necessitating conditions of the cosmic 
whole to which it belongs.21
 Vollenhoven did not give these positions of pantheism and 
pancosmism much specific attention in his published work. For the 
denial of any boundary between God and the cosmos removes them 
from the direct line of his interest, which is the boundary acknowledged. 
Accordingly, Vollenhoven is more interested in dualism and the 
alternatives it offers. Dualism as such comes closer to home, for he thinks 
of the Calvinistic position as being properly dualistic, a ‘biblical dualism’. 
The improper (or ‘non-scriptural’) dualisms call for attention first.22 
 Dualism, as understood by Vollenhoven at the time, is the view 
that the acknowledged existence of theos and kosmos entails a boundary 
that is effective by virtue of their difference. Vollenhoven takes the chief 
characteristics of these existences to be sovereignty and subservience 
20   Vollenhoven 1933a: 55; also Vollenhoven 2010, Appendix IIb, 150*. 
21   A case in point is the view defended by Alvin Plantinga in his Aquinas Lecture 
of 1980, Does God have a Nature, in which God is taken to be “the first being of the uni-
verse” (Plantinga 1980: 1, 9); reprinted in Plantinga 1998: 225, 228.
22   Vollenhoven seldom uses the term “biblical/scriptural dualism”, but the meaning 
is clearly implied when speaking of dualism as “accepting a boundary between God and 
cosmos” and that “non-scriptural dualism . . . assumes the boundary to be other than as 
the Holy Scripture directs” (Vollenhoven 2010, Appendix IIb, §150). We add that this 
use of ‘dualism’ focuses on the correlation of God and world and does not as such include 
an anthropological dualism of, say, immortal soul and mortal body—Vollenhoven had 
expressed his agreement with Janse’s criticism of this anthropological view in his letter to 
him, dated 19 February 1924. Also it does not entail an antithesis of good and evil (as 
in Gnosticism, Catharism, etc.). John Kok referred me to one use of “scriptural dualism” 
that is in print, namely in Vollenhoven 1934a, instalment VI (27-11-1934).
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respectively. The boundary problem is how these characteristics are 
implemented when appealing to theos and kosmos. If something of kosmos 
is thought to be intrinsically sovereign, though without taking this to hold 
for the whole cosmos, then there is not a full pantheism. But there is 
still too much taken as sharing in sovereignty. Vollenhoven refers to this 
as ‘partial theism’. Examples are: a spiritual kernel in the human being, 
taken to be holy, autonomous, etc.; Caesar worship; the starry heavens 
taken to be divine; etc. On the other hand, if something of theos is taken 
to be subservient—something of divinity is taken to be creaturely-like—
but without this being a full pancosmism, then we still have too much 
that is subservient. This is ‘partial cosmism’; e.g. the position of the Holy 
Spirit as subservient to the other Persons; the denial of the divinity of 
Christ, etc.
 These forms of ‘improper dualism’ are not just ‘metaphysical’. 
They can inform and are reflected in worldviews. When anything of 
the cosmos is given privileged status, such as fideism in honouring an 
unfettered belief function, or spiritualism, that attributes autonomous 
authority to matters ethical or juridical, or aesthetic modernism, with its 
ideal of an ever-continual creativity, etc., then such ‘partial theistic’ views 
give prominence in particular to humanistic views of life and the world. 
They ‘divide the world’ in a way that can lead to forms of totalitarianism 
and forced submission within the contours of human life (the church 
not excluded). Such divisions of the world threaten freedom.23 On the 
other hand, ‘partial cosmistic’ views have an element of fatalism. In the 
heart of the matter, life cannot be redeemed; it lacks meaning or purpose 
over which divine sovereignty has no control. Such worldviews tend to 
be ineluctably tragic, though not always without poignancy, as when the 
divine is touchingly described as “the fellow-sufferer who understands” 
(Whitehead).24 Vollenhoven however does not himself expand on these 
worldview features, so we limit our remark here to an indication of their 
presence. 
 All told, Vollenhoven reduced the fundamental positions of 
‘opponents’ to four. There are two forms of (subsuming) monism, namely 
pantheism and pancosmism, and there are two forms of (improper) 
dualism: partial theism and partial cosmism. In this phraseology, the 
positions indicated, if set to work in philosophy towards delineating 
an ‘ideal epistemic system’, would bring about a distorted general 
understanding, evidenced (as we will see) by antinomies. Both ‘cosmism’ 
23   Cf. Vollenhoven 1933a: 26. 
24   Whitehead 1978: 351. 
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and ‘theism’, in whatever shade of meaning, are found to be, formally at 
least, wanting and in that light unsuitable for ‘Calvinistic’ use. They are 
indicative of the required ‘reformation’ of philosophy.25 
 Of the four positions of ‘opponents’, as here distinguished, only 
partial theism was significantly ventilated. In the important work of 1933, 
Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, the second main part 
is devoted to an historical study of the influence of partial theism in the 
West from the time of early Greek culture and philosophy up to and 
including the time of the Reformation and John Calvin (1509-1564).26 
The choice for the discussion of partial theism, in its historical relevance, 
is motivated by its importance towards critically understanding the partial 
theistic nature of humanism and the autonomy of thought in modern 
times, in particular in Vollenhoven’s own day. The current terminology 
of philosophers, he says, is so drenched with humanism as to make the 
attempt to sift this out futile (cf. op. cit.: 16). Thus philosophy that strives 
to reckon with the Christian faith, through advancing a properly dualistic 
position, must take a stand against any accommodation with (this kind 
of ) “prevailing philosophy” (gangbare wijsbegeerte).
 Vollenhoven’s critical use of the terms ‘theism’ and ‘cosmism’, and 
their derivatives, was actually short-lived. In a note published in 1941, 
Vollenhoven explains that, though the distinctions of the two forms of 
monism and dualism were clarifying, their application led to difficulties, 
particularly when an author is not explicit about “the most encompassing 
relation” between God and the world, on the basis of which a ‘position’, 
as here meant, can be ascertained. Hence he comes to a reassessment, 
already begun in 1938,27 as to what the chief characteristic of “prevailing 
philosophy” is. He turns to characterizing this in light of the conflict 
between realism and nominalism/antirealism.28
25   When ‘theism’ is taken to mean ‘too much deity’, then ‘atheism’ could (‘for-
mally’, so I note) be taken to imply “the rejection of too much deity”. This could be 
looked upon, by a ‘Calvinist’, as a positive recommendation! Because Vollenhoven simply 
bypasses atheism, this suggestion nowhere surfaces. The same holds for ‘acosmism’. We 
also note that Vollenhoven takes ‘deism’, somewhat surprisingly, to be a form of ‘pan-
cosmism’, for it looks upon God, he says, as a machine designer (machinebouwkundige), 
which implies that God is part of the cosmos. However, there is something to say for 
deism being ‘partial cosmistic’, in that God is reduced to the role of ‘first cause’ of the 
cosmos, without the follow-up of revelation and guidance. Cf. Vollenhoven 1933a: 52, 
note 47; Vollenhoven 2010, Appendix IIb, §150, note 10. 
26   Vollenhoven 1933a: 69-301. 
27   Vollenhoven 1938v. 
28   Vollenhoven 1941k: 65-66, note 2 (first instalment); cf. also Tol 2010a. The 
approach in terms of realism and nominalism was, in turn, replaced in the early 1940s 
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 This shift in his approach to prevailing philosophy in fact reflects 
a new change in his own understanding of the encompassing relation 
between God and the cosmos. It is time we turn to the discussion of what 
that position is and why it was itself, in time, superseded.
III. boundary and law
The problem of the boundary had Vollenhoven’s attention throughout 
his career. In this section we will discuss Vollenhoven’s approach and 
formulation of it. The very concept of a boundary, this being crucial 
when speaking of God and the world, was for him nonnegotiable. The 
world or cosmos, being a creation, calls for determining or delimiting 
conditions; it is intrinsically not self-sufficient; it is subservient. These 
conditions, which hold for the world, have their source in God. This 
source, however conceived, has a determining and sustaining efficacy; it 
is intrinsically sovereign. God and world, being mutually different, when 
taken together delineate a boundary, as called up by their different natures. 
‘Formally’ a boundary exists by default, being called up by the necessary 
difference between God and cosmos; ‘materially’ the boundary serves to 
mark off the difference between sovereignty and subservience. Hence it 
has the character of law. In introducing this notion, Vollenhoven used 
the (not so fortunate) monarchical metaphor of the ‘absolute prince’. 
The metaphor was chosen also to emphasize an important measure of 
voluntarism involved here, and that the chief connotation of law is that it 
is ordinance-like.29 Law, of course, may be cognitively contemplated. But 
contemplation should bring to the fore the source of law in God’s will, 
hence that law is something to be followed up and not primarily studied 
and admired. The first and foremost effect of law is its being a dynamic 
factor in life practice. In this regard, the basics presuppose a context of 
activity, whereby cognition is checked by the law-constrained will. So the 
theme of ‘boundary and law’ calls for careful discussion. 
 For the duration of his career, marked by the inaugural lecture (26 
October 1926) and the valedictory lecture (26 October 1963), there is 
by the development of the ‘problem-historical method’. In the context of that method 
the terms monism and dualism acquire their definitive meanings for Vollenhoven. They 
then denote a basic feature of the cosmos as such (no longer the God-world correla-
tion): monism, when a unitary feature presides, dualism when two (or more) principles are 
postulated. Vollenhoven’s own understanding of the correlation of law and cosmos now 
precludes his own position (from the early 1940s on) from being either monistic or dual-
istic; cf. section III.V.C. below. Of course, Vollenhoven did continue to point to types of 
thought, in the context of his problem-historical work, that proceed from the God-world 
correlation. 
29   Vollenhoven acknowledged this specifically in his 1933a: 23-24. 
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explicit continuity regarding the law as boundary. In the former lecture, 
discussing the question as to where the principal boundary (hoofdgrens) 
is to be drawn, Vollenhoven opts for “the pure dualism, namely that 
between God, who institutes his ordinances and the cosmos which stands 
under these laws” (Vollenhoven 1926a: 7, also 18, 20-21). In his farewell 
address, in which he discusses Plato’s realism, he states: “Hence Calvinistic 
philosophy—contrary to Greek-Hellenistic thought and the synthesis 
thought dependent on it—sees the law as the boundary between God 
and the cosmos.”30 However, a telling difference appears in the very next 
sentence. “Whereby at the same time the dualism that is unacceptable for 
a Christian, but still finding acceptance, of God and world is replaced by 
the view that is neither dualistic nor monistic, of a law posed by God that 
is correlate with a world created by him.” So the initial “pure dualism” of 
the correlation of God and the world has been replaced by the correlation 
of law and the world, itself included in a complex of God-law-cosmos 
that is neither dualistic nor monistic.31
 In order to make headway in the ensuing discussion we shall first 
carefully toe the line of ‘pure dualism’. 
A. The boundary properly determined
Continuing the discussion of monism and dualism, as initially defined by 
Vollenhoven, the main points of contention of the positions Vollenhoven 
opposes concern, formally, (i) there being a boundary between God and 
the world—monism failing to acknowledge such, but dualism ceding—
as well as (ii) when ceded, where the boundary runs. The criterion 
for determining the properly situated boundary is a ‘Christian’ or 
‘Scriptural’ criterion. The God of the Scriptures cannot, part or whole, 
30   Vollenhoven 1963a: 128; also in Tol and Bril: 155-156.
31   In chapter three we made mention of the fact that Dooyeweerd was the first to 
put the theme of ‘law as boundary’ (as ‘sphere sovereignty’) in writing (cf. Dooyeweerd 
1923d) and to publish forceful defences of it (cf. work of 1924 and later). Little is known 
of his contact with Vollenhoven at the time, who, in late 1923, was in the advanced 
stage of convalescence. How this topic arose in their contact remains in the dark. For 
Dooyeweerd ‘law as boundary’ was integral to what he called the ‘law-idea’, which posed 
boundaries to the use of reason and expressions of the will, but not to the role of faith, 
later replaced by the spiritual selfhood. For Vollenhoven, law as boundary holds across 
the board. As our discussion will indicate, Vollenhoven never accepted the context, and 
also rejected the notion, of a ‘law-idea’. In their later careers, the ‘law as boundary’ theme 
appeared to be more characteristic of Vollenhoven than of Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd’s 
relinquishing realism (in the late 1920s) was no doubt a factor. This is in step with his 
formulation, particularly when the ontology of meaning is presupposed, of the boundary 
problem as ‘sides’ (“law-side and subject-side”) of “the structure of reality in the diversity 
of meaning”; Dooyeweerd (1935-1936), vol. 2: 3. 
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share features with the cosmos, which is his creation. Thus Vollenhoven 
takes the ‘Scriptural position’ to be formally dualistic, as involving the 
acknowledged existence of God and of the cosmos, as well as their 
complete difference. The existence of the cosmos being dependent on 
that of God, the distinction of their prime characteristics of sovereignty 
and subservience is itself predicated on this difference. The alternative 
forms of dualism are objectionable, ‘by definition’ as it were, merely in 
applying the prime characteristics in a way that is not congruent with the 
difference between God and cosmos.
 If this were the whole account, it would be very unsatisfactory. 
Theists and cosmists (as defined by Vollenhoven) could complain that 
the ‘biblical criterion’ simply does not agree with their view of reality. 
Also, as we mentioned, there are worldviews that inform life in ways that 
reflect versions of ‘theism’ and ‘cosmism’ (as defined). So alternatives to 
‘biblical dualism’ are not just speculative construals, to be waved away on 
account of their being speculative. One needs to argue more pointedly if 
conclusions proper to philosophy are to be drawn in favour or disfavour 
of any of these positions.
 This, in fact, is as Vollenhoven would have it. His choice of doing 
philosophy in a way that reckons with Scripture is motivated and 
conditioned from out of the (Protestant) Christian religion. But this 
is not to replace or side-step philosophy. It orientates one with respect 
to the questions asked, questions that then need to be responded to—
formulated and critically discussed—within the possibilities of philosophy. 
A statement of Vollenhoven from 1942 is apposite and is characteristic of 
Vollenhoven in general.
Truly, Calvinistic thought does not take the view of Holy Scripture being 
a work of philosophy, from which one simply reads a philosophy. If one is 
to do philosophy, then one ought to instigate a serious and fundamental 
inquiry into the structure of the whole cosmos. Don’t think that the Scrip-
ture exists to spare us the difficulty that will come our way when conduct-
ing such research.32
 But in Vollenhoven’s initial definitive work, he was apt to 
reformulate the complex of God and the cosmos almost directly into the 
mode of critical philosophy. This was done not to call special attention 
to God—that could initiate an ‘inquiry’ into God’s existence, the sort 
Vollenhoven, citing Kuyper (as we saw), had explicitly rejected as being 
speculative—but to draw out the main implication about the nature of 
the law, as based on the difference between God and the cosmos. Thought 
32   Vollenhoven 1942m: 1.
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cannot start from nowhere with no means. It is what the acceptance of 
the existence of God and the cosmos entails that calls for consideration. 
Two terms in particular are favoured: substance and infinity.
1. Substance and antinomy
When the existence of God and the cosmos is spoken of in a religious 
context, the focus is more on the meaning of that existence than on the 
bare acceptance of existence. The religious confession of God’s relation 
to the cosmos expresses the conviction that God, in being the source 
(archè) of the cosmos, is also its essential support, its “firm ground”. 
Vollenhoven did not hesitate to use the term ‘substance’ or ‘hypostasis’ in 
this connection.33 (This use however ceases after 1932). In this capacity 
as ‘firm ground’ God is the bearer or maintainer of the cosmos that is 
itself dependent, non-self-sufficient.34 This characterization, which is 
itself religious, takes on critical meaning when considering the situation 
in which the import of this confession is not honoured. Such a situation 
occurs when the ‘firm ground’ of the cosmos is sought within the cosmos 
itself. But then the cosmos has to provide its own foundation. This, now, 
results ineluctably in antinomies; for in that case the substance of the 
cosmos, which in bearing the cosmos also conditions it, is sought within 
that which is conditioned. In this way the former discussion concerning 
the ‘boundary’ between God and the cosmos has an immediate relevance 
for the problem of such antinomies. 
 This ‘Kantian’ theme of antinomies in fact becomes integral to 
Calvinistic philosophy in its critical sense. For antinomies—prima facie 
‘clashes’ of boundaries—cannot be tolerated in the world that the human 
being seeks to know and to live in. Thus the principle that antinomies 
are to be excluded—the ‘principium exclusae antinomiae’—is written 
across the face of Calvinistic philosophy, for, as Vollenhoven states: “this 
principle . . . is none other than the corollary or effect of the confession 
of God’s sovereignty over all things, on whatever terrain.”35 
33   Vollenhoven 1932d: 397-398; also Vollenhoven 2010, Appendix IIb, §151. This 
ontological characterization was not taken over into the (reworked) parallel text of Vol-
lenhoven 1933a. This temporary use at the time may simply reflect the use within the 
Reformed tradition—until thinking better of it—as also in Kuyper, where God is spoken 
of as ‘(eternal) Essence’ (cf. footnote 12 above). 
34   The confessional statement given philosophical attention here is: “God has cre-
ated everything and still carries this by the word of his power”, which echoes Heb. 1:3; cf. 
Vollenhoven 1926d: 190. In Hebrews 11:1 the term ‘hypostasis’ occurs in the sense that 
Vollenhoven wished to advance: “Now faith is the hypostasis of things hoped for . . .”, 
presuming that it is the import of faith that is taken as ‘hypostasis’, not the act. 
35   Vollenhoven 1931a: 190 [= 1931g: 396]; also in Vollenhoven 1933a: 29. 
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 We need to review this theme of antinomies more closely. In 
Kant, antinomies signal a conflict of reason in conjunction with the 
understanding, namely when ‘concepts of reason’ (ideas) are treated 
as objects of the understanding. For Kant, too, the problem arises in 
a misuse of ‘condition and the conditioned’, in particular the way the 
understanding is conditioned or determined by conditions of reason.36 
Vollenhoven formulates this more directly as a conflict of boundary 
arrangement, in particular in connection with what is determined by 
boundaries in terms of what they regulate. 
 To state this formally and generally, the context of boundaries will 
be free from antinomies only if (i) that which conditions is not itself 
conditioned, at least is not dependent on a higher condition for itself 
to be a condition, for that would introduce an infinite regress, and (ii) 
that which is conditioned, is such not by virtue of something that is self-
imposed, for then it would be in itself self-determined. In other words, 
the first alternative says that there must be a principal boundary, the 
second says that that boundary cannot itself be part of what it bounds. 
The first is needed in connection with the cosmos, the second can only 
be rightly attributed to God.
 Perhaps unexpectedly, Vollenhoven is reluctant to say much about 
the principal boundary. For, to delve into it could invite an ‘inquiry’ into 
the Counsel of God, and that would be speculative. But an effect of that 
boundary is its delineating the unity or the whole of the cosmos. On that 
point Vollenhoven says: 
We should proceed from the creation by God. Hence the cosmos stands 
under the law of God. Here there is no objection to acknowledging unity: 
on the contrary, one who draws the principal boundary accurately has no 
alternative but to take all that is ‘not-God’ together. This [gathered] unity 
has more than just a negative logical meaning. For in the Scriptures the 
creation is called ‘cosmos’ = ‘elegantly ordered whole’. Thus the unity is 
that of God’s work of art.37
36   In Kant, an antinomy results when a concept of reason is used in a way that 
assumes that it is capable of illustration in a ‘possible experience’, as is fitting for or a cri-
terion of the understanding. However, reason and its ideas condition the understanding, 
for they answer to the desire for completeness of insight with regard to the Self, the World 
and God. These being ‘totalities’, they cannot themselves be thought via the categories 
of the understanding, and the attempt to do so yields (among other things) antinomies. 
As Kant states it, the difficulty arises when “reason, rather, in continuous progression of 
the empirical synthesis has been led to [ideas] necessarily when it tries to liberate from 
every condition, and to grasp in its unconditioned totality, that which can always be de-
termined only conditionally in accordance with rules of experience.” Kant 1998, A462/
B490.
37   Vollenhoven 1926msA, section 19, also section 1. 
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The unity of the cosmos is taken to be of an aesthetic nature. This provides 
little opportunity to get a firm grip on antinomies. At best an antinomy 
could be signalled by the ‘disharmony’ it engenders. Vollenhoven retains 
this aesthetic characterization of the whole only in the period of his 
initial definitive thought.38 It drops out of sight in the early 1930s when 
Vollenhoven’s anthropology becomes more pronounced and, with it, a 
new emphasis on the antithesis of good and evil. We return to this below.
 For Vollenhoven, antinomies are especially evident in connection 
with what is bounded, i.e. what is subject to law. When the principal 
boundary is not drawn right, the resulting disharmony entails conditions 
being entangled. The principle of the exclusion of antinomies, as corollary 
to the confession of God’s sovereignty, has an important distinguishing 
effect that is of direct philosophical relevance, as the following passage 
clarifies.
When, in a strict sense, we maintain ‘subject’ to mean ‘subject to law’ then 
that excludes the acceptance of any anti-nomic subject. The discovery of 
an anti-nomic subject demands that we differentiate it into as many sub-
jects and, parallel to this, accept as many laws as is found to be necessary 
to resolve the antinomy. It would be the simplest to call this principle: 
‘principium exclusae antinomiae’ (or better: ‘principium exclusi subjecti anti-
nomici’), the principle that states: the sustained acceptance of an antinomy 
is excluded. And when its application leads to the discovery of more than 
one law-sphere, then that plurality of law-spheres is now secured, namely 
in the correlation: law-subject.39
 An ‘anti-nomic subject’ is a subject that lets itself be determined 
by different, i.e. mutually exclusive laws or ordinances in terms of which 
its own activity is deemed warranted or ‘lawful’. It is essential not to 
confuse ‘subject’ in ‘subject to law’ with ‘subject’ as ‘determining subject’. 
(In Dutch this is “subjèct” as over against “súbject”, respectively.) The 
latter—a humanistic alternative—merges the individual agent and its role 
of subjecting. In that case, an “anti-nomic” subject involves the trait of 
a person stubbornly attempting to harmonize different perspectives, in 
an attitude that maintains that the error is chiefly one of not properly 
using intrinsic determining capacities, such as reason and understanding. 
But the former alternative—‘subject’ as ‘subject to law’—distinguishes the 
38   In Vollenhoven 1930b: 13, Vollenhoven continued to speak of “God the ar-
chitect and artist of the cosmos” (p. 13). The phrase is deleted in later reprints. In this 
same work there is mention of ‘good and evil’, but, characteristic of Vollenhoven’s initial 
platform, this is treated in a wholly religious context. In 1932 the ‘antithesis of good 
and evil’ is re-interpreted and introduced as a more distinct determination of the human 
condition. Cf. the discussion in section V.B. below, or Tol 2010a. 
39   Vollenhoven 1927ms, section 64. 
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individual from its qualities of ‘standing in subjection’. When standing in 
subjection, the individual agent is aware not only of his/her own attitude 
but also of the context of activity and the kind of regulation it requires 
to make sense of that activity. E.g. at a cocktail party the context is social, 
at the market it is economic, in court it is juridical, etc. (Recognition of 
context and characteristic is of course more than just personal belief or 
merely subjective assessment.) Now, if one can agree that justice should 
not be bought (doing such is to subject matters juridical to economic 
norms) nor ought the market to privilege social contacts (which invites 
societal corruption) etc., then one acknowledges, and accepts on point 
of principle, that different contexts of activity call for different kinds of 
regulation to which one ought to submit in kind. This is how Vollenhoven 
avoids the subject’s becoming ‘anti-nomic’: the person is called on to 
answer only to such norms as are suited to the situation. This is to 
acknowledge a diversity of ‘qualities of subjection’. The radius in which 
such a quality is exercised may (provisionally) be called a ‘law-sphere’.
 So the principle that antinomies be excluded has the effect of calling 
attention to and requiring a pluralism of laws, or rather, a diversity of 
(general) situations—law-spheres—calling for regulation in terms of 
relevant ordinances or laws. Nothing is said about the extent of this 
diversity, nor does Vollenhoven offer the possibility of a ‘derivation’ from 
out of a unity of law. Again, his explicit wording is quite clear.
This absolute unity [of the aesthetic whole of the cosmos] can only be 
reconciled with a multiplicity if this multiplicity is ranked under it, hence 
despite all the difference of the many, nothing of this many falls beyond 
the boundary of the unity, i.e. outside of the boundary of being creaturely 
and hence subject to God’s will. That is why, if this multiplicity exists, we 
have to speak of law-spheres.40
 Hence, Vollenhoven holds that however much the avoidance 
of antinomies calls for the acknowledgement of a diversity of law-
spheres “under” the unity of the principal boundary (of God’s will)—in 
other words, the distinct law of a law-sphere is a case of the principal 
boundary—this does not prove that there is such a plurality. The last 
quotation continues with the statement:
That there is a multiplicity of law-spheres, in other words that there is 
more than one law-sphere, is here presupposed. It can only be proven in 
connection with the law by way of knowledge, proven by way of the logic 
that knowledge presupposes. (ibid) 
This statement appears to say that one needs to appeal to a ‘law of logic’—
40   Op. cit. , section 19. 
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in connection with a ‘logical law-sphere’?—to prove that there is more 
than one law-sphere. Wouldn’t the one ‘law-sphere’—wouldn’t that be 
the cosmos as a whole under the principal boundary?—from which the 
‘proof ’ proceeds then be of a logical character? That would constitute a 
fundamental denial of the cosmic character of created reality, in favour of 
a ‘logical’ or cognitive characterization. This cannot be a correct reading.
 When Vollenhoven speaks of the logic that knowledge presupposes, 
he is appealing to a metalogical situation of the order of knowledge, its logic 
being the ‘order’ found to hold in that situation. Relevant epistemological 
remarks will be made in an ensuing section. At this point we can appeal 
to Dooyeweerd’s prior work for clarification, at least in its broad outline, 
to which Vollenhoven concurred (if not being its initiator).
 The metalogical situation, as documented in the early 1920s, is that 
of critical realism, in which rationality and scientific research is channelled 
in a multiplicity of ‘region categories’. These ‘regions’ differ as to modality, 
which is to say that they differ in the unity of the highest material 
characterization of each region. Within a distinct modal region ‘essential 
connections’ are found in conjunction with the ‘logic’ or rationality that 
is fitting for that region. So the “logic that knowledge presupposes” is 
a logic that proceeds from a multiplicity of regions, mutually distinct 
as to the characterizing modality of each, which together delineate the 
metalogical situation of a pluralist rationality, not reducible to a unity. 
The regions are distinguished by means of the metalogical intuition. The 
intuition’s viewing focuses on the ‘adequate concept’ of a region by which 
the rational operations of knowledge acquisition in a region is guided, 
while at the same time the viewing, as executed by the viewing subject, is 
itself of the appropriate kind of modality for the region involved.
 If, for the moment, we may take ‘region category’ to be the ancestor 
of ‘law-sphere’—Vollenhoven’s understanding of a law-sphere is certainly 
very much like a ‘region’ category, but we can’t clinch the correlation 
just yet—then the ‘proof ’ of a multiplicity of law-spheres appeals to the 
current methodological situation in scientific practice and to the need 
of acknowledging a diversity of (kinds of ) science, requiring a diversity 
of methods. A dominant unity of method, such as maintained by the 
Marburg neo-Kantians, was definitely passé for Vollenhoven as of 1921, 
this being inconsistent with the prime role performed by the metalogical 
intuition in discerning Gegenstand regions of different modality. In 
later work Vollenhoven retained this close link between philosophy as 
general science and the special or the fundamental sciences, through 
the correlation of the fields of investigation (of the primary sciences) 
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with the law-spheres. The theme of modality, of the highest material 
characterization as discerned by intuition, plays a decisive role here. 
 We can now see how the critical realist background is fit into the 
current ‘law as boundary’ discussion. The principle of antinomies (that 
antinomies be excluded) not only holds for the subject in its qualities 
of subjection; it is also relevant for the ‘regions’ in which the qualities 
of subjection are implemented. Such regions constitute the domains of 
inquiry of a science, each of which is the context of a specific method. 
Should a domain of inquiry be ‘worked over’ with an unsuited method, or 
a combination of methods, then that would make it liable to harbouring 
antinomies.41 So the principle that antinomies be excluded is relevant for 
the methodology of science as well, in the role of a ‘metalogical’ principle 
in the ‘order of knowledge’. At this metalogical level, antinomies are 
avoided by the recognition of an adequate diversity of domains, whereby 
each domain has a method that is suitable to working its content. This was 
acknowledged in critical realism as well. But at that time the metalogical 
intuition’s viewing had to suffice in making and securing the adequate 
distinctions. (At the same time, there is the metaphysical intuition in the 
background, but up to that point in time the ‘presence of reality’ and its 
ideas had not been made explicit.) Now, however, with the diversity of 
‘qualities of subjection’ worked into the methodological context, each 
such quality requires a ‘sphere’ of implementation, a proper ‘law-sphere’. 
The regulation of this implementation is attributed to a ‘law’ (norm or 
ordinance) suitable for a specific sphere. Thus the ‘order of knowledge’ 
offers an argument for requiring a diversity of law-spheres, in line with the 
diversity of methods that are ‘materially’ in operation in the fundamental 
sciences.
 This ‘order of knowledge’—whose pedigree is Gegenstand theory 
and the metalogical intuition—is a permanent element of Vollenhoven’s 
thought. Later he refers to it as ‘the noetic’ (het gnotische), meaning 
knowing and learning to know as part of and belonging to cosmic life (cf. 
Vollenhoven 1948p: 16; this should not be confused with Gnosticism 
nor the autonomous inner ‘spark of knowing’). Because knowing resorts 
under being, this order of knowledge does not have an autonomous 
status. (As we will see, this also affects the distinction between the 
metalogical and the metaphysical intuition.) ‘The noetic’ is the reality of 
our knowing life, involving the acquisition of everyday knowledge and 
41   An antinomy is not a logical mistake within an argument, but a clash between 
lines of arguments, each of which is logically valid. This gives the principle of antinomy 
methodological relevance. 
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scientific knowledge.42
 Having an argument that calls for a diversity of law-spheres, we 
now need to properly assess its status in reality. To that end we need to 
pursue the topic of the ‘cosmic order’.
2. The Infinite and cosmic being
The link to the order of reality is prepared by way of the distinction 
between the infinite and the finite. This distinction is worked into 
the boundary problem on the basis of God’s being infinite and the 
cosmos finite. This is not a sudden, novel element. In Vollenhoven’s 
earlier work he had worked with the same characteristics.43 The finite 
cannot encompass the infinite. The finite is delimited in a way that 
the infinite is not. Finitude is a characteristic that calls for a superior 
or supporting principle. To be finite is to be vulnerable in a way that 
the infinite seems to supersede. So when God is said to be infinite and 
the cosmos finite, these traits of infinitude and finitude are attributed 
to the cosmos as well. God is superior, and the cosmos, being finite, 
requires the support of God as superior principle. Hence, with respect to 
the cosmos, one needs to presuppose an upholding principle, as coming 
from God, for the cosmos’ own existence. In other words, God’s being 
infinite is an ontological characterization on a par with the confession 
of God’s sovereignty, and the cosmos’ being finite is on a par with its 
status of subservience. Vollenhoven finds this in Calvin, though without 
any suggestion that the characterization derives from him. In Logos en 
Ratio (1926a) Vollenhoven paraphrases Calvin as holding that God is of 
everything the creator according to his will and can treat it as he wants.44 
In that way “the Infinite seizes the finite and the reverse is never the case: 
finitum non est capax infiniti [the finite is not able to grasp the infinite]” 
(op. cit.: 31). He adds (significantly, as we will see) that this thesis (stelling) 
dominates Calvin’s Christology and his doctrine of the sacraments and of 
grace (i.e. the understanding of the work of the Spirit) as well.
42   Cf. Vollenhoven 1948p: 16. 
43   Cf. chapter 2, section VIII.A. In the dissertation (1918a) Vollenhoven accepted 
both God and the world, as given, to be actually infinite. It seems he changed his mind 
about the world in this regard soon after; cf. also footnote 3 above.
44   Vollenhoven subscribes to Calvin’s voluntarism. “For Calvin’s way of thinking 
[over against Luther’s anthropological point of departure], God stands at the beginning. 
He is the creator of everything through his will. That is why the cosmos is merely his 
artefact. He can do with it as he favours, reveal himself in a special way” (Vollenhoven 
1926a: 31). We see how the ‘aesthetic’ characterization of the cosmos itself evidences 
divine voluntarism. 
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 The pair ‘infinite-finite’ throws light on the boundary problem, 
for it calls attention to God’s transcendence and immanence. One needs 
to avoid confusing an ontological and a cosmological interpretation. 
The duality induced by the boundary (as described) seems to put God 
‘above’ the cosmos and the cosmos simply ‘below’ this boundary. Hence 
the boundary could be thought to act as a separator between God and 
cosmos. Vollenhoven is often interpreted that way. Yet his own wording 
in Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte (1933a) is explicit 
in countering such a reading: “Whoever is of the opinion that God 
stood outside of the cosmos, does not do justice to the confession of His 
immanence”.45 God’s infinitude includes his presence in the world, and it 
is through that inclusion that his presence warrants the cases of the law’s 
obtaining for the world. At the same time one must also acknowledge 
God’s transcendence. Thus Vollenhoven states:
This limit [i.e. law as boundary; A.T.] marks off that which is created from 
God, but not God from that which is created. To accept the latter position 
would be incompatible with the acknowledgement of the infinity of God, 
who is always and everywhere acting in and upon—and certainly not only 
from within—the cosmos.46
So when speaking of the dualism between God and the cosmos, 
Vollenhoven does not mean to assert God’s separation from the cosmos. 
This is what a primarily cosmological reading suggests. But this makes 
havoc with God’s immanence. God’s infinity is a warrant for both his 
transcendence and his immanence. To put it simply, God’s being infinite 
entails his presence everywhere (omnipresence). It is when coming to the 
chief characteristics of God and the cosmos that the ‘dualism’ makes itself 
felt. It is primarily the pair ‘sovereignty and subservience’, in the guise of 
infinite and finite, that calls for an apportioning of terms above and below 
45   Op. cit. : 24. Vollenhoven here argues against taking the ‘boundary’ terminology, 
with its spatial connotation, as having actual spatial import. 
46   Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 13, comment 2; emphases added. The addition in dashes 
appears to suggest that at this point for Vollenhoven it is the transcendence, rather than 
the immanence, that needs the reminding! A recent reaffirmation of the misunderstand-
ing is in Friesen 2005; Friesen states: “Vollenhoven’s basic idea is the triad God-law-
cosmos. God is not in the cosmos. Nor is God’s law in the cosmos; law stands outside, 
and governs and structures the cosmos. Law is the boundary between God and cosmos” 
(p. 110). The first and last sentences are correct, those in between are not. Not only does 
Vollenhoven take God to be immanent in the cosmos, but he also holds that the cosmos 
has an immanent structure as well (with the two cases of immanence taken in different 
senses), a structure that needs to be duly distinguished from ordinance-like laws that 
impinge upon the cosmos. This misunderstanding, being at a fundamental level, sends 
confusing reverberations throughout his discussion.
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the law as boundary. But this is not meant as a cosmological separation. It 
is an ontological matter, a characteristic of being, a difference in being. In 
his lecture notes of 1927-1928 Vollenhoven states explicitly:
And also one who speaks of the being of God, without being conscious 
that this being is a being above the law and hence has nothing in common 
with being under the law [uses language lacking in meaning]. The one is 
the archè [= controlling principle] of the other, and whoever wants to sub-
sume them under a common denominator will transgress, consciously or 
unconsciously, the boundary that God has posited upon him as creature.47 
 We need to keep in mind that Vollenhoven does not mean to conduct 
inquiry into God, otherwise his stricture on taking the stated problem 
as inviting a (monistic) search for a being that is common to God and 
cosmos is difficult to follow. It may also help to read the word “being” as 
an infinitive “to be”. The voluntaristic context of Vollenhoven’s thought 
emphasizes the reality of activity. God’s being is a “to be sovereign”, and 
that of the cosmos a “to be subservient”. In any case the existence of God 
and cosmos are never in question. (We may add that when existence 
is taken without the recognition of sovereignty and subservience, one 
overlooks the very reality that makes it dynamic.) It is how their prime 
features are mutually apportioned. What the pair infinite-finite adds is 
the understanding that the infinite ‘includes’ the finite, but at the same 
time the infinite is ‘other’ than the finite. The infinite has a priority over 
the finite, not just in being transcendent, elevated ‘above’ it, but in also 
having an immanent governing and regulating effect upon it.
 The ‘duality’ we came across earlier, of speaking on the one hand of 
the principal boundary in the correlation of God and the cosmos and on 
the other hand of the diversity of law-spheres within (the aesthetic unity 
of ) the cosmos, can now be understood better. It evidences the distinction 
between God in his transcendence and God in his immanence. So, while 
we confess the principal boundary to be the law, as the expressed will of 
God, the law that we can know, in becoming aware of it, needs to take 
into account our human condition or cosmic situation, which is that of 
obtaining law in the context of law-spheres. The latter is no less a matter 
of ‘divine imperative’, but tailored to human possibilities, guided by the 
avoidance of antinomies. Were one to ignore the confession here, one 
would not be motivated to acknowledge the laws that hold within the 
unity of the cosmos to be of divine or ‘external’ origin, i.e. expressive 
of the divine will. The option for the humanistic variant of claiming 
validity to originate in the human Self or some spiritual-mental feature 
47   Vollenhoven 1927ms, section *8; translation mine. 
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of it would be more enticing. But in Vollenhoven the confession of God’s 
sovereignty/infinity is consonant with the philosophical acceptance of 
a strong externalist-realist perspective regarding the law. The following 
quote brings it together.
Whoever honours the [law-]boundary between God and cosmos, aban-
dons the humanistic concept of subject (= active substance) and accepts 
the Calvinistic concept of subject (= being subject to the law), thereby 
[also accepting] a difference in different qualities of subjection, in cor-
relation with the difference of the law-spheres, [that person] is more and 
more cured of the illusion as if from one or other classification of the 
old psychology [= consciousness as substance with well-defined or distinct 
qualities/faculties] a criterion to distinguish law-spheres could be adopted. 
And all these law-spheres belong—together with the matching qualities of 
subjection—to being [behoren . . . tot het zijn].48
 So we now see that the metalogical exclusion of antinomies is 
not the last word. The threat of antinomies calls for the acceptance of 
different ‘qualities of subjection’, whereby to each quality a ‘region’ or 
‘law-sphere’ belongs to operate within. The last step is to accept that 
a law-sphere, as region of a quality of subjection, is controlled by an 
externalist-realist factor of law. Law (as injunction), law-sphere and qual-
ity of subjection pertain to ‘cosmic being’. Law in general—in terms of 
its transcendent source—is the defining or delimiting condition of the 
cosmos in its unity, but its immanent effect as injunction within the 
cosmic and its finite unity is the law’s obtaining in cases of law-spheres. 
Therefore the qualities of subjection that match the law-spheres are de-
termined, not by criteria of consciousness—that appeals to a humanistic 
priority of consciousness—but by the reality of the law’s holding, which 
also ‘guards’ the chief features of a law-sphere.
 The metalogical intuition of discerning the modality of a ‘region 
category’, in correlation with the ‘form of viewing’ of the viewing 
subject—this was the ‘principal’ feature within ‘critical realism’, as written 
up by Dooyeweerd (cf. “Cosmos and Logos”, 1923a)—we now see to 
be superseded. There is too much of a ‘subjectivist’ criterion operative 
here, so long as the modality as form of viewing is decisive.49 True, region 
categories were also grounded in the cosmos, but at that point all that can 
be known of the cosmos is what is ‘given for consciousness’ as recognized 
48   Vollenhoven 1926msA, section 18; emphasis added.
49   This is a feature taken over from Ch. Sigwart, from whom Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven first borrowed the term ‘modal’, in ‘modal relation’, which is ‘intra-mental 
content in an evaluative relation to the Self ’; cf. chapter 3, footnote 110, also in chapter 
3, section III.C.4.b. The term ‘modality’ is also used as synonym for E. Lask’s ‘region 
category’. 
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by the viewing subject. Hence the focus remained metalogical. Now that 
the quality of subjection is linked to the awareness of regulation of a law-
sphere, as context of subjection, one can understand that the awareness 
itself is an intuitive discerning of the appropriate regulation, fitting for 
the law-sphere (region and its modality) in question. This is now said 
to be at the level of being, hence the intuitive discerning is not merely a 
metalogical matter, but more importantly a realist acknowledgement of 
being as requiring concurrence. The modality of the region category/law-
sphere and the intuitive acknowledgement of its character, are secured 
in the realist validity of what holds here, which is a law regulative for a 
sphere of law, a case of ‘law as boundary’ for the cosmos.
 Another way to put this is to say that consciousness is ‘affected’ 
in the sense that the presence (being) of a law-sphere and of its law is 
itself determinative for the awareness that takes place in the attendant 
quality of subjection. The latter too is being, namely the being of the 
quality that the Self takes on when standing in subjection to a sphere’s 
law. This awareness of standing in subjection is intuitive, and it is primal 
as regards consciousness. It yields “judgments of discernment”, whereby 
the law-spheres are discerned in their typical differences as pertaining to 
terrains of reality.50 This is in step with the discussion of antinomies. An 
‘anti-nomic subject’ is a person (Self ) who is confused in the judgments 
of discerning, one who does not properly discern the modality relevant 
to a quality of subjection as regulated by its law. It is the awareness of 
law and its proper discerning that marks the quality of subjection; it is 
this awareness of being that is presupposed when coming to know it. 
Knowing resorts under being. This was already stated by Dooyeweerd in 
his “Cosmos and Logos” (1923a). But now it has been secured more 
firmly in connection with the laws of appropriate modality, laws of being, 
proper to the cosmos itself. Only by virtue of that resorting is human 
acquisition of knowledge regarding the cosmos possible.
 So the (former) role of the ‘metalogical intuition’ is now taken over 
by a more fundamental intuition that discerns the being in terms of law-
reality. Here too, the term intuition retains its former quality of ‘viewing 
or seeing’, though this is now a discerning of cosmic presence, resulting in 
“judgments of existence or of discerning” (existentie- of ontwaringsoordeel) 
(Vollenhoven 1926a: 8). A judgment of existence is also said to be a 
“judgment of the intuition concerning modality” (op. cit.: 28, 63). There 
50   Judgments of discerning arise entirely through the intuition. It is not a form of 
perception (Vollenhoven 1926a: 10, 14) for the latter yields representations. The judg-
ment of discerning is preparatory for “possessing truth”, i.e. coming to know; cf. further 
discussion below. 
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is no resuscitation of the initial ‘concrete intuition’ of 1918, which is an 
inner certitude of being affected—‘that I am affected’—when affected. To 
the extent that such an effect takes place, it is psychological and subsidiary 
to knowledge. The heart of the intuitive discerning of existence or of 
presence is that it presents to the mind the cognitive challenge of truth, 
that is to say, it presents reality in the guise of its ability to be cognitively 
known in predicates, concepts and judgments.
 Once Vollenhoven brought about this change in his realism in 
the mid-1920s, he never relinquished the realism of creaturely being, 
as warranted by law and knowable by virtue of intuitive discernment. 
However Dooyeweerd, in time (probably from about 1928), did 
relinquish it in favour of an ontology of meaning, when the Self, in its 
supra-temporal position, is turned away from “the diversity of meaning 
of the cosmos” and towards the (divine) totality of meaning and its 
source. This is to favour a supra-temporal condition of the Self (with 
metaphysical overtones), that secures the metalogical level of discourse in 
an ontology of meaning.51 
 This divergence between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd should not 
be reduced to a matter of interpretation. From the side of Dooyeweerd 
there is clear evidence as to his position. The ontology of meaning is central 
to his De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee of 1935-1936. In 1931 he speaks of 
his “theory of knowledge and cosmology” as “extensively discussed in my 
De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, which has not yet appeared”.52 This suggests 
that a significant portion of this text was in existence in 1931 (at least in 
a draft version). Because 1928 appears to be the year of “the discovery 
of the religious root of thought itself ” (Dooyeweerd 1935-1936, I: v), 
Dooyeweerd must have begun writing it shortly after this discovery in 
1928. De Crisis itself advances the ontology of meaning: “but the whole 
of reality, high to low, is meaning, which has its origin in the religious 
fullness of meaning” (Dooyeweerd 1931: 94). The following passage has 
more than just an ‘anti-realist’ ring to it:
Our thesis: ‘There does not exist any religiously neutral experience of real-
ity’ asserts a truth that everyone will admit to who mutually compares the 
51   Cf. chapter 3, section III.G.4 where the effect of the ‘ontology of meaning’ in 
Dooyeweerd is discussed. Dooyeweerd introduced a ‘second way’ of transcendental criti-
cism when acknowledging that the ‘first way’ depended too much on the transcendent 
character of the Self. In the second way Dooyeweerd attempts to make do with transcen-
dental subjectivity. Cf. Dooyeweerd 1953-1958, I: 34 ff. 
52   “Voorwoord” to Dooyeweerd 1931: 3. For other anticipating references to “De 
wijsbegeerte der wetsidee” in De Crisis, cf. p. 99, note 1, and p. 125, note 1 (with thanks 
to K.A. Bril). 
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pre-theoretical experience of reality of a simple Christian and that of a 
simple citizen. One may also express it as follows: In an apostate attitude of 
self-consciousness one does not penetrate to one’s true transcendent Self-
hood. That self-consciousness adheres in idolatrous fashion to the tempo-
ral, it is dispersed in the diversity of meaning of the cosmos, and it lacks the 
true concentration in the focus of existence: the service of God! (Dooyeweerd 
1931: 86, note; translation mine)
Philosophy is here made to undergird confession in formulating an ‘upward 
trend’ counteracting diversity. Vollenhoven, however, cherished diversity, 
as being indicative of the richness of creation, the acknowledgement of 
which entails ‘praising God’.53
 At some point near the end of the initial definitive period 
Vollenhoven refers to the quality of subjection as the ‘function of 
subjection’ (subjèctsfunctie). I believe that the main motive for the switch 
in terminology is the more favourable connotation of the latter phrase. 
The phrase “quality of subjection” reminds one (too much) of the former 
“quality of being a subject” in critical realism, in which the Self takes on 
a quality by choice. The phrase “function of subjection” more fittingly 
suggests the Self ’s stance in existence as always already being a ‘tasked 
subject’, that conditions the Self ’s functioning. The functioning evinces 
the subjection, calling for validity of law as its warrant. As trait of being, 
a function of subjection as such cannot be subject to choice. What is 
subject to choice is the attitude of response—willing or unwilling—and 
the nature and degree of actual response. On that understanding, the two 
phrases can be taken as synonymous. The limited degree to which there is 
choice in this connection is important in distinguishing laws and norms, 
which also calls for a discussion of the ‘cosmic order’, to which we now 
turn.
3. The cosmic order
A quality of subjection/function of subjection is delimited by a distinct 
law of relevant modality. The laws that govern the law-spheres are cases 
of the ‘law as boundary’ between God and the cosmos, and their ‘holding 
for’ the cosmos attests to God’s immanence.54 So a law-sphere is the region 
53   I believe that it is historically accurate to say that, if ‘reformed philosophy’ 
began in 1923—Vollenhoven accepting ‘tasked subject’ and rejecting realism of ideas; 
Dooyeweerd working with ‘law-idea’ but in the context of the realism of ideas—then 
Dooyeweerd re-founded it in 1928, in light of his ‘ontology of meaning’. In other words, 
with the ‘philosophy of the law-idea’ of 1928 and thereafter, Dooyeweerd ‘cofounded’ 
reformed philosophy ‘in his own way’. 
54   In the context of religion and worldview, God’s immanence will be referred to 
in a different idiom, involving “inspiration”, “salvation”, “renewal”, etc. Cf. Vollenhoven 
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of a modally distinct quality of subjection as governed by an appropriate 
law (as ordinance). 
 The need for a plurality of law-spheres, as argued for metalogically 
(as we saw) in order to avoid antinomies, raises the question as to their 
arrangement. The question arises in accordance with Vollenhoven 
methodological maxim (freely stated): where there is a difference one 
can ask about a relevant relationship (cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 10). The 
diversity of the law-spheres is warranted by the difference in the laws that 
hold for them. The expectation of a relationship between the law-spheres 
points to an assumption of a ‘cosmic order’,55 an order that delineates 
cosmic being and is grounded in an inner complexity of cosmic being 
(of the functions of subjection, as we will see). The assumption—indeed, 
it is an assumption, an ontological assumption—is that the plurality of 
law-spheres is not a haphazard collection but an organized arrangement. 
For Vollenhoven the law-spheres form a linear order, an order he portrays 
as a vertical order of being. The vertical order is due to a certain necessity 
that holds between law-spheres mutually: of any two, one is necessarily 
presupposed by the other. The law-sphere that is presupposed by the other 
law-sphere is portrayed as lying ‘under’ the latter. (The ‘metaphysics’ of 
this cosmic order is discussed later.)
 Examples of this ‘underlying’ are the following. The physical sphere 
of energy interactions presupposes the sphere of motion, which in turn 
presupposes space and number; psychical sensitivity, in turn, cannot take 
place without an organic basis, which itself presupposes energy relays, 
etc.; juridical functioning of right and wrong presupposes the economics 
of property and ownership, which presupposes social interaction, and 
this in turn linguistic interaction and logical analysis and discernment, 
etc.
 The number of law-spheres presupposed by any one law-sphere 
is a measure of the complexity of being of that law-sphere. So in the 
1942m. In 1918a Vollenhoven stated that the norms of logic call for God’s immanence 
to account for their being “maintained for our knowing” (1918a: 438). I cannot see any 
reason why Vollenhoven might have changed his mind about this in the overhaul of his 
thought in the mid 1920s. If the law as boundary does not separate God off from the 
cosmos (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 13), then it makes sense to expect God’s immanence to 
be relevant in connection with the law as boundary. 
55   The term ‘cosmic order’, though not its meaning, was short lived. It occurs prom-
inently in the work of 1926: in Logos en Ratio as “cosmic order of the distinct spheres” 
(1926a: 11; cf. also pp. 36, 46, 49, 63); also in “Contours of the theory of knowledge” 
(1926b: 392, 393, 397, 399); and “Epistemology and Natural science” (1926d: 153). In 
the first version of Isagôgè Philosophiae (1930d, §42) Vollenhoven simply speaks of “natu-
ral order”, an expression that is retained in later editions; cf. Vollenhoven 2010, 54 ff. 
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vertical arrangement there is an increase in complexity of being as one 
passes from the bottom to the top. During Vollenhoven’s initial definitive 
period, the portrayal of this cosmic order was still subject to discussion 
and experimentation. But the assumption that there is a cosmic order to 
the modes of being subject itself became a fixed element of Vollenhoven’s 
thought, as ‘natural order’, the main feature of cosmic (earthly) being. He 
put it to work in the context of the ‘intersection principle’ of his cosmology 
(cf. the next main section). The cosmic order, as ontological order, is the 
‘backbone’ of his thought. But as assumption, its being an hypothesis, it 
is of course not a validated truth but an operating platform (though its 
etymology might entice one to treat a particularly useful hypothesis as a 
true ‘underlying thesis’). The assumption of the cosmic order of being is 
so vital to Vollenhoven that, practically speaking, he treats it as a cosmic 
truth. (In the section on truth below this point is given more proper 
attention; cf. III.B.3.d.-e.) Confessionally, Vollenhoven thought of the 
cosmic order as a reality by virtue of creation, but this does not change 
its status in philosophy as an assumption. It is, of course, also the main 
guard against the pitfall of antinomies. 
 In the early work of Dooyeweerd (cf. his 1922d1, 1923a2), we came 
across a ‘proto-version’ of distinguished region categories or modalities, 
namely quantity, space, (physical) being, so-being, (logical) validity, 
etc. (cf. chapter 3, section III.C.4.c). By the mid-1920s the listing had 
become nuanced and more definitive. In 1926 Vollenhoven listed the 
lower law-spheres as: the logical, number, space, time, motion, energy, 
the biotic and the psychic; of the higher spheres mention is made of the 
economic, the aesthetic, the juridical/legality and the ethical, but not yet 
in a definitive order.56 In the lecture notes of a course on epistemology 
given in 1926-1927 the position of ‘the logical’ is moved from the lowest 
rank to an approximate middle position, next above the psychical. In 
1930(b: 17), in “The first questions of psychology”, the partial listing 
is: “arithmetical, spatial, mechanical, physical or energetic, organic, 
psychical, analytical, social, etc.” and subsequently continued (on p. 18): 
“analytical, social, historical, linguistic, economic, juridical, ethical, and 
pistical.” (The ‘aesthetic’, about which there was still uncertainty, is left 
out.) The order in the first version of Isagôgè Philosophiae (1930d, §23) is: 
arithmetical, spatial, mechanical, physical, organic, psychical, analytical, 
historical, linguistic, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical and 
56   Vollenhoven 1926d: 154; in Vollenhoven 1926a: 55; also “legality and economic 
life are law-spheres” (1926a: 57); ‘ethics’ i.e. “moral life” (1926a: 46, 54, 57); “aesthetics 
region” (1926a: 54). 
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pistical, which (later) became the ‘standard’ listing.57
 The assumption of this order gives rise in Vollenhoven to a 
rather recondite discourse, that is intelligible only when keeping the 
assumption of the cosmic order firmly in mind. The one or more law-
spheres presupposed by a law-sphere—hence those ‘below’ it, of less 
complex being—constitute its ‘substrate spheres’ (or just its ‘substrate’); 
the one or more law-spheres not presupposed by a law-sphere—hence 
those ‘above’ it, being more complex—are its ‘superstrate spheres’ (or 
just ‘superstrate’). Two prefixes are introduced to denote what, from a 
chosen law-sphere, belongs either to its substrate—indicated with ‘sub-’—
or to its superstrate—indicated with ‘supra-’. E.g. the arithmetical law-
sphere being the first in the cosmic order, every other sphere belongs to 
its superstrate and is ‘supra-arithmetical’. (This is not to say that they 
embody some kind of recondite arithmetic. It would be better to speak 
of the numerical law-sphere throughout.) Or in the case of the pistical 
law-sphere, which is the highest and last in the order, the other spheres 
all belong to its substrate and are ‘sub-pistical’ (which is not meant to 
suggest unworthiness of belief ). The law-spheres that are neither lowest 
nor highest may have either prefix; e.g. at the physical level, its substrate 
spheres are ‘sub-physical’ and its superstrate spheres are ‘supra-physical’; 
at the lingual level, every sphere of its substrate is ‘sub-lingual’, those 
of its superstrate ‘supra-lingual’; etc. In use, this terminology allows 
for very trimmed expressions; e.g. Vollenhoven recommends that “the 
term cause . . . be reserved for certain supra-spatial relationships” (Is.Ph. 
sec. 68). What this says is: (i) in the cosmic order being assumed here, 
57   The most noteworthy shifts in these listings are: the logical (to be referred to 
below, cf. footnote 103 below); time as law-sphere, that soon is simply deleted; the social, 
which indicates an early view of the distinction between individual (up to and including 
the analytical) and community (above the individual, hence beginning with the social 
law-sphere), and the position of the aesthetic. In a ‘provisional listing’ in lecture notes 
of 1928-1929 (Vollenhoven 1928ms; section 38) the position of the aesthetic is said to 
be uncertain. Perhaps the uncertainty relates to the viewing of the unity of the cosmos 
as being aesthetic, making it difficult to consider it a law-sphere. In the same provisional 
listing there is no mention of the physical, probably an oversight or a typing error, for 
the distinction of the mechanical and the physical is an important point of discussion in 
Vollenhoven 1929d. However, in 1931 and later, this distinction is annulled, with the 
mechanical and the energetic both merged into ‘the physical’. (This is standard in Isagôgè 
Philosophiae from 1931 on.) Dooyeweerd reintroduced the distinction between the me-
chanical and the physical/energetic in the early 1950s, with which Vollenhoven then 
agreed. Naturally, in connection with these shifts, one expects to find discussions that 
focus on threatening antinomies that necessitate the making of these distinctions. But 
this is, disappointingly, hardly ever the case; the intuition’s role of discerning difference of 
modality is usually taken to be sufficient as a telling indication. 
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the term ‘cause’ is limited to an (intra- ) cosmic use (this excludes the 
use, say, of treating God as the ‘first cause’ of the cosmos); (ii) ‘cause’ is 
furthermore meaningful in each of the superstrate spheres of the spatial 
sphere, meaning it is deemed to be relevant in all the law-spheres from the 
physical upwards (hence not just in the physical); (iii) the spatial and the 
arithmetical spheres, in being excluded from the superstrate in question, 
are not deemed relevant contexts of causality; finally, (iv) in being 
called a ‘relationship’, causality is among the ‘horizontal connections’ of 
the supra-spatial law-spheres, not the ‘analogies of being’ (cf., for this 
distinction, the discussion of cosmology below). 
4. Laws of being
There are, in Vollenhoven’s thought, some peculiar features regarding 
law and function of subjection. First, as to laws, it should be clear that 
they are taken as being the most general determinators, in the sense of 
regulators, of cosmic life. They are themselves of distinct modality. Their 
effects are intuited by the human being in the most general ‘spheres’ of 
cosmic life. Despite the importance of this intuition, Vollenhoven was 
very hesitant, throughout his career, to actually hazard a formulation of 
the law for a law-sphere. There are two exceptions. One is the pistical 
law-sphere, the law for which is simply said to be the Word of God (“as 
to its faith aspect”)58 as regulator of pistical life; the other is the analytical 
law-sphere, where the formulation of the law focuses on distinction and 
identity.59
 Vollenhoven’s reticence probably reflects his wanting to avoid 
the pretension of being able to read God’s mind. We are better off in 
describing what the main traits of such laws are. First of all, they are 
injunctions, formulated as prescriptions or ordinances (cf. the last 
footnote above, where the formulation of the law of the analytical law-
sphere begins with ‘distinguish’), and they have a regulating effect. Then, 
in holding for or regulating ‘cosmic life’, they hold for the creatures that 
populate the cosmos or universe. Here the realist character of these laws is 
important, for it says that the creaturely condition of being is to be subject 
to (a multiplicity of ) law(s), without a choice in so standing, within the 
cosmic order of law-spheres. Thus the creaturely condition includes the 
58   Vollenhoven 1950d: 74. 
59   In his Hoofdlijnen der Logica (Vollenhoven 1948p: 30), Vollenhoven formu-
lates this as follows: “distinguish what is distinguishable, whatever that be, well”, or, in a 
broader formulation: “distinguish what is distinguishable, A, whatever that be, as analys-
able A from everything else that is analysable, the latter being non-A, for only in what is 
analysable is A A.”  
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impulse to answer/respond to injunctions. But the creaturely response to 
laws (see the next point) can never be identified with those laws: there 
is an ontological difference between impinging injunction (as condition) 
and the function of subjection as context of response. “Law and function 
[of subjection] are correlate. This can only be the case when they differ 
mutually.”60 It is by virtue of this (ontological) difference that the actual 
response to the impingement of law can be submissive or dismissive, with 
many shades of variation between these extremes. For law, in the sense 
here meant, is essentially norm-like.
 Lastly, law as injunction should not be confused with patterns, 
plans, templates, structures, regularities, trends, etc., namely all that can 
be described within cosmic parameters, rather than (in a fundamental 
sense) prescribed. All such ‘described structures’ fall within the compass of 
the law-spheres and do not dictate to the law-spheres. For the laws which 
hold for cosmic life—injunctions—are cases of the ‘law as boundary’; 
structures, patterns, regularities, and the like, that are discernable within 
cosmic life, are descriptions of that life in its functioning. A possible 
confusion might be felt in that both injunctions and descriptions are in a 
sense ‘universal’, and both may be said to ‘hold’. But this does not negate 
the radical difference between them. Injunctions enjoin and address the 
functions of subjection (the factor of willing, impulse, tendency, etc. 
being relevant here); descriptions denote and pertain to states of affairs that 
are met with within the conscious experience of standing in subjection 
(calling for intra-cosmic recognition). Thus the former pertains to the 
law as boundary, the latter to what is under or within the scope of 
the law as boundary, i.e. within law-spheres. Cosmology concerns the 
reality within the law boundaries, and in that context Vollenhoven fully 
recognizes, indeed proceeds from, the fundamental distinction between 
(cosmic) individuality and (cosmic) universality of describable states in 
the order of the law-spheres (cf. the discussion of cosmology below). In 
1950(e: 40) he summarized this succinctly as: “(1) All that is subject to 
the law . . . is both universal and individual. (2) The mutual relation of 
the universal and the individual in the creation is this, that both are of 
equal value and always and everywhere occur together.” But cosmology/
creation as such presupposes the order of being that is set by the order of 
law.61
60   Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §115 [= 2010, Appendix I, §115]; cf. also Vollen-
hoven 1950d: 73. 
61   This has particular relevance for so-called ‘abstract objects’: sets, states of affairs, 
propositions, etc. Vollenhoven takes these as falling within the scope of the (created) cos-
mos and its law-spheres. Within the cosmic order there are, besides individual creatures, 
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 On first hearing, one might be willing to grant the relevance of 
injunctions as regulating human life. After all, life without norms (“Thou 
shalt . . .”; “Do not . . .”; “So act that the maxim . . .”) would leave life 
in chaos. But is this relevant for the spheres the human being shares 
with other creatures? Here too Vollenhoven never specified the ‘laws’ that 
might be relevant, though he certainly maintained that there are such laws 
for the lower law-spheres. On the basis of the general features that such 
laws should have (and leaving wide margins for further consideration), 
one expects such formulations to (i) be injunction-like, (ii) be distinct 
as to modality, (iii) be broad enough to impinge upon all the relevant 
functioning, and (iv) act as boundaries within which detailed functioning 
takes place. 
 A very tentative attempt to address the ‘sub-analytical’ law-spheres 
in the interest of a first indication might (Vollenhoven-wise) go as 
follows. The psychical law, mindful of the sensibility and sensitivity 
that is relevant not only to human beings but also (the higher species 
of ) animals, might be: “abstain from harming and denigrating psychic 
creatures, promote rather their happiness and wellbeing”. For the organic 
law-sphere there is the drive of life to sustain itself and to multiply, 
as if in response to: “live and multiply”. At the physical level there is 
the peculiar character of the second laws of thermodynamics and the 
conservation laws. The former says that, for the whole physical universe, 
entropy (the measure of randomness) increases. The conservation laws 
say that basic physical quantities are conserved in all physical processes: 
the conservation of energy, of (linear and angular) momentum, of charge, 
of baryon number, and of leptons.62 As for space and number, considered 
in disjunction from the physical world, there would appear to be the 
‘control’ over mathematical infinity: the inward spatial continuity of 
position or situation, and the unending series of the natural numbers.
also universal features, the most prominent of which are ‘analogies of being’ (whereby one 
law-sphere is partially reflected in another) and ‘relations between beings’ (connections 
between creatures). When these abstract objects are said to hold or to obtain, this is more 
of a fixed ‘keeping together’ of denoted form (‘5+7=12’ holds eternally) than an injunc-
tion to abide by. So, for Vollenhoven, this ‘holding’ of abstract objects is also by virtue of 
creation. 
62   The second law of thermodynamics is time–asymmetrical, meaning that the 
time-parameter cannot be reversed (from +t to –t), whereas the usual laws of physics 
(Newton’s laws, Maxwell’s laws, Hamilton’s equations, Einstein’s general relativity, etc.) 
are symmetrical in time and are of a structural nature. Cf. Penrose 1989: 392; also Pen-
rose 2005: 696-697. The conservation laws hold irrespective of the type of processes and 
of time and space location. The renown physicist, Richard P. Feynman, states: “In the last 
analysis, we do not understand the conservation laws deeply”, Feynman 1998: 84. 
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 The cosmic order is by virtue of creation. In the above we have not 
touched on its ‘metaphysical’ status. We do so at the appropriate place 
below.
5. Qualities of subjection / functions of subjection
We also wish to note a peculiarity of the cosmic order in connection 
with human beings. All beings—‘creatures’—participate in law-spheres. 
Every creature is an individual being—Vollenhoven initially spoke of a 
“cosmic unity”, a term he soon dropped in favour of “individual”. Each 
acts as a “substance, the bearer of different qualities of subjection”.63 As 
discussed earlier, the distinction between individual thing/person and 
qualities of subjection, enables the one thing/person to ‘have’ (or be 
the bearer of ) a multiplicity of such qualities of subjection—later called 
“functions of (standing in) subjection”,64 as traits of its being. Creatures 
(cosmic unities) display differences of being in that not all participate 
in the same law-spheres. All participate in the lowest spheres. In fact, 
the natural numbers, these being the ‘simplest’ of beings, have only the 
numerical function of subjection. Spatial figures have both the numerical 
and spatial functions. Then minerals, chemicals, inorganic material, 
physical objects, etc. reach (in the cosmic order) up to and include the 
physical law-sphere/quality of subjection. Plants reach higher to include 
the organic, and animals include the psychical. Only the human being 
participates in the entire cosmic order, in the sense of having/bearing all 
the functions/qualities of subjection.
 Now, given that ‘knowing resorts under being’, the possibility of 
knowing relates to the human being’s participation in the (full) cosmic 
order. Each quality of subjection involves a subjection to law, for there 
is always the ontological difference between law and the function of 
subjection. The human being, Vollenhoven now maintains, is aware of 
this difference, and this is clearly so at the point in the cosmic order 
where the consciousness of difference and connection becomes explicit. 
This occurs at the level of participation in the analytical law-sphere, 
the injunction of which is (to paraphrase somewhat) “to distinguish 
what there is to distinguish as different” (cf. footnote 59 above). “For 
that matter, it lies in the nature of the analytical function that also this 
difference [of law and function] is [given the cosmic order] first discerned 
63   Vollenhoven 1926msA, section 12. 
64   It may be that the phrase “quality of subjection”, which reflects Vollenhoven’s 
early use of “quality of being a subject” (when the Self complies to norms), is too limited 
in Vollenhoven revised context in which every creature “stands in subjection to laws”. The 
phrase “function of subjection” is broader and gained preferential use in Vollenhoven. 
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here.”65 Because the analytical law-sphere lies in the substrate of every 
‘supra-analytical’ law-sphere, this consciousness of law and function is 
relevant in all the supra-analytical spheres as well.
 Intrinsic to this consciousness of the difference between law and 
function is the awareness of the law’s ‘holding for’ the function. Now the 
difference of law and function brings with it the possibility of functional 
compliance or non-compliance to the respective law, at least at the level 
(from the analytical function and higher) where one is aware of this 
difference. This is not to say that the person, who is functioning at that 
level, is capable of annulling the standing in subjection. There is only the 
‘measure of freedom’ for a person to comply either in a positive sense or 
a negative sense to the relevant law. (E.g. ‘anti-social’ is still to be social, 
but in a negative sense, while ‘non-social’ is to lack the social function; a 
rebellious youth is anti-social, never non-social, as animals are.) In this 
way, the laws of the analytical law-sphere and of the ‘supra-analytical’ 
spheres take on the role of norms, in light of which a human being can 
realize different directions of response, depending on his/her meeting or 
flouting the laws as norms.
 It may seem that the introduction of norms induces a difference in 
the order of the laws themselves, between those that hold ‘as laws’ and 
those (at the typically human level) that hold ‘as norms’. But Vollenhoven 
does not mean to ‘split’ the cosmic order in a (higher) part, governed 
by norms, and a (lower) part, governed by laws. (That might serve as 
incentive to deny or at least overlook the difference between law and 
function in the law-function correlation in that lower part.) It is the 
kind and degree of complexity of the functioning, in correlation with laws, 
that motivates the distinction. What remains constant is that law and 
function nowhere coalesce, and that the cosmic order is governed by one 
order of laws (injunctions).
 But the awareness of the difference between law and function of 
subjection is not ‘suddenly’ felt at the analytical level. At this level it is 
clear and marked. (When attentive we soon spot a contradiction, i.e. 
realize a logical norm is not being respected.) In the ‘sub-analytical’ 
regions, from the psychical law-sphere and down, something of this 
difference is ‘felt’, though with progressively diminishing consciousness, 
including the contrast that reflects the difference of direction of response. 
One can, through wanton living—a misplaced exercise of ‘personal 
freedom’—overburden one’s psychical life (through instinctual disrespect 
of oneself?), resulting in shame, guilt or mental disturbance, and the like; 
65   Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §115 [= 2010, Appendix I, §115]. 
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on the positive side one can ‘feel good’ when sensitivities are in balance. 
Similarly for organic health: abnormal attention to or neglect of organic 
well-being can lead to illness, while a more relaxed and subconscious 
‘listening to one’s body’ would be wiser. Then, at a more physical level, 
there is a vague fluctuating physical awareness/non-awareness, such as 
fatigue in bearing one’s weight, or in behaving so as not to occasion the 
reprimand “you don’t know your own strength”. As to space, there is the 
‘field awareness’ of requiring space and the effect of having too little or 
too much of it (claustrophobia, agoraphobia, etc.). Finally, there is a sense 
of personal unity—as assumed in “one man one vote”—and its damaged 
form in schizophrenia.66 In all these cases, it is not the awareness, vague 
or clear, that constitutes the standing in subjection; the awareness is an 
effect of so standing.
 We add the remark that consciousness for Vollenhoven is intrinsic 
to the functioning human being, i.e. awareness as correlated to functions 
of subjection. Hence this awareness is modally diverse. Once, late in 
his career, he stated: “consciousness is in the body”.67 (This is not ‘body’ 
as soma, but as ‘unity of subjection’; cf. section IV below.) There is no 
longer the independent concrete intuition, as formulated in his earliest 
work. As to animals and plants, the former are admitted to be sensitive 
creatures, having awareness, but indications of the ontological difference 
of law and function is limited to variations within instinctual boundaries. 
Individually, plants are even more limited in their variability (response 
to the environment). Contrary to his position in his earliest work, 
Vollenhoven is no longer a proponent of a ‘plant psychology’.68 In the 
course of time Vollenhoven raised the possibility of distinguishing more 
66   In mentioning these ‘sub-analytical’ cases I go beyond Vollenhoven’s own dis-
cussion. In Vollenhoven 1930b: 20. Vollenhoven speaks of “law-spheres whose laws are 
norms”—cf. also Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §81 (= 2010, Appendix I, §81)—and then 
proceeds to mention that there is relevance for the law-spheres beneath the analytical law-
sphere. “Here too lies the difference [in direction of response] in [organic] health and ill-
ness, [psychical] guilty and innocent, etc.” Surprisingly, this discussion of ‘laws as norms’ 
was suppressed in the versions of Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1932 and later, although the 
topic remained fully valid for Vollenhoven. The topic is central in “Norm en natuurwet” 
(Norm and natural law) (Vollenhoven 1951h), and explicitly discussed in “Problemen 
rondom de tijd” (Problems in connection with time) (Vollenhoven 1963c: 188). The dis-
tinction of law and norm is first discussed in lecture notes of 1926-1927; cf. Vollenhoven 
1926msA, section 11. 
67   Vollenhoven 1963c: 191. 
68   Cf. Vollenhoven 1930b: 24; in this connection he speaks of “confused premises” 
that don’t lead to “dependable conclusions”. On ‘plant psychology’ in the early Vollen-
hoven, cf. chapter 3, footnotes 21 and 31.
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functions of subjection in living creatures than the traditional organic 
and psychical functions.69
B. The boundary threefold
So far the boundary concept has found an application as a concept of law, 
where law is taken in the sense of principle of governance, formulated 
prescriptively as injunction. This is consonant with the religious 
interpretation of the principal boundary as law, this being the expressed 
will of God. We will return to this interpretation below. But first a further 
point about the boundary is in order concerning its application. The 
application of the boundary is in fact broader than was discussed so far, 
namely in connection with law, though this remains the dominant (or 
most explicit) application. 
 The boundary, in Vollenhoven, has a full Trinitarian scope. Above 
we quoted Vollenhoven as saying, about Calvin’s use of the distinction 
between the Infinite (God) and the finite (creature), that this holds not 
only in a cosmological sense, but that it is also relevant for Christology 
and towards understanding the work of the Spirit (Vollenhoven 1926a: 
31). This clearly suggests a relevance, religiously, of the boundary as 
holding in connection with the three Persons of the Trinity. Otherwise 
he would not have followed this up immediately with the comment: “this 
clear seeing of the boundary between Him who poses laws and those who 
are subject to them” (ibid.). Vollenhoven made this explicit in the first 
format of Isagôgè Philosophiae (1930-1931). But we should add at once 
that Vollenhoven maintained a low profile in this matter. The relevant 
passages were reworked in the next version of 1932, with the Trinitarian 
understanding now being more suggested implicitly than stated 
explicitly; as a result, this topic is not common knowledge.70 Nevertheless 
it is a central feature of Vollenhoven’s thought, so much so that one may 
continue to qualify Vollenhoven’s position as being Trinitarian theistic.
69   Vollenhoven proposed a ‘biotic function’ relevant for unicellular creatures, a ‘sen-
sory function’ of creatures (plants) that respond to stimuli, a ‘vital function’ of creatures 
with urge and impulse, and a ‘feeling function’ of creatures that feel pleasure and pain. 
Cf. Vollenhoven 1963c: 183-184. J. Klapwijk, in his recent Purpose in the Living World? 
Creation and Emergent Evolution (2008) explores new avenues in this regard against the 
background of the Reformed tradition. 
70   One of the first (if not the first) to discuss the Trinitarian framework in the 
early Vollenhoven was Albert M. Wolters, in “Vollenhoven on ‘Word of God’” (Wolters 
1979b). His prime reference is to Isagôgè Philosophiae of January 1931, which (for the 
topic in question) is slightly revised as compared to the first version of October 1930; cf. 
Vollenhoven 2010. 
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1. The Trinitarian theistic position
In the 1930-1931 text,71 mentioned above, Vollenhoven, when speaking of 
the connection between the sovereign God and the creature, provisionally 
calls this “the religious” (op. cit., §71), which is a vague term (as he himself 
admits; ibid.), but it allows for a broad account of divine activities. He 
then refers to the three basic activities of God, activities in which each 
of the three Persons has a distinct or at least leading role. There is first 
the creating of God the Father, then the revealing of God the Son/Logos, 
and finally the guiding of God the Holy Spirit (op. cit., §§72, 73). There 
is a sequence here, in that the Logos-revelation presupposes the creating 
work of the Father, and the guidance of the Spirit presupposes the work 
of both the Father and the Son/Logos. This reflects their positions within 
the (transcendent) Godhead of the Trinity. Furthermore, each Person 
also effectuates its own characteristic conditioning in connection with 
the cosmos. From the Father there is the imposition of law, the Son/Logos 
effectuates ‘word-revelation’ in that he commands by way of indicating 
direction (op. cit., §75), and the Spirit, in turn, guides in the light of 
determined direction (op. cit., §76).
 These effects of divine immanence also accord with the sequential 
character of the Persons in their transcendent roles. For laws, being laws 
for being, maintain and sustain creaturely life in the most basic sense of 
its dynamism. But, given the difference between law and subject/creature, 
this maintaining and sustaining of law does not preclude the possibility 
of different directions of activity. Hence in Scripture one finds many 
instances in which God ‘speaks’ by way of commanding that this or that 
take place, from the “let there be light” (in the Genesis 1 creation account) 
to the “thou shalt love . . .”, of the ‘love command’ directed specifically 
to human beings. In connection with this speaking God is said to be 
the Logos (op. cit., §74). This ‘speaking’ of the Logos presupposes the 
work of the Father. Thus “every command—the result of commanding—
presupposes a law, and a command of the Logos presupposes a law of the 
Creator.” Also “every command entails a law, while not every law entails a 
command” (op. cit., §75). The commanding of the Logos has a relevance 
that is additional to the imposing of law in connection with the creation.
 Then there is also God’s relation to the creature in which he is the 
guiding Spirit. This is specifically relevant in connection with genesis 
and development. This too is an ‘additional’ feature not accountable in 
terms of the (prior) work of the Father and the Logos. In the Genesis 1 
account there is the “Spirit of God brooding over the waters” (Gen. 1: 
71   Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f; also Vollenhoven 2010. 
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2) and the subsequent guiding of the Spirit in “the unfolding of specific 
creatures that are mutually diverse from out of the earth as pre-different 
[praedifferente aarde] to this diversity” (op. cit., §76).72 This topic of genesis 
and development, as guided by the Spirit, remained a prominent feature 
of Isagôgè Philosophiae (cf. Vollenhoven 2010, 22). Vollenhoven sees the 
earth as initially enveloping or enclosing a motley diversity, and takes 
development to be the evolving out or disclosing of this enveloped state 
into an openness and a sustaining of mutual connections. The Spirit’s 
guiding determines direction—I read this as being goal guiding—while 
the presupposed command (only) points in a direction (Vollenhoven 
1930d/1931f, §77).
 The above account of the three divine Persons, relevant at the time 
of Vollenhoven’s initial platform, is I believe sufficient to warrant the 
conclusion that Vollenhoven retained a ‘theistic position’. In using this 
term, which Vollenhoven himself did not use for himself apart from 
his earliest work, we must hasten to add two qualifications. First, this 
theist position is typically Trinitarian. The distinct relevance of each of 
the Persons of the Trinity not only allows for separate reference to each 
but also requires this. Creaturely cosmic life is never without the relation 
to the triune God. In his immanence God ‘goes along’ with creaturely 
life, sustaining, directing and guiding it. But, also in connection with 
this immanence, there is always the ontological difference between God’s 
sovereignty and the cosmic life’s subservience, a difference by virtue of 
which cosmic life is meaningful and challenging, centring on direction. 
Vollenhoven’s retaining this position is most clearly evidenced by a 
lecture he gave in 1955, entitled “Life-unity” (Vollenhoven 1955i). Here 
he again speaks of “threefold law” and “threefold standing in subjection” 
(ibid, p. 122), in direct correlation with the three Persons of the Trinity. 
(We note though that the term ‘law’ here is itself used in a threefold 
sense, but the meanings agree with the uses denoted by the earlier ‘law’, 
‘command’ and ‘guidance’.)73
72   Evidently, with “pre-different earth”, Vollenhoven means to indicate an early 
stage of created reality. Mindful of his use of “earth”, as synonym for “universe”, he would 
appear to have an early stage of the universe in mind. In this connection he also refers to 
Psalm 104, a hymn to the Creator in the form of a meditation on the creation.
73   Vollenhoven re-emphasizes ‘threefold law’ from 1953 on, as creation law, law of 
love and positive law (cf. my discussion of its first re-appearance in Tol and Bril 1992: 
107-111). However Vollenhoven’s explicit Trinitarian statements are in work he left un-
published. In published statements he mentioned the threefold law without making the 
correlation with the Persons of the Trinity explicit; cf. his 1953l, 1959d and 1963a, re-
printed in Tol and Bril 1992: 104, 138 and 155-156 respectively. Then, in his lectures 
on time, i.e. 1963c, he states that over the years, “there was a gradual consolidation of 
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 Secondly, Vollenhoven’s critique of ‘theism’, when that term is used 
in connection with an ‘ideal epistemic system’, in the sense of attributing, 
partially or completely, sovereignty to the cosmos, remains in full effect. 
The cosmos is bounded by, thus dependent upon, sustaining laws, 
direction determining commands and guidance towards goals. Broadly 
speaking, Vollenhoven’s position is teleological. Not that the teleology is 
‘built-in’, as in Aristotle or in Hans Driesch.74 For Vollenhoven, cosmic 
life does indeed tend towards ‘last things’ on account of God’s immanent 
‘goading’. But this is meant to include the human being, who, when 
responding to God in a positive sense, hastens the Coming, but when 
responding negatively, thwarts it. There is no predicting the wayward 
course of actual life in reaching the eschaton. This implies that life is neither 
rigidly set nor unboundedly free. Response, and thus responsibility, are 
vital.
 At this point we may look back to see what is changed in connection 
with Vollenhoven’s former ‘theism’ and his ‘critical realist’ position in 
philosophy. At the same time, his initial definitive position was not 
the last word on many a topic, though it is the platform for all later 
changes. In our discussion we will be particularly interested in surmising 
‘what happens’ to the scholastic problem of the harmony of subjective 
and objective rationality. That problem is interwoven quite typically 
with theistic themes. When that is clarified we will give an outline of 
Vollenhoven’s cosmology, and then touch on how he overcame the 
‘dualism’ of his initial definitive position.
 Changes with respect to Vollenhoven’s former early position are 
perhaps easiest to gauge by taking the formulations of the roles of the 
Persons of the Trinity as guiding thread. We begin with that of the Spirit.
2. The work of the Spirit reviewed
There is a major shift in the way Vollenhoven formulates the relevance 
of the work of the Spirit. In critical realism the Spirit’s work is taken to 
include that of warranting norms, not only the norms of thought (logical 
norms) but also norms of aesthetics, ethics, religion etc. These norms are 
distinct from laws, as the term was then used in the usual sense of ‘laws of 
[my] own view of years ago in the Isagoge”, and he then lists the “threefold law requiring a 
threefold being subject”; cf. Tol and Bril 1992: 171-172. The only versions of Isagôgè Phi-
losophiae that fit the bill in this regard are those of the first setup of 1930-1931. Cf. also in 
my “Algemene inleiding” to the text-critical edition of Isagôgè Philosophiae, in particular 
the discussion of the first setup of this text (Tol 2010a). 
74   Vollenhoven had criticised the latter on this score in his 1920a; cf. chapter 3, 
note 21 above. 
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nature’. A characteristic feature of the early view is that the human being, 
as a Self, has the independence of submitting or not submitting to these 
norms as based on its own prior intuition of self-certainties. Only when 
submitting does the Self gain the ‘quality of being a subject’, this being 
a ‘distinguishing subject’ in light of the norm of identity, a ‘thinking 
subject’ in light of the principle (as norm) of contradiction, an aesthetic 
or ethical subject, etc. in the face of aesthetic or ethical norms, etc. In 
that sense the ‘normative effect’ of norms is dependent on the voluntary 
submissive attitude of the Self. (In the background we have the ‘objective 
values’ of neo-Kantianism, whereby values have an evaluating effect only 
when taken in [the modal] relation to the valuing subject; though from 
the start Vollenhoven clearly distinguished the Self and its qualities of 
being a subject, something that is lacking in neo-Kantianism). But the 
independence of the Self ’s intuition, relevant to the ‘concrete intuition’, 
Vollenhoven comes to see—Janse’s criticisms had a role here—as being 
subjective, with humanistic implications.
 In the revision, Vollenhoven retains the distinction between Self 
and ‘quality of being a subject’, but he re-interprets the context in which 
this is implemented. The intuitive self-certainties are now taken to be 
merely psychological, so that these self-certainties no longer attest to the 
independence of the Self. Related to this is Vollenhoven’s rejection of the 
soul being an immortal substance, which takes away any firm basis in the 
Self. Then there is also the undercutting of the thought-being polarity, 
whereby the pole of thought had been firmly planted in the Self. All this, 
taken together, in effect removes the basis from which knowledge can be 
formed with the authority of subjective rationality. Knowing now resorts 
under being.
 The Self is brought into a much closer rapport with the World 
(cosmos), expressed as the Self being ‘tasked’ or always already ‘standing 
in subjection’. Vollenhoven retains the view that the Self, in its qualities 
of subjection (or ‘functions of subjection’), is subject to norms. But he 
now re-interprets norms as ‘laws of injunction’ and takes the latter to be 
of a cosmic character. The usual cosmic ‘laws of nature’ thereby become 
subsidiary to the ‘cosmic’ laws of injunction. 
 This last step, which involves taking norms to be a species of laws 
(of injunction) and interpreting the latter as ‘laws for cosmic life’, seems 
a big and perhaps arbitrary step. To Vollenhoven it was probably less 
so. From the start he spoke of the Holy Spirit as ‘law-giver’, as when 
speaking of truth as a “norm, posited by God the Holy Spirit as law-
giver . . .” (Vollenhoven 1918a: 391). In critical realism the Self is 
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spoken of as “cosmic Self ”—even as “microcosm” (Vollenhoven 1918a: 
442)—which perhaps explains Vollenhoven’s terminology at this point. 
When ‘norm’ and ‘law-giving’ are themselves put in a cosmic context, 
in that of the cosmos as world-in-the-large—this is the chief shift that 
takes place here!—then that consolidates the cancellation of the relative 
independence of the Self vis-à-vis the World. This is in agreement with 
Vollenhoven’s initial definitive platform.
 Given the stated change, with the Spirit no longer seen as functioning 
as the warrant for the norm’s holding capacity, the Spirit’s role now calls 
for reconsideration. From the time of Vollenhoven’s initial definitive 
platform, the emphasis falls on guidance. Regretfully, Vollenhoven never 
gave an explicit account of this guidance. What complicates and to some 
extent confuses matters is the status of the ‘spiritual world’ (heaven) 
that Vollenhoven brings into the picture. (The latter goes virtually 
unmentioned in Vollenhoven’s earlier work.) Janse’s emphasis on the 
presence of the spiritual world has a follow-up in Vollenhoven.75 There 
are heavenly creatures, said to influence the lives of earthly creatures 
(Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 138; also 2010, 138),76 though Vollenhoven 
never elaborated on this influence. In any case the influence is for good 
or evil, for there are ‘upright’ and ‘fallen’ spirits (angels and demons).77 
But the work of the (Holy) Spirit cannot be identified with these forms 
of spiritual influence, for the latter are an influence of (heavenly) creature 
upon (earthly) creature, in other words, this influence is ‘inter-creaturely’.
 The Spirit, as divine Person, transcends the creaturely, though there 
is also the effect of the Spirit’s immanence as well. A prominent effect 
of the Spirit is, as we saw, that of guiding development and disclosing 
the potential of earthly life. This is a role in the context of creation. In 
later work Vollenhoven also emphasizes the effect upon office-holders in 
75   One finds a clear reminder of Janse in Vollenhoven’s understanding of ‘spirit’. 
On the one hand spirits are “powers” under God’s command, on the other hand spirit is 
like “wind, which controls the creatures in their growth and movement and, correlate to 
this, [it is] the capacity of animal and human being—contrary to plants—to move about 
on the earth” Vollenhoven 1930b: 13. In Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 139 and 2010, 139 
(from 1932 on), the biblical meaning of ‘spirit’ is, according to Vollenhoven, ‘principle of 
direction’. 
76   Vollenhoven 1930b: 13, heaven and earth are said to be “in continual connec-
tion with each other . . .”. 
77   In 2005d/e, also 2010, Part III on the connection between heaven and earth, 
Vollenhoven comments: “As far as angelic influence ‘for worse’ [is concerned], being ‘pos-
sessed’ is its most abnormal form” (section 138). Heaven (the spiritual world) and earth 
(the universe) are the two main realities that make up the cosmos, both of which are 
characterised as ‘being subject’ or ‘standing in subjection’ (section 19). 
Philosophy in the Making
428
societal spheres of responsibility. The sense of responsibility, relevant to 
the societal tasks of the office in question, attests to the presence of the 
Spirit.78 Societal office, as such, is not ‘man-made’. In light of the Trinity’s 
sequential arrangement, the offices of societal spheres presuppose norms 
(perhaps now concentrated in norm-principles) and directing commands. 
But when considering the actual human response on the part of office-
holders we must (I take it) also allow for the influence of the spiritual 
world, for good or evil, which influence might be noted empirically as 
‘strength of character’ or ‘bending to corruption’, respectively. But even 
Vollenhoven’s later notes were incomplete in this respect.79
3. The work of the Logos and role of the human logos reconsidered 
The understanding of the work of the second person, the Son or the 
Logos, also undergoes change. The initial, predominantly metalogical 
role of warranting the harmony of subjective and objective rationality 
makes way for a fuller but also thoroughly transformed account. The 
former ‘harmony’ was taken to be an agreement between on the one hand 
the adequate concept, which directs the subjective discovery and growth 
of knowledge, and on the other hand cosmic reality, as acknowledged 
in the idea, itself the warrant for the rational structure of the cosmos. 
The scholastic harmony is undercut (or at least seriously thwarted) when 
either the pole of the Self or that of the World is sufficiently refashioned. 
The revision (as described above) of the understanding of the Self, and 
with it that of the Spirit, has removed the basis for an autonomous 
acceptance of subjective rationality supporting an adequate concept. We 
have seen that the idea (of objective rationality) also goes by the board. 
But that still leaves the Logos’ role of ‘disposing the synthesis of subject 
and object’ to consider in its own right.
a. Why an intuition?
Vollenhoven, we found, when defending the scholastic harmony, held 
that the harmony, though necessary, is not itself a sufficient cognitive 
basis for knowledge. The harmony is necessary, for the subjective and the 
object must agree in the end. But this can only be deemed sufficient in 
light of a means that includes essential features of the subjective and the 
objective. In his dissertation Vollenhoven saw subjective rationality as 
78   Vollenhoven 1950n, in Tol and Bril 1992, esp. p. 44. 
79   The clearest statement is in “Levenseenheid” (Life-unity), Vollenhoven 1955i. 
Vollenhoven’s lectures on time, Vollenhoven 1963c: 194-195, announced, but did not 
actually treat, the topic of societal offices. 
429
Embarking Within Bounds of Law: The Initial Definite Platform
contingent and factual; objective rationality as necessary but formal. The 
‘synthetic a priori’ is able to bridge this divide; it has content but at the 
same time is necessary.80
 Vollenhoven’s prime reason for appealing to intuition in his earliest 
work was to justify the synthetic a priori. The intuition must offer 
immediate certainty, not derived, but it still needs to be understood as 
properly situated so as to be justified. The analytical intuition, which is the 
immediate grasp of similarity and difference of data (Vollenhoven 1918a: 
350), has a decisive role here. In Vollenhoven’s earliest work it is brought 
into rapport with the cosmic reality of the Self (as ‘microcosm’), whereby 
the mind and the body provide the focus for the primary synthetic a 
priori’s, namely that of arithmetic (in connection with the mind and the 
concrete intuition) and of spatial localization (as concerns the body and 
the forms of sensibility). Then (as confirmed in 1921) there is the shift 
towards the World (cosmos, the idea, and the metaphysical intuition), 
which is now itself seen as basis for distinguishing distinct regions of 
scientific endeavour, each of which has a distinct modal character and 
is the context of ‘essential connections’. The analytical (= metalogical) 
intuition picks up these essential connections (as synthetic a priori’s, 
of which the mathematical are now some among others) as means of 
adjudicating between on the one hand the pluralist subjective discovery 
and growth of knowledge and on the other hand the ideal of systematic 
complete knowledge of a region, grounded in the idea, as represented 
by the adequate concept of a region. Whether the analytical intuition 
operates in league with the Self or with the World, it is as a (human) 
‘small-l logos’ that it complements, in the sense of making sufficient, 
what the (divine) ‘large-L Logos’ disposes as ground pattern of harmony. 
An awareness of the logos’ standing with the Logos, would appear to be 
assumed here, for the Logos’ role of disposing subject and object to come 
together needs to be answered to if the harmony of subject and object 
is to become an accomplished fact. This awareness no doubt is, or at 
least involves, a moment of faith. But it is a faith that complements and 
completes reason’s aim of achieving an (objectively) true and (subjectively) 
adequate understanding. Now what happens to this scholastic cognitive 
schema in Vollenhoven’s revision? We find that he gives a much more 
careful account of that which falls under the aegis of the Logos.
b. The ‘Logos-logos’ difference
In Vollenhoven’s reconsideration, he retains the use of the ‘Logos-
80   Vollenhoven 1918a: 9; cf. also chapter 2, section IV.A. 
Philosophy in the Making
430
logos’ pair, in the primary meaning of the second Person of divinity 
and the human context of rationality, respectively. So prima facie the 
reconsideration does not seem to be radical. But the human context of 
rationality is now said to involve “the created logos”,81 situated in the 
cosmic order. This created logos is the logical or analytical law-sphere. 
This says that rationality is now contextualized. Furthermore, the latter is 
subjected to a notion of “truth in itself ”.82 This realist indication of truth 
takes the place of the former disposed harmony of subject and object. 
The ‘disposing’, formerly a divine effect, is now of cosmic alloy. All this is 
quite new. Thus the meaning of the ‘Logos-logos’ pair needs to be looked 
at more carefully in the context of the new discussion that replaces the 
former use.
 In the revised context of the mid-1920s, the meaning of the 
term ‘Logos’ is, before anything else, fixed in its primary biblical use 
in portraying God’s ‘speaking’ or his ‘revelation’ to the creature, as 
second Person of the Trinity. Thus ‘Son’ denotes the second Person in 
its transcendence, while ‘Logos’ refers more to its immanence—“the 
light . . . coming into the world” (John 1:9; cf. also Vollenhoven 1926a: 
18). This divine speaking usually takes the form of commanding (as we 
saw; cf. Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §75; also 2010, Appendix I, §75). 
The commanding is such that, as regards knowledge, it directs by way 
of promoting relevant knowledge acquisition and warning against error, 
i.e. avoiding “going astray” (dwalen). (Vollenhoven often uses the pair 
“kennen en dwalen”, “knowing and straying”, as being on a par.)83 The 
commanding directs in that it aims at a judicious ‘handling’ or assessing 
of the epistemic situation, which is more than just being in the know. 
A prime example of a command of the Logos is the (biblical) central 
love command, which is (in essence) ‘to love God above all and one’s 
neighbour as oneself ’ (cf. Mark 12: 30-31). This enjoins piety and 
righteousness, and when applied to the epistemic situation, advances a 
‘good or loving’ handling of rationality and truth. “The logical function 
needs to be controlled by love.”84 Knowledge acquired and used calls for 
81   This term is used almost exclusively in Vollenhoven 1926b and 1926d; in Vol-
lenhoven 1926a it is gradually replaced by logical law-sphere as the text proceeds. 
82   Vollenhoven 1926b: 385. It is completely indifferent to truth whether it be 
known. It is only when known that it has ‘validity’ (op. cit. : 384). Vollenhoven finds a 
rapprochement with Bernard Bolzano, who also spoke of “Wahrheiten an sich”; cf. 1926a: 
51-52. 
83   Vollenhoven 2010, 11, 13. 
84   Vollenhoven 1963c: 189. The love command does not make the logical norms, 
to which the logical function is subject in a direct sense, redundant. It directs only on 
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a context of wisdom.
 We see at once that the understanding of the primary role of the 
Logos is now quite removed from any ‘disposing of subject and object to 
come together’. The main role of the Logos is to provide aim. It orientates 
cognition, i.e. the operating of the analytical function, in such a way as 
to warrant a satisfactory outcome of the knowledge endeavour. At its 
own level the divine Logos is ‘above’ knowledge synthesis. To acquire a 
satisfactory outcome of the knowledge endeavour, the human exercise 
of rationality (= the logical function in use) needs not only to submit 
to norms—this is what was required in Vollenhoven’s former view as 
well—but also to practise rationality in a way that edifies. This is not a 
‘(subjective) reason + faith’ construction, but the ‘right/proper rational 
use of a function’. The analytical function is (1) itself the basis for the 
possibility of understanding through distinguishing differences and 
establishing connections; (2) this possibility becomes rationally actual in 
compliance to logical norms; (3) the function’s rational actuality is right, 
proper or justified when exercised in light of contributing to advancing 
life ‘for good’, which ‘light’ is provided by the Logos. Of course, ‘beliefs’ 
as moments of awareness are present throughout, but this is not ‘faith’ as 
meant in a scholastic context, namely as superadded truth. 
 In Vollenhoven’s former view, the knowledge situation itself was one 
in which the merging of subject and object was taken to be the primary 
feature, in what was described as ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ (cf. chapter 
2, section V.D.). In that situation the knowledge synthesis is one in which 
the Self, in its quality of being a knowing subject, assimilates, processes or 
works over (the Dutch verb is ‘verwerken’) the object, making it answer 
to or serve human ends. In other words, the former model of knowledge 
is one in which control is central, being a model of subject dominating 
object, as end in itself. The new view calls for an orientation of the entire 
knowledge endeavour, so that, whatever possibility of control knowledge 
provides, this is itself situated to serve towards enhancing life in which it 
is had and put to use.
c. Values and assessment
Now how is the knowledge endeavour described that stands subject to the 
orienting (commanding) aim of the Logos? It seems that Vollenhoven 
initially (in the late 1920s) wished to emphasize the contextualization of 
the assumption that the logical function is used validly. Love is no warrant to cover up 
mistakes! Cf. also, Vollenhoven 1948p: 25, i.e. “section 10: The meaning of this law [for 
the analytical function] qua modal law [/norm].” 
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knowledge in terms of values. In somewhat neo-Kantian, Freiburg-like 
fashion, he held values to be objective and “ubiquitous in the cosmos”. 
When the epistemic situation is “assessed”—he distinguishes ‘assessment’ 
(beoordelen) and ‘judgment’ (oordelen) in this connection—that involves 
the recognition of value. On the other hand, the value that knowledge has 
“for us” “can only be properly assessed when acknowledged as anchored in 
the Logos.”85 Thus there is an intriguing connection suggested as holding 
between the Logos and the knowledge situation (within the cosmos), as 
relevant to the topic of values. The text that discusses this is a section in 
the first version of Isagôgè Philosophiae (1930-1931; sec. 124). However, 
the whole context is reworked in the next version of 1932 and the topic 
of values appears simply to drop out of sight, apart from an isolated 
memory of it.86 But the topic itself fits the ‘aesthetic’ characterization of 
the cosmos we find to be prevalent till the early 1930s, when it too simply 
falls away, and appears to be replaced (as of Vollenhoven 1932e) by a 
more ‘moral’ qualification (about which more later).
 I believe we should interpret Vollenhoven’s view of values at the 
time to be the most encompassing metalogical feature of the cosmos. 
Values appear to delineate (what might be called) ‘objects of attention’; 
they are such as to serve to make human awareness take notice. If we 
may assume this to be correct—textual support is very limited—then 
“value” appears to be a synonym for what Dooyeweerd, in “Cosmos 
and Logos” (1923a2), referred to as “objective meaning”, understanding 
this to be: “meaning as ‘given for consciousness’.”87 The way objective 
meaning (in Dooyeweerd at the time) involves awareness of reality as 
given for consciousness, in a similar way value (here in Vollenhoven) 
appears to invite awareness of reality in its being given for discernment. 
Basically there is the same thought expressed in two different idioms. 
85   Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §124; also 2010, Appendix I, §124. A work that 
discusses these matters is N. Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom. A revolution in the 
aims and methods of science (1984). The author wished to go beyond the ‘philosophy of 
knowledge’ towards a more inclusive ‘philosophy of wisdom’. The view proposed is based 
on “an objectivist, realist view of value” (p. 248).
86   In Vollenhoven 1932e and later versions, there is a classification of judgments, 
arranged according to the way that the structure of the cosmos is presented. Between the 
class of religious judgments and that of the kingdoms, there is the class of judgments 
about values, and the example given is: “It is good to speak truth.” Strangely enough, 
there is no longer any direct textual support about values in the main body of the text. 
But the ‘position’ of this class of judgments (between that of religion and cosmic king-
doms) matches the ‘high ranking’ that is attributed to values in the earlier version. Note 
also that the example of the value given here is itself ‘moral’, namely ‘good’.
87   Cf. the discussion in chapter 3, section III.E. 
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Each supports the thesis of ‘knowing resorting under being’.
 But the current discussion is post-1923, hence the assumption of 
the presence of cosmic being, as law-spheres and their laws, is relevant. 
Value brings the relevance of being ‘to light’ (as it were). The awareness 
of cosmic being takes place as the intuitive valuing of what is given, 
an awareness yielding “judgments of discerning or of existence”. These 
judgments—in 1930, as we stated, they are referred to as “assessments”—
affirm a presence (existence) of distinct modality (discerned).88 We see 
immediately that this intuition of the value of being combines in one 
what was formerly distributed over the metaphysical intuition (identity 
of distinctive being) and the metalogical intuition (of the adequate 
understanding of being). Combined, they allow one to transform a given 
of being into a presupposition for knowledge. Because the discerned 
pertains fundamentally to law-spheres and their modal characterization, 
this ‘assessment’ turns the law-sphere as assessed into a “gezichtsveld”, a 
“field of vision” or “region”,89 which serves to meet the ends of knowledge. 
These fields are fundamental towards delineating the epistemic situation: 
on the one hand the valued presence is now attended to as something 
knowable (object of attention or of discerning) in a context that is subject 
to law, on the other hand the focus of the valuing embodies the interest 
in knowing in the acknowledgment of value (hence: striving to know, 
reflecting a ‘prepared’ situation that the knowing agent finds him-/herself 
in). Thus the order of the law-spheres supports an ‘order of associated fields 
of vision’, which is the order of the cosmos as knowable.90 So the former 
‘metalogical intuition’ loses its distinct sense, at least it cannot be used 
to denote an involvement in a ‘Gegenstand sphere’ that is separate from 
an acknowledged order of reality, as in critical realism. Knowing resorts 
under being, thus ‘the metalogical’ has an ineluctable ‘metaphysical’ facet 
as well. Later (as we said) Vollenhoven calls this order of knowledge, 
or general epistemic situation, ‘the noetic’ (het gnotische), this being the 
88   The ‘judgments of existence or of discerning’, these being based in the intuition 
of modality (Vollenhoven 1926a: 9, 28) and themselves the basis of concept formation 
(op. cit. : 25, 28, 63), do not have a subject-predicate form. Vollenhoven represents an ex-
istence judgment as ‘A is’; hence a subject-predicate judgment, having the form ‘S is P’, is 
built up from ‘S is’ and ‘P is’ (op. cit. : 14, 60). Vollenhoven would appear to be following 
Brentano in this analysis of a complex judgment (op. cit. : 60). For a study of Brentano’s 
logic, cf. “Chapter 3. Brentano’s reform of logic” of Simons 1992: 41-69. 
89   On this terminology, cf. chapter 3, section III.E.3, especially footnote 173. 
90   In Vollenhoven’s epistemological writings of 1926, the notion of ‘field of vision’ 
is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘law-sphere’. But officially there is the difference 
brought on by the intuitive discerning or “assessing” of value. 
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reality of our everyday and scientific knowing.91
 On consideration, the interplay of value and being seems problematic. 
All being is subject to law, but discerned value is dependent upon given 
attention, which might be haphazard and flighty or concentrated and 
serious. The ‘meeting’ of being and value seems difficult to grasp. But 
when considering that the being, which is subject to law, needs to be a 
knowable something, and that the attention given it is to yield something 
that is discerned about it, then the context of values gives a foothold 
for the distinction of the basic components of a judgment: ‘subject’ (as 
the object of attention) and ‘predicate’ (what is discerned). It would 
appear that the interplay between value and being is the concern of, and 
controlled by, truth.
d. Truth ‘in itself ’
The weight Vollenhoven places on truth in his writings of 1926 appears 
almost overdone. It is over-illuminated, making it difficult to grasp his 
meaning. Truth is taken to be ‘in itself ’ (Vollenhoven 1926b: 385; 1926a: 
51). It is irrelevant to the essence of truth that it is known; validity is an 
effect of truth when subjectively grasped (1926b: 384). But the main 
feature of truth is that it is the kernel of knowledge. Because knowledge 
calls for an agent and an object known, the knowledge situation is, in 
general, that of ‘an agent possessing truth about something’ (1926b: 381; 
1926d: 54). The heart of this ‘(agent) possessing truth about (something)’ 
is that truth signals the state of connection, a ‘systasis’ between agent and 
something; it does not (i.e. no longer) signal(s) a process of synthesis, 
of coming together, involving only agent and object.92 It is a genuine 
‘third factor’, beside agent (subject) and something (object) (1926b: 395; 
1926d: 56). So knowledge, as truth possessed about something, might 
be loosely described as ‘understood cosmic connections’, or ‘cosmic 
connections rightly grasped’. In any case, cognition is threesome, no 
longer assumed to involve only subject (agent) and object.93
 We will not go into a detailed discussion of Vollenhoven’s 
epistemological views at this point, preferring to focus on the broader 
91   Vollenhoven 1948p: 16. 
92   1926a: 11: “But knowing is truth possession: it is systasis, not synthesis, certainly 
a state of affairs, least of all act.” 
93   There is an intriguingly similar analysis of volition in René Girard, in his dis-
tinguishing, besides subject (agent who desires) and object (what is desired), also the 
required presence of a ‘third factor’, namely the model who mediates the desire. Desire is 
analysed as being ‘triangular’; cf. Girard 1965. In Girard’s later work he also emphasizes 
the biblical ‘logos of love’.
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epistemic context and its basic set-up.94 What calls for clarification is 
the distinction between knowing and thinking. Only then do we get 
to see what the ‘small-l logos’ amounts to in the revisions Vollenhoven 
introduces.
e. Truth known
Knowledge’s resorting under being implies, among other things, that the 
knowing agent and the object known are embedded in valued being, 
i.e. they are embedded in discerned law-spheres and as such stand in 
subjection to the laws/norms of law-spheres. Thus the most primitive 
judgments (in the sense of being ‘prime’) are judgments (or assessments, 
as we saw) of discerning the general modal characterization of things 
and of one’s own involvement. The knowing agent knows itself to be 
‘instated’ in reality in such a way as to involve, among other things, 
the ‘task’ (or ‘interest’) of understanding appropriately (Vollenhoven 
1926b: 382). The human agent is not a collector of impressions, though 
impressions are involved at a psychical-perceptual level. Understanding 
does not take place by forming a synthesis of sense-data. This is evident 
when considering our everyday knowledge.
 Much of what we know is conveyed to us, accepted on trust, the 
truth assumed. Knowledge that is conveyed brings us in the know (when 
true) about something of being. One might be told that an earthquake 
has set up a tsunami, that the neighbour broke his arm, that a niece got 
the highest marks in the exams, that this or that political party won the 
elections and will now form the next government, etc., etc. We assume 
without question the relevance of the levels of reality involved in such 
cases: geological, physiological-organic, educational, political-juridical, 
etc. Of course, one can throw doubt on such claims and set about to 
investigate their truth. But not everything can be investigated, certainly 
not all at once, nor even in series. Very many claims are, practically 
speaking, never doubted, relying as we do on the truthfulness of the 
conveyer. Knowledge is embedded in reality as lived, and truth partakes 
of its structure. We apportion knowledge in accordance with the (modal) 
level of subjection (of the ‘field of vision’) that is relevant to the statements 
made.95
94   For a more detailed discussion, cf. “Chapter 7: Logos, states of affairs, and 
knowledge” of Kok 1992: 233-290.
95   From 1932 on, Vollenhoven stated in 2005d/e, 154, that “in the nature of the 
case, coming to know differs modally according to the law-sphere within which it takes 
place”. He restricts (as he states) his discussion of the “knowing connection” to the ana-
lytical law-sphere, but this connection is present and relevant in the ‘supra-analytical’ law-
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f. Truth acquired: thought
Now knowledge may also be acquired, as well as being conveyed. When 
acquired, one proceeds from an absence of the appropriate knowledge 
and sets out to seek the truth.96 One then calls upon thought in a more 
direct or focussed way than is the case when knowledge is conveyed. 
For one must now make the necessary distinctions in light of relevant 
differences and place things in relations that evidently belong together. 
This ‘more focussed way’ of proceeding involves a choice on the part of 
the knowing agent to subject itself to typically logical or analytical norms. 
Here the ‘logical law-sphere’—the ‘created, little-l logos’—is brought to 
bear. The ‘logical function of subjection’ is that of making distinctions 
and connections, subject to logical norms (i.e. the principle of identity, 
the principle of contradiction, etc.). But the ‘thinking agent’ brings this 
analytical functioning to bear on the content that is thought about. 
What we have is a situation in which the knowing subject, by using the 
logical function, focuses on a knowable topic that is now investigated 
as to intrinsic differences and connections. In the attempt to discover 
truth, the knowing agent participates in the search for truth by means of 
the logical functioning, and the known object is treated as represented by 
the differences and connections being searched. For representation to be 
possible, one must assume that the relevant context of the known object 
has ‘an analogy’ of the logical sphere, in being analysable.
 The logical law-sphere itself concerns the business of analysing and 
connecting. This matches the primary functions of distinguishing and 
relating. Hence the “logical essence par excellence” is “the ‘relation’.”97
 In his epistemological work of 1926 this “logical essence” is applied 
in such a way that the logical law-sphere lays bare its two sides: the formal 
or schematic side and a material or content side.98 Relation, in its ‘logical 
essence’, is then described as the ‘logical schema’99 of “a system of a relation 
spheres as well. One needs to keep this broad modal setting in mind, for the context in 
which this is stated is the discussion of ‘everyday knowledge’, not the scientific knowledge 
of the specific sciences. 
96   For the distinction between conveyed and acquired, cf. Vollenhoven 1926b: 
382-383; 1926d: 58. 
97   Vollenhoven 1925c: 393. 
98   Every law-sphere has, as will be pointed out later, a general and a particular ‘side’, 
as relevant for its standing in subjection to the law/norm. The ancestor of this view is the 
‘Gegenstand sphere’, with its two sides of form and content. 
99   Vollenhoven first spoke of “contentless truth” (i.e. formal truth) in 1926b and in 
the first instalment of 1926d; in the second instalment of the latter article he switched to 
using “logical schema”; cf. 1926d: 178, footnote 1; 179, footnote 2, and 188 footnote 1; 
also cf. footnote 6 above. 
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with (in the simplest case) two moments, which moments become relata 
by virtue of the relation”.100 It is the instrument for drawing distinctions 
(by virtue of the difference between moments) and laying connections 
via the relation. But this is formal or general. It needs to be met with 
content that particularizes the logical schema. Vollenhoven draws up the 
following correlations:101
     General logical schema:                           Particular state of affairs:
 - system  (is modulated by)  - the modality
 - the relation (is modulated by) - the essential connection
 - the moments (are modulated by)  - the Gegenstände
 At this particular point, the states of affairs are particularized content 
in the logical law-sphere as representative of what is real or at least of what 
is outside of the logical law-sphere. To illustrate, the logical schema might 
be indicated as ‘a-R-b’, i.e. the simplest case of two moments, a and b, 
that stand in the relation R. Then this can be ‘particularized’ in a host of 
ways, say: psychically as ‘Anne kisses Bob’, arithmetically as ‘5 exceeds 2’, 
in a juridical sense as ‘Judge Jackson convicts criminal Carl’, etc. Each 
case is qualified in a modally distinct sense, but in each there are (two) 
terms (Gegenstände) taken as standing in a relation that fits the modality 
in question. Each of these statements is a much reduced sketch of a 
broader reality, whereby the reduction focuses on the ‘relational facet’ by 
means of which the reality can be represented in the logical law-sphere.
 We add the remark that each law-sphere has a characteristic ‘essential 
connection’, appropriate to the modality in question, which forms 
the basis of a ‘general truth’ for that law-sphere. This puts the concern 
about the synthetic a priori to rest. Also, concepts are forthcoming when 
considering that different Gegenstände can be placed in the position 
of relatum of a relation, yielding cases of ‘the so-being of this or that’ 
(Vollenhoven 1926b: 393). Setting up the represented content in the 
relational schema—encumbering the logical schema (1926d: 58)—is 
an essential part of the logic of inquiry, being the way basic concepts 
and judgments get to be formulated. This is how the truth is gained as 
mediated by the logical law-sphere.
100   Vollenhoven 1926b: 397, cf. also 1926d: 57. In this formulation the relation is 
no longer a factor dependent upon the (particularised) relata, taken as being prior to the 
relation, as is the case in the monadological understanding of a relation in Vollenhoven 
earliest work. As discussed in chapter 2, the basic relations are now taken to be ‘external’; 
cf. chapter 2, V.B. 
101   Vollenhoven 1926b: 397; also 1926d: 57. 
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g. Method
But besides gaining (verwerven) knowledge there is also its “verwerken”, 
its processing. This is a matter of methodology and no longer the direct 
concern of logic (Vollenhoven 1926d: 59-60). Each encumbrance of the 
logical schema that represents a different modality gives rise to different 
concepts and judgments. When intermixing concepts and judgments 
of different modality, a confusion of method arises, which can in turn 
give rise to antinomies. Modally different encumbrances form the basis 
of different sciences. But in each modally distinct science, one can 
investigate its states of affairs in either of two ways, or two ‘directions’: (i) 
one may resolve a term by taking it itself to be a unity of system of terms 
standing in a relation; in this way one proceeds in the way of analysis; (ii) 
one may compose a term by merging given terms via a relation to form a 
new (systematic) unity; in this way one proceeds in the way of synthesis.102
 The fact that matters of non-logical law-spheres can be represented in 
the logical law-sphere as states of affairs is due to a certain ‘connection’—
itself a ‘systasis’, a ‘standing together’, not a synthesis—between the logical 
and the other law-spheres. This is evidenced by each of the non-logical 
law-spheres’ having an analogy of the logical system-of-related-terms. 
This makes it possible to meet the content of the non-logical law-sphere 
in a logical way.103 This connection of analogy (systasis) between law-
102   In 1926d: 158) and in 1926a: 58) Vollenhoven spoke of “simplicerende [sic] 
en complicerende richtingen”, i.e. ‘simplicating [thus] and complicating directions. In 
Isagôgè Philosophiae this became resolution and complication. In the methodology of sci-
ence there are various ways in which the dual method of analysis and synthesis is applied, 
a classical application being that used in geometry by the ancient Greeks; cf. Hintikka 
and Remes 1974. Vollenhoven’s application is ‘dialectical’ in that it moves between unity 
and diversity, not with a view of cancelling either but towards showing complexity in 
unity and connectedness in diversity. I shall refer to the route of “complicering” as that of 
composition. 
103   I make mention of the fact that, in a fuller discussion, the differences in the order 
of the law-spheres would need to be taken into account. In the work of 1926, the logical 
law-sphere is the lowest in the cosmic order. Every non-logical law-sphere has an analogy 
by virtue of the fact that the lowest law-sphere is presupposed by every other law-sphere. 
About early 1927, the logical law-sphere is moved to its position immediately above the 
psychical law-sphere. The law-spheres that are then ‘sub-logical’ no longer contain an 
analogy of the logical sphere. They do have so-called ‘anticipations’ of the logical law-
sphere. But, in Vollenhoven, anticipations are actual only when mediated by creatures 
who function in the anticipated law-sphere. In this case (of the logical law-sphere) only 
human beings can fulfil this mediating role. How we have to see this role in connection 
with the natural sciences remains uncertain (cf. Vollenhoven 1926msA, section 22b). 
There is also, more or less simultaneous with the shift in position of the logical law-
sphere, a change in the view of states of affairs. In the work of 1926, states of affairs are 
representations, in the logical sphere, of the logical analogy in the non-logical spheres. 
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spheres cannot be investigated or derived, for it is presupposed in any 
investigation that involves thought, i.e. that involves the distinguishing 
of difference and the relating of what is connected.
h. Concluding summary
The general conclusion of this (all too brief ) discussion is that the 
former role of the analytical intuition, namely of helping to provide the 
connection between subjective and objective rationality, is completely 
redefined. The divine Logos’ role itself is no longer seen as disposing 
the harmony of subject and object. It is now taken as ‘revealing’ (or 
focussing on) the fundamental difference between knowing and straying, 
in ‘commanding’ that knowledge be pursued in love and error abated. 
This places the ‘problem of the synthesis of subject and object’ entirely 
in the human-creaturely context of that which is subject to the divine 
Logos, whereby this ‘standing in subjection’ is evident in the value that 
being has for knowing. It is first and foremost a matter of the intuition of 
discerning to pick up on this value, which results in an explicit awareness 
of the modal diversity that is grounded in the cosmos.
 Within the awareness of this modal diversity, knowledge and thought 
have their distinct roles. Knowledge is a matter of possessing truth. Truth 
attests to the connection of knowing agent and known object. Truth is 
not itself a confluence of agent and object, but a genuine ‘third factor’. 
Thought, in turn, operates explicitly with the possibility that is provided 
by the ‘created logos’, this being itself a ‘logical law-sphere’ in the cosmic 
order of the law-spheres. This ‘created logos’ contains the logical schema 
with which one explicitly distinguishes and connects. The logical schema 
becomes operational when encumbered with content from another 
law-sphere, as represented in (or through) the logical law-sphere. This 
‘small-l logos’ indeed provides or supports a connection between subject 
and object. But the subject is the thinking agent, i.e. the Self as bearing 
the logical quality of subjection, and the object is the something knowable, 
as represented by means of the logical relevance of content. Both the 
subjective and the objective are contextualized in the cosmic order. Thus 
the model of an order of thought coming into agreement with an order 
of being is entirely superseded.
 So truth, when possessed as knowledge, sits (so to speak) in between 
But this is changed so that each law-sphere is considered to have its own states of affairs in 
a primary way. Cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 173; also 2010, 173, and also the cosmological 
discussion below. In any case, this development at the ‘philosophy of science’ level takes 
notions from the prior context of critical realism and incorporates them in the burgeon-
ing cosmological insights; cf. also chapter 3, section II.C.4.c. 
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thought and intuition; it is presupposed by the former and contextualized 
by the latter. Truth connects, in the cosmic order, the human being’s 
discerning on the one hand with the value of being when known on the 
other. In that sense, truth assumes one’s getting the cosmic connections 
right, if the ordering of one’s concepts are to be dependable. In that 
light, the ‘boundary of the cosmos’, which delineates the latter’s scope, 
is relevant to truth. The following citation of a text of 1932 brings the 
essentials together: 
The principle according to which concepts are ordered, then, is no longer 
that of the genetic order in which they came to the knower at the time but 
another one entirely. The significance of the arenas [i.e. law-spheres/fields 
of view; A.T.] involved depends on the extension they have according to 
the knower. As a result, it is crucial that when ordering these concepts one 
sees their extensions and their mutual relations correctly. For example, if 
you take the area of that which is created too narrowly, you will end up 
deifying that part of the cosmos that, as you see it, falls outside it [i.e. ‘par-
tial theism’; A.T.] and you will begin to ask all kinds of questions about 
the relationship between the parts of the one cosmos, which in this way 
have been thrown asunder, and so on. That makes it clear why whether one 
bows to the Word revelation [Logos] helps to decide about the value [and 
disvalue/non-value; “waarde en onwaarde”] of such an ordering. One who 
obeys God’s Word can certainly still err when it comes to details, but one 
who does not arrives at concepts that are false in their basic structure.104
4. Creator and creation
A subtle but decisive change also occurs in Vollenhoven’s ‘Trinitarian 
theistic’ position in connection with the creation, the world of the 
Father, as governed by the divine Counsel. The basis or ‘metaphysics’ 
of Vollenhoven’s cosmology has so far remained in the background. 
Naturally, this topic was essential to (critical) realism, for cosmology was 
also the main prop in the earlier work. But the attention given it was 
primarily focussed on its supporting role in the metalogical discussions 
of epistemology and philosophy of science. (We found this to be the case 
in the early work of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, as discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3.) But enough came through to be able to at least discern 
its main outline.
a. The metaphysics of ideas
Vollenhoven initially viewed the cosmos, as we saw, as secured 
metaphysically in ideas, realistically understood. Ideas are the principles 
104   Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 182. The text stems from 1932, with small changes intro-
duced in subsequent editions, for which cf. 2010, 182.
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of distinctive being, of general and particularized essences. As general 
essences they govern the species of creatures. When individuated, 
they serve as the ‘thing-laws’ of individual beings, controlling a thing’s 
appearances and development and the connections to other things. 
Ideas are metaphysically present in the divine predestining Counsel, 
which makes them primarily subject to the will of God the Father or 
Creator. Cosmology studies the whole terrain in which individual things 
play-out their predestined roles, in seeming interaction with each other. 
Vollenhoven referred to this cosmology as a monadology (cf. chapter 2), 
which was apt. The name most famously associated with a monadology 
is that of G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716). He (Leibniz) was himself aware of 
standing in the tradition of an Aristotelian-based theory of substance, 
which combined “a prominent strand of Platonic, Neoplatonic, and 
Augustinian teaching, particularly the thesis (shared in a long line of 
Christian thinkers) that the ideas of things in the mind of God functioned 
as archetypes of God’s creation.”105
 But Vollenhoven did not have to have a special inclination towards 
Leibniz (indeed, he didn’t) when formulating his early view of the cosmos 
and its security in metaphysical ideas. The Reformed tradition itself is no 
stranger to the view in question, it being in essence a scholastic view. The 
principal proponents of the Free University in its early years—Abraham 
Kuyper, Jan Woltjer, Herman Bavinck, etc.—were later targeted by 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd as having been too accommodating 
towards scholasticism.106 Thus, Vollenhoven, who attended the grammar 
school of which Woltjer was also rector, imbibed this influence already 
in his secondary education and through his university training. The Free 
University itself expressed an understanding of the “Reformed principles”, 
referred to in “Article 2” of its statutes, in a way that presupposes the 
distinction of subjective and objective rationality. The Senate of the 
university once explained: “under ‘principles’ is to be understood, not 
those points of departure which lie in the facts and in the essence of 
things, but such principles as control, in consciousness, the world of 
thought.”107 
105   Antognazzi 2009: 52. 
106   Recall Dooyeweerd’s criticism in this regard, as formulated in his “Kuyper’s 
wetenschapsleer” (1939); cf. footnote 140 in chapter 3. 
107   Publicatie van den Senaat der Vrije Universiteit, in zake het onderzoek ter bepaling 
van den weg die tot de kennis der Gereformeerde beginselen leidt (Publication of the senate 
of the Free University regarding the inquiry towards determining the way that leads to 
knowledge of the Reformed principles), J. Woltjer, rector, A. Kuyper, abactis (Woltjer and 
Kuyper 1895: 8). Cf. the discussion of this document in chapter 1. 
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 In terms of immediate influence, the person who was most noticeably 
present in Vollenhoven’s early life was, undoubtedly, the classicist, Jan 
Woltjer (1849-1917).108 Kuyper was no longer teaching at the Free 
University when Vollenhoven entered its halls, and Woltjer had impressed 
Vollenhoven already in his high school years, before Bavinck came into 
the picture. Woltjer became Vollenhoven’s university mentor. His death 
prevented him from guiding Vollenhoven in the actual completion of his 
dissertation, a role which then fell, more or less perfunctorily, to Wilhelm 
Geesink, who did most of the teaching in philosophy at the time.
 In Woltjer we find a strong and explicit defence of the harmony 
between subjective and objective rationality. He speaks of “an agreement 
between our minds and nature”. To paraphrase his wording: He states 
that, because we find that our deducing of concepts and ideas from 
other concepts and ideas in the mind traces the same path as the things 
of nature, we are obliged to conclude (i) that there are ideas in nature, 
which are also realized in nature, and (ii) that because ideas in our minds 
result from a thinking subject, this must also be the case with the ideas in 
nature.109 Ideas play a central role. “The idea, expressed in the things, is 
the unity in the plurality of relations, given with each thing, the whole in 
the parts” (Woltjer, J. 1896: 214). That ideas also serve as ‘thing-laws’ is 
evident from a statement such as: “More real than the perceptible world 
is the world of ideas, of imperceptible things, that control the perceptible 
[things]” (Woltjer, J. 1901: 152). This has full cosmic implications. “But 
the idea also controls the connections and relations of things mutually, 
each time in wider circles climbing up to the idea of the whole of the 
cosmos, which encloses the harmonious whole of all relations in what 
is creaturely. In that way, through ideas, that which is viewed becomes 
knowledge, and the knowledge elevates itself to science and science to 
wisdom” (Woltjer, J. 1896: 214; emphasis added).
 Woltjer summarizes, by way of conclusion, his basic thoughts about 
the ideal and the real in the following way.
The ideal exist, in the first place, as the eternal thoughts of God, His speci-
fications [bestek] and His Counsel [ideas; archetypes], according to which 
He has brought forth all that is created in its being and becoming and in 
their countless relations, both as to being and as to consciousness. — The 
ideal exists, in the second place, objectified, as ectype, in the cosmos and in 
the human being, to the extent that both, in their resemblance as well as in 
108   On J. Woltjer, cf. the book length study of H. van der Laan (Van der Laan 2000); 
also Vollenhoven’s short article under “Woltjer, Jan”, with the addendum by K.A. Bril, in 
Vollenhoven 2005c: 441-442. Cf also footnote 110 below. 
109   Woltjer, J. 1896: 211. All translations of the Woltjer citations are mine.
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their opposition, are the effect of the one plan of creation. This objectifica-
tion or positing can be called—over against the ideas themselves—the real, 
but then from this it immediately follows that the ideal cannot be of less 
value in connection with being than the real, but is the ground on which 
this real exists. [—] Finally, the ideal exists in the mind of the human be-
ing or humankind, for, being created according to God’s image, by virtue 
of this spiritual capacity, he can know, from out of the cosmos, the ideas 
that are objectified in the cosmos, and in that way he carries in himself 
a distinct world of ideas which, to the extent that they are rooted in the 
essence, connection and the order of God’s creation, form his science.” 
(Woltjer, J. 1896: 218) 
 These citations, selected to be sure to indicate their close proximity 
to the early Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd in their ‘critical realism’, do 
not touch on Woltjer’s defence and argument, on his analysis of thought 
and language, nor on the hermeneutical principles he maintained 
in his orientation to classical antiquity. The more precise similarity 
and difference with Woltjer need not be pursued here.110 However, a 
noticeable difference is Vollenhoven’s appeal to the intuition, which is 
not evident in Woltjer, as the means of acquiring certainty about the 
harmony of the subjective and the objective orders. Thus Vollenhoven 
was creative in working within his mentor’s framework. The influence on 
Vollenhoven was effective through the high respect and admiration he felt 
towards Woltjer, as Christian scholar and thinker. But however sustained 
and positive Vollenhoven’s feelings were in this regard, this attitude did 
not detract from his realizing, in time, that this ‘logos-tradition’ needed 
reforming.111
b. ‘Substance-phenomenon’ philosophy
The criticism that Vollenhoven directs against the metaphysics of the 
logos-tradition is aimed, not at Woltjer in any direct sense, but at essential 
110   For a balanced and exploratory discussion of J. Woltjer’s thought, cf. Kok 2007: 
41-64, in Sweetman 2007a. Dooyeweerd offers a critical discussion of J. Woltjer’s thought 
in Dooyeweerd 1939. The knowledge that Dooyeweerd himself, up to about 1928, held 
to ideas, in the sense that he later criticized in Woltjer, throws a new light on that discus-
sion. 
111   In Vollenhoven 1926d: 191, Vollenhoven responds to a paper, entitled “Over de 
beteekenis der natuurwetten” (On the meaning of laws of nature) by R.H. Woltjer, a son 
of J. Woltjer (Woltjer, R.H. 1925). He refers to “the so highly esteemed father, also by 
me” in the context of which he criticizes Woltjer senior’s “Ideëel en reëel”. He mentions 
in particular J. Woltjer’s acceptance of “the subject-object schema” of knowledge, which 
does not allow for ‘truth’ as distinct factor; “its terrain then has to be spread over subject 
and object, and in semi-idealism is attributed [entirely] to the subject. This results in the 
doctrine of the logos being immanent in the subject.” 
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features of his own implementation of that tradition, as monadology. 
He characterizes this as ‘substance-phenomenon’ philosophy.112 The 
substance of things lies in their ideas, their principle of unity, while 
what we know of a thing comes by way of the interaction with what 
the phenomena reveal. This ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ (cf. chapter 2, 
section V.D.) is supplemented by the metaphysical intuition, through 
which one attains a direct grasp of a being’s identity, despite the change 
of motion and the variety of species among individuals (Vollenhoven 
1918a: 351). In other words, the metaphysical intuition offers a grasp 
of the idea of a thing, as its substance or ‘thing-law’ (inner principle), 
thereby supplementing what is not come by via the outer approach of 
knowledge by acquaintance. Taken together there is knowledge of the 
complete whole of substance and phenomena. What gives critical point 
to this philosophy is its anthropological application. There is body and 
soul, each an ‘incomplete’ substance—incomplete in that each is (only) 
a part of the human being: the psycho-physical body being animal-like, 
and the mental soul, “angelic-like”—that together constitute the whole 
of the human being (the Self ). As ‘complete’ substance, the Self combines 
the two incomplete substances, making a human person to be a unique 
complex being. The soul, in being an immortal substance, is controlled 
by an idea with implications as to its predestination in eternity.113 Isn’t the 
notion of substance just what Christian thought would embrace? 
i. The ‘substance-phenomenon schema’ deconstructed
Vollenhoven has two critical discussions of substance-phenomenon 
philosophy. The first is in Logos en Ratio, in the part where he discusses 
ancient philosophy (cf. 1926a: 8-11). Here he sees the rise of the notion 
of substance as idea. The gist of the matter is that the discovery of 
cognition in ancient philosophy is predicated on a limited, perceptual 
schema. Vollenhoven finds it to be inadequate. The Sophists, Socrates 
112   As described by Vollenhoven, Leibniz’s monads or ‘atoms’ “have a kernel . . . 
called ‘soul’; the body is the visible circumference or appearing, from which two forms, 
space and time, can be abstracted” (Vollenhoven 1926a: 41). Should one fail to notice 
an autobiographical undercurrent here, then the next sentence has added significance. 
“Not the sphere [of sphere sovereignty] with its laws is the point of departure here, but 
the animated [literally: “besouled”] individual substance.” The new point of departure of 
sphere sovereignty is integral to the intersection principle (cf. discussion below).
113   In connection with the human being one should not confuse the concrete and 
the metaphysical intuitions in the early Vollenhoven. The metaphysical intuition is an im-
mediate awareness of being or presence in its identity, while the concrete intuition is the 
awareness of experience, namely of being affected when affected (e.g. when remembering, 
the awareness that I remember). 
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and Plato are influential in its formation.
 The Sophists introduce the subject-object distinction, but they 
implement this in the context of the human being, who seeks to dominate 
the environment by means of logos (thought expressed in speech). This 
striving for control is looked on as an exclusive and privileged form of 
humanism, for the human being is the measure of all things.
 Socrates, in looking for a more objective ground of judgments, 
turns to defining concepts in terms of representations that are more 
‘general’ than those of normal perception, the latter being particular. The 
perceptual context induces the demand that the general and particular 
awareness on the part of the human subject be objectively secured 
in a similar distinction on the part of the (perceived) object in the 
environment. The feature of generality controls something in the object 
that is of ‘greater scope’ than the feature of particularity. Thus the former 
is correlated to a concept, the latter to representations of perception.
 Plato advances on Socrates’ work. He proceeds from a more 
anthropologically secured notion of the human subject. The human 
being has an inner and an outer reality. The outer is bodily, and through 
its sense-organs, perception takes place. The inner being is intellectual, 
where cognition, and hence concept formation, takes place. Now, because 
Plato also accepts the subject-object context of the human subject and its 
environment, with its emphasis on control, a primary difference on the 
side of the human being calls for a corresponding difference on the side 
of the object or environment. “This is then modelled on an anthropology, 
so that, as in a human being, there is an inner and an outer side; the 
outer is the appearing, which addressed the sense-organs, the inner is 
the essence, which is known by means of concepts” (op. cit., p. 10).114 
What Socrates termed ‘general’ is in Plato ‘essential’, and the former’s 
‘particular’ has in Plato become—Vollenhoven says “degraded to the 
rank of”—‘appearance’. We have in fact a glorification of the intelligible. 
Concepts are honoured as being “the key enabling one to unlock the 
114   One recognizes readily that Vollenhoven is referring to the image of the propor-
tions of the divided line in Plato’s Republic VI 509. There is first of all the difference in the 
human knowing and the reality known. In each, Plato draws a line and makes an analo-
gous division between perception and cognition in human knowing and the perceptual 
and the intelligible on the part of reality. For his discussion here, Vollenhoven does not 
need the further division Plato makes in each line segment. On the human side, percep-
tion is divided into imagining (eikasia) and belief (pistis), and cognition into thinking 
(dianoia) and intelligence/knowledge (noesis/episteme); on the side of reality, in analogous 
proportion, Plato has images, visible things, mathematical objects and forms/ideas. Cf. 
Plato 1977: 221-223. 
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secrets hidden behind the appearance”.115 In Platonism cognition “is 
exalted into a magic wand that forced the ‘inner side of nature’ to disclose 
its treasures” (op. cit., p. 11). This inner nature is the essence, which Plato 
calls ‘forms or ideas’.
 However much cognition is venerated in Platonism, it cannot be 
denied that cognition is looked upon as a kind of ‘higher perception’. One 
starts with things in their environment, as phenomena to be explained. 
Essences, as ‘higher objects’, retain a link with the perceived objects in 
that the latter are taken to be exemplifications of the higher objects. This 
enables the higher objects (as forms or ideas) to operate as the controlling 
principle of things, their ‘thing-law’. The mind enables the human being 
to conceive ideas, much as the sense-organs allow the human being to 
perceive the empirical things.
  Vollenhoven now takes distance from this view. He insists that 
perception and knowing/cognition are of different orders.116 Each 
involves the “whole human being” but in different ways, without the 
one being in the extension of the other (Vollenhoven 1926a: 37). When 
perceiving, “the soul is directed by the sense-organs towards the material 
that is within and outside of the body” giving rise to representations 
(data). Representations evidence that something is ‘known about’ the 
perceived object in the human environment. That is of value to science, 
as means of verification. But this is not a knowing that implicates truth; 
it is psychological (op. cit.: 11). In perception the duality of subject 
and object suffices, but for cognition one needs the threesome: subject, 
object and truth.117 We readily see that this separation of perception 
115   Ibid. The (classical, Platonic) low ranking of knowing (as a knowing about, as 
belief ) over against the exalted position of concepts is continued in modern philosophy 
via Descartes. In a letter to Marin Mersenne (27 May 1630), Descartes states that one 
can know without comprehending. “[I]t is possible to know that God is infinite and all-
powerful although our soul, being finite, cannot comprehend or conceive Him. . . . To 
comprehend something is to embrace it in one’s thought; to know something it is suf-
ficient to touch it with one’s thought” (Descartes 1970: 15). This tradition is behind the 
use of ‘adequate concept’, as the aim of progressing towards the complete knowledge 
(comprehension) of the idea.
116   Vollenhoven 1926d: 178: “Knowing is something other than perceiving. On 
both terrains, one deals with at least two subjects [i.e. agent and object] that stand in a 
relationship. The nature of the relationship is determined by the terrain. The relation of 
knowing is a different one from that of perceiving.” Also: “Concept and representation 
differ toto caelo. . . . [T]he human being who perceives [i.e. represents] creates the more or 
less, individually different, free reproduction of a perceived figure; whereas understanding 
[i.e. forming a concept] is bringing together a form [logical schema] and a content [state 
of affairs]. . .” (1926a: 9).
117   The full quotation is: “For indeed the whole human being is active, both when 
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and cognition undercuts Vollenhoven’s former view of knowledge by 
acquaintance. That too is a perceptual procedure. But it was taken as 
involving a synthesis of subject and object, whereby the knowing subject 
processes and works over the data, yielding truth. Such a synthesis, so we 
found, is now rejected by Vollenhoven, and this has direct implications 
for the epistemic status of perception/acquaintance.118 
 The chief criticism levelled at the view of cognition being in the 
‘extension’ of perception is the confusion concerning cognition. As 
Vollenhoven has it, the kind of rapport that the “whole human being” 
has in the cognitive contact with reality has to do with truth. To that 
end one must grasp the being of what is conceived. In cognition, one 
is focussed on what is present to mind, resulting in an ‘assessments of 
existence’, that brings the modality of being to the fore. This is not itself 
any ‘higher object’, but it is a making explicit the basic characterization of 
what is conceived. But when the perceptual schema controls cognition, 
the relevance of discerning the mode of being threatens to be overlooked 
in favour of assuming that one is focussing on an (inner or higher) 
‘object’.119 In fact, such an object is the result of hypostatization. What 
should be taken as the awareness of modality becomes the awareness of 
an essence.
 Thus the substance-phenomenon schema is now unserviceable. The 
substance (essence) is a pseudo-object, while the phenomena are merely 
the appearances of things as perceived. The ‘substance’ that the phenomena 
‘reveal’ is just the concrete thing as bearer of the appearances. When it 
comes to truths about the thing, one needs to focus on its modalities 
of being, the law-spheres relevant to it.120 These are not controlled by 
knowing and when perceiving, but that is not to say that both of these activities lie in 
each other’s extension: when perceiving, the soul is directed by the sense-organs towards 
the material that is within and outside of the body, when knowing, it is directed towards 
truth. . .” (1926a: 37).
118   The representations of perception are said to act as ‘truth-marks’, analogous to 
the way a trademark is relevant for the product it marks. The distinction of perception 
and cognition is also important in connection with concept formation. Concepts do not 
derive from representation, but arise within the application of the relational ‘logical sche-
ma’. However, representations can be organized into a system that provides orientation 
for perception. Aristotle took abstract representations for concepts, which long “hindered 
insight in the essence of concept formation” (Vollenhoven 1926d: 149). 
119   Cf. the quote in footnote 116 above. Cf. also Vollenhoven 1926a: 9. 
120   Consider: “Indeed, in the human being the function[s] of perceiving and know-
ing go hand in hand. To these are correlated objects of perception and truths [respec-
tively]. But these two do not stand to each other as appearance and essence. The essence is 
a cosmic unity [= individual], and some truths, namely the metaphysical ones, are indeed 
truths about them. But there are many truths that don’t deal with essences but concern 
Philosophy in the Making
448
the thing’s essence, but they are governed by the laws/norms (modal 
injunctions) that hold for the modalities in question. In deconstructing 
this substance-phenomenon schema, Vollenhoven also rejects the subject-
object context it presupposes, as well as rejecting the kind of domination 
or control that is deemed suitable for that context. Ideas that control a 
thing’s appearances and development dominate in a different way from 
the way injunctions govern in connection with functions. Injunctions 
presuppose ‘room’ (the ontological difference) for response, something 
which is not entailed by ideas that control a thing.
ii. Contra the dualist anthropology
The second discussion of substance-phenomenon philosophy is an 
anthropological application in the lecture “The first questions of 
psychology” (Vollenhoven 1930b: 14-15). In this discussion, which is 
not geared to give a careful analysis but is more intent on sketching a 
trend of religious thought, Vollenhoven offers the mind-set, outside of 
the biblical tradition, that supports a dualistic anthropology.
 Vollenhoven proceeds from the assumption that there has always 
been some sense of a cosmic order. Human beings function in more 
complex ways than animals, and these in turn are more complex than 
plants. When placed in one context we have the view of a primal self-
contained unity, a substance, on which everything else depends and is 
thought to be appearance (op. cit.: 14). I believe we can interpret this as 
the common background of views that can subsequently be developed 
in monistic or dualistic ways. It will be pantheistic (monistic) when 
there is no definitive difference between the substantial unity and the 
appearances. But when difference is taken into account, we may have 
either partial theistic or partial cosmistic schemata (cf. section II.B. above 
for discussion of these terms).
 This common background suggests that God and cosmos are 
thought to be arranged in a vertical order. The expression made famous 
by Arthur Lovejoy, in his “The great chain of being”, readily comes to 
mind.121 Plato’s elevation of ideas and intelligence found a classical and 
elaborate application in Neoplatonism’s order of being. Augustine’s 
accommodation of this in a Christian context influenced Christian 
scholars to find this acceptable. The whole medieval period felt the pull of 
this accommodation. A scholastic notion of objective rationality resulted, 
their intersections, namely [truths] about essences to the extent that they lie in a distinct 
law-sphere” (Vollenhoven 1926a: 10).
121   Lovejoy 1960. 
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in which there are in God governing ideas of being that are realized in the 
order of the cosmos.
 Vollenhoven does not object to the acceptance of a (vertical) 
‘cosmic order’. Indeed, ever since 1926 (as we saw) this is the backbone 
of his work.122 What he objects to is taking the relation between God and 
the world as an application of the schema of substance and appearance. 
In that application, God is, as substance, the highest point of security, 
on which the cosmos depends, in the sense of its being phenomena or 
appearances (emanations) of this substance. This gives rise to a ‘centre-
periphery’ effect, inducing a scale of worth: whatever is closest to the 
centre is more ‘worthy’, in its having more intrinsic merit than what is 
farther away and inexorably deficient, “more ephemeral, a thicker cloak, 
more chance contingency, etc.” (1930b: 14). This can be made more 
definitive when an actual division is made, as in partial theism, between 
what is of positive value, as sharing in the (higher) Godhead, and what 
negative, disdained, being ‘lower’ or ‘peripheral’.
 This sort of a worldview finds a most ready application in 
anthropology. The mental-intellectual capacities of the human being, 
taken to be higher than those of the body, are brought in direct conjunction 
with the divine substance. In that way, substantial value is attributed 
to the higher functions of the human being, such as immortality, over 
against the dubious value of the lower functions (mortality).123 It is 
against this sort of a background that a dualist anthropology commends 
itself. “I know that those in our circle, who speak of the metaphysical 
substance in the human being, usually don’t mean to harm. But still this 
use of substantial thought is not so innocent. . . . It isn’t just [innocently] 
‘self-evident’, but it’s what [the apostle] Paul calls a really ‘natural’ [way 
of thought], . . . of not understanding the things that are of the Spirit of 
God. Hence it appears to me to be the first demand of Christian thought 
that we totally break with this substance-phenomenon philosophy” 
(1930b: 15; emphasis added). Vollenhoven concludes that a half-way 
view of ‘substantia incompleta’ does nothing to rectify this context of 
122   Cf. 1926a: 11, 36, 46, 49, 63.
123   Consider: “Religion is then . . . an unio substantialis [substantial union] or unio 
functionalis [functional union]. The way to please God is . . . to retreat from the so-called 
lesser contingencies on the periphery; [e.g.] one fasted—not out of love of neighbour 
nor from sorrow, in shame confessing . . . sins, but—from pride, seeking rest in thought. 
When not letting the sense organs function, and ignoring the consciousness of pain and 
representation, the provisional ideal is reached, for nothing remains to be distinguished 
. . . by the analytical function after having turned inward to the Self ” (Vollenhoven 
1930b: 14-15). 
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thought. It appeals to a higher functional or substantial bond with God. 
 The alternative to all this, according to Vollenhoven, is that of the 
biblical version. It now becomes clear that when he defends the dualism 
of God and cosmos, he does not mean to suggest a vertical arrangement. 
At issue is a difference-in-being. The religious understanding of this is 
religion as a unio foederalis, a federate union, instead of a functional 
or substantial one. God and humanity enter into a covenant in which 
humanity is accorded responsibility in its whole life and interaction with 
the cosmos, a total ‘walk with God’. Here the ‘centre-periphery’ model 
has no place, for there is no ‘part’ of life or of the human being that 
is intrinsically nearer to God over against other ‘parts’ that lie farther 
removed. Here there is no incentive to introduce a higher-lower split 
into the human being’s self-understanding nor in the human being’s life 
in the world. In other words, though there is a ‘vertical’ cosmic order, 
this order is based not on ‘worthiness’ but on a gradated complexity of 
law and function. Higher functions of subjection are more complex than 
lower ones. But each has a boundary, which is an instance of the pervasive 
boundary between God and the World.124 
c. Order and law
What, now, is the order of reality according to Vollenhoven? To start 
with, the basis of order lies in the order of laws. Correlate to this order 
is the analogous order of the law-spheres. Between the order of laws 
and the order of the law-spheres there is an ontological difference: the 
order of laws is grounded in the will of God, the order of the law-spheres 
delineates the cosmos. God’s being is being sovereign, as evidenced by 
the law-order; that of the cosmos is being subservient in the context of 
law-spheres. Vollenhoven denies that this correlated order is a rational 
order, an order that can be viewed as an objective model of rationality by 
the human being. “The difference between these functions [within law-
spheres] is not analytic in nature” (1930b: 17), for the analytical function 
is itself one within the order. Neither can any other function/law-sphere 
be the origin of the whole order.
 The law-order as boundary between God and the cosmos is an 
124   We add two remarks. (i) The difference between laws that are norms and those 
that are not norms does not define a ‘kink’ or ‘break’ in the cosmic order. This difference 
depends (as we saw) on the degree of consciousness that functions involve. (ii) In some 
work around 1930 Vollenhoven did use the term ‘substance’ to indicate the Godhead in 
its religious role of ‘secure ground’. But he did not mean to suggest that he looked on the 
cosmos as ‘appearance’. This use could confuse, thus it is fortunate that it was short-lived. 
Cf. Vollenhoven 1932d: 397-398.
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order by virtue of creation. In taking it to be an order, one assumes that 
differentiation is involved; at the same time it could not be an order 
without unity. We remarked earlier that in the late 1920s Vollenhoven 
took the unity of the cosmos to be aesthetic-like. I believe his motive 
was to avoid referring to some fixed characteristic; hence, the unity there 
is, is by way of the harmony or concord of the diversity involved. He 
does not mean to say that each law-sphere has an aesthetic qualification 
and warns, in any case, against confusing order and law. “For there is an 
order of laws, in the same way that there is an order of the functions [of 
subjection in law-spheres]. If one identifies order and law, then all kinds 
of confusion threatens” (Vollenhoven 1933a: 31). Vollenhoven lists three 
alternatives: either the one order is interpreted as entailing that there is 
only one ‘functional law’ (this would immediately invite antinomies); or 
the multiplicity of functional laws makes one conclude to a multiplicity 
of arrangements or orders, thereby losing sight of the order of laws; or 
one functional law is taken as determining the entire cosmic order, with 
the result that beyond the scope of this functional law there is no order.
 To seek a law for the law-order itself is in fact to deny the ultimate 
boundary character of the law-order. Important to Vollenhoven is what 
we can and cannot know of this order. In 1930 he expressed it as follows. 
Functions of subjection are grounded “in an act of creation of God. And 
because he has created everything and maintains it subject to his will, all 
things stand under his laws, in other words are ‘subject to God’. These 
laws are not hidden: they resort under the revealed part of the will of 
decision [wil des besluits]. Though they are knowable in that which is 
subject to them, they are not identical to our formulations of them and 
therefore are not ‘wavering’. More specifically, these laws are modally 
diverse, analogous to the functions that are subject to them” (Vollenhoven 
1930b: 17) 
 I believe that the long and the short of the problem of the 
‘metaphysics’ of the cosmos is given with the phrase “the revealed part 
of the will of decision”. The reference to the will of decision appeals (so 
I take it) to the divine Counsel that subjects everything to laws. But 
about that Counsel, only a part is revealed, namely that part that can be 
surmised by considering what is subject to these laws. In other words, 
here too the distinction of God, in his transcendence and immanence, is 
in effect. We can know the immanence of God through the maintaining 
effect, via law, to which created things are subject. These laws are modal 
laws, they are not ‘thing-laws’. In fact, maintenance through modal laws 
assumes that there are creatures that are subject to them, sustained in 
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their being by them. But creatures themselves come forth through the act 
of creation. This is totally beyond the human ken, for it is grounded in 
God’s transcendence. Creation as such belongs to the ‘hidden’ part of the 
will of decision. This hidden part is precisely that part of God’s Counsel 
in which the (platonic) ideas are thought to reside, the ideas that govern 
the order or set-up of anything creaturely. After 1923 Vollenhoven ceased 
appealing to such ideas.125 It makes no sense to appeal to something 
that is in point of principle hidden from human purview. Obviously, 
Vollenhoven’s very intuitional approach is readjusted. 
 Vollenhoven’s deletion of ideas is not just on account of a theological 
qualm about the degree to which the mind of God can be known. There 
is also the matter of the ‘metaphysical intuition’. In Vollenhoven’s former 
view, this intuition is the means of acquiring an immediate awareness of 
the identity of things. But this presupposed a substance-phenomenon 
schema, in which the principles of distinctive being are thought of in 
terms of an ideal schema governing the appearances of things. Ideas 
are controls of order and organization, i.e. ‘laws of individuality’. But 
Vollenhoven has come to understand the being of the cosmos to be a 
matter of subservience, of being sustained, law-bound, addressed to 
respond. The being of the cosmos is not a deterministic, predestining 
principle that includes all that will happen to the cosmos as a whole and 
to things in particular. The being is its being maintained and sustained by 
modal laws, allowing the future of the cosmos to be open.126 The intuition 
of this being is an awareness of the modal diversity of subjection to law, 
the foundation of the realist correlation to law. It is no longer fitting to 
call this a ‘metaphysical intuition’. The intuition in question involves the 
assessment of distinct modality. This means that the terms ‘(modal) law’ 
and ‘individual’ need to be accepted as primitive (in a cognitive sense). 
This is indeed the case, as our discussion of Vollenhoven’s cosmology will 
show. 
 Terms that are primitive in a systematic sense still call for 
125   The term ‘idea’ remained, in light of its Greek ancestry, metaphysically loaded for 
Vollenhoven in an objectionable sense. In a later context he states, in passing: “in Greek 
thought ideas are said to be true being” (1952k; Tol and Bril 1992: 86), which shows that 
the meaning of “idea” remained objectionable to him. Hence he boycotted the very use 
of the term. 
126   This should not be taken as a denial of predestination, which Vollenhoven cer-
tainly did not deny. But Vollenhoven’s understanding of predestination is predicated on 
‘God’s going along’ with the world and his interaction with it in terms of creation, revela-
tion and fulfilment. This is essential to redemptive history, a discussion of which is a fixed 
topic in Isagôgè Philosophiae from the start (in the versions of 1930 and 1931: §§81-94). 
Cf. the different versions in the text-critical edition, Vollenhoven 2010. 
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motivational discussion. One of the more prominent indicators of 
‘reckoning with Scripture’ is Vollenhoven’s statement: God created 
the cosmos and subjected it to his law.127 One should not overlook the 
duality of being created and standing in subjection. “For a law without 
something for which it holds is as meaningless as a subject without law.”128 
The created cosmos cannot be without law. But that does not mean that 
created things arise or unfold by means of ‘thing-laws’. The ontological 
difference between law(s) and creaturely function(s) prevents the order 
of the functions and, more generally, the order of the law-spheres of 
the cosmos, from being controlled by any ‘law of unfolding’ or ‘law of 
organization’. Were that the case, then one has not really taken distance 
from a metaphysical construction in the order of Platonic (thing-)ideas. 
d. Creationism?
Creation, and with it the cosmic order and the order of (modal) laws, is 
accorded a primary status. Is Vollenhoven then a creationist? Taking this 
in a philosophical sense, the answer is, I believe, “no”. For a creationist, 
the creation is the be-all and end-all of life. The future then has nothing 
new in store. The ‘fall’ (traditionally seen) brought about evil, which called 
for redemption and spirit guidance. In a creationist context, redemption 
and guidance constitute a return to the original intentions of creation.129 
Wouldn’t that introduce a new attempt for human, subjective striving to 
be in harmony with a (God-)given order? 
 Vollenhoven’s Trinitarian theist position opens to another view. 
Naturally (speaking theologically) everything starts with creation, and 
one need not (as indeed Vollenhoven never did) deny that God has a 
‘plan’ with the world. The divine ‘will of decision’ does not annihilate 
the ontological difference between the Creator and the world. It is 
that difference that welcomes further orientation, as offered by divine 
revelation, prior to any fall, so as to be more properly guided towards 
God-intended fulfilment. The appearance of evil intensifies revelation 
127   The wording varies somewhat at different places, but the thought remains con-
stant; cf. Vollenhoven 1926d: 190; 1926a: 7; 1931a: 186 [= 1931g: 392]; 1933a: 23, 24; 
2005d/e, 13B; also in later work, in Tol and Bril 1992: 55, 98, 104-105, 113-114, 123, 
138, 156, etc.
128   Vollenhoven 1953l: 104.
129   This I believe includes “the intuition that grace restores nature” said to be cen-
tral to Herman Bavinck. Cf. Veenhof 2006: 3. In a similar spirit Albert Wolters wrote 
Creation Regained. Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview (Wolters 2005). The title 
chosen for the Dutch translation, Schepping zonder grens (Creation without bounds) is 
even more telling.
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and guidance, but the ‘fall’ did not occasion the first appearance of 
redemption and guidance. Beside the ‘will of decision’ there is the ‘will 
of command’. Vollenhoven associates this will with the second Person, 
the most central command being the love command.130 And to clinch 
‘the good life’, there is the Spirit that motivates and calls to responsibility. 
The human being is a ‘tasked subject’. However much this comes to be 
marked by the fall, it is of prelapsarian vintage. Vollenhoven’s discussion 
of good and evil cannot be understood without such a context. 
 When taking the human condition as a whole, Vollenhoven’s 
understanding of ‘covenant religion’, as a ‘walk with God’, does not mean 
a return to creation, let alone a spiritualist kind of attempt to escape from 
creation; it assumes all along a concursus Dei, of God, in his immanence, 
going along with ‘his work’. Being aware of how prone these thoughts are 
to speculation, Vollenhoven kept a low profile. But he did once say, as to 
the present, that among possibilities God continually chooses one to be 
realized.131 Possibility evidences the present’s unpredictable openness to 
the future. To neglect this is to mistake the understanding of the creation 
in its openness of possibility and its aim of fulfilment. “What are the 
demands of a Calvinistic philosophy and a Calvinistic logic other than 
[being] consequences of the confession that the Spirit[!] lives and works 
in the world of his making?”132 
 The world of his making—what are its chief parameters and 
features? Vollenhoven’s cosmology follows up on the conditions that he 
has placed the cosmos under. We review this as a distinct topic. 
IV. the cosmologIcal ‘IntersectIon PrIncIPle’
In light of the rejection of a ‘substance-phenomenon’ metaphysics, it is 
fitting to ask what its alternative might be. What view of the cosmos does 
Vollenhoven now defend? We indicated above that two terms are given 
‘primitive status’: individual, i.e. distinct things, such as Aristotle called 
‘primary substances’, and law-sphere, i.e. a sphere of response to law that is 
130   This is the “wil des bevels” (will of command), which puts the ‘will of decision’ in 
a broader, or at least more practical context. For Christians do not seek rest in a particular 
function “but only in the functioning of everything, to the extent that this takes place 
out of love towards God, according to the will of command” (Vollenhoven 1930b: 18). 
The precise interplay between the love command and the creation order (of modal laws) 
is subject to some subtle shifts in step with Vollenhoven’s placing the moral antithesis of 
good and evil in a more central position, as of 1932; cf. section V.B. below. 
131   In Vollenhoven 1948p: 36, Vollenhoven states: “For the present implies diverse 
possibilities, from which God each time chooses one to become reality.” 
132   Vollenhoven 1942m: 2. 
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of distinct modality. In use, these terms never occur separately from each 
other. “[God] created cosmic unities [= individuals] in such a way that 
they are intersected by diverse law-spheres”.133 This view of intersection, 
often repeated in Logos en Ratio (1926a), is not given a name, but the 
thought of intersection is fundamental. In his Hoofdlijnen der Logica 
(1948p: 83) Vollenhoven repeats: “These fields of inquiry [= law-spheres 
in a scientific context] are modal intersections of reality, extending over 
the whole breadth of the cosmos and they have a universal character.” 
This intersection also plays a central role in Isagôgè Philosophiae, from 
the time of its first version in 1930. There he adds the thought that the 
order in which the topics of individuality and law-spheres are taken is 
“immaterial, for they never occur separately” (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 29). 
I believe it is legitimate to call this fundamental role of intersection, the 
‘intersection principle’, though Vollenhoven does not call it a principle.
 The intersection principle focuses, as the citation from Hoofdlijnen 
der Logica (1948p) indicates, on the contrast between individuality and 
universality (both taken in a broad sense). This is the main contrast 
within the cosmos, thus it belongs entirely on ‘one side’ of the ontological 
difference between law and what is subject to law, viz. the latter side. The 
order of law is, as ontological given, the backbone for the cosmological 
intersection principle. The order of the law-spheres are correlated to 
its order, and individuals, as things, are governed by the order of law 
through participation—which is what the intersection is—in the order 
of the law-spheres. The fact that Vollenhoven first spoke of “cosmic 
order” in connection with the law order—he intended to emphasize 
the correlation with the law-spheres—in no way cancels the ontological 
difference. But “intersection principle” is used entirely on the ‘cosmos 
side’ of the ontological difference.
 The intersection principle postulates that individuality and 
universality never occur separately. In order to catch the import of this 
“togetherness”, we need to expand on what these basic terms entail. Each 
is said to represent a determinant (bepaaldheid). Now a determinant is 
a configuration (to be specified immediately) that centres on states of 
affairs. Initially (in 1926a, 1926b, 1926d; cf. the earlier discussion in 
section III.B.3.f.) a state of affairs is taken to be logical content that 
answers to (or is organized by) the ‘logical schema’ of the unity of system, 
relation and moments. So long as the logical law-sphere is taken to be the 
133   Vollenhoven 1926a: 43; cf. also pp. 10, 13, 35, 39, 41, 42, 57. The term ‘cosmic 
unity’ occurs in the writings of the second half of the 1920s, but is soon replaced by ‘in-
dividual’. I shall use the latter term in the current discussion. 
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first law-sphere, its analogy occurs in every other law-sphere, by virtue of 
the logical law-sphere being in the substrate of every other sphere. In that 
way all content could be distinguished as to modality (system), essential 
connection (relation) and Gegenstände (moments). In other words, a 
state of affairs is a relational fact of two or more terms standing in some 
relation, itself of distinct modality. But soon Vollenhoven generalized 
this, viz. from a logical setting to a cosmological one. Wherever one is 
confronted with a difference (of terms) calling for a distinction, one can 
also inquire as to their connection (i.e. their relation). This is first stated 
explicitly in Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1931, but without any explanation.134 
When tracing its use, it is clear that this serves as the basic methodological 
stipulation that guides cosmological understanding. Thus, judging from 
Vollenhoven’s practice, a determinant is a configuration involving the 
schema of ‘difference and connection’.
 A determinant need not be limited to a basic cosmological use. 
Wherever there is difference and connection Vollenhoven speaks of a 
determinant. Thus there is the determinant consisting of the difference 
and connection between heaven and earth, and the moral determinant 
of good and evil, etc.135 But the determinants essential for cosmological 
analysis pertain particularly to individuality and universality. This says that 
there is diversity and connection within each category. The determinant 
of individuality concerns all the different individual things there are and 
the relationships in which they stand. The determinant of universality, in 
turn, concerns the diversity of law-spheres and the connections between 
them.136 In depicting these two determinants, Vollenhoven applies a 
spatial metaphor: the relationships between individual things is portrayed 
horizontally, while the connections between the law-spheres are indicated 
using vertical (upward or downward pointing) arrows in a law-sphere. So 
the intersection principle is not just the assumption of universality and 
134   The statement is retained in subsequent versions, but never with an added com-
ment. It reads: “In every case where two things are different, we can ask about the rela-
tionship between the two” (2005d/e, 10; 2010, 10). The term ‘thing’, that occurs here, 
needs to be taken very liberally, for its very first application, in the very next sentence, is 
in connection with the difference between philosophical and non-philosophical knowing: 
what their difference and their connection entail. 
135   2005d/e, 19, 85 respectively; also 2010, 19, 85. 
136   Vollenhoven speaks of individual things as standing in “samenhangen”—liter-
ally: hanging together—and of law-spheres in “onderling verband”—mutual connection. 
I shall use “relationship” to translate “samenhang”, thereby diverging slightly from the 
translation of Isagôgè Philosophiae (2005d/e), where “interrelation” is used. The latter is 
somewhat cumbrous when translating “inter-individuele samenhang” and “intra-indivi-
duele samenhang”. 
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individuality never occurring separately. It has the more complex form of 
their determinants never occurring separately, each with a complexity of 
difference and connection.
 Cosmological inquiry (as in fact any scientific inquiry) needs to 
proceed methodically. When Vollenhoven first applied the relational 
schema in its logical context (the ‘logical schema’ of 1926), he applied 
this schema in either of two directions: resolution or composition. In the 
broader cosmological context, there is a similar application in two possible 
routes. When going in the direction of resolution one attempts to arrive 
at the point where a determinant resists further analysis, a point where 
the determinant is resolved into an abstract framework that is incapable 
of further analysis. The direction of composition “cloths the framework” 
(as it were), showing how the more complex situations are manifold 
complications of, and within, the determinant in question. Mindful of 
the cosmic context or cosmic boundary, and in line with what is said 
about cosmic being’s being knowable, the way of resolution does not lead 
to ideas in the mind of God but rather to the fundamentals (not being 
further analysable) of that which stands in subjection. Their surfacing 
in the way of resolution makes them appear distinctly. On the other 
hand, the way of composition is not an erecting of a human construction 
based on privileged representations. The way of composition makes it 
possible to see how specifications and additions can be introduced to the 
fundamentals, as revealed by analysis, in our coming to understand better 
the complex reality we live in. The links laid in the way of composition 
are not random steps, but laid in the interest of truth.
 For reasons of expediency, Vollenhoven invested much more effort 
in Isagôgè Philosophiae in discussing the way of composition than the way 
of resolution. The way of resolution is only given a scant indication. He 
mentions the cosmos as a whole and then refers to the kingdoms and 
species, ending with individual persons and things and their features.137 
For dearth of material we will have to follow suit in limiting our discussion 
to the way of composition.
 The way of composition begins where the two primary determinants 
are at their most abstract or elementary. (Vollenhoven dubs these the 
‘individual determinant’ and the ‘modal determinant’.) Because the 
intersection principle stipulates that neither can be seen as separate from 
the other, one might expect first a description of each, in the complexity 
of the difference and connection of each, and then a follow-up as to what 
is involved in their intersection. But that is not the sequence Vollenhoven 
137   Cf. 2010, 22. 
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follows. His discussion is much more circuitous. His strategy is (I) first 
to take the feature of difference in each of the two determinants and 
discuss these separately (Ia and Ib), followed by a discussion of their 
combination as differences (Ia+Ib). Then (II) the same is done with the 
feature of connection of the two determinants: first the separate discussion 
of relation (IIa) and modal connection (IIb), and then their occurring 
combined (IIa+IIb). This allows for the step-by-step introduction of 
cosmologically relevant notions.138
 A summary discussion of the notions that Vollenhoven introduces 
will have to suffice. The starting-point is, as we said, the beginning of the 
way of composition, where the ‘materials’ are most abstract or elementary. 
In fact, Vollenhoven lets it begin with the most elementary form of the 
intersection principle itself, in a ‘this-such’ combination. A ‘this’ is some 
distinct, referable feature understood to be (modally or characteristically) 
‘such’. A combination of this kind is a state of affairs. One might think 
of a specific ethical act, or a specific physical event, or a specific uneven 
number, or a specific economic windfall, etc. Each case is a ‘this’ or ‘that’ 
that is such and such. (One can represent this with a ‘+’-sign: the vertical 
bar stands for the ‘this’, the horizontal bar represents the ‘such’.)
 From this elementary beginning the two kinds of differences (I) 
can be introduced. First the ‘individual difference’ (Ia). This is achieved 
by keeping the modal characteristic of a state of affairs constant and 
to group with it other states of affairs of similar modality. E.g. to this 
physical event is grouped other physical events; to this economic windfall 
is placed other economic events, to a specific natural number is grouped 
other numbers. This ‘individual difference’ may be represented as 
                 {. . ., +a,1, +a,2, +a,3, +a,4, . . .}
(whereby the scope is potentially infinite; the ‘a’ represents the chosen 
modality). All the ‘this’s’ of the same modal characteristic form the (scope 
of the) law-sphere of that modality. To warrant such a grouping in a law-
sphere, one needs to secure a law-sphere in what typifies the one modal 
grouping over against another grouping of different modality. This is 
secured by the law for such a law-sphere. The states of affairs of a law-
sphere answer to the modal characteristic for which the corresponding 
law holds.
 But the ‘modal difference’(Ib) can also be grouped. Events of 
138   The ensuing summary discussion is based on the following sections of Isagôgè 
Philosophiae (2005d/e or 2010): I: 30-49; Ia: 36-40; Ib: 30-35; Ia+Ib: 41-49; II: 50-84 ; 
IIa: 50-53; IIb: 54-66; IIa+IIb: 67-84. 
459
Embarking Within Bounds of Law: The Initial Definite Platform
different modality can also be combined if they ‘lodge’ within or occur 
in the ‘same individual’. The specific economic windfall can be together 
with an ethical act of pledging troth and having a physical accident, etc. 
if this all involves the same person. Not only persons but also animals, 
plants and specific things (mountain, river, chemical element, etc.) can 
be involved in a diversity of modally distinct states of affairs. We may 
represent this as:
 
   
   +g,1
   +f,1
   :
   + a,1
   
(The vertical scope of modal differentiation, is indicated by the two 
triangles and is finite; ‘1’ represents the individual.)
The grouping is a ‘coming together’ of modally different characterizations 
to which one is susceptible only when being that way. (An animal can be 
specifically aware—a dog recognizes his master—a stone cannot.) Thus 
the grouping brings together the features to which something can be 
subject. As a grouping it denotes a unity of subjection, the warrant of 
which is the individual said to bear these ‘qualities of subjection’.
 The two types of differences that are organized in law-spheres and 
unities of subjection can also be combined (Ia+Ib). Individual and law 
are the presupposed realities that warrant the groupings. The existence of 
an individual is, in an ultimate sense, by virtue of creation, and creation 
stands subject to law. In the course of an individual’s conforming to 
law, its specific quality of subjection can pass from one state of affairs to 
another within the law-sphere for which the law holds. Thus a unity of 
subjection always participates in the law-sphere in which its qualities of 
subjection are present. In this way a unity of subjection maintains itself 
in the law-spheres to which its qualities belong. This ‘maintaining itself ’ 
is a functioning, which itself attests to the combined presence of unity of 
subjection and law-sphere. Thus an individual’s subjection to law involves 
functioning within the scope of validity of law, and the individual is said 
to have ‘functions of subjection’.
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
+g,3
 {. . ., +f,1, +f,2, +f,3, +f,4, +f,5, . . .}
+e,3
:
+a,3

(A function at modal level ‘f ’ of an individual ‘3’, within the law-sphere 
of modality f.) 
 In this approach, the problem of substance and phenomenon, 
being that of hidden essence and public appearance respectively, has 
been thoroughly transformed. An individual is still a ‘substance’, 
the bearer of qualities. But the substance is not run (as it were) by a 
hidden motor (idea). Its dynamics is by virtue of being law-bound in 
its functioning. Its ‘essence’ is not a schema that holds the appearances 
together; rather, the ‘essence’ is the unity of subjection, which attests to 
the reality of being law-bound. It is the ‘externalism’ of the law-order, in 
its ontological difference with the cosmos, that undercuts the substance’s 
so-called “hidden working” from within and allows its being the bearer 
of properties (proper to it) as over against mere appearances.
 And then there are the features of connection (II) in each of the two 
cosmological determinants. Vollenhoven first mentions the feature of 
connection in the ‘individual determinant’ (IIa). This discussion is, from 
its first formulation in Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1930, very brief. But it 
concerns relations. Individual things, or even modally distinct ‘this’s’ and 
‘that’s’, can, and very often do, ‘hang or cling together’. (Vollenhoven’s 
term is “samenhang”.) If this is not to be a mere coincidence, one 
needs to assume the reality of relations. Relations can be of any modal 
level, for there are relations between numbers, between moving bodies, 
there are relations at a psychical level of influence, ethical relations, etc. 
The relations meant at this point are external relations (cf. chapter 2, 
section V.B.), the reality behind the ‘essential connections’, spoken of in 
the context of critical realism. Typical for these relations is that “terms 
become relata by virtue of the relation”, not the other way around, as in 
the case with relations monadically understood.139 A relationship is a case 
139   Vollenhoven does not state this as explicitly as I do. The quoted phrase is from 
Vollenhoven 1926d: 57, where the logical schema and states of affairs are discussed. Be-
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(a “samenhang”) of terms bound by a relation. Because the relation is 
itself of a distinct modal level, the relationship is too.
   [ +b,1  +b,2 ]
   [ +a,1  +a,2 ] 
(A relation between the individuals ‘1’ and ‘2’ is indicated with a bold 
line, at the modal levels ‘a’ and ‘b’; the relationship is the whole within 
square brackets.) 
 There are also features of connection in the modal determinant 
(IIb). The basic thought is that of connection between ‘modal levels’ (i.e. 
either between law-spheres or between the functions of subjection in an 
individual). What ‘relation’ is to relationships, the ‘natural order’ is to 
the connections to be described here. In an earlier discussion we made 
reference to the distinction between the substrate and the superstrate of 
a law-sphere. This distinction reflects a ‘natural order’ (what Vollenhoven 
called the ‘cosmic order’ in 1926), an order that arises by virtue of a 
primary ‘dependence’ of a law-sphere on one or more other law-spheres, 
whereby this/these other law-sphere(s) are presupposed by the law-sphere 
in question. The presupposed law-spheres are its substrate, those not 
presupposed its superstrate.
 Against the background of this given order, Vollenhoven points 
to evidences of this order in the occurrence of functioning. E.g. 
the life functions in an organism cannot take place without energy 
interaction (metabolism), transport of materials, spatial arrangements 
and quantitative balances. These are ‘retrocipations’ in the organic 
function and controlled by organic law, but they express, not directly but 
analogically, features of the life’s substrate functions. On the other hand, 
one can also make separate study of biochemical processes, as answering 
to physical-chemical laws, or separate study of the transport of materials 
and its complex mechanisms, or study the spatial shapes of proteins and 
the quantitative relations. In these cases, the studies are conducted at 
the physical, mechanical, spatial and numerical levels respectively, as 
belonging to these law-spheres and their respective regularities. But for 
these studies one needs to proceed from the overriding assumption that 
cause the current cosmological discussion proceeds from a generalization of this logical 
schema and states of affairs, the assertion of the externality of these relations is, I believe, 
justified. This is not to say that all relations are external; more monadic-like relations are 
referred to below.
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they ‘anticipate’ the life function or life context in order to be able to 
understand their very existence.
 So in general, when considering the actuality of a function—not 
just its existence as function of subjection, answering to modal law, but 
an effective or ‘subject(ing) function’—its operating can be visualized as 
passing through a series of states of affairs at the relevant modal level. 
Such functioning also depends on the presence of the substrate levels, 
said to be retrocipations. But this functioning will refer to superstrate 
levels, as anticipations, only on condition that what performs the 
functioning itself actually has a function at the anticipated level. E.g. the 
difference between animals and human beings as to the organic material 
each has is of essential importance for performing the more complex 
(higher) functions. In a human being this material is of more complex 
organization than is the case in animals. In human beings this supports 
the higher functions and behaviour a human being evinces (say speech, 
aesthetic appreciation, etc.) as over animal behaviour that lacks the higher 
functions.
        
       c  —  b — a —  +d,1 —
               b — a —  +c,1 — d
                    a —  +b,1 — d — c
                        —  +a,1 — d — c — b
             
(Note. The arrows pointing downward are retrocipations at a specific 
modal level, analogically referring to the modal levels below that level; 
the arrows pointing upward are anticipations at a specific modal level, 
analogically referring to the modal levels above that level. These analogical 
references are predicated on an individual ‘1’, subject to four functional 
levels: a, b, c, and d. The horizontal lines are not relations; they merely 
indicate the function level. Were one to place another individual ‘2’ 
beside individual ‘1’, then the basic relations would apply at the modal 
levels. There are also relations that reckon with the relevant anticipations 
or retrocipations. These relations are more like ‘monadic relations’, in 
being dependent on these anticipations and retrocipations as ‘predicates’ 
or particularizations of the terms.)140 
140   The fact that the anticipations (upward arrows) are on the right side of the indi-
vidual (between the triangles) and the retrocipations on the left side (downward arrows) 
is of no significance. Vollenhoven was in the habit of repeating the anticipations and the 
retrocipations, mirror-image, on both sides. This was to emphasize that these analogies 
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 In the first setup of Isagôgè Philosophiae (1930-1931), the above-
mentioned retrocipations and anticipations are the only indications of 
connection within the modal determinant. From 1931 on, Vollenhoven 
included the account of ‘object functions’ which, in the first setup, was 
discussed in the subsequent topic of the combination of the two kinds 
of connection. The later account puts the emphasis on the ‘inter-modal’ 
meaning of an object function. E.g. gold, being a physical metal, does 
not itself have an ethical function. But it can be made to serve an ethical 
end when, in the shape of a ring, it is used to certify wedding vows. 
The metal ring then has an ethical ‘object function’. Thus, things, plants 
and animals can have relevance at modal levels where they do not of 
themselves have qualities of subjection. 
 In Vollenhoven’s first account of object functions, the emphasis is 
more on the relational facet (e.g. the relationship between wedded pair 
and the ring). This fit the topic of the combination of the two kinds of 
connections of the individual and modal determinants (IIa+IIb). This 
topic was still in flux in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and we need 
not review its development here. The main point of the combination 
of the two kinds of connection is two-pronged. In the first place, the 
introduction of retrocipations and anticipations serves to pull a unity 
of subjection together (as it were). Its qualities of subjection are, 
when actually functioning, interconnected (as analogies of being). In 
other words, a unity of subjection is in fact ‘structured throughout’ 
(doorgestructureerd). This opens the door to the treatment of ‘individuals’, 
now as concrete things and persons, in all their complexity. Secondly, 
the relationships between things and persons can now also be more 
properly respected in their complexity and nuance. In this connection 
Vollenhoven introduces distinctions between inter- and intra-individual 
relationships, between inner and outer relationships, between successive 
and simultaneous relationships, etc. These are all predicated on the basic 
(external) relations, but now, additionally, taking into account qualities 
of the individuals concerned. 
 This completes the review of the intersection principle, which 
governs the intersection of the modal and the individual determinants. 
Taken from its most primitive point, namely the starting point of the way 
of composition, this starting point presupposes the reality indicated by 
four terms: (modal) law, individual, (modal) relation and natural order.141 
concern structure, which remains the same, whether on the right side—indicative of the 
morally good direction—or the left—the morally evil direction. 
141   It is tempting to call these terms ‘transcendentals’, though Vollenhoven does not 
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(i) Law warrants the grouping of states of affairs of similar modality, taken 
together in one law-sphere. (ii) The individual warrants the grouping of 
states of affairs in a unity of subjection, when the qualities of subjection 
involved are borne by a specific individual. A function of subjection attests 
to the combined presence of a law-sphere and a unity of subjection. 
(iii) The reality of relations is the ground for relationships, of whatever 
modal level, between states of affairs and, in their extension, between 
individuals. (iv) The natural order, indicated by substrate and superstrate 
functions of subjection/law-spheres, is the basis for the analogies of being 
(retrocipations and anticipations) between functions of subjection or 
law-spheres. When taking relations and the analogies together, a complex 
relational network results.
 The effect of the intersection principle begins (in the order of 
composition) from its simplest exemplification with the two cosmic 
determinants, namely in states of affairs: (distinct) ‘this’s’ and ‘that’s’ which 
are (modally) thus or so. The full intersection of the two determinants 
(at the opposite end of the simplest exemplification) involves the 
conjunction of functions of subjection operative within a relational network. 
Taken together, the above summary presentation presents Vollenhoven’s 
schematic model of the framework of our complex world, offered to 
enable us to help analyse and understand it better.142 
 A point of detail that is found only in Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1930 
(1930d, §§64-69) is worthy of mention because it helps to explain a 
peculiarity in the theory of knowledge that is retained in all the later 
versions of the text, but without the explanation. It concerns the 
forerunner of the account of object functions. Vollenhoven applies two 
sets of terms: “potential and actual” and “latent and patent”. Two steps 
are required in accounting for an object (e.g. the golden wedding ring, 
mentioned above). First, something must be present that is suitable for 
becoming an object; secondly, someone must actually realize the object 
in question. The first step involves the assessment of suitability, which is 
the step from potential to actual. Gold is found to be suitable for a role 
between married couples by virtue of its lustre, endurance, economic 
value, etc.; but then this actualization of choice (of gold) must be 
transformed into an actual ring (meaningful object). In gold as (chosen) 
do so. As assumed or acknowledged realities, they are instrumental in the acceptance by 
thought of notions that defy analysis, namely “law-sphere’, ‘unity of subjection’, ‘relation-
ship’ and ‘analogy’ respectively. 
142   It is of some interest to compare this schematic model with the one sketched and 
discussed by Hendrik Hart, himself a former student of Vollenhoven, in Hart 1984. A 
certain kinship of approach and in the content is evident. 
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material, the ring is only latent; it becomes patent when made concrete 
(what Vollenhoven calls “the cancellation of latency”). Meaningful 
objects of the sort here meant are not just culture-bound. They occur 
in nature too. A bird selects twigs (actualization), which it uses to build 
a nest (cancellation of latency). A wall gives protection from the north 
wind (actualizing protective surroundings) enabling plants to grow more 
abundantly (op. cit., §67).
 Vollenhoven applies this to memory and perception as well (adding 
expectation in 1932). A human being doesn’t just remember or perceive. 
The attention needs to be triggered or set to focus on a past or present 
event. That means that, of all the events that could, potentially, be 
remembered by an agent, a particular event becomes the actual choice 
(potential to actual). Then, through the actual remembering, one recalls 
what that event involved, i.e. the latency of its content becomes patent 
content. The same holds for perception: a present event that can be 
perceived—this is perceivable—discloses, when actually perceived, its 
content patently. The choice that actualizes the remember-able and the 
perceivable (and later the expectable) places the event in a relation to 
the knowing subject, who subsequently ‘now remembers’, ‘now perceives’ 
and ‘now expects’ what the event involves.143
 The actual event remembered, perceived or expected may be 
dynamic or dull, weighty or of no consequence, etc., but in the relation 
to a knowing agent it is passive, a knowable event. Its being knowable 
is not, as such, the object function. An object function needs the active 
or actualizing initiative of the agent in connection with which anything 
fulfils an object function. Being knowable is prior to anything actual, 
whether as a subject(ing) function or an object function. The knowable 
is “noetically passive” (gnotisch-passief),144 i.e. is epistemically passive, a 
phrase that we found was relevant in connection with the ‘ubiquity of 
value’ in the cosmos (Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §124). Despite the 
brevity of the text about values (as mentioned earlier), the reference to 
value would appear to give epistemological relevance to ‘actualization’. 
Something needs to trigger or set the focus on an actual knowable event 
in the context of what is potentially knowable. A candidate could be value, 
realistically conceived. Values could then mediate, as already surmised, 
the difference between reality and content of consciousness, in that value 
is operative in that ‘selection process’ (or ‘assessment’; ibid.) to which 
143   Cf. 2005d/e [or 2010], 160B, 160C, 161D, 164C, 168C. 
144   Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 201; in 1930d/1931f, §140; both references in Vollen-
hoven 2010. 
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consciousness is subject. Value is the warranty for being’s being knowable. 
In that sense it is directly relevant in undergirding the view that knowing 
resorts under being.
V. reVIew of VollenhoVen’s InItIal defInItIVe Platform and new 
deVeloPments
In the early 1930s Vollenhoven ceased speaking openly of values. This 
was simultaneous with his ceasing to characterise the cosmos in aesthetic 
terms and the Creator in the metaphor of an artisan. Also he revised his 
account of knowledge and objectification. More important, there is the 
appearance of the moral antithesis of good and evil coming more into the 
foreground than had been the case so far. This new emphasis on good and 
evil has everything to do with the new discussion of the human being, 
as soul and body, but now in the terminology of “direction determining 
centre” and “direction determined periphery.”145 We shall now attempt to 
give a unifying sketch of Vollenhoven’s initial definitive platform, despite 
the fragmentary character of the sources, and then discuss its two most 
important developments: anthropology and the overcoming of dualism. 
A. Cosmic life and knowing
Vollenhoven once defined ‘cosmos’ as “created reality and hence the 
reality dependent on God’s will” (Vollenhoven 1926d: 56). He then 
immediately mentions a primary distinction within the cosmos. All reality 
is real (realiteit), but only a part of reality is factual as well (werkelijkheid). 
Factual reality is “that part of the cosmos that is spatio-temporal in nature 
and acts upon our organism as environment, in other words [the part 
which constitutes] the humanistic reduction of reality” (ibid.). To non-
factual reality belongs, for example, (any) truth (op. cit.: 57).
 In this reference to factual reality one sees a development of what was 
initially described as the level of the “the psycho-physical organization” 
in Vollenhoven’s dissertation (cf. chapter 2). Sensibility absorbs sense-
data through the spatial and temporal forms of sensibility. The data 
themselves derive from the outer world, localized in the absolute context 
of space and time. This ‘realm of appearances’ has in the meantime made 
way for a view that focuses on the relational network that the human 
being shares with nature. Vollenhoven now also recognizes organic 
functioning as a non-reductive reality.146 In the work of 1926 he speaks of 
145   Vollenhoven 1932e, §64; also in 2010, 93. 
146   Vollenhoven had expressed a tendency towards attributing more independence 
to the biological world, than had been his wont, in the letter to A. Janse, 7 November 
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the environment of an organism, which he refers to as (following Hans 
Driesch) an organism’s ‘absolute medium’,147 a term that evinces the 
transformation of the earlier work.
 This absolute medium is the context of perception. The “whole 
human being” is active in perception, for “the soul is aimed at the 
content within and outside of the body by means of the sense-organs” 
(Vollenhoven 1926a: 37). Perception yields representations of things, 
gleaned in the subject-object relation of organism and environment. To 
the extent that this has epistemic relevance, it is a ‘knowing about’, but it 
does not appeal to an awareness of truth. (The ‘knowing about’ was the 
former knowledge by acquaintance, which was thought to involve truth 
through the synthesis of subject and object. The latter is now rejected.) 
Truth is central when ‘knowing that’. Knowing, in the sense of ‘knowing 
that’ also takes place through the activity of “the whole human being”, 
but now the activity is “aimed at the truth” (ibid.), or “the grasping of 
truth-content” (1926a: 13-14).
 So we see how ‘the whole human being’, active in perception and 
knowing, matches the ‘whole cosmos’, in the reality of its ‘factual part’ 
and its ‘ideal part’. Again, as in Vollenhoven’s earlier position (cf. chapter 
2), there is at least an analogy between the Self and the World, provided 
we can interpret the expression “whole human being” as synonym for 
‘Self ’, and “cosmos” for ‘World’. Depicted schematically, we have: 
                    knowing (cognition)                     real / truth
Whole human             Cosmos 
      being                
                         psychic (perception)     factual / absolute medium
 While this analogy between the human being and the world 
reminds us of the earlier setup of ‘occasionalism’, Vollenhoven is now not 
simply repeating himself. In the human being the main distinction is no 
longer that between psycho-physical body and conscious mind. We had 
noted that the human being (or the Self ) was portrayed as a psychical 
creature: the psyche being a factor of the psycho-physical body, but also 
relevant for the immortal soul and its support of the mind. But in the 
1922; cf. chapter 3, section II.C. In his letter to Janse of 19 February 1924 he states that 
he is working on “the logical foundations of biology”. 
147   Cf. Vollenhoven 1926b: 394; 1926d: 54, 155, 193. It is in 1926a: 13 that he 
indicates that the phrase “the biotic absolute medium” comes from Hans Driesch. The 
term was soon dropped, but the meaning, insofar useable, is preserved in speaking of the 
environment as relational network. 
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current view, knowing is taken as common factor: perception provides 
the representation by which we ‘know about’ inner and outer reality, 
while cognition is focussed on grasping truth, in ‘knowing that’. In both 
cases there is an “activity of the soul”, a dynamic principle common to 
both, but with a difference: the “grasping [on the part of cognition] 
does not arise through perception” (ibid.), and “concept [of knowing] 
and representation [of perception] differ toto caelo” (Vollenhoven 1926a: 
9). If, in Vollenhoven’s earlier work, ‘psychical growth’ was taken to be 
of cardinal importance—you might say “the point of it all”—this now 
seems to be replaced by ‘coming to know’ and the quality of ‘rest’ that 
achieved knowing brings with it. The weight now placed on knowing, 
and the context in which this takes place (as indicated very roughly in 
the schema), gives this view a certain consonance with what Vollenhoven, 
in his later terminology of the problem-historical method, referred to as 
“ennoetism” (literally an ‘in-the-mind-ism’). We will discuss this more 
thoroughly in the addendum to this chapter.
 Now the cosmos too has diversity, but not as separate parts. 
Vollenhoven is clear in his terminology, namely that the entire cosmos 
has the reality (realiteit) of standing in subjection to God. But factual 
reality (werkelijkheid) is a subpart (onderdeel) of reality, being the reality 
that is essentially spatial and temporal. Thus reality is the encompassing 
category, of which factual reality is only a (sub)part (1926d: 56-57). 
An important feature of non-factual reality is truth. It is on a par with 
knowing that, which is important to Vollenhoven, for now “it is possible 
to secure knowing in the real” (op. cit.: 57). And the intersection principle 
ensures that the factual (as individual determinant) and the non-factual 
(as modal determinant) are always taken together.
 One may ask whether this contrast of the factual and the real 
remained in effect. In Vollenhoven theory of knowledge there is the 
peculiar but not properly explained two-step feature of first selecting 
a content for the mind and then asserting or affirming it (cf. the end 
of the section on the intersection principle). The first step is a ‘making 
now knowable’ (perceivable, remember-able, expectable). It is difficult to 
maintain that this is not a moment of perception that yields ‘noetically 
passive’ content for the mind. The mind’s subsequent affirmation 
underscores its truth. This view remained unchanged throughout the 
editions of Isagôgè Philosophiae.
 Now we can take the next step and consider the distinction between 
Self or ‘whole human being’ and World or ‘cosmos’. We portrayed this 
above as it occurs in Vollenhoven’s earlier thought, viz. side-by-side. 
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But then it was secured in what Vollenhoven at the time took to be a 
cardinal difference, i.e. between thought and being. The Self embodies 
the qualities and properties needed for thought, while the World is the 
context of cosmic being. In the meantime any independent status of the 
Self has been annulled in favour of the view of the Self as essentially that 
of a ‘tasked subject’. It stands subject to laws/norms that serve as cases of 
boundaries for the World. This says that the former difference between 
Self and World has essentially collapsed. The Self still has its part to play, 
but this is no longer taken to be executed on the basis of a solipsistic self-
conscious thought, predicated on the individual. The Self is ‘wedded to 
the World’ (as it were), in the sense that it is itself a creature that belongs 
to the cosmos as created. Vollenhoven has shifted in his thought towards 
a ‘holism’ or ‘universalism’. Four independent lines of consideration 
point in this direction.
 In the first place, there is the shift that is indicated by “knowing 
resorting under being”. This would appear to be the advance made about 
mid-1922. It at least says that knowing should not be taken as taking 
place in independence from the World. But it does not directly call for a 
dependent Self.
 Secondly, there is the evidence in connection with the critical 
apparatus that Vollenhoven developed in the second half of the 1920s, 
when he aimed to understand philosophical views as variants of theism 
or of cosmism. God and cosmos are taken in one arrangement, and the 
prime question is where the line of difference is drawn and what that 
difference entails. He expressed his own stance at the time in terms 
of the same question. But he eventually, certainly before 1941, found 
this approach to be dissatisfactory.148 He characterizes this approach as 
implementing a ‘whole-part schema’. In our discussion of this approach 
above (section II.B.2), one observes that there is no (direct) concern for 
a possible fundamental distinction between a ‘cosmos-in-the-small’ and 
a ‘cosmos-in-the-large’, despite the focus on the cosmos. If Vollenhoven’s 
earliest context still held sway, in which the thought-being polarity did 
find cosmic expression in the non-holistic distinction of microcosm and 
macrocosm, then he certainly would have reckoned with it when setting 
up his critical apparatus (of the forms of theism and of cosmism). Now an 
argument from silence is, of course, always somewhat tendentious. But 
148   Vollenhoven expresses his dissatisfaction with this approach in “Richtlijnen ter 
oriëntatie in de gangbare wijsbegeerte” (Orientating directives in connection with cur-
rent philosophy); 1941k: 65-66, footnote 2). The ‘whole-part’ qualification first occurs 
in comment 4, section 13 of Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1941, the revised version of that year. 
Cf. Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 13 or Vollenhoven 2010, 13. 
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his own (later) qualification, of ‘whole and part’ in this regard, breaks the 
silence. His own view of the late 1920s falls under the same qualification, 
which therefore indicates holism or universalism.
 Then thirdly, there is a statement of Vollenhoven in 1926 which, at 
face value, sounds extreme, but which, on consideration, fits the context 
of a universalism. “A human being is not only not an individual that is 
suddenly mature; he is not in any sense (in het geheel niet) an individual, 
but he has a historical place in the whole of humankind, which for many 
centuries is executing—regrettably continually with failures—its task 
viz. exercising the office of being subject” (1926b: 382). The individual 
is nothing outside of humankind, and that humanity as such stands in 
subjection. There is now no separate or distinct status of the individual 
in a cosmic sense.
 Finally, there is the epistemological evidence. The former 
distinction of Self and World served as the poles on which knowledge 
acquisition took place. The Self receives data from the World, which 
it assimilates in terms of its own structures (forms of sensibility and 
Gegenstände). Knowledge is a synthesis, first in the form of judgments, 
then, in a constructive sense, also in the form of concepts. But we found 
that Vollenhoven now clearly rejects this account of knowledge. The 
synthesis there is, involves representations, which are psychical. Hence 
the synthesis of representations is also psychical, put together and lacking 
in truth-value. Genuine knowledge is a systasis, i.e. a structure in which 
truth is grasped, as a ‘knowing that’. In that case, ‘coming to know’ does 
not proceed from an activity of the Self, but it takes place in the context 
of law-spheres, whereby the first concern is the intuitive discerning of 
modal qualification of the relevant truth (1926a: 14) . 
 I believe that the above evidence is sufficient to assert that 
Vollenhoven’s initial definitive position is committed to a universalism. 
Let us attempt to bring this ‘holism’ more sharply into focus. But we 
can state at once that, in its original understanding, it was short-lived. 
In 1932 Vollenhoven brought the human being more explicitly in 
the picture again, when he made the theme of ‘body and soul’ more 
pronounced. This did not eradicate the theme of the whole, but it did put 
it in a different light (as we will see). 
 How is ‘the whole’ initially characterized? The best way to discover 
this is to focus on the situation in which Self and World are together, 
which is the situation of knowledge.
 Vollenhoven’s paradigm of knowledge is indicated as ‘I know 
something’, which, translated into the idiom of a systasis, is ‘I have 
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knowledge about something’. Because ‘having’ knowledge comes down 
to ‘possessing truth’, and ‘I’ being a knowing Self, the paradigm statement 
becomes ‘Self possesses truth about something’. This is a tripartite 
schema of knower, truth and the knowable, with two relations: one of 
possessing—best described as ‘participating’—and one of representation. 
 Now truth is ‘in itself ’, in the sense that it is not dependent on 
the subject or knowing agent, nor is it dependent on language, nor the 
facts.149 (I believe we can say that for Vollenhoven truth, in the present 
context, is based on given connections which, when acknowledged (or 
seized) are true, as seized, of reality.) What calls for consideration are the 
knower and the knowable in connection with truth.
 In the situation of everyday knowledge, truth is conveyed as 
information or as a truth content . For any understanding of information 
to take place, the first prerequisite is that the knower intuits the modal 
characteristic of information conveyed. For the Self this means discerning 
the relevant modal quality of subjection and its modal law. Likewise, the 
something that is knowable—this need not be a simple object, but could 
be an event, or a situation, or itself a state of affairs, etc.—needs also to 
have the relevant qualification. Vollenhoven does not make this explicit, 
though it is clear that there needs to be a modal qualification of the same 
modality as that of the quality of subjection. The link that indicated the 
modal qualification of something of reality is, I believe, value. Here ‘value’ 
needs to be taken in the manner of our earlier discussion, namely the 
value that signals being’s being knowable. The ‘something’ is not merely 
part of a blanket being. Cosmic being displays diversity, so that one 
‘part’—a facet, moment, event, situation, occasion, etc.—can be picked 
out and be known. The take-off point of perception and memory is (as 
was said above) that that which is perceived or remembered is ‘picked 
out’ as being knowable.150
 The Self ‘bears’ its qualities of subjection, it does not freely form 
them from its own activity. In the same way, a ‘something’ ‘bears its 
value’, in the sense that it can be deemed relevant in a multiplicity of 
149   In 1926a: 51-52, Vollenhoven expresses rapport with Bolzano’s distinctions be-
tween independent propositions (Sätze an sich), independent truths (Wahrheiten an sich) 
and independent representations (Vorstellungen an sich). The truths-in-themselves are 
prior to, and independent of, language (propositions) and human thought (representa-
tions); cf. Bar-Hillel 1972.
150   I repeat that linking value to this actualization is not supported explicitly in Vol-
lenhoven’s text. But it helps to make sense of what Vollenhoven’s all too brief text in this 
connection fails to explain, while being in accordance with what he does say; cf. section 
III.B.3.c. above. 
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ways. This calls for a further level of account.
 Vollenhoven now turns to religious categories. The knowledge 
enterprise is taken to be part and parcel of fulfilling (as discussed earlier) 
the prophetic office.151 This ‘office’ is relevant not just for an individual 
knowledge seeker. It includes the knowledge seeker, and, with him or 
her, the cosmos in the sense of that about which knowledge is sought. 
In speaking of office here, Vollenhoven means to point to a ‘post’, with a 
‘task’ or obligation to be met. It is communal in involving all humankind, 
but it is not a ‘community-idea’, as if it guarantees the possibility of 
achieving shared knowledge. It is more like the call that awakes the 
knowledge interest, making one receptive to the ‘noetic’ value of being’s 
being knowable.
 In speaking of office or task, Vollenhoven is at the point where 
the Self stands subject to the law. The Self is at the boundary, and it is 
at the boundary that religious categories hold. Here we find the final 
characterization of ‘the whole’.152 Vollenhoven speaks of “the religious” at 
this point.153 It is where the concreteness of cosmic life becomes definitive, 
over against the abstract framework of where cosmology began. We have 
found that Vollenhoven had spoken of the aesthetic characterization of 
the whole, underlying the use of ‘cosmos’. But that does not go beyond 
a general or abstract characterization. When speaking of office, its 
fulfilment can be none other than concrete. And that fits the knowledge 
enterprise. Human beings come to particular truths, and each individual 
knower invests his or her own measure of interest of acquiring knowledge 
in line with the possibilities offered by the context towards acquiring 
knowledge.
 Religion is not merely about having a belief about God. For 
Vollenhoven, religion is much more encompassing. It is about fundamental 
life-attitudes, about taking a stance in the face of the exigencies of life. 
Here the ‘standing in subjection’ of an office is understood to involve 
a position of responsibility. The category of ‘the religious’ links the 
anthropology of responsibility to the divinity from whom responsibility 
151   There are also the priestly and the kingly offices. The three offices are relevant for 
anthropology, but only the prophetic office is directly relevant for epistemology. 
152   The cosmos, being knowable through the mediation of values, also has religious 
relevance for Vollenhoven. For (as quoted in an earlier context) “value can be adequately 
seen only when taken as anchored in the Logos” (Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §124; also 
2010, Appendix I). 
153   Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §71; 2010, Appendix I. He admits the expression to 
be vague, which is probably why, or at least part of the reason why, it was written out of 
later versions of Isagôgè Philosophiae. 
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derives. In that sense, concrete existence reflects divinity. Ideally, the 
image of the triune God reflected in the human being is also threesome. 
“The human being, being created with all his functions by the living God 
out of the earth, addressed by him and guided, is in this triune structure 
of created, addressed and guided, the subject on the side of that which is 
subject, the correlate of the triune God.”154 So we find that Vollenhoven 
continues to have a theistic understanding of the characterization of the 
whole of reality. The three cases of God’s immanence, where the divine 
will expresses laws, commands and directives, provide the ‘points of 
contact’ with cosmic life.155 
 But Vollenhoven must have sensed that this formulation was not 
entirely satisfactory. For he speaks of the structure of the human being 
at the very point where the concern is that of direction, i.e. response to 
norms, commands and directives. It does not help to encourage taking 
the right direction by only emphasizing that there is the capacity of 
choice. In the next version of Isagôgè Philosophiae (1932) there is progress 
in terms of a renewed anthropology.
B. Renewed anthropology
Of the numerous changes Vollenhoven introduced into the text of Isagôgè 
Philosophiae in 1932, a significant one was no doubt that concerning 
the human being. With this change came an increased emphasis on the 
theme of the ‘moral’ antithesis of good and evil, a theme that is directly 
relevant to the distinction between structure and direction.
 In the work of 1926 Vollenhoven appears to use the word ‘soul’ as 
synonym for ‘the whole human being’, that is, when the whole human 
being is active, as in perception and in knowing (cf. Vollenhoven 1926a: 
37). In “The first questions of psychology” (1930b), the thought is 
repeated, with emphasis on its biblical use, where ‘soul’ is associated with 
the ‘breathing’ of animals and human beings,156 itself a metaphor for 
being concretely alive. In the Bible there is also a link, says Vollenhoven, 
between the soul and that which influences life, for good or evil (ibid). 
The latter is given more scope in Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1930-1931.
154   Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §79; also 2010, Appendix I. 
155   The understanding of the roles of the Persons of divinity is not the same as ini-
tially formulated in Vollenhoven’s dissertation (1918a). The change is discussed in III.B. 
above.
156   Op. cit. : 12-13. The discussion of this topic is in line with work of A. Janse. In 
the renewal that Vollenhoven introduces in 1932, he places more of his own stamp on the 
handling of this theme. For a recent discussion of Vollenhoven’s more considered view, cf. 
Van der Walt 2010a. 
Philosophy in the Making
474
 The context of the discussion in the first setup of Isagôgè Philosophiae 
is religious (or redemptive) history. The fall of humankind (in Adam and 
Eve) makes good and evil a reality or actual in human life. (Vollenhoven 
follows the text of Genesis explicitly; cf. 1930d/1931f, §§83-84). The 
reality of good and evil invites a systematic discussion of it, which 
Vollenhoven offers in four short sections (§§85-88). In the revised 
versions of 1932 and 1939 these sections are lifted out of the context of 
redemptive history and placed in a position adjacent to the discussion of 
cosmology (the intersection principle). The justification for this move is 
Vollenhoven’s revised view, that the antithesis of good and evil constitutes 
a determinant in its own right, a ‘third determinant’, in addition to 
the modal and the individual determinants. The content of these four 
sections, while undergoing expansion, is not essentially changed. What 
is changed is the anthropological consequence drawn from the change of 
the position of these sections.
 The essential point of the systematic discussion of good and evil is, 
from the start, to demonstrate that this antithetical relation does not fit 
into the cosmos, i.e. cannot be reduced to or is fundamentally different 
than the two primary determinants of the cosmos, individuality and 
modality. While each of these two determinants involves difference—
the ‘this-that’ difference between individuals and the modal differences 
between the law-spheres—nowhere can these differences legitimately 
offer a foothold to secure the difference of good and evil: of anything in 
the cosmos, never can we say that ‘this’ is exclusively good or evil, nor 
is this the case for any one mode of being subject. What also stands in 
the way of any merging of good and evil with these two determinants 
of the cosmos is that any difference with respect to these determinants 
can be ‘relativized’, for wherever there is a difference one can ask about 
the connection (2005d/e, 10). But good and evil cannot, and certainly 
should not, be connected or ‘relativized’. We all know that rationalizing 
our missteps doesn’t get us off the hook—which is why Vollenhoven 
speaks of an antithesis. The concepts of good and evil differ in their own 
right, but there is no connection that overrides this difference, hence in 
reality good and evil are antithetic.
 This means that this ‘third determinant’ cannot be integrated into 
the two cosmic determinants, despite its being listed as third. In other 
words, it does not itself ‘intersect’ with the other two determinants. 
This accords with the biblical evidence that the antithesis of good 
and evil  does not obtain by virtue of creation.157 Whatever its exact 
157   Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 85, or 2010, 85. One should not confuse this with the 
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‘origin’,158 good and evil became evident in human life owing to what is 
termed ‘the fall’. That is why Vollenhoven initially placed its discussion 
in the context of redemptive (covenant) history, and spoke of “religious 
direction”, good and evil being two different directions in human life, 
for or against God.159 But from 1932 on, the antithesis of good and 
evil is listed along with the other two determinants of creation. Why 
is that? I believe the answer is that, by appealing to this antithesis, 
Vollenhoven saw a way of introducing the distinction between body 
and soul, all the while staying clear of the dualistic substantialist view 
of a human being. (The prior religious context of the discussion of 
good and evil did not include this anthropological distinction.) But 
the distinction, as introduced in 1932, did induce a peculiar tension in 
Vollenhoven’s thought.
 One cannot of course merely juxtapose the antithesis of good and 
evil beside the cosmic determinants—this in itself constitutes a difference 
or contrast in its own right—without expecting a connection. The 
connection is not, as we said, an ‘intersecting’ of good and evil with 
the two cosmic determinants, but they need at least in some sense to be 
related. Vollenhoven now has the soul mediate the connection between 
the cosmic determinants and that of good and evil. Take the two cosmic 
determinants in turn. In the modal determinant, law and function (of 
subjection) never coalesce. In the ‘supra-psychical’ law-spheres the human 
being is aware of this ontological difference, which is why law is then 
said to be a norm. At this level the human being is able to consciously 
function or act contrary to the norm. Here a factor of direction, viz., 
that of compliance or defiance with respect to a (supra-psychical) norm, 
presents itself. In each of the law-spheres, from the analytical upwards, 
this possibility is present. But it can’t be that the compliance or defiance is 
itself merely a ‘modal phenomenon’, distinct in each of these law-spheres. 
After all, the same human being participates in all these law-spheres, and 
it is the human being who is held accountable. It is more likely that 
biblical indication of the creation being ‘good’, even ‘very good’, in the opening pericope 
of Genesis. The original Hebrew has ‘tov’, which means ‘in good order, pleasing, satisfy-
ing’. This is closer to ‘good’ as in ‘good versus bad’ than to ‘good’ as in ‘good versus evil’. 
E.A. Speiser, the translator and editor of the Genesis volume in the Anchor Bible series, 
Genesis, translates the divine expressions in chapter 1 (with slight variations) as: “And 
God was pleased with what he saw”; Speiser 1964: 3-5. 
158   Vollenhoven adduces the biblical evidence of a prior ‘fall in heaven’, whereby 
“the most important angels did not remain standing in the truth, that is to say, in the 
constancy, safety and faithfulness of God” (2005d/e, 21, or 2010, 21.) 
159   Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f, §88. 
Philosophy in the Making
476
an attitude in the person contributes towards inclining either way in the 
context of a law-sphere. This attitude is not peculiar or partial to any 
one particular function, hence it must already lodge in the human being 
‘prior’ to the specific expression of functioning in the face of a modal 
law. (In 1941 Vollenhoven referred to this as ‘pre-functional’, but the 
thought is present in 1932.) The seat of this attitude in the person is 
then the soul or hart.160 It is relevant for functional life, in the law-spheres 
being the channel for compliance or defiance, but it cannot be identified 
with anything in functional life, say, one specific function or a group 
of functions. The latter is contrary to the traditional view of the soul as 
mental/spiritual ‘substance’ controlling higher functional expression.161
 Now this soul is related to the body. This is specified in connection 
with the individual determinant. The soul or heart is localized in the 
individual human being. Now the functions of an individual being form 
a connected unity, which in itself does not encourage privileging one or 
more of these functions to act as seat for the soul. But what about the 
unity of subjection itself? This is ‘the body’ in the full sense of the word. 
(Vollenhoven includes all the supra-psychical functions in what he refers 
to as the body.) The body is structured throughout.162 But this holds for 
animals, plants and even ordinary things, though these have progressively 
less functions than the human being has.163 The unity of subjection is 
warranted by individuality, hence one speaks not only of this person, 
but also of this plant, this animal, etc. The cardinal difference between 
a human being and the non-human creatures is not just the latter’s lack 
of the higher functions—which should not occasion grouping these as 
‘soul’, for then we again ‘break’ the human body’s unity of subjection—
160   Vollenhoven 1932e, §63****; also 2010, 92. Vollenhoven uses synonymously 
the two pairs: “soul and body”, “heart and “function mantle”. The latter pair is suggested 
by the expression used by the apostle Paul, in 2 Corinthians 5: 1, where he speaks of the 
body as an “earthly tent”. 
161   Consider: “When in my work I speak of the dichotomy in an averse sense, then 
this always pertains to the dichotomy in the functionalistic-substantialistic sense as pro-
posed in pagan and humanistic philosophy. But I do myself maintain the dichotomy of 
soul and body. . . .” D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, letter 4 April 1939 to the Curators of the Free 
University. Website J.G. Friesen, www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Curators.
html.
162   In Isagôgè Philosophiae Vollenhoven uses the term “unbroken unity of subjec-
tion”, in later work he speaks of “doorgestructureerd”, i.e. ‘structured throughout’. Cf. 
1932e, §94***, or 2010, 139. For the second term, cf. the index to Tol and Bril 1992. 
163   Consider: “Although the structure of a human being, if we overlook the heart, 
corresponds, as was seen, with that of things in that it, too, is functional . . .” 2005d/e, 
92, or 2010, 92. 
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but (more importantly) the lack of any evidence that the non-human 
creatures can in any way be held accountable for their behaviour. There is 
no determination of choice in their ‘compliance or defiance’. They are too 
integrated in their surrounding world for that, though there are limited 
‘measures’ of freedom. But human beings are accountable for their doings 
(which is not to deny that there are dispositional factors to take into 
account). Thus the soul, as seat of the direction determining attitude, is 
‘something’ that is distinct from the body (as unity of subjection), but it 
does stand in an intrinsic (intra-individual) relationship to the (whole) 
body. Thus Vollenhoven calls the soul the ‘direction determining centre’ 
of the body,164 the functions of which, in consequence of the soul, are 
inclined in a direction either for good or evil.
 Now what determines the inclinations of the heart or soul in its 
pre-functional significance? We naturally think of a ‘law’ criterion. But 
this cannot be a law in the sense of a norm. Norms control the (higher) 
functions. Also, one may functionally act in accordance with norms, yet 
use this to cover over evil intentions of the heart. (Consider the discussion 
of knowledge and its ‘good or loving’ handling; cf. section III.B.3.b.) 
Commands, as we saw, give more pointed orientation as compared 
to norms. The prime command for Vollenhoven is the (biblical) love 
command. This is what serves as criterion for determining the good 
direction as over against the one evil (2005d/e, 114, or 2010, 114).
 But the status of the soul was never made completely clear. In line 
with A. Janse’s use, Vollenhoven refers to the soul as the ‘inward human 
being’ while the body is the ‘outward human being’.165 Inward and 
outward belong together, and in that sense they are part of the structure 
of the human being. Yet each is attuned to different impositions: the soul 
or inward man is subject to the love command, the body or outward 
man to the laws/norms of the cosmic order. Vollenhoven once called the 
soul our ‘centre of willing’.166 In that sense, the soul is sensitive to good 
164   In 1941 Vollenhoven dropped the terms “centre” and “periphery”, and spoke 
merely of “direction determining” and “in direction determined” (cf. 2010, 93). In 1939 
he also re-introduced the qualification “religious direction” (1939h, §63****; or 2010, 
92). Vollenhoven never favoured the term ‘moral’ (cf. op. cit. , 114). But if one agrees to 
distinguish this term from ‘ethical’, as in ‘ethical function’, and not presuppose an au-
tonomous practical reason, the term is, I believe, useful. After all, the antithesis of good 
and evil is moral, it’s the context and account given to it by Vollenhoven that calls for 
the predicate ‘religious’, as over against Kant’s account that turns it into an autonomous 
feature of practical reason. 
165   Cf. Vollenhoven 1952k: 78 ff., 86. The terms “inward man” and “outward man” 
also occur in the Pauline corpus; cf. Rom.7: 22; Eph. 3: 16; 2 Cor. 4: 16. 
166   He speaks of “centre of willing in the Scriptural sense”; letter to the Curators 
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and evil. But it is not a build-in teleology, for then the moral obligation 
loses its point, in confrontation with the (external) love command. It is 
a case of the correlation of law-as-command and subjection-as-direction-
determining that is sui generis.167 It is at death that the distinction 
between soul and body becomes an evident difference. The soul goes 
through death,168 it is the (functional) body that is annihilated when 
dying. However, this separated state is characteristic of death. When alive 
the soul is the heart from which the issues of (functional) life proceed. 
 Upon comparing Vollenhoven’s original 1918 view with the revised 
view, we find that, whereas formerly there was the Self, as higher synthesis 
of the two incomplete substances of (psycho-physical) body and (mental) 
soul, the term ‘soul’ is now used (as complete human being) in the position 
of the Self. Vollenhoven’s statement about dying calls for reinterpretation. 
In 1918 he stated: “Dying is the dissolution of a complete substance [viz. 
the Self ] on account of the soul’s organ becoming unserviceable” (25th 
statement appended to the dissertation, 1918a). The organ or instrument 
of the soul here is, as John Kok has pointed out, the body (Kok 1992: 
38). In itself this (so-called ‘scholastic’) view is rather remarkable. For 
the Self, which is said to dissolve on account of the body’s corruptibility, 
is (in Vollenhoven 1918a) the invariant principle that regulates the 
connection between body and soul. One might expect this to be the seat 
of personality, or whatever affects both body and mind together, yet this 
is what is said to dissolve when dying. In Vollenhoven’s revised view, 
which never went completely public, it is this seat of the whole human 
being that “goes through death” but is not annihilated. What is now 
taken to be dissolved at death is the coherence of ‘body and mind’, or 
of the Free University, 4 April 1939; cf. website J.G. Friesen: www.members.shaw.ca/
hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html . 
167   Vollenhoven did also illustrate the relation of body and soul as modelled on that 
of modal laws and the love command. E.g. in 1951h: 55-56, he states: “Thus, one readily 
notices, analogous to the difference between soul and body in connection with the hu-
man being—taken in the Scriptural sense of heart and function mantle—the difference 
between the principle intent [hoofdsom] and differentiation in connection with the law. 
The former summarizes the kernel of the law as the demand of love to God and to the 
fellow human being, whom he has placed beside us. However, this one law [of love] is dif-
ferentiated in a diversity of laws for functional life.” The two pairs: body/modal laws and 
soul/love command are clear enough. But it is how the former pair is a ‘differentiation’ of 
the latter pair (respectively) that remains in the dark. 
168   Cf. Vollenhoven 1933a: 44; also consider: “The continued existence of the soul 
after death is not in discussion for Calvinistic philosophy;” first proposition of the list of 
propositions written at the request of the Curators of the Free University (probable date 
19 March 1938; my translation). Website J.G. Friesen: www.members.shaw.ca/herman-
dooyeweerd/Curators.html . 
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what Vollenhoven came to call the entire “bodily structure of functions”, 
which includes ‘mental functions’.169
 Vollenhoven wishes to avoid speculation. And that severely restricts 
any ‘thorough’ treatment of this topic. If we resort to the routes of 
Vollenhoven’s method, then the ‘way of resolution’ (the way of analysis) 
calls for the distinction of soul and body, a distinction of inward centre 
of willing and outward functional-directional effect, a distinction that 
also requires us to recognize a peculiar relational, ‘intra-individual’ 
component. But when retreating on the way of composition (the way 
of synthesis), one does not merely ‘reassemble the parts’; there is also 
the recognition of a more concrete or existential reality that is ‘better 
understood’ as a whole on account of having distinguished the parts. 
In the light of that more concrete reality, the soul (the “inward” person) 
represents the ‘whole person’ (as is to be expected of an intra-individual 
relationship of soul and body), while the body (the “outward person”), 
when taken by itself, is merely an abstraction. For body without soul is 
not a concrete human reality. In that sense an anthropological analysis 
needs to presuppose, and cannot completely account for, the unique 
worth of the human person that each one is.
C. Dualism overcome
In his early years Vollenhoven used the term ‘dualism’ to portray a 
primary or essential contrast. This is how it occurred in his dissertation 
(as we found in chapter 2), where it referred to the duality of norm 
and fact and, in extension, God and the world. In his work of the late 
1920s there is the similar use, to again indicate the primary distinction 
between God and the world. The distinction is called upon in connection 
with the practice of philosophy, as helping to delineate philosophical 
methodology. It does not necessary imply an ontological dualism in the 
strict sense of the word. The methodological distinction could be based 
on a strict ontological dualism, but it can equally be the primary contrasts 
of a unity, as we found is the case in Vollenhoven’s dissertation.
 Now, when speaking of the practice of philosophy one can readily 
distinguish a constructive and a critical part. The constructive part 
concerns, in Vollenhoven’s phraseology, “the complex of statements 
expressive of the knowledge acquired in the human being’s striving to 
know” (Is.Ph.: 1). Vollenhoven restricts this to the cosmos, to what 
169   It is of interest to compare (noting similarities and differences) the above “scho-
lastic” view with Aristotle’s view of the instrumental body of the soul in the (re)interpreta-
tion of A.P. Bos; cf. Bos 1999. 
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is within human reach to inquire into. But the critical part concerns 
the discussion of philosophy’s “place and task” (Is.Ph.: 10, 14-17). If 
the constructive part is philosophy proper, then the critical part is 
meta-philosophical. In meta-philosophy there is the discussion of the 
presuppositions of philosophy, which serves to clarify the conditions 
that hold of the practice of philosophy. Philosophy and meta-philosophy 
should be carefully distinguished. Should this be neglected, two kinds of 
problems may arise. One might be tempted to treat a meta-philosophical 
factor as belonging to philosophy in the constructive sense. In that 
case one induces an element of dogmatism in philosophy. On the other 
hand, a philosophical construal might be deemed to represent reality so 
convincingly as to be raised to a condition of philosophy. This introduces 
speculation in the meta-philosophical understanding of philosophy.
 Nowhere does the problem between the meta-philosophical and 
the philosophical in Vollenhoven become more evident than in the 
first setup of Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1930-1931. Vollenhoven proceeds 
from the correlation—the “dualism”—of God and cosmos. Vollenhoven 
always accepted the existence of God and of the world, not on the basis of 
argument, but from out of his understanding of religion and worldview, 
as informed by biblical religion and the Reformed historical tradition. 
As such this is meta-philosophical, depending as it does on choices made 
within an understanding of the discourses of religion and worldview. 
But how does this meta-philosophical discourse affect philosophy in 
Vollenhoven’s initial definitive position? We need to consider this from 
the point of view of epistemology, ontology and cosmology.
 As to epistemology, an element of dogmatism is, I believe, 
initially evident. Vollenhoven would appear to maintain that the meta-
philosophical discourses justifies taking the existence of God and the 
World (cosmos, nature) as being realities that are knowable. The important 
factor is how the knowable comes to the attention of the knower. There 
are two “sources of knowledge” or “means of knowing”, according to 
Vollenhoven, viz. Scripture and Nature.170 Each source reveals the 
knowable—namely God and the World—in its own way. Therefore 
Vollenhoven organizes his epistemological discussion by first focussing 
on the knowledge of the cosmos, thereby appealing, in sequence to 
Nature (as source) and Scripture (as source). Then he turns to discussing 
170   In the revised version of Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1932 Vollenhoven replaces the 
term “source of knowledge” with “means of knowing”, this being part of a thorough 
overhaul of the whole epistemological discussion; cf. Vollenhoven 1932e, §118; or 2010, 
173. The two means of knowing God are written into the Belgic Confession, Article 2, viz. 
through nature or creation and Scripture; cf. Zwanepol 2004: 168. 
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the knowledge of God, by appealing (in the opposite order) to Scripture 
and Nature. 
 The crosswise treatment of the knowledge of God and the cosmos 
through Nature and Scripture turns this epistemological complex into 
one network. Where the source of Scripture is central, there the discussion 
is surely meta-philosophical; but where nature is central, the discussion 
is philosophical. In theory these are placed entirely on a par. But in the 
actual execution of the discussion there is a difference. The first category 
(knowledge of the cosmos by means of Nature) has priority of place in 
terms of the extent of its treatment (§§104-127). The discussion of the 
other three categories is much briefer (§§128-130; 132-134; 135-136 
respectively),171 to the point of hardly exceeding the format of outlines. 
The imbalance in the treatment might attest to a certain misgiving 
by Vollenhoven from the start. In any case, he thoroughly revised his 
whole epistemological discussion in the edition of 1932 which, apart 
from internal adjustment brought to bear in later versions, remained 
essentially intact. From that point, the discussion of knowledge focuses 
only on human knowledge concerning the cosmos, in both of its variants, 
everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge.172 This at least brings 
greater consistency in the execution of Vollenhoven’s own professed 
intentions.
 Beside the duality in sources of knowledge, there is also the 
dualism of God and cosmos. We found that Vollenhoven secures this 
ontologically in terms of the difference in the natures of each. God is an 
infinite being, who is sovereign; the cosmos is a finite creation that stands 
in subservience. The two are correlated through the ‘law as boundary’. 
This boundary is, as far as ontology is concerned, by default by virtue 
of the difference in their natures: infinite versus finite. This difference 
is law insofar as it expresses sovereign will and delineates creaturely 
subservience. 
 Here too one might wish for a clearer distinction of the philosophical 
and the meta-philosophical. When Vollenhoven maintains that the 
principle of the exclusion of antinomies in philosophy is the correlate 
171   The text, with the indicated sections, is in Vollenhoven 2010, Appendix I. 
172   The account of scientific knowledge—the treatment ought to be compared with 
Vollenhoven 1926d—is brief and incomplete. After 1932 the text underwent only su-
perficial changes. The setup is in two chapters: the first, on the special sciences, is a short 
account of (in the main) scientific method (Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 200-205); or 2010, 
200-205), the second only announces the topic of the general sciences, which would have 
to include philosophy. Vollenhoven deferred the discussion (cf. op. cit. , 206) to which, as 
it turned out, he never returned. 
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of the confession of God’s sovereignty, then we have a clear difference 
between the philosophical and the meta-philosophical. Also, when 
Vollenhoven is more forthright about the cases of ‘law as boundary’ for 
the distinct law-spheres, as over against an assertion about the unity of 
the cosmos, then he respects the limitations of philosophy. But when 
God’s infinity becomes a virtual synonym for God’s sovereignty, it is hard 
to avoid dogmatic and speculative moments, at least if these descriptions 
are taken to be philosophical. Philosophy has good reasons to adduce a 
notion of ‘source’ on which the world depends. But is that source to be 
understood as being sovereign through dominance (imposed will)? And 
its having an infinite essence, isn’t that a speculative suggestion adduced 
from the experience of finitude of our world?
 But Vollenhoven does maintain the difference between the 
philosophical and the meta-philosophical. Is he then at times confused, 
or must the reader apply the distinction more explicitly when interpreting 
Vollenhoven’s text? The latter is relevant when we remind ourselves that 
Vollenhoven introduced the ‘being of God’ in a way that has nothing in 
common with the being of the cosmos (cf. section II.B.1. above). The 
fact that this should not be read as an ontological dualism is attested to 
by the following quote from lecture notes (Vollenhoven 1927ms, section 
35), entitled “The archè as philosophical”:
God is sovereign. Hence he is not to be investigated by us, but [on the 
contrary] he investigates us. . . . That is why philosophy cannot concern 
itself with Him. We stand in connection with Him through religion, and 
only through it; a connection in the prime sense of God being its author 
and we its receivers, who are urged to reciprocate in love.
Does that not make philosophy a-theistic? On the contrary: it will serve 
God so long as it remains within the boundaries set by Him. And whoever 
serves can never negate the one who is served.
But then God and God’s relation to the created world can never become 
an object of philosophical inquiry. 
 In cosmology the same problem recurs. When Vollenhoven 
characterizes his standpoint concerning God and cosmos as ‘properly 
dualistic’, and finds the alternative dualisms maintaining a schema of 
God and the Cosmos in one vertical arrangement but with incorrectly 
placed boundary, then one follows suit by interpreting ‘proper dualism’ 
also vertically. But then the higher that one is in the cosmic order, the 
closer one is to God. But that occasions misunderstanding. Every law-
sphere of the cosmic order involves a case of ‘law as boundary’. There is 
no difference in proximity to God within the cosmos (cf. Vollenhoven 
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1930b: 14). In other words, the vertical schema should not be applied, 
though Vollenhoven’s terminology does not always avoid its connotation. 
 If Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1930-1931 attests to Vollenhoven’s 
“Scriptural dualism” at its boldest and, I might add, its most vulnerable 
and contestable, then the revision of the text did not at once affect the 
dualism, despite the changed conception of knowledge. The 1932 version 
incorporated other changes that are predicated on the same dualism. The 
most prominent change is the discussion of the antithesis of good and 
evil (cf. discussion above), and its anthropological relevance in terms of 
the characterization of the soul. Vollenhoven also brings this to bear in 
his discussion of religion.
 The section on religion has also undergone revision. He no longer 
speaks of “the religious”. He now defines religion as “the connection 
between God and humankind that is inclusive of the whole cosmic 
order” (Vollenhoven 1932e: §72; 2010, Appendix IIa). This expresses the 
covenant understanding of religion. Now the follow-up of this quoted 
passage is remarkable. It continues: (religion is the connection) “that 
not only points over and above the cosmos [boven den kosmos uitwijst], 
but it also enables us to see the cosmos as it is” (ibid; cf. also §18). In 
Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte (1933a) there is a 
similar description. There, speaking of the covenant relation as a relation 
between God, who does not belong to the cosmos, and the human being 
who does, it follows, says Vollenhoven, that this relation “does not lie 
within the cosmos, but, because the cosmos is taken up in this relation, it 
refers beyond it” (op. cit., pp. 40-41). This puts the reader in a quandary. 
Is this description meta-philosophical (as one would expect)? But if the 
cosmos refers beyond itself, that trait must be of relevance for philosophy, 
which investigates the cosmos. 
 The systematics of this ‘trans-cosmic’ relation is that it is a 
connection between God and the cosmos, the latter more particularly 
in and through humankind. Humankind belongs to the cosmos, but it 
is through humankind that there is a ‘referring beyond’ to God. On the 
other hand, God places himself in relation to the cosmos/humankind 
via the expression of his will, which is the law. The dualism of God and 
cosmos/humankind is ‘bridged’ (as it were), not through any ‘third 
factor’ that would warrant the link, but through a ‘meeting’ of the two. If 
the ‘referring beyond’ on the part of humankind is to enable the relation 
to be laid, it must be capable of answering in a positive sense to the 
law, as expressed will of God. The description of the human soul (as of 
1932) meets this demand. It being a ‘direction determining centre’, its 
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direction is determined in the face of the law of God. Thus it is through 
the soul that the ‘referring beyond’ takes place. The soul is not merely an 
existential condition, but also an ontological one: the condition of being 
referential.173 Taking into account the distinction of body and soul, one 
will readily see that the law that enters into this relationship between 
God and humankind is not modal law—at least not in a direct sense, 
for modal laws govern the functions of the body—but the central love 
command. 
 One cannot but think of Dooyeweerd in this connection, who 
in the meantime spoke of the supra-temporal heart and its position 
in a privileged Archimedean point. Vollenhoven I believe is trying to 
meet Dooyeweerd ‘half way’ as it were, at least to the extent that his 
own discourse allowed for this. However the characterizations ‘supra-
temporal’ and ‘Archimedean point’ are absent in Vollenhoven here, 
although the privileged viewing—seeing the cosmos “as it is”—on the 
part of the human being/soul, who stands in the covenant relation, does 
come through in Vollenhoven at this point.
 Vollenhoven’s revised view of religion at this point still fits his ‘biblical 
dualism’. But this revision itself turned out to be only provisional. In 
the Isagôgè Philosophiae version of 1939 Vollenhoven introduces, almost 
unawares, a change that will become more explicit through the further 
changes introduced in 1941. In 1939 the law is said to be knowable. The 
significance of this addition is easy to miss if one does not realize that 
this implies attributing to the law its own status of being. In the 1939 
text this is not made explicit, though some implications are drawn in 
connection with concepts and judgments. Also there is some discussion 
about the use of ‘boundary’, when speaking of the law as boundary.174 
173   In Vollenhoven 1963c: 186, Vollenhoven explicitly advises against using the 
term “referring beyond”, though for himself he had long rejected the term, it being “too 
ontological”. He prefers to speak of a Christian’s “reaching out”, which is existential and 
does more justice to the religious context of the term’s use. He explains: “the human being 
is more than all those other creatures, because he can respond to the revelation, and this 
responding on the part of the human being now is the same as the ‘reaching above’ all the 
other creatures.” 
174   This ‘boundary’ discussion is in Vollenhoven 2005d/e, 13; 2010, 13 (the 1939 
edition, 1939h, the section is §12), which is about God, the cosmos and the boundary 
between the two. Vollenhoven now adds three Comments (in 1939h these are numbered 
1, 2 and 3; in the revision of 1941 they are numbered 2, 3 and 5; cf. 2010, 13). These 
three remarks attempt to clarify, without actually addressing the status of the law. The first 
says that God is not separated from the cosmos through the law; he is both within and 
beyond the cosmos. In other words, this reaffirms Gods immanence and transcendence. 
Comment 3 emphasizes that the term ‘boundary’, as spatial metaphor, is not itself meant 
to be a boundary in a spatial sense. This too is not a new element. The last Comment (no. 
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The bigger change comes in the course of 1941. 
 Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1941 has new passages (e.g. on society) and 
revisions, particularly the discussion of religion. The phrase “referring 
beyond” is deleted, nor is there any mention of ‘privileged seeing’. But 
the most important change lies in four additional Comments to section 
13—numbered 1, 4, 6 and 7 (cf. 2005d/e or 2010)—about God, law 
and cosmos. 
 Taking the Comments 6 and 7 together, the first focuses directly on 
the mode of being of the law, which is said to be a “holding for”. The law 
is always distinct from that for which it holds, viz. the cosmos. This is of 
course clear from the start. But the reference to its own mode of being 
emphasizes that the law is now taken to be something distinct from God. 
(It is of course God who is said to posit it, but this is like the cosmos 
which, though said to be created by God, is still distinct from him.) 
God’s being is to ‘be sovereign’, the law’s being is to ‘hold for’, and that of 
the cosmos is to ‘be subject’. Comment 7 says that this ‘holding for’ is not 
a matter of human choice. E.g. normative laws remain valid, also when 
they are transgressed. 
 So law is taken to be a ‘domain’, a realm of being in its own right. 
Does this ‘realist emphasis’ of the law not constitute a regress towards neo-
Kantianism (of the Freiburg school)? In a superficial sense Vollenhoven 
is ‘in their vicinity’. If laws were taken to be objective values, then there 
would be a similarity. But the neo-Kantians held that values become 
empowered as norms—hence gain an authority of ‘holding for’—only 
through the evaluating subject. That takes validity to be a subjective 
feature; then value, in the status prior to gaining its validity, is merely 
a kind of intellectual objective concept. For Vollenhoven laws/norms 
are above the distinction of subject and object (cf. Comment 6). If value 
serves to make being knowable (cf. our discussion above), then laws—
these now claimed to be knowable—no doubt also have value, but that 
serves to recognize and acknowledge them, not to empower them with 
validity. So there is not really a rapprochement with neo-Kantianism.
 But what does it benefit to ‘add’ a distinct domain of being? We 
will see presently that it enables Vollenhoven to express a deeper sense of 
5), separates ‘difference’ and ‘boundary’. The term ‘law as boundary’, Vollenhoven now 
states, does not adequate touch on the whole difference between God and cosmos. Vol-
lenhoven does not explain, but he probably refers to the limitation to the creation, as over 
against revelation and fulfilment. Then he adds that ‘difference’, as relevant in contrasts 
such as Creator-creature, infinite-finite, etc., does not actually act as boundary. This last 
remark affects biblical dualism directly and adversely (as becomes clear in the 1941 edi-
tion). 
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the relevance of law for cosmic life. But its more immediate effect is to 
undercut the dualism of God and cosmos, as favoured by Vollenhoven up 
to this point, but without falling back into a monism which, superficially, 
might be thought to be the only alternative. 
 Comment 1 addresses this.175 This remark is important in that 
Vollenhoven takes distance from both a dualist understanding of the God-
cosmos relationship and a monistic one. In the dualist understanding 
the relationship is determined by relevant qualities of its terms. This is 
clear from Vollenhoven’s own prior dualism. The law, as ‘expressed will’ 
of God, is volitional, not ontological, and the cosmic/human side ‘stands 
in subjection’ through the soul. Law-consciousness—divine expression 
and human response—remains enclosed in a religious consciousness of 
difference. We add that, given the volitional characteristic of law, this 
consciousness could take on an authoritarian air, particularly when 
nothing modulates sovereignty and subservience. So when sovereignty 
and subjection are ‘defined’ merely by appealing to their difference, there 
is an ‘automatic’ dominance on the part of sovereignty, empowering the 
‘Thou shalt’. In the early Dooyeweerd there is evidence (as we saw) of an 
authoritarianism, which in his case was reinforced by his ‘intra-cosmic’ 
view of providence (cf. chapter 3, section III.F.5.a.). But in Vollenhoven, 
the cosmos is, from the start, more open, not merely intra-cosmic. 
He allows for ‘commands’ that offer orientation within the difference 
between the expressed divine law and the cosmos, particularly the love 
command that is answered to in the moral choice of good and evil. And 
there are the further directives that guide, though Vollenhoven is silent 
about this after 1931. 
 What the acknowledgement of the distinct being of the law directly 
affects is that it serves as warrant for the connection between God and 
cosmos/human being. There is still their difference, of course, but this 
difference is bridged not merely through the qualities of the terms, 
i.e. God’s being sovereign and the cosmos’ being subservient. The law 
175   The comment reads as follows: “This means [i.e. upon focussing on the relation-
ship between God and cosmos] that we reject the following: a. The attempt to understand 
the basic relationship between God and cosmos purely in terms of their similarity. This 
happens when God and cosmos are seen as manifestations of phases of a ‘being’ or ‘pro-
cess’: In this way, God as well as cosmos are subordinated, for example, as coincidentia 
oppositorum ([the coincidence of opposites] Nicholas of Cusa and Hegel), to something 
that stands above both and hence are coordinated with one another. b. The attempt to un-
derstand the basic relationship between God and cosmos purely in terms of their differ-
ence. This happens when people set God and cosmos over against each other as the divine 
and the non-divine and consequently call God das ganz Andere ([the “wholly Other”] K. 
Barth); in this way, the relationship becomes a contradictory one.” 
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mediates the connection. This is no longer adequately described as the 
boundary of difference, it is the basic bridge of the difference. The law 
that connects is indeed ‘posited’ by God. But at the same time, in order 
for the law to connect with the cosmos/human being, the law must 
actually serve to support and secure cosmic life. This makes any ‘referring 
beyond’ of the cosmos/human being, via the soul, redundant. For the 
law’s support and security is no longer primarily ‘for (or through) the 
soul’ but for the ‘whole human being’, body and soul. (Cf. the attestation 
of this in the next paragraph.) The law is posited by God so as to be in 
correlation with the cosmos.176 With this understanding of law, whatever 
authoritarian tone may continue to cling to ‘law’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘will’, 
and the like, it is now abated in favour of the law’s entailing the divine 
concern that life be good. Up to this point God and the world had been 
in correlation, in 1941 Vollenhoven emphasizes the correlation of the law 
and the world. 
 Vollenhoven did not immediately make this explicit in print. But in 
Vollenhoven 1951h: 55-56, there is the explicit statement (repeated here 
as relevant in the present context):
While it may be so that the law’s diversity is not as extensive as that of the 
cosmos, [diversity] is certainly not absent regarding the law. Thus, one 
readily notices, analogous to the difference between soul and body in con-
nection with the human being—taken in the Scriptural sense of heart and 
function mantle—the difference between the principle intent [hoofdsom] 
and differentiation in connection with the law. The former summarizes the 
kernel of the law as the demand of love to God and to the fellow human 
being, whom he has placed beside us. However, this one law [of love] is 
differentiated in a multiplicity of laws for functional life. 
The modal laws and the central love command together now reflect the 
176   A passage from Vollenhoven valedictory address, “Plato’s realisme”, quoted 
earlier, is apposite here. “Hence Calvinistic philosophy—contrary to Greek-Hellenistic 
thought and the synthesis thought dependent on it—sees the law as the boundary be-
tween God and the cosmos. Whereby at the same time the dualism, that is unaccept-
able for a Christian but still finding acceptance, of the correlation of God and world is 
replaced by the view which is neither dualistic nor monistic, of a law posed by God that 
is correlate with a world created by him.” Vollenhoven 1963a: 128; in Tol and Bril 1992: 
155-156. The qualification, expressed in the second sentence, is first put into effect in 
1941. I add, as formal comment, that a correlation would appear to involve a duality of 
two ‘things’, that nevertheless belong together without being ‘bonded’. When Vollen-
hoven spoke of the “Biblical dualism” of God and the world, this was taken as the most 
encompassing correlation, even if not explicitly express that way. The correlation of law 
and world assumes the acknowledged being of the law (something formerly wrapped up 
on the acknowledgement of God’s will), and it allows God to be more primary than both 
law and world, say a ground of being that sustains all. In any case the attention given to 
‘correlations’ is more pronounced in the later Vollenhoven. 
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schema of the bodily modal functions and the soul or heart, in a way that 
brings what is central and what is modal/functional more closely together 
than was formulated before. The term ‘differentiation’ remains vague 
here, but it does suggest that the concern of love is not divorced from 
the conditions of law that regulate the universe. Anthropology represents 
this, because the whole human being is co-terminus with the whole of 
cosmic life. 
 The threesome ‘God-law-cosmos’—Comment 1 continues—should 
not be interpreted monistically either. For then God and cosmos are 
both subsumed under some common feature (process, qualification) they 
share or that applies to each. If the law is taken to be such a common 
factor between God and the human being, then God is subservient to the 
law. In that guise the law would act as a factor of fate for both God and 
the human being.177 It is clear that Vollenhoven’s new view avoids this 
monistic alternative as well.
 Then there is also Comment 4. It has two parts. The first part 
expresses a criticism of realism, that is, realism when understood as the 
doctrine that maintains that the law also holds for God. This is a case 
of the point just made. But this comment’s criticism is also in line with 
Vollenhoven’s earlier work. Realism, in the sense meant, i.e. God being 
subservient to the law, is a version of partial (or pan-) cosmism, which 
was never an option for Vollenhoven. 
 The second part of this Comment expresses Vollenhoven’s rejection 
of “the attempt to understand the basic relation between God and 
cosmos as that between whole and part.” Vollenhoven states that this 
is consistently applied in pantheism and pancosmism, inconsistently 
applied in partial theism and partial cosmism. In other words, this second 
part of the Comment refers to the critical apparatus Vollenhoven had 
developed in the late 1920s. The rejection of the positions mentioned (of 
cosmisms and theisms) is in line with Vollenhoven’s earlier critical stance. 
One wonders whether this part of Comment 4 is merely meant to make 
the rejection explicit.
 In a footnote to an article of 1941 (the same year that Comment 
4 appears), Vollenhoven states that he “has abandoned” the attempt 
177   Viewed from the point of view of the logic of relations, the dualistic context in 
fact encourages a monadistic understanding of relations, whereby the relationship de-
pends upon the predicates of the terms. The revised view accords better with the external 
view of the relational element, a view that was already accepted for the primary relations 
within each law-sphere in the context of the intersection principle. Of course, the relation 
between God and the cosmos cannot be decided merely on the grounds of the formal 
understanding of what a relation is. 
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to characterize “non-scriptural conceptions” in terms of “the most 
encompassing relation, namely between God and cosmos”, and he then 
lists the options of the various theisms and cosmisms, in the way he had 
distinguished these.178 Naturally, the stated positions are still objected to. 
But his point is to clarify that he now prefers to characterize conceptions 
differently. He now takes the most pressing problem to be that of realism 
and nominalism. He takes realism as entailing the acceptance of the 
distinction between being and becoming, whereby being serves as the 
law of becoming, while nominalism denies emphasizing being at all (op. 
cit.: 67). We see at once that this approach to ‘non-scriptural philosophy’ 
directly reflects Vollenhoven’s own new emphasis on the being of the 
law. Vollenhoven’s abandoning of his former versions of ‘theisms’ and 
‘cosmisms’ in fact entails a rejection of his own ‘scriptural dualism’ to 
the extent that that dualism shares the framework of that approach, i.e. 
within the characterization (as Comment 4 now has it) of the God-cosmos 
relation as that of whole and part. The whole is indeed represented in that 
vague term (as first used by Vollenhoven), namely ‘the religious’, of which 
the cosmos is a part. The threesome, God-law-cosmos, whereby the law 
has its own being, now definitely supersedes that understanding.
 So the terms ‘God’, ‘law’ and ‘cosmos’, that together came to serve 
as a kind of logo to signify Vollenhoven’s position, in fact came into 
its own only from 1941 on. About at the same time—the early WWII 
years—Vollenhoven makes another switch in his approach to the study 
of the history of philosophy. The approach via the theme of realism and 
nominalism was in fact short-lived and in 1943 it is itself definitely 
abandoned.179 In Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1941 one finds a prescient 
clue, that will soon be picked up by Vollenhoven and developed into 
a full method.180 The conceptions, says Vollenhoven in this last public 
revision of Isagôgè Philosophiae, that one has reasons to oppose, should 
not simply be rejected. One must, on the contrary, make every attempt 
to understand such conceptions and thus also be clear as to why they 
are subject to criticism. However, Isagôgè Philosophiae is not the place 
for such discussions, he adds, for that text attempts to give a connected 
178   Vollenhoven 1941k: 65-66, footnote 2 (first instalment). 
179   Vollenhoven 1941k. This text was broken off after three instalments had ap-
peared. This series is an emended and expanded version of approximately the first half of 
Vollenhoven 1941j, a separately published, 162 page text with the same title. 
180   From the mid-1940s on, Vollenhoven published many articles related to the 
problem-historical method in the three media of the Association for Calvinistic Philoso-
phy: Philosophia Reformata, Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbeg-
eerte and Correspondentiebladen. 
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account of the position Vollenhoven himself deems worthy of defence. 
The critical discussion should be conducted “in the survey of the history 
of philosophy; for it is there that the different schools of thought are 
outlined within the framework of their basic thoughts and in the context of 
their historic period” (Vollenhoven 2010, 4; emphases added; the passage 
first appeared in 1941b.)
 This proposed critical discussion has two parameters: the framework 
of a school’s basic thoughts and the context of its historical period. These 
parameters become the ‘type’ and ‘current’ distinction respectively of 
Vollenhoven’s so-called “consequential problem-historical method”. 
Types focus on distinguishable cosmological schemata, which are often 
found to essentially recur in time in the history of philosophy. Each such 
schema reflects a conceptualization of the modal law-order/law-spheres. 
Currents on the other hand signal the main features of the subsequent 
ages in which philosophy is practiced, in which schools wax and wane or 
renew themselves. A current proceeds from a sense of urgency as to what 
needs to be thought, which problems call for solution. In other words, a 
current reflects the sense of being addressed in the practice of philosophy; 
what Christian thought would bring in relation to the love command. 
Currents occur uniquely, types recur repeatedly.181 The development of 
this method, and its application in outlining the main thoughts of the 
different schools in the history of philosophy, occupied Vollenhoven in 
the last three decades of his career, affecting everything that he wrote in 
his later years. Little can be fully appreciated of this ‘later Vollenhoven’ 
without an orientation in this problem-historical method.182
We have anticipated two of the more important changes—in anthropology 
and in the conception of the law—that Vollenhoven incorporated into his 
work, after he had formulated his initial definitive position. Our emphasis 
is on Vollenhoven’s part in the emergence of Reformed thought, not on 
his proposals in connection with its later (historical) consolidations. 
That later history needs at least a firm basis in the material that has been 
181   For an exploratory discussion of the problem-historical method, cf. Bril 2005. 
For a discussion of the method against the background of Vollenhoven’s systematic 
thought, cf. Tol 1993. For a discussion of the method’s application to Ancient philoso-
phy, cf. Tol 2007 
182   The schematic charts associated with this method, explanations of terminology, 
and very many useful observations related to the content of the history of philosophy 
are to be found in Vollenhoven 2000, thanks to the extensive editorial work of K.A. 
Bril. Vollenhoven’s articles, written for the Oosthoeks Encyclopedie, are predicated on the 
problem-historical method. They have been collected in Vollenhoven 2005c, with many 
comments added by the editor, Bril. 
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discussed so far. Having reviewed and analysed the main contours of this 
early work (apart from a reflection on the past reserved for an addendum) 
this would appear to be a suitable moment to break off the constructive 
part of our discussion.
VI. addendum. VollenhoVen’s retrosPectIVe account of the early years
In later years of his career, Vollenhoven occasionally looked back on his 
early work. He felt that there was something to learn from the past. He 
was aware of having come a long way from the intellectual position he 
defended in his dissertation. How does he formulate what he now sees 
of that earlier work? How does he assess its influence within the circle of 
his influence?
 There are four autobiographical passages in print, two of which 
were published/approved in his lifetime, the other two appeared 
posthumously. One (which he published) relates to the time when 
Reformed philosophy emerged, the other three occur in the context of 
the discussion of current problems, the most prominent of which is the 
problem of time.183 For Vollenhoven, part of that problem is how it came 
about that the numerical and the spatial law-spheres came to be seen as 
temporal, something he himself, in his later years, came to reject. He feels 
that his dissertation played a role here, in particular that it exercised an 
influence on Dooyeweerd in connection with the questions surrounding 
the understanding of number and time.
 We note in passing that there is no doubt in Vollenhoven’s 
mind about Dooyeweerd’s acquaintance with the dissertation. Thus 
Vollenhoven feels that he “too is to blame for the difficulties in this regard” 
(IV; 1968b: 202). It is while discussing this problem that he characterizes 
the philosophical conception he was partial to in his dissertation as being 
‘ennoetistic’. This characterization calls for discussion. (We met with this 
term above, in section V.A.) But we will first pause to look at an earlier 
183   The four sources are numbered I-IV + date to facilitate reference: 
(I; 1953p), i.e. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, “Divergentierapport I” (April/May 1953), in Tol 
and Bril 1992: 107-117. (This is a posthumous publication.) 
(II; 1953o), i.e. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, “Wijsbegeerte, Calvinistisch”, Oosthoek’s Encyclo-
pedie, 4th edition, volume 15, 1953; reprinted in Vollenhoven 2005c: 78-79. In the 5th 
edition the autobiographical passage in question is deleted in the article, now titled “Cal-
vinistische wijsbegeerte”; this version is also reprinted in op. cit. : 76-77. 
(III; 1963c), i.e. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, “Problemen rondom de tijd” (1963); first pub-
lished (posthumously) in Tol and Bril 1992, especially pp. 173-174.
(IV; 1968b), i.e. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, “Problemen van de tijd in onze kring” (1968), 
text approved by Vollenhoven; first published in Tol and Bril 1992, especially pp. 202-
203.
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statement about himself and Dooyeweerd, regarding the period when 
Reformed philosophy emerged, for this fits the timeframe of our study. 
Then we will discuss Vollenhoven’s characterization of his dissertation as 
remembered, and follow this up by a discussion of the possible influence 
of the dissertation on Dooyeweerd. We end by taking a closer look at 
‘ennoetism’ in Vollenhoven. 
A. The early years in a nutshell
The autobiographical passage in source II (1953o) reads as follows (my 
translation, with the numbering of the sentences added for purposes of 
reference):
(i) In connection with the mutual connection between intuition and 
thought, Vollenhoven, in his dissertation (1918), came close to the con-
ception of [Henri] Poincaré, who combined life philosophy with enno-
etism. (ii) This led, shortly afterwards, to undertaking a more focussed 
study of these two elements and the possibility of combining them with 
Calvinism, whereby the latter implied the ontic correlation of moral law 
and moral subject, that already [G.H.J.W.J.] Geesink had taken to be 
ethical. (iii) This was when Dooyeweerd too began to see the necessity of 
philosophical reflection. (iv) Both authors had a very searching contact. (v) 
In the following years the theory of knowledge was definitely subordinated 
to ontology, (vi) and Dooyeweerd demonstrated that the life- and world-
view is always rooted in a specific law-idea. (vii) In 1926 both authors 
were simultaneously appointed to chairs at the Vrije Universiteit. (viii) 
Shortly thereupon, the distinction was drawn in anthropology between 
religion and the function of faith, and, related to this, heart (soul) and 
function mantel (including the psychical function); (ix) also the theory of 
the aspects, of the retro- and anticipations, and that of subject and object 
functions were further elaborated. (x) In 1931 and following, some char-
acteristic publications appeared in short succession [by both Dooyeweerd 
(1931, 1935-36) and Vollenhoven (1932b, 1933a)].184
Re (i). Vollenhoven indicates the conception of Poincaré by naming its 
time current—life philosophy—and type—ennoetism. As to Poincaré’s 
time current, in listing (IV; 1968b) this is said to be pragmatism. In light 
of Poincaré’s conventionalism, I believe that ‘pragmatism’ is more suitable 
than ‘life philosophy’. But the characterization ‘life philosophy’ is better 
suitable to Vollenhoven himself at the time, when we take into account 
184   An edited version of this article is in the Vollenhoven archives, that was presum-
ably initially destined for the 5th edition, but the article was subsequently rewritten. 
In this edited version sentence (iv) reads: “As of 1921, these authors, both having now 
settled in The Hague, had a very searching contact.” Sentence (v) reads: “In the following 
years Vollenhoven learned to distinguish the psychical [function] from the soul, [and] the 
theory of knowledge was definitely subordinated to ontology.” Finally, in sentence (ix), 
there is added: “also the theory of the modal aspects, . . .”. 
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his stated dependence on Henri Bergson, who was definitely a proponent 
of life philosophy. (Vollenhoven gleaned the three forms of intuition, 
concrete, analytical and metaphysical, from a reading of his work; cf. 
Vollenhoven 1918a: 348-351). About the “mutual connection between 
intuition and thought”, I believe we may interpret this as “intuition 
and knowledge”. The intuition is based on intra-mental awareness, 
knowledge on the forms of sensibility. The term ‘thought’ applies, in the 
dissertation, to both intuition and knowledge, namely in representing 
the ‘subjective pole’ in the contrast between ‘thought and being’. Poincaré 
too distinguished intuition (the awareness of the mind’s power of being 
able to repeat unendingly whatever can once be repeated) and forms of 
sensibility (cf. chapter 2, section III.A. and III.B.). 
 Re (ii). This sentence is a teaser. First of all, the “elements” that came 
up for closer study must be intuition and thought, not life philosophy 
and ennoetism. This would appear to be the natural reading. Also, while 
‘life philosophy’ was a going term, ‘ennoetism’ (of Vollenhoven’s own later 
making) was nowhere in the vicinity at the time. This “more focussed 
study” refers, in all likelihood, to Vollenhoven’s study leave, from the 
end of May till the end of September, 1920, in Leipzig, to study under 
Felix Krüger. His theme was, as he explained in a letter to Krüger,185 “the 
relation of emotion and intellect in Bergson, tested genetically and socio-
psychologically”. He hoped to acquire results that would confirm that 
“neither intuition (emotional knowledge) nor intellect can do without 
the other, and [both] are in and of themselves abstractions of psychical 
occurrence [aus dem psychischen Geschehen].” The teaser is to know what 
Vollenhoven means when he mentions his attempt to combine intuition 
and thought with Calvinism. The letter to Krüger has nothing about 
this. It may be that Vollenhoven refers to a renewed sense of Calvinism, 
in which Geesink had a role at that time. Wilhelm Geesink (1854-1929), 
who is Vollenhoven’s mentor after the death of Jan Woltjer in 1917, did 
emphasize Calvinism’s moral implications. I know of no source that 
illuminates specifically what Vollenhoven has in mind here.186 
185   Letter to F. Krüger, 19 May 1920. For more about this trip and its disappointing 
results, cf. Stellingwerff 1992: 42-46.
186   There is a commemorative article by Vollenhoven on the occasion of Geesink’s 
retirement from the Free University in 1926, whom Vollenhoven succeeded. In it he 
mentions the distinction Geesink often applied, between general human morality and 
Christian morality. When this threatened to become a rigid principle of division Geesink 
switched, says Vollenhoven, somewhere around 1910, to “the distinction between norm, 
subject and activity, which fit the content far better.” Vollenhoven 1927a: 92. There is 
no evidence that Vollenhoven may have taken this distinction to heart at about the time 
that he is himself referring to, i.e. shortly after 1918. After all, he already worked with 
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 Re (iii). The mention of Dooyeweerd’s becoming interested in 
philosophical reflection presents a slight problem of timing. Vollenhoven’s 
“at this time” would appear to refer to the time of his own study leave 
(in 1920), and one then thinks of Dooyeweerd’s (only extant) letter 
to Vollenhoven, 17 December 1920. But in that letter Dooyeweerd 
is already actively involved in philosophy. Vollenhoven’s description 
(of Dooyeweerd’s becoming interested) applies more aptly to his later 
memory of a letter from Dooyeweerd in mid-1919 (cf. chapter 3, section 
III.B.), although this is stretching “at this time” somewhat.
 Re (iv). The contact that Vollenhoven refers to took place, according 
to the emended version (cf. footnote 184), when both Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven were in The Hague, which is as of May 1921. Vollenhoven 
noted elsewhere the fruitful contact between October 1921 and the fall 
of 1922 (cf. chapter 3, section III.B.). 
 Re (v). In the “following years” (in other words as of 1922) the 
theme of ‘knowing resorting under being’ is relevant. This accords with 
what we found in Dooyeweerd’s work of late 1922–early 1923 (“Cosmos 
en Logos”). This accords also with our own observation that the prior 
polarity of thought and being is still defended in Vollenhoven 1921c 
(which is dated July 1921). Vollenhoven’s memory, expressed in 1963, 
of having broached this resorting theme already during a Hardenbroek 
conference in 1919, is not consistent with what he states here.187 The 
emended version (cf. footnote 184) includes the remarkable admission 
about ‘learning to distinguish the psychical function from the soul’. This 
can hardly be other than a reference to the influence of Antheunis Janse. 
The learning experience began with Janse’s letters to Vollenhoven, late 
1922, and took effect after Vollenhoven’s breakdown, as Vollenhoven’s 
own memory here evidences (cf. chapter 3, section II.C.). 
 Re (vi). Dooyeweerd’s demonstrating that a life- and worldview 
is rooted in a law-idea is the development in Dooyeweerd that is first 
evident in the latter part of 1923 (cf. chapter 3, section III.F.). In this 
article Vollenhoven represents both Dooyeweerd and himself in this 
report of the emergence of Calvinistic philosophy. Thus his mention of 
‘law-idea’ should not be taken as implying that he himself at first agreed 
to this term. 
 Re (vii). The appointments to the chairs at the Free University in 
1926 need no comment.
the distinction of ‘norm and subject’ in his dissertation, applying this in logic and the 
humanities. 
187   Cf. chapter 2, footnote 153. 
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 Re (viii). The distinction between the faith function and religion is 
rather obvious in Dooyeweerd as of 1928, when he speaks of “the religious 
kernel of personality”, where previously he referred to the unique role 
of the faith function (cf. chapter 3, section III.F.5.c.). Given the (more 
or less) chronological sequence in Vollenhoven’s report, it would appear 
that he probably has Dooyeweerd in mind here. But in that case he 
short-changes himself. In his Logos en Ratio (1926a) the distinction is 
also evident, e.g. when he says that regeneration is presupposed by faith 
(op. cit.: 30) or “[t]he three offices [of priest, prophet and king] belong 
to the terrain of religion” (op. cit.: 32). The distinction he mentions 
next, between heart or soul and function mantle (i.e. the body and its 
functions), is certainly due to him, this being his typical wording. This 
distinction is first evident in Isagôgè Philosophiae of 1932.
 Re (ix). The mention of the theory of the modal aspects, of the modal 
retrocipations and anticipations and that of subject and object functions 
reflects the developments of the details of Calvinistic philosophy in the 
second half of the 1920s. These theories were being tested at the time 
before they took on a definitive form. 
 Re (x). By the early 1930s Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have found 
their metier, Vollenhoven with his Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie in de 
Wijsbegeerte (1933a) and Dooyeweerd with De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, 
three volumes (1935-1936). Dooyeweerd refers to the latter text in De 
Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer (1931) as a work that is evidently in 
an advanced stage (op. cit.: 3, 99, 125). 
The above autobiographical note of Vollenhoven, written in 1953, is the 
closest to the events and the history remembered of all the statements 
of memory. As thumbnail sketch it is essentially accurate in light of the 
evidence found to date. Why this statement was deleted for the 5th edition 
of the Oosthoeks Encyclopedie is difficult to say. Perhaps Vollenhoven felt 
that at least some of the details mentioned require more discussion to 
be illuminating. At the time there was no archival material generally 
available. It is certainly true that, without the backup of research, at least 
some of the points mentioned are difficult to appreciate in what they 
entail.
B. The dissertation as remembered
A point that deserves fuller discussion is Vollenhoven’s characterization 
of his early work as being ennoetistic. It is a term of Vollenhoven’s own 
making, it being the ‘type’-characterization of a philosophical conception. 
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Types are the general ‘schemata’ of ‘views as to the structure of the cosmos’ 
that find adherence throughout the history of western philosophy. But 
ennoetism is mentioned also with a view to a problem Vollenhoven raises, 
viz. that of a difference between himself and Dooyeweerd, in connection 
with which the name of Henri Poincaré occurs and also the correlation of 
number and time. In this section we focus on the characterization of the 
dissertation; in the next section Vollenhoven’s reference to Dooyeweerd 
will be discussed.
 We begin by selecting relevant passages from the sources listed 
above in footnote 183: 
Listing I; 1953p: 115: “In his dissertation Vollenhoven accepted, with 
Poincaré, that the succession of number is correlate to time. In this con-
nection Vollenhoven did not speak of time in space.” 
Listing II; 1953o: 78: “In connection with the mutual connection between 
intuition and thought, Vollenhoven, in his dissertation (1918), came close 
to the conception of [Henri] Poincaré, who combined life philosophy with 
ennoetism.” 
Listing III; 1963c: 174: “Where is time first introduced? In the arithmeti-
cal function, and through it (later) to all the [modal] functions. In Dooye-
weerd [time] is exclusively in the functions.” [The schematic portrayal of 
ennoetism occurring here in the text is repeated in listing IV.] 
Listing IV; 1968b: 202-203: “In my dissertation, which appeared in 1918 
(. . .), I was still too dependent on Henri Poincaré, an influential French 
philosopher at the time, who was an ennoetist. He was an adherent of 
Kant’s conception, but . . . with an irrationalist feature of a moderate prag-
matism. I don’t need to discuss Poincaré now, at least with respect to the 
question as to where precisely he stood, for the question that interests me 
particularly is that of number and space.
  The schema of ennoetism is:
  - contemplative nous 
 
  -  self-moving psychè (time, number, astronomy 
  moved sôma (space)
Time pertains to motion; which is why it is considered to be correlate to 
number. Matter is what is moved, taken to be primarily correlate to space. 
In that way number comes to be above space, and is the correlate of the 
psychical, with the world-psychè. Hence, according to Poincaré, the succes-
sion of numbers is connected with, or secured in, the succession of time. 
This proposition [about the succession of numbers and that of time] is 
thanks (owing) to Poincaré, insofar as it finds adherence in our circle [i.e. 
in Dooyeweerd], and it stems from the time of my dissertation.” 
 In our own discussion of Vollenhoven’s dissertation (cf. chapter 
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2) we found clear evidence of the influence of Poincaré. Numbers are 
constructions of the mind, as Poincaré averred, being based on repetition 
of successive recurrence of a mental act (cumulatively adding 1 to 1, 
to 1+1, etc.). The intuition of this possibility is the basis for accepting 
the arithmetical principle of complete induction. Vollenhoven speaks of 
first order arithmetic, this being the account of the number concept, 
that arises through counting, and second order arithmetic, which is the 
science of arithmetic. (Cf. chapter 2, section III.A.) Geometry, in turn, 
is based on the ‘group’ concept, which is a specific set of conditions to 
which the transformations of spatial figures are subject. For Poincaré 
the group concept “pre-exists in our minds, at least potentially” 
(Poincaré, 1902), while experience presents an opportunity to apply a 
specific group. The one that is actually chosen for that purpose is based 
on convention, being whatever suits the psycho-physical makeup of 
the body best. Vollenhoven, while accepting this, takes a stricter line. 
Convenience in light of the psycho-physical makeup of the human body 
is not itself an explanation, but calls for one. The ‘forms of sensibility’ 
of the body provide the a priori possibility of localizing things spatially 
and temporally. This dictates a preferred spatial structure (first order 
Euclidean three-dimensional geometry), while the science of geometry 
(second order geometry) studies all the possible ‘spaces’ as based on the 
different group conditions. (Cf. chapter 2, section III.B.)
 Essential to Vollenhoven’s recollection of his own dissertation is the 
Kant-Poincaré precedence. Kant made an essential distinction between 
sensibility and understanding. Sensibility, through which one undergoes 
the outer and inner experience of data, is controlled by forms of sensibility, 
these forms being ordering schemata that allow us to experience sense-
data either in sequence (time-wise) or contemporaneously (space-wise). 
The data, as organized by these forms, constitute the ‘material’ for the 
mind (understanding) to work on in terms of its own spontaneity and 
categories. The human awareness of the forms of sensibility is intuitive, 
which is why, in Kant, intuition is always related to (possible) sense-
experience. He does not acknowledge a ‘mental’ or ‘intellectual intuition’. 
Here the schema of ennoetism emerges, with its basic distinction 
between mind and sensibility (or the body), and at the bodily level, the 
distinction between psychè and sôma, in correlation with number and 
space, respectively.
 Kant accounted for arithmetic and geometry by appealing to the 
forms of sensibility. As Vollenhoven has it, Poincaré’s view of number 
and space is geared to the same schema. We (with Vollenhoven) need not 
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ask whether this is persuasive, for Poincaré is not so explicit about the 
ontological (as over against the epistemological) foundations of number 
and space.188 But what we do need to ask is whether Vollenhoven does 
justice to himself, viz. regarding the position he claims he took in the 
dissertation. We do find a similar sort of schema, in that there is a primary 
distinction between mentality and the psycho-physical, and in the latter, 
the temporal and spatial forms of sensibility. But in linking number and 
space to this schema, Vollenhoven is entirely clear (in 1918a) in insisting 
that number is correlated to a mental intuition, not to the temporal form 
of sensibility, while space and geometry is associated with the psycho-
physical body. The two ranks of the synthetic a priori are linked to this 
distinction. The synthetic a priori of arithmetic appeals to the mental 
intuition, while the geometrical a priori (of localization) is based on the 
spatial form of sensibility. The temporal form of sensibility is correlated, 
not to number, but to kinematics! One statement sets it all in perspective: 
“the apriority of arithmetic is of higher rank than that of geometry and 
kinematics; we can distinguish them as intuition and form of sensibility” 
(Vollenhoven 1918a: 417) (Cf. chapter 2, section III.C.)
 I don’t believe it is possible to make the wording of the dissertation 
match with what Vollenhoven remembers. Even a not-so-close reading 
of the dissertation does not provide sufficient scope for an alternative 
reading. The difficulty is two-pronged: there is the matter of intuition as 
over against forms of sensibility, and there is the problem of where time 
and number fit.
 To take the second difficulty first, it could be that a statement of 
L.E.J. Brouwer hung in the background of Vollenhoven’s memory. In his 
inaugural address (Brouwer 1912), Brouwer states: “However weak the 
position of intuitionism seemed to be after this period of mathematical 
development [since the time of Kant], it has recovered by abandoning 
Kant’s apriority of space but adhering the more resolutely to the apriority 
of time” (op. cit.: 69). This, to be sure, is not a rehabilitation of Kant, but 
it does put the emphasis on the intuition, as relevant to number, at a point 
in Kant’s conception where, in Kant, the temporal form of sensibility is 
addressed. This is the ‘place’ where Vollenhoven thought he had himself 
positioned number and time. But in the dissertation Vollenhoven has 
two views of time. There is time as sequence and as succession. Time as 
form of sensibility is time as sequence. It is a schema of organization of one-
188   Vollenhoven’s characterization of Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) being an “influ-
ential French philosopher” is somewhat misleading. He was the leading mathematician of 
his day, whose writings on the philosophy of mathematics and science were influential. 
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after-the-other. This is relevant to motion and kinematics, e.g. in tracing 
the path of motion of a moving object. The ‘number line’ is relevant here, 
the (as Bergson called it) spatialization of time. On the other hand, time 
as succession is the actual undergoing, in a cumulative way, of experienced 
changes of state. This is a matter of mental awareness that is quite distinct 
from any sensitivity of the body. The natural numbers are ‘constructed’ 
through counting, and counting is predicated on this intuitive awareness 
of succession. That awareness is the essential support of the a priori 
principle of complete induction. In this sense number (in counting) is 
correlated to time (as succession).
 The other difficulty of intuition and form of sensibility also cannot 
be bridged. In a superficial sense one might appeal to Kant’s use of the 
word “intuition”, which he limits to sensibility (pure and applied). But 
if this is seized on to put number and time in Vollenhoven back in their 
‘Kantian place’, then that creates havoc with Vollenhoven’s epistemology. 
He distinguished (at the time) between ‘knowing’ and ‘knowing that’. The 
former is essentially a matter of acquaintance, which involves a process. 
One can increasingly get to know an object better, and even the Self, in 
a Self-approaching process. The forms of sensibility mediate this process. 
But there is also the immediate awareness of knowing that I undergo 
seeing or feeling or willing or distinguishing, etc. This is an intuitive 
awareness of the state I am in (this is the ‘concrete intuition’) when and as 
I stand in relation to other things or persons. I can only know my states 
‘occurrently’, i.e. when they really occur (subject oriented), whereas I 
can (progressive) know things so long as they are in my presence (object 
oriented). So quite apart from choice or use of terminology, there are 
two ‘scenes’ in the early Vollenhoven calling for recognition: ‘becoming 
acquainted with’ and ‘being immediately aware of ’. The one may (and 
does) reinforce the other, but neither can be subsumed under the other. 
The succession that is relevant to counting, and to grasping number 
that results from this,189 is based on the primal two-oneness of intuition 
in self-awareness; this succession is not a species of sequence in a Self-
approaching process of temporal localization. 
 Is it possible to characterize Vollenhoven’s position more adequately? 
We found in chapter 2 that Vollenhoven’s early work does at least hint 
at evincing ‘a position’. The term ‘occasionalism’ arose in that context. 
How does occasionalism compare to ennoetism? We will need to define 
these terms first. We have, however, found a use for the latter term in the 
189   There is also the additional factor of the analytical intuition, needed to consoli-
date difference and similarity in the intuited content; cf. chapter 2, section VI.F. 
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context of characterizing Vollenhoven initial definitive position. I believe 
that the significance of ‘ennoetism’ lies, not in the dissertation itself, but 
in the move away from the dissertation.
 But before turning to this ‘problem in Vollenhoven’ there is still 
the question of the relevance in Vollenhoven’s addressing Dooyeweerd 
about ‘ennoetism’. If Vollenhoven appears to misinterpret the very work 
he claims influenced Dooyeweerd, what was that influence, if any? After 
all, Dooyeweerd nowhere seems to admit this. Is Vollenhoven’s feeling 
of regret in this connection then misplaced? We need to take a closer 
look at Dooyeweerd’s understanding of time and how it compares to 
Vollenhoven’s view in the dissertation. 
C. Dooyeweerd’s ‘modalization’ of time
Let us summarize Vollenhoven’s position on time as evidenced in the 
dissertation. Time and number ‘lodge’ in the intra-mental, concrete 
intuition. There is first the intuitive awareness or occurrent experience 
(Dutch: “beleven”) of awareness taking place. Secondly, its taking place 
gives rise to an accrual of content, in step with the acts of intuition. If 
there were no succession, there could be no accrual at all, thus time as 
succession is essential here. Then, thirdly, the addition of the analytical 
intuition reinforces the awareness of similarity and difference in the 
content accrued. Here is where the grasp of number takes place, viz. 
through the successive grasping of the addition of different ‘this’s’, as this 
accrues in succession. This is prior to any concept formation; for grasping 
content is fixing on meaning (a prerequisite for any concept-formation). 
This grasping is of the essence of Gegenstand formation, which takes place 
by means of the analytical intuition, in submission to the principle of 
identity. In light of this principle, mental content is ‘identified’ (posited) 
as a fixed, objective meaning. The analytical intuition is not itself original, 
but it presupposes experience as needed for any content to be able to 
accrue. In other words, the analytical intuition presupposes the concrete 
intuition and the reality of succession, i.e. time. The intuition itself is a 
bi-unity that always involves the Self, in the sense that the intuition is 
the awareness of a state of the Self by virtue of the Self ’s participating in 
relations to things or other persons.
 If we now take a representative text of Dooyeweerd on the topic 
of the problem of time, say, “The problem of time in the philosophy 
of the law-idea” (Dooyeweerd 1940), the reader soon discovers a (close) 
similarity in argumentation.
 First, the sense of time, says Dooyeweerd, is deeply rooted in human 
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experience; it is at a depth of occurrent experience [beleven] that is beyond 
the reach of the theoretical [or analytical] consciousness (op. cit., p. 160-
161). “Only in the “beleven” does the knowledge of reality become our 
own, and the awareness of our own being is the first condition of genuine 
knowledge” (p. 161). These statements place time in the centre of what in 
Vollenhoven was the concrete intuition and its link to self-consciousness.
 Now, continues Dooyeweerd, whatever remains foreign to our 
Selfhood cannot be known (op. cit.: 161). It is in non-theoretical or 
naïve experience that one experiences full reality, in its ‘in-one’-ness 
(op. cit.: 162). (This is much like Vollenhoven’s ‘bi-unity’.) Implicit in 
this cohering experience is the modal structure, which is ‘how’ reality 
reveals itself to us (op. cit.: 164). Thus human experience, in the deep 
sense of occurrent experience, and the experience of time this involves, is 
channelled in modes of being, that are at once modes of experience and 
a cadre in which reality appears. “Temporal reality functions in a diversity 
of modal aspects, which are not themselves subject to change in time, 
but rather form a constant and fundamental modal cadre, within which 
the individual changing things, events, activity, acts and societal forms 
have their variable functions, and which first makes possible that variable 
functioning” (op. cit.: 163-164). Given this modal cadre at the (depth) 
level of the Self ’s experience, a level where time is a real factor, it comes 
as no surprise that the modal cadre is a framework of time, in the sense 
that, in each modality, time comes to expression in a distinct way (op. 
cit.: 164). Dooyeweerd proceeds to list and describe the distinct ways in 
which time is modally expressed (op. cit.: 167-174), beginning with the 
arithmetical aspect. In this aspect, the series of the natural numbers, from 
small to large, is interpreted as evincing a temporal order of earlier and 
later.
 I believe that this account, with its focus on the Self, its intuitive 
experience, and the factor of time that is involved (and its modal cadre), 
is too similar to Vollenhoven’s early work to be merely coincidental. The 
only significant point of difference is the modal cadre. But that, of course, 
came into the picture in the work of 1922-1923, when the modalities are 
taken to be the primary forms of consciousness (modalities of viewing) beside 
their being region categories (cf. in particular Dooyeweerd 1923a; also 
chapter 3, section III.E.3). That modal cadre arose in the context of the 
Gegenstand-sphere and its organization in regions of distinct modality. It 
is presented as a (metalogical, intuitive) presupposition of the theoretical 
consciousness. Thus it ‘fits’ at the level where the ‘modalization of time’ 
takes place, given that time is the real succession of occurrent experience. 
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Strictly speaking, Vollenhoven’s observation (about the influence on 
Dooyeweerd) points to this modalization. It was, as such, subsequent 
to the dissertation, but its introduction fits within the schema of the 
dissertation, which is that of critical realism. Dooyeweerd’s account is 
predicated on the account of the Self as prevalent in critical realism. 
 Vollenhoven’s point of criticism assumes, naturally, his regretting 
this modalization of time.190 This only makes sense from the perspective 
of his having abandoned the appeal to the subjectivity of the concrete 
intuition, and everything that is part of that. In fact, he took that step 
when he re-gauged subjectivity from a self-certain subject to a tasked 
subject, a subject standing in a (prophetic) office. The recognition of 
modal diversity is then no longer dependent on the intuitive awareness 
of primary forms of consciousness. (Recall Vollenhoven’s dubbing this 
an “illusion” in the quotation referred to in footnote 48 above.) That 
recognition takes place in the execution of the task of understanding, 
to the extent that this task involves acknowledgement of adequate 
regulating rules (ordinances) and the avoidance of antinomies. This is 
an externalist criterion, over against the former internalist, intra-mental 
criterion. Dooyeweerd, it would appear, continued to give pride of place 
to the Self ’s need of security of self-certainty, and when he accepted the 
ontology of meaning (in the late 1920s) the Self ’s self-centredness became 
essential to him as supra-temporal privileged participation in meaning 
(the Gegenstand-sphere of meaning of critical realism thereby becoming 
the modal cadre in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee). Vollenhoven recognized 
something of his own former position in this, and so, whether rightly or 
not, felt responsible.
 There is double irony here. Dooyeweerd spoke of the problem of 
time in the “Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee”, whereas we are now forced to 
acknowledge that the problem is that of the ‘concrete intuition’, as an 
inheritance of Vollenhoven’s initial critical realism. Vollenhoven, in turn, 
assumed and regretted what was, indeed, an influence on Dooyeweerd. 
But in formulating this influence as an accommodation to ‘ennoetism’, 
190   It would be a mistake to assume that Vollenhoven denied the relevance of time 
in the first two law-spheres already at an early date. In 2005d/e, 48, he states that we find 
time “in all the modalities of a unity of subjection”, continuing immediately with “in the 
arithmetic as succession, in the spatial as simultaneity . . .”. But he began by saying that 
“time is neither an individual nor a modal difference”, which leaves us wondering what 
Vollenhoven’s unspoken thoughts are here. The first evidence of Vollenhoven’s question-
ing the ‘modalization of time’ is in “Divergentierapport I”, (1953p); cf. my introduction 
to this report in Tol and Bril 1992: 108-111. Dooyeweerd’s initial response to this would 
appear to be (as I stated in the said introduction) the long footnote in Dooyeweerd 1953-
1958 I: 31-32, in which he (rather vigorously) defends the ‘modalization’. 
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Dooyeweerd probably could not catch his meaning. At least he never 
confirmed the influence.
D. From ‘occasionalism’ to ‘ennoetism’
Now, finally, what about that enigmatic term ‘ennoetism’? It stems from 
Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method and is not a current term in 
philosophy. This is not the place for a close historical discussion,191 but 
a general description is required in order to detect what relevance this 
might have towards understanding Vollenhoven in the present context. 
1. The theory of priority
Ennoetism is a type of thought that belongs to a group of four types that 
Vollenhoven classed as the theory of priority.192 This theory focussed on 
the threesome ‘mind-psyche-soma’, whereby ‘mind’, as higher principle, 
has priority over soma (matter), the lower principle, without there being 
a significant reverse effect. The psyche, which is traditionally the principle 
of motion, relativizes the duality of mind and matter in mediating, from 
out of a primary unity, the contact by which the higher principle affects 
the lower principle.
 The sketch of ennoetism (given in listing IV [1968b], section B.) 
indicates that the psyche here belongs entirely to the lower principle, 
meaning that the psycho-somatic reality is entirely self-dynamic and self-
guided. The chief role of mind, as higher principle, is to contemplate 
this reality which, in doing so, makes it the content of its knowing and 
affects it through knowing it. This is what suggested the term ‘ennoetism’ 
to Vollenhoven, which literally means: ‘in-the-mind-ism’. Considered 
from the perspective of the human being, perception focuses on the 
psycho-somatic reality, while cognition characterizes the mind’s own 
contemplation.
 Ennoetism has, within the family of priority theory, a close cousin, in 
what Vollenhoven calls “occasionalism”. In the latter the psycho-somatic 
principle is also self-dynamic, but it is not self-guided. Depending on the 
191   Vollenhoven published a detailed study on the arise of ennoetism in his “En-
noëtisme en ‘ahoristos duas’ in het praeplatonische denken” (Ennoetism and ahoristos 
duas [indefinite two-ness] in pre-Platonic thought) (1954c). But the article in no way 
hints that the topic might, in some way, be relevant to Vollenhoven himself. 
192   In the late 1960s Vollenhoven re-interpreted priority theory in a way that af-
fected occasionalism. I leave this aside, for it complicates the discussion without throwing 
new light on the problem at hand. Besides, the former interpretation was prevalent when 
the differences between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were in discussion. Cf. Vollen-
hoven 2000: 17-19. 
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occasion, there is guidance, as called for, which is provided by the higher 
principle of mind. The higher principle is not just noetic, but psycho-
noetic. Thus, in occasionalism there is a double (or at least a diverging) 
psyche, one (part) belonging to the psycho-somatic body (this accounts 
for self-movement) and one to the psycho-noetic mind (a teleological 
effect). In occasionalism the lower principle of individual existence is 
limited to the animus of the body, with psychical mental activity rising 
above this.193
 The two other types that belong to the theory of priority are a 
vitalistic type and a type called “instrumentism”. In “vitalism”, the lower 
principle is bio-somatic; only a vegetative force is relevant here. All 
motion, in the sense of change of place and direction, is accorded to the 
psyche, that is part of the higher principle. Finally, in instrumentism, the 
lower principle only concerns physical matter, with the higher principle 
being the full source of growth, direction and thought.
 Vollenhoven, it would appear, developed a preference for priority 
theory through the double influence of Bergson and his understanding 
of the Christian tradition. As a student, Vollenhoven wrote appreciatively 
on Bergson, though, as a later lecture on Bergson attests (cf. Vollenhoven 
1921ms), he was critical of Bergson as well (e.g. there is too much change 
in Bergson, not enough stability). Bergson’s élan vital is the principle of 
life that impels reality into an upward development, while matter is life 
spent, the dead precipitate of life—“life being the skyrocket bursting in 
air, and matter being the dead ashes falling down”.194 This suggests the 
instrumentistic version of priority theory, which indeed does justice to 
essential features of Bergson’s thought.195
193   In illustrating occasionalism, Vollenhoven often used the example of a horse and 
its rider to portray the lower and the higher psyche respectively. Confusingly, J. Stellingw-
erff refers to this example as illustrating ennoetism; cf. Stellingwerff 2006: 28. Occasion-
alism is not without its own contemplative moment, in the context of the psycho-noetic 
higher principle. (Cf. Vollenhoven 2005c, “occasionalism”: “the higher principle is not 
merely mind . . .”, p. 298.) I believe we may interpret this as follows. This psycho-noetic 
principle contemplates what accrues in the psyche and, through contemplating it, turns 
it into ‘inner objects’ or ‘mental material’ in the process of Gegenstand formation. In other 
words, occasionalism includes a theory of mental objects. 
194   Edman 1944: xvii. 
195   Cf. Vollenhoven 2000, chart 43; also the article on Bergson in Vollenhoven 
2005c: 63-64. Within the range of the elan vital, Bergson distinguished knowledge and 
intuition. Knowledge, particularly that of the natural sciences, is focussed on the inert, 
spatially extensive reality, while the intuition is an intra-mental intellectual sympathy, in 
empathy with life. The distinction of knowledge and intuition recurs in Vollenhoven, but 
with a difference. For Vollenhoven, the object-orientation of knowledge includes psycho-
physical reality, as positioned in space and time. Also the intuition is not so much in 
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 The part that can be accorded to the Christian tradition is the 
doctrine of God’s sovereignty, when interpreted as ‘priority’. Strictly 
speaking this is philosophically relevant only ‘on the boundary’ between 
divinity and the creature, in other words, only where the immanence of 
God affects the creature, as constituting the effect of the ‘priority’, i.e. 
as transcendental condition. Vollenhoven recognized that in the history 
of Christianity there are many instances of how Christian thought is 
conceptualized in terms of traditions that are pre-Christian, priority 
theory being a case in point. He acknowledged that one cannot avoid 
these traditions, but one ought (very much) to be aware of them, in the 
broad spectrum of their historical presence, and be mindful of whether 
a specific accommodation helps or hinders philosophical understanding. 
In that sense, Vollenhoven, in time, moved away from priority theory. 
 The four arrangements (ontology) of mind-psyche-soma of priority 
theory also find applications in cosmology. The arrangements can be taken 
as characterizing the world in the large, with plants, animals and human 
beings integral to it—a kind of universalism—or as characterizing the 
individual creature, whether plant, animal or human being, depending 
on the chosen type, whereby the world acts as substrate to that choice—a 
kind of individualism. But it is also possible, for each of the four types 
of priority theory, to maintain both side by side, as macrocosm and 
microcosm, analogously structured. In that case the lower principle of the 
macrocosm acts as an ‘Umwelt’ or context for the creatures, whose own 
bodily nature fits that context. 
2. Ennoetist metaphysic
We shall now attempt to pull the various loose strands of our analysis 
of Vollenhoven’s thought together. I believe we can affirm, with a 
reasonable degree of confidence, that the type of priority theory to which 
Vollenhoven first felt affiliated is that of occasionalism, including its 
cosmological side-by-side arrangement of macrocosm and microcosm. 
The shift that is evident in Vollenhoven after his breakdown is more 
difficult to pinpoint, mainly because of the lack of a unifying text. But 
it has features that are consonant with what Vollenhoven later saw to 
be characteristic of ennoetism. The point, of course, is not to impose a 
empathy with life as being the psycho-noetic awareness of the Self ’s unity with whatever 
affects it mentally. But, despite this difference, Vollenhoven acknowledged the influence 
of Bergson in his dissertation, especially as regards the doctrine of intuition (cf. 1918a: 
348). We add that this intuition, in being predicated on the psyche in its being relevant 
to the higher principle, can occur (leaving adjustments of context aside) not only in in-
strumentism but also in vitalism and occasionalism. 
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schema on Vollenhoven’s thought, but to do justice to how he understood 
and formulated his primary distinctions.
 For the evidence of an initial occasionalism we may point, first 
of all, to the last section of the discussion of metaphysics of chapter 2, 
where we indicated the primary theme of dynamic reconciliation in 
the occurrence of dualities in the early Vollenhoven, namely of duality 
becoming one by virtue of belonging together. Such occurrences are 
“occasions of experience” (to use Whitehead’s phrase). This is intimately 
associated with the role of the intuition of positing bi-unities, which in 
fact becomes the model for all the main dualities. In that sense the term 
‘occasionalism’ is a fitting characterization.196 
 Then, secondly, in the provisional summary offered in connection 
with Vollenhoven’s Christian theism (cf. chapter 2, section VIII.B.3), the 
relevance of the arrangement of macrocosm and microcosm is discussed. 
This arrangement provides the context for the objective and the subjective 
orders, which themselves seek reconciliation through the harmony 
predisposed by the Logos. These two orders are given cosmic relevance in 
an interpretation of the world order and the human being in a way that 
matches the type of priority theory Vollenhoven calls “occasionalism”. I 
shall not repeat here what is said there. But the illustration (in section 
VIII.B.3. of chapter 2) indicates an ‘occasionalistic’ arrangement of 
mind-psyche-soma.
 The metaphysics of Vollenhoven’s early work is that of a monadology 
of substances and their changing appearances.197 The appearances occur 
in space and time, which form the context of nature and the human 
body. But these appearances are controlled by ideas, the substances of the 
appearing things. In the macrocosm (the World), the thing-laws are like 
‘psychic principles’, themselves the individuation of general essences. In 
other words, they are ‘psycho-noetic’, and in that capacity they regulate 
or guide empirical things. On the part of the microcosm (the Self ), there 
are the ‘qualities of being a subject’, themselves determined by objective 
norms, which are ‘psycho-noetic’ (relevant to the immortal soul, or will 
governed by recognized norms) and hold sway over the waywardness of 
196   The features of occasionalism prominent in modern thought, such as ‘seeing all 
things in God’ (Malebranche) or ‘linking thought to bodily reaction’ (Geulincx), etc. are 
select features of this conception, which has roots in ancient philosophy (e.g. Philistion, 
Ekphantos). Cf. Vollenhoven 2005c, the articles: “Geulincx” (p. 158), “Malebranche” (p. 
245), “Occasionalism” (pp. 297-198). 
197   In the article on “occasionalism” in Vollenhoven 2005c: 298, Vollenhoven men-
tions, presumable without recalling its relevance to his own early work, that the macro-
cosm-microcosm variant of occasionalism in general harbours a monadology! 
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the human body (perishable body).198
 When comparing Vollenhoven’s changed position in the second half 
of the 1920s with the occasionalism of his early position, several things 
are readily noticed. First of all the micro- and macrocosm arrangement 
is dissolved. This is most pronounced in the denial of a ‘principle of 
individuality’. A human being is part of humankind, and the individuals 
that we are need to be seen in the context of our ‘standing in subjection’. 
The individual’s subjectivity is not that of the certainty of self-awareness, 
but—in its being a ‘tasked’ subjectivity—that of being ineluctably in a 
position of responsibility.
 This new understanding has important consequences. In the first 
place, there is no longer any basis for the distinction between thought and 
being. Thought belongs to being, which means that it cannot intelligibly 
be distinguished from it. This means that the concrete intuition has lost its 
earlier importance. It is no longer the prime witness of self-consciousness 
but a psychological phenomenon, useful but not to be elevated to a prime 
principle. The analytical intuition in turn shifts away from the concrete 
intuition and becomes involved in the role of assessing the value of being 
in its being knowable.
 In the second place, the way Vollenhoven’s theistic understanding 
is combined with the initial cosmological arrangement is also reworked. 
No longer is the Spirit the warrant of norms that impinge upon the Self ’s 
qualities of being a subject. Norms are now understood as being part of 
an integral ‘creation order’. This means that the Logos also no longer has 
the role of disposing subject and object to form a synthesis. This signals 
the fundamental change in the scholastic framework of the harmony of 
subjective and objective rationality. The subjective order is itself directed 
from out of the cosmic order. The task is not to imitate or become 
adequate to that order, but to comply to it so as to effect fulfilment. The 
Self ’s general lack of independence (or autonomy) makes it possible to 
198   There is further unexpected convergence on occasionalism in this respect, name-
ly in the limited but sympathetic influence of R.H. Lotze and Ch. Sigwart. Vollenhoven 
appeals to Lotze, where the latter argues for the reality of succession in the world, that helps 
to certify the distinction between God and the world (cf. chapter 2, section VIII.B.1.). Of 
Sigwart, who emphasized the normative character of the principles of logic, Vollenhoven 
says: “In his meritorious Logik, thought resides in his opinion under the higher psyche, 
but at the same time is norm-controlled: logic is . . . not the physics but the ethics of 
thought” (Vollenhoven 2005c, “Sigwart”: 383). Vollenhoven expressed a similar opinion 
in his early years: “logic is the ethics of psychical thought” (Vollenhoven 1921c: 82). The 
influence of each of these authors is where the higher principle affects the lower one, in 
the macrocosm and the microcosm respectively. Vollenhoven characterizes the type of 
thought of both authors as being occasionalistic; cf. Vollenhoven 2005c: 298, 383. 
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consider the Self and the World more as a whole.
 This ‘cosmological shift’ does not as such evidence an ennoetism. 
For that we need to see what the main arrangement is of the whole. We 
saw already that the former psycho-physical realm (within occasionalism), 
with its ideals of absolute space and absolute time and met by the forms 
of sensibility of the human psycho-physical structure, has been worked 
into a fuller environment, now called an ‘absolute medium’ (Vollenhoven 
1926a: 13; 1926b: 394; 1926d: 54, 155, 193). When, after 1926, 
the cosmological intersection principle is more fully developed, the 
environment becomes the full relational network of inter/intra-individual 
relationships (cf. section IV on the cosmological intersection principle). 
This is consistent with a shift, within priority theory, from occasionalism 
to ennoetism.199 
 The environment is also the object of perception. If one were to 
limit the cosmos to this feature, it would be a cosmos reduced to factual 
reality. But there are also non-factual features of the cosmos, as disclosed 
in knowing. The intersection principle ensures that it is one cosmos. But 
one can detect two emphases here: the environment that is perceived, 
and a distinguishable ‘realm’ above it, that is more typical of cognition. 
What does this ‘higher realm’ of non-factual reality look like? 
 In occasionalism, this higher realm is the domain of the ideas (of 
distinctive being). There are general essences, that are noetic, and they 
individuate into ‘thing-laws’ that govern the structure, coherence and 
development of finite things. As thing-laws they are principles of control 
or direction, in other works, they have a psycho-noetic meaning. They 
define the substance of things, which reveal themselves in the factual 
world via their phenomena. This is the ‘metaphysics’ of occasionalism, 
being essentially that of a monadology. We saw the effort Vollenhoven 
applied to undercut this metaphysics, as being unsuited for a more 
‘reformed philosophy’, when realizing the liability of that metaphysics.
 So what is the alternative? To start, Vollenhoven quite rigorously 
rejects the construal of ‘thing-laws’. Ideas that are thought to have a 
controlling or determining role in factual reality are speculative and 
deterministic. They leave no freedom for consideration in what in 
Vollenhoven is the ontological difference between law and subject. 
199   When comparing the four views of priority theory, viz. instrumentism, vitalism, 
occasionalism and ennoetism, one observes (in the given order) a progressively fuller 
understanding of the ‘somatic’ principle: from bare inert matter, whereby all change and 
activity is due to the higher psycho-noetic principle of development, direction and cogni-
tion in instrumentism, to a self-directing active soma, taken up in cognition by the higher 
noetic principle in ennoetism. 
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By rejecting ideas in the sense of thing-laws, Vollenhoven removes 
the ‘psychic-dynamic factor’ at the level of the psycho-noetic realm of 
occasionalism. In other words, that level has become more exclusively 
‘noetic’, matching a more exclusive cognitive meaning. This step is at 
least consonant with the setup of ennoetism.
 But isn’t cognition just a function? Shouldn’t we expect an alternative 
‘metaphysics’ if the monadology of occasionalism is really being rejected? 
Cognition is indeed a function. But we need to see its broader use. It is 
called upon in the context of knowledge. Now knowledge can be conveyed 
or sought. But either way, there is an essential kernel to knowledge, 
and that is that knowledge attests to ‘possessing truth’. Now we found 
a certain difficulty in understanding what truth is in this connection. 
The difficulty is caused not in the last place by the realist-metaphysical 
qualification Vollenhoven gives to this notion. It is entirely ‘in itself ’, 
it has no need of a knower to be, and it is entirely indifferent to being 
known (Vollenhoven 1926b: 385). No doubt there are anti-psychological 
motives at work here, also anti-Kantian ones, such as opposing the view 
that truth ‘holds’ by virtue of the active knower (op. cit.: 384). But 
Vollenhoven is not merely being critical. At the same time he is asserting 
a position. He commits himself to truth as noetic principle, and in doing 
so he attests to accepting a ‘metaphysic’ of truth.
 But to qualify as a metaphysic of ennoetism, it is not sufficient 
merely to assert truth as ontological principle. The ‘facts’ of reality must 
in some sense stand in relation to it. There must be a link between the 
higher (noetic) principle and the lower (somatic) principles. Now we 
find that this is indeed the case. There is truth, and there is ‘a truth’. 
Truth in general is the schema in which knower and the knowable come 
together, not synthetically but ‘systatically’. Any state of affairs that does 
not violate the structure of this systasis can be taken up into truth. In 
other words, everything that is structured according to the intersection 
principle of cosmology can become the content of thought. This is how 
the facts or the states of affairs can be dealt with, viz. in being cognized 
or in becoming known, which is to come to possess their ‘systatic’ truth. 
This trait is quite essential for the view of ennoetism: the lower principle 
is affected by mind in being known, i.e. through becoming the content 
of mind.
 But don’t we still need a connecting factor between knowledge and 
object and also to the subject who knows the object? If truth in ennoetism 
is on a par with substance in occasionalism, what is the correlate of 
‘phenomena’? And what is the correlate of their being revealed? We found 
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that knowledge needs, on the one hand, to presuppose a prior intuition of 
assessment. The intuition of assessment views the most basic characteristic 
of what can be known, which is the modal characteristic. The intuition of 
modality is intrinsic to every cognition. On the other hand, there is also 
the factor by virtue of which any being is knowable. That is the factor of 
value. Value is “ubiquitous in the cosmos” (Vollenhoven 1930d/1931f: 
§124). However rudimentary Vollenhoven’s view of value remains, 
it may nevertheless be understood as being the warrant for being’s 
being knowable. It answers to what the intuiting subject assesses when 
attending to a being in the interest of knowledge. So if the metaphysic of 
occasionalism is the monadological schema of substance (thing-law) and 
(revealing) phenomena, then the analogous metaphysic of ennoetism in 
Vollenhoven is truth (in itself ) and (intuited) value.200 
 Difficult questions arise in the wake of this assertion. The emphasis 
on values is consonant with the aesthetic qualification Vollenhoven 
gave the cosmos in his initial definitive period. But both values and this 
cosmic aesthetics retreat when, in the early 1930s, the moral antithesis 
of good and evil is introduced as determinate beside the two standard 
cosmic determinants. Is this a continuation of ennoetism, or does this 
development involve another shift? I believe that there is continuation,201 
but there is an important change in that the individual human being 
regains a relative independence, as effected by the introduction of the 
moral determinant. And what about the reinterpretation of the law as 
boundary in the early 1940s, whereby both monism and dualism have 
become problematic for Vollenhoven? Here I believe there is a shift away 
from ennoetism, for the re-interpretation of the law as supporting correlate 
of the cosmos, as over against the earlier view of law as revealed will, is 
difficult to rhyme with the ‘priority’ attributed to the higher principle 
of reality, that also ennoetism evidences. All these conjectures require 
careful discussion in their own right. But if our analysis of Vollenhoven’s 
early work and his initial definitive position is not seriously in error, it 
should be possible to extend our approach to the later years in a way that 
200   I restrict the formulation of this metaphysic to the terminology that Vollenhoven 
provides at this point. One would have to compare other proponents of ennoetism, in 
the period of late neo-Kantianism or life-philosophy, in order to investigate whether a 
more general mode of expression might be more suitable. In Vollenhoven’s later problem-
historical work he never, to my knowledge, formulated the metaphysic of ennoetism 
explicitly. 
201   In personal correspondence (email, 27 February 2010) dr. K.A. Bril pointed out 
that, in connection with ennoetism, Vollenhoven distinguished an aesthetic and an ethi-
cal variant in the history of philosophy. Regretfully, he seldom refers to this, and never 
made the distinction explicit. 
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does justice to the nuance of his thought and to the historical sensitivity 
with which he executed it. 
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Samenvatting 
Filosofie in opbouw. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven en de verschijning van de Reformatorische 
wijsbegeerte, samen met de tekstkritische uitgave van zijn voornaamste 
systematische bijdrage, Isagôgè Philosophiae (Inleiding tot de filosofie) 1930-
1945, namelijk,
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae 1930-1945 tekstkritische uitgave. 
Filosofie in de traditie van de Reformatie, gebaseerd op een door de auteur bewerkt 
exemplaar gedateerd 1945. Redactie, met inleiding, wetenschappelijk apparaat en 
tekstverantwoording door Anthony Tol. 
In de jaren twintig van de vorige eeuw is in Nederland een zogenaamde 
‘reformatorische filosofie’ ontstaan. Hieraan lag niet een definitief plan ten 
grondslag. Diverse factoren speelden bij het ontstaan ervan een rol van betekenis. 
De hoofdrolspelers waren de zwagers Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven 
(1892-1978) en Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), maar ook de aanwezigheid 
van Antheunis Janse (1890-1960) moet genoemd worden. De zwagers voerden 
intensieve gesprekken in het begin van de jaren twintig over de wenselijkheid van 
een meer ‘calvinistische’ benadering van vragen in de filosofie, en hoe dit gestalte 
kon krijgen, bijvoorbeeld in de kennisleer en de wetenschapsfilosofie. Zij waren 
ook enigszins kritisch over de scholastiek in het eigen neocalvinistisch milieu. 
Maar men was zich vooral bewust van het intellectueel milieu van die tijd, dat 
in Nederland sterk gedomineerd werd door het neo-idealisme, met name de 
Marburgse en de Freiburgse (of Badense) richtingen van neokantianisme. Hier 
had een humanistische wereldbeschouwing vrij spel, waarvan Vollenhoven en 
Dooyeweerd zich wilden distantiëren. De zwagers zijn niet tot een volledige 
overeenstemming gekomen over de gewenste afstand tot het neokantianisme. Dit 
heeft ook hun verstaan van de reformatorische wijsbegeerte beïnvloed. Beiden 
erkenden een onderling verschil en spraken dan ook van ‘de grondleggers’ in 
meervoud.
 In de beeldvorming over de ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte 
in reformatorische geest is tot nog toe vooral de rol van Dooyeweerd sterk naar 
voren gekomen. Soms wordt zelfs de aanwezigheid van Vollenhoven nauwelijks 
erkend, of, zo die wordt erkend, dan blijft zijn rol in nevelen gehuld. Maar 
Vollenhoven had een volledige wijsgerige opleiding achter de rug, inclusief een 
‘proeve van bekwaamheid’ in de vorm van een lijvige dissertatie, toen Dooyeweerd 
zich nog in de filosofie moest gaan inwerken. Er is ook onomstotelijk bewijs dat 
hij zich een aantal jaren bewust aan Vollenhoven heeft gelieerd, totdat hij in 
staat was verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor eigen publicaties in de filosofie. 
Dit doet de vraag rijzen niet alleen welke invloed Vollenhoven op Dooyeweerds 
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denken kan hebben gehad, maar ook wat zijn rol was in het tot stand komen 
van reformatorische filosofie. Dat dit gescheiden vragen zijn moet vooral worden 
erkend omdat zij zelf van onderscheiden grondleggers spraken. Tot nog toe is 
niet nagegaan hoe de ontwikkeling van reformatorisch denken er uitziet vanuit 
het perspectief van Vollenhoven. 
 Vandaar dat dit werk zich voornamelijk richt op het vroege denken 
van Vollenhoven. Dit vroege denken heeft, historisch gezien, twee ijkpunten. 
Het eerste is Vollenhovens positiebepaling zoals ingenomen in zijn dissertatie. 
Dit werk, getiteld, De Wijsbegeerte der Wiskunde van Theïstisch Standpunt 
(1918), richt zich op drie hoofdrichtingen in de grondslag van de wiskunde, 
namelijk formalisme, empirisme en intuïtionisme. De eigen keuze valt bij het 
intuïtionisme, welke keuze ruimschoots wordt verantwoord vanuit algemene 
wijsgerige overwegingen. Het tweede ijkpunt is het dictaat Isagôgè Philosophiae 
(Inleiding tot de filosofie). Door zijn benoeming tot eerste voltijdse filosoof 
van de Vrije Universiteit in 1926 was Vollenhoven verantwoordelijk voor het 
opzetten van het wijsgerig programma, waarvan een onderdeel was het geven 
van verplichte inleidende colleges in de filosofie voor alle eerstejaars studenten. 
Vollenhoven nam deze verplichting te baat om de grondslag van een ‘calvinistische 
wijsbegeerte’ te formuleren. De eerste volledige versie is als syllabus verschenen 
in 1930. Vollenhoven bleef zijn denken ontwikkelen, zoals blijkt onder andere 
uit de vele latere versies van dit dictaat, totdat hij de tekst voorlopig afsloot 
in 1945. De syllabus van 1930 getuigt van Vollenhovens standpunt vanaf zijn 
benoeming in 1926, dat verder ook wordt ondersteund door publicaties vanaf 
1925. Deze positiebepaling in de tweede helft van de twintiger jaren wordt 
hier genoemd Vollenhovens “aanvankelijke definitieve positie”. De benaming 
is gekozen om recht te doen enerzijds aan het blijvende ‘calvinistisch’ karakter 
van zijn positiebepaling daarna, anderzijds aan de verdere ontwikkeling die dit 
standpunt onderging.
 Dit dictaat, Isagôgè Philosophiae, is nooit door Vollenhoven vrijgegeven 
voor publicatie, hoewel het wel altijd beschikbaar was voor studiedoeleinden. De 
intentie om de laatste hand te leggen aan de tekst is niet in vervulling gegaan. 
Omdat deze tekst toch een sleutelrol vervult in het werk van Vollenhoven, heeft 
de D.H.Th. Vollenhovenstichting toestemming gegeven tot het uitgeven van de 
tekst. In 2005 is de laatst bewerkte uitgave van de tekst (van 1945) verschenen 
in een Nederlands-Engelse editie. Tevens verschijnt een tekstkritische uitgave 
(in het Nederlands) van alle versies van Isagôgè Philosophiae gelijktijdig met deze 
studie, als bijlage bij het hoofddeel van de dissertatie.
 De dissertatie heeft vier hoofdstukken, voorafgegaan door een “Preface”. 
In dat voorwoord worden de hoofdstukken kort toegelicht, inclusief een 
opsomming van bijzondere momenten, tussen 1918 (Vollenhovens dissertatie) 
en 1930, toen Dooyeweerd al ver gevorderd was met het schrijven van De 
Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (verschenen 1935-1936). Hier zullen punten van de 
opsomming meegenomen worden in een meer uitgebreide bespreking van de 
hoofdstukken.
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Het eerste hoofdstuk bespreekt Vollenhovens program, als uiting van 
‘reformatorische wijsbegeerte’. De nadruk ligt op de hoofdtekst, Isagôgè 
Philosophiae, voornamelijk in hoe de opzet wordt bepaald door drie methoden, 
die de beoefening van filosofie begeleiden en tevens de beperkte maar 
belangrijke “taak en plaats” van de filosofie bepalen. De drie methodes zijn: de 
thetisch-kritische methode, de ‘methode van kennis-organisatie’ (op zich door 
Vollenhoven naamloos gelaten), en de methode van resolvering en compositie.
 De aandacht gaat vervolgens uit naar de context van Vollenhovens 
wijsgerig program, namelijk de principiële neocalvinistische positiebepaling van 
de Vrije Universiteit, binnen de traditie van de Reformatie. De Vrije Universiteit 
baseerde haar onderwijs op ‘gereformeerde beginselen’. Een Senaatsrapport van 
1895 over die beginselen laat een trek van scholastiek zien, die vooral blijkt in 
de opvatting van een harmonie tussen enerzijds het menselijke denken, binnen 
normen van logica en methode (af te korten als ‘subjectieve rationaliteit’), 
anderzijds de orde die gelegen is “in de feiten en in het wezen der dingen” 
(‘objectieve rationaliteit’). De betreffende ‘gereformeerde beginselen’ worden 
geacht te behoren tot de objectieve orde. Maar zij moeten eerst ontdekt worden 
door een benadering vanuit de subjectieve orde. Wijsgerige thema’s worden 
ook geacht licht op deze zaak te werpen. Dit alles roept zekere verwachtingen 
op aangaande de beoefening van wijsbegeerte aan de VU. Kuyper heeft in zijn 
Stone-lezingen een toepassing gegeven van hoe, volgens hem, het “calvinistische 
beginsel” in de wetenschap doorwerkt.
 Vollenhoven had respect voor en bevorderde de poging in gereformeerde 
geest te werken, zonder echter, zoals al in zijn inaugurale rede blijkt, het 
scholastieke schema van de harmonie van de twee ordes van rationaliteit bij te 
vallen. Hij ontwikkelt een program van filosofie dat, gelet op haar taak en plaats, 
zich beperkt tot de geschapen werkelijkheid (kosmos) en op wetenschappelijke 
wijze beoefend wordt. Dit houdt in dat filosofie zich niet moet opwerpen als een 
religie (noch als surrogaat noch als een nodige verdediger van religie) en ook niet 
als een wereldbeschouwing. Filosofie behoort limiteringen in acht te nemen. Maar, 
daar filosofie een activiteit is, die daadwerkelijk wordt beoefend, staat filosofie 
niet los van oriëntering door middel van een religieus en wereldbeschouwelijk 
karakter, die meta-filosofisch op de filosofie betrokken wordt. In deze oriëntering 
is Vollenhoven vooral ‘calvinistisch’. Dit is in de filosofie terug te vinden in hoe 
filosofie aan de praktische oriëntering beantwoordt. Zo wordt het mogelijk 
van een “calvinistische filosofie” te spreken, zonder dat dit een religieuze of 
levensbeschouwelijke filosofie is.
 De typering van scholastiek als de onderstelling van ‘de harmonie van 
subjectieve en objectieve ordes van rationaliteit’, wordt in deze studie als 
basisbetekenis van ‘scholastiek’ genomen. Deze betekenis doet zich niet alleen in 
het vroege geestelijke milieu van de VU voor, maar ook in de vroege Vollenhoven 
en Dooyeweerd.
Hoofdstuk twee bespreekt het vroege denken van Vollenhoven, zoals 
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geformuleerd in zijn dissertatie en de vroege artikelen tot en met 1922. (In 1923 
was Vollenhoven ziek; pas in 1925 is er een hervatting van wijsgerige publicaties.) 
De bespreking van dit denken begint met een weergave van Vollenhovens 
opvattingen op het gebied van de aritmetica en de meetkunde, gaat dan over 
tot thema’s in de wetenschapsfilosofie, kennisleer, metafysica, het theïsme en de 
‘metalogica’. Het hoofdstuk wordt afgerond met een duiding van de ‘wijsgerige 
positie’ die in dit vroege werk te onderkennen is.
 Wat de wiskunde betreft, staat Vollenhoven vooral dicht bij H. Poincaré 
en L.E.J. Brouwer. Dit zijn vertegenwoordigers van de intuïtionistische richting 
in de wiskunde, met op de achtergrond Immanuel Kant. Van Brouwer neemt 
Vollenhoven het onderscheid over van wiskunde van de eerste en tweede orde. 
Eerste orde aritmetica is de daad van het tellen; dat van de meetkunde is 
lokalisatie. De tweede orde van beide is de wetenschappelijke formulering van 
axioma’s en afleidingen. Aangaande de fundering van de eerste orde wiskunde 
gaat Vollenhoven voornamelijk zijn eigen weg. Hier zijn ‘synthetische a priori’s’ 
in het spel. Het tellen is gebaseerd op de realiteit van successie in de geest, zoals 
door zelfbewustzijn te noteren valt; lokalisatie is gebaseerd op de psychofysische 
organisatie van het menselijk lichaam. Beide zijn de basis voor synthetische a 
priori’s.
 Het intuïtionisme is daarom van belang, doordat het binnen de 
wetenschapsfilosofie een eigen koers houdt tussen de eenzijdigheden van 
formalisme en empirisme. Het maakt ook een belangrijk onderscheid in de 
kennisleer mogelijk. Er is een kennen van de dingen, afhankelijk van hoe de 
dingen zich presenteren, maar er is ook een besef vanuit het zelfbewustzijn van 
de eigen toestanden van weten. Dit laatste is intuïtief. Zelfbewustzijn is daarom 
een bron van zekerheid. Drie vormen van intuïtie zijn vooral van belang: de 
concrete intuïtie (de zekerheid dat de geest aangedaan wordt, wanneer hij 
aangedaan wordt), de analytische intuïtie (onmiddellijke zekerheid van verschil 
tussen mentale akten en inhouden), en de metafysische intuïtie (het onmiddellijk 
besef van identiteit in ruimte- en tijdbepalingen en soortidentiteit). Wanneer 
betekenis die gevat wordt via de concrete en de analytische intuïtie, bevestigd 
wordt door het principe van identiteit, dan is er sprake van ‘mentale objecten’, 
dat wil zeggen: ‘objectieve betekenis’. In navolging van Alexius Meinong neemt 
Vollenhoven een gebied van objectieve betekenis aan, genaamd ‘Gegenstände’, 
(termen en proposities) in het kader van een Gegenstands-theorie. Wanneer 
Gegenstände als substraat voor verschijnselen dienen, en principes van de logica 
de methodische omgang met Gegenstände begeleiden, dan is dit geheel een 
‘organisme van de wetenschap’. (We merken op dat dit de subjectieve orde van 
rationaliteit is. Het wordt ook wel de ‘Gegenstands-sfeer’ genoemd, getypeerd als 
‘meta-logisch’, te omschrijven als ‘logisch geordende wetenschappelijke kennis’. 
Dit is de voorloper van de modale orde in de reformatorische wijsbegeerte.)
 De objectieve orde van rationaliteit is echter in de metafysica gegrond, door 
Vollenhoven opgevat als een vorm van monadologie, namelijk van substanties 
en verschijningen. De substanties zijn (geestelijke) ding-wetten (ideeën), die 
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controle uitoefenen op de verschijning van de dingen, de opeenvolging van hun 
eigenschappen en kwaliteiten en hun ontwikkeling. Mens en wereld zijn hier de 
meest basale gestalten van bestaan. Hun analoge Opbouw doet denken aan een 
opzet als microkosmos en macrokosmos.
 Vollenhovens ‘theïstisch standpunt’ blijkt uit hoe hij de goddelijke 
werkelijkheid, als Christelijke triniteitleer, met zijn kennisleer en metafysica 
verbindt. God de Schepper is de waarborg voor de objectieve orde van de 
werkelijkheid. In zijn Raad liggen alle dingen, via hun ideeën, vast, zowel in hun 
zijn als in hun ontwikkeling. Door de Heilige Geest worden normen en idealen 
gewaarborgd, die gehandhaafd worden voor het menselijk kennen. Vanuit 
deze normen (logische principes, maar er zijn ook normen voor de ethiek, de 
esthetica, religie, enz.) wordt het ‘subjectieve’ denken van de mens in wetenschap 
begeleid, waarbij de mens trouw of ontrouw kan zijn aan normen. Wanneer 
de mens trouw is aan normen dan bepaalt dit een subjectskwaliteit van het Ik, 
bijvoorbeeld wanneer men trouw is aan logische normen dan heeft het Ik de 
kwaliteit van een kensubject.
 De Logos (de tweede Persoon van de drie-eenheid) is de waarborg voor 
de verwezenlijking van theïsme als epistemisch ideaal. In hem is de dispositie 
dat subject (van kennen) en object (dat gedacht wordt) samen komen in het 
ontstaan van kennis. Dit ideaal sluit nauw aan bij de scholastieke aanname van 
de harmonie tussen de subjectieve en de objectieve orde. Wanneer de dingen van 
de werkelijkheid volledig zouden worden gekend, is er sprake van een adequaat 
begrip in de subjectieve orde. Maar menselijk kennen is beperkt, en de mens 
is nauwelijks in staat tot volledige kennis te komen. Vandaar dat de mens met 
begripsrepresentanten werkt, die echter wel steeds in de richting gaan van een 
nadering van het volledige begrip. Zo is deze (scholastieke) onderstelling van een 
harmonie tussen de beide ordes een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor de kennis. 
Vollenhoven echter kwalificeert dit. De scholastieke harmonie is noodzakelijk 
maar niet voldoende. Het besef dat de mens goed op weg is moet zelf ook 
gewettigd zijn. Dit besef is intuïtief aanwezig, en biedt de grondslag voor de 
synthetische oordelen a priori van de wiskunde. De wiskunde is namelijk in de 
mens gefundeerd: de aritmetica in de menselijke geest, de meetkunde in de 
psycho-fysische organisatie.
 In 1921 brengt Vollenhoven, in wat hier steeds als de koppeling van 
(adequaat) begrip en idee (van zijn) geldt, een aangescherpte formulering aan. 
Sprekend van een “Christelijk realisme”, houdt hij vast aan een ‘idee’ van een 
“anders-gedacht-zijn” (ook wel: het denkvreemde). Maar ‘begrip’, op het gebied 
van het door denken verworven kennis, wordt nu ietwat anders verpakt. In zijn 
dissertatie had Vollenhoven de diverse wetenschappen binnen een eenheid van 
methodologie gedacht (invloed van het Marburgse neokantianisme). Nu erkent 
Vollenhoven verschillende gebieden van geldigheid (meer zoals in het Freiburgse 
neokantianisme). Ieder gebied heeft een ideaal van volledigheid, dat erkend dient 
te worden bij de wetenschapsbeoefening. Het volledige gebied van wetenschap, 
dat eerst door Vollenhoven als ‘organisme van wetenschap’ werd geduid, wordt 
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nu een metalogisch gebied van verschillende domeinen. Er is dus behoefte aan 
een ‘metalogische intuïtie’, die deze gebieden in hun ideale karakter schouwt. 
Het blijkt nu dat deze metalogische intuïtie een herijkte versie van de eerdere 
analytische intuïtie is. ‘Begrip en idee’ blijft dus karakteristiek voor “Christelijk 
realisme”, en ook onderscheiden van neokantiaans denken. Het laatstgenoemde 
denken laat de idee samenvallen met het ideaal van de volledige kennis, terwijl 
het begrip een stap is van het Ik op weg naar die volledige kennis, humanistisch 
begeleid door de richtinggevende Idee. Er is hier geen betekenis van ‘idee’, zoals 
Vollenhoven voorstaat, namelijk die van ‘gedachte Gods’.
Het derde hoofdstuk gaat in op de twee belangrijkste contacten die Vollenhoven 
onderhoudt. Het eerste dat besproken wordt is dat met A. Janse. Deze had 
contact gezocht met Vollenhoven in 1919 in verband met de toepassing van 
Vollenhovens gedachte over aritmetica in het kader het leren rekenen in het 
lager onderwijs. Dit contract groeide tot een vriendschap, met gesprekken over 
allerlei onderwerpen. Janse had bewondering voor, maar ook wel kritiek op de 
opvoedkundige benadering van Maria Montessori, waarin de mens (het kind) 
benaderd wordt als een eenheid van lichaam en ziel. Aan het einde van 1922, 
opperde Janse, vrij plotseling, de gedachte dat er niet zoiets is als een ‘onsterfelijk 
ziel’ (‘substantia incompleta’) in de mens. Hij was er inmiddels van overtuigd 
geraakt dat hiervoor geen voldoende bijbelse grondslag was. Vollenhoven was 
aanvankelijk verontrust. Maar voordat hij op Janse’s voorstel kon reageren, werd 
hij plotseling ziek. Janse wachtte het herstel niet af en publiceerde zijn gedachten 
begin 1923 in korte artikelen, die tot nog toe onopgemerkt zijn gebleven. 
Vollenhoven las dit werk voor het eerst eind 1923. Hij kon het nu in hoofdzaken 
met Janse eens zijn, maar had wel kritiek op diverse formuleringen. Vollenhoven 
had, in de tijd van zijn herstel, ook de leer van ‘de onsterfelijke ziel’ afgeschreven.
 Vollenhoven heeft later erkend dat er van Janse een zekere verfrissende 
invloed uitging. De punten die hij opsomt kunnen grotendeels bevestigd 
worden. Niet alleen was Janse de eerste binnen de gereformeerde kringen van 
die tijd die de notie van ‘onsterfelijke ziel’ aan de kaak stelde, ook benadrukte 
hij dat er in de Bijbel een eigen verstaan van mens en wereld te onderkennen 
valt, dat meegenomen kan worden (waar dit geschikt is) in de betreffende 
wetenschapsbeoefening. Zo is er een psychologie mogelijk die ‘rekening houdt’ 
niet met een scholastische maar met de bijbelse opvatting van de menselijke ziel.
 Hoe Vollenhoven de invloed van Janse verwerkt heeft, is niet expliciet 
bekend. Maar let men op zijn vroege denken, waar de ‘substantiële ziel’ 
de vaste waarborg is voor de intuïtie, dan kan men de omslag zien: van een 
oorspronkelijke op het Ik gerichte subjectiviteit, tot een subject als geroepen tot 
een taak of ambtsvervulling, met als kern het ‘subjèct-zijn’, het onderworpen 
zijn aan goddelijke normerende wetten. (Er wordt hier tevens groter afstand 
genomen van het neokantianisme.)
 Het tweede contact is dat met H. Dooyeweerd. Hun persoonlijk contact 
gaat terug tot hun middelbareschooltijd en zette zich voort in hun studietijd 
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aan de VU. In juli 1917 promoveerde Dooyeweerd op een juridisch thema 
(“De ministerraad in het Nederlandse staatsrecht”). Al een half jaar daarvoor 
was Dooyeweerd naar Friesland verhuisd. Pas in mei 1922 wonen de (inmiddels 
sinds 1918 zwagers geworden) vrienden weer in dezelfde stad (nu Den Haag) 
waardoor een meer regelmatig contact mogelijk was.
 In het kader van deze samenvatting zijn twee vragen van belang. Hoe vond 
Dooyeweerds ontwikkeling in de filosofie plaats op weg naar een zelfstandig 
denker? Hoe verhoudt het denken van Dooyeweerd zich tot dat van Vollenhoven 
wanneer er sprake is van een ‘calvinistische wijsbegeerte’? 
 Wat betreft de eerste vraag, het beeld dat in het bijzonder door Dooyeweerd 
geschetst wordt is dat hij op zijn eigen gezag zich tot filosoof heeft moeten 
opwerken. Dit is echter moeilijk te rijmen met het relevante feitenmateriaal. 
Zeker, Dooyeweerd heeft zich vooral neokantiaanse literatuur op het gebied 
van de rechtsfilosofie eigen gemaakt en op een eigen manier verwerkt. Maar er 
was ook correspondentie tussen de zwagers. Daaruit komt het beeld naar voren 
van een Vollenhoven die Dooyeweerd op weg hielp. Wat vooral van belang is, 
wanneer Dooyeweerds ongepubliceerde studies uit die tijd gelezen worden tegen 
de achtergrond van het vroege denken van Vollenhoven, dat Dooyeweerd bewust 
wijsgerig bezig was binnen de algemene lijnen van het concept van Vollenhovens 
vroege denken. Dit wordt in detail, door een ‘close reading’ van een aantal 
van Dooyeweerds teksten, aangetoond. Dooyeweerd neemt een standpunt van 
“kritisch realisme” in (soms genaamd “transcendentaal realisme”). Maar dat is 
niet te onderscheiden van de hoofdtrekken van Vollenhovens denken uit die tijd 
(van “Christelijk realisme”, of ook “het dualisme van begrip en idee”).
 In verband met de tweede vraag, eerst iets meer over het kritisch realisme. 
De studies die Dooyeweerd schrijft leggen een accent op de Gegenstands-sfeer. 
Die bestaat uit regionen, ieder van eigen modaliteit, wat de hoogste inhoudelijke 
karakterisering van een regio duidt. Diverse verbanden tussen regionen worden 
verder ook onderzocht, die later een vaste plaats krijgen in de reformatorische 
wijsbegeerte. Opvallend is dat, in Dooyeweerds eerste publicaties, hij erg 
terughoudend is om al te veel van de kentheoretische grondslag van zijn denken 
weer te geven, hoewel dit in de boven bedoelde studies toch terug te vinden is. 
Zoekende naar een verklaring hiervoor, lijkt de enig overtuigende oplossing te 
zijn, dat die grondslag juist op conto van Vollenhoven staat, maar dat hij, door 
zijn ziekte in 1923, van publiceren een tijd moest afzien. Vollenhovens eerste 
artikel in 1926 gaat ook over “enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie”.
 Het is gedurende Vollenhovens ziekteverlof dat Dooyeweerd met de 
notie van ‘wetsidee’ komt. Dit is het kernbegrip in Dooyeweerds verstaan van 
‘calvinistische wijsbegeerte’. Hij geeft hiermee een basis voor de regionen van de 
Gegenstands-sfeer. Het gaat om een kosmologisch principe van de voorzienigheid 
Gods. Door nauwkeurig te letten op Dooyeweerds gebruik, kan blijken dat hij 
hier—bij ‘wetsidee’—nog vasthoudt aan het scholastieke onderscheid van begrip 
en idee, zoals door Vollenhoven in 1921 was vastgesteld. Vollenhoven heeft zich, 
na zijn ziekte, nooit weer als een voorstander van deze scholastieke ‘tandem’ 
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getoond. Het verbaast dan niet dat hij wel de term wet, maar het gebruik van de 
term ‘wetsidee’ niet aanbeveelt.
 Maar Dooyeweerd blijkt zelf ook in beweging te zijn. In 1928 zijn er 
aanwijzingen van Dooyeweerds overstap van een kritisch realisme naar een 
transcendentaal kriticisme. Dooyeweerd volgend op zijn weg, zien we een 
afname van zijn belangstelling voor realisme en een toename voor belangstelling 
voor het Ik. Er waren al eerdere aanwijzingen van deze tendens, bijvoorbeeld 
van een ‘gelovig ik’ dat schouwt sub specie aeternitatis. Maar het is vooral de 
manier waarop Dooyeweerd zijn wetsidee de gestalte geeft van een (metalogisch 
geïnvolveerd) ‘wets-organisme’ dat bepalend is. Want de eerdere metalogische 
afhankelijkheid van de kennis ten aanzien van de kosmos, wordt nu verlegd 
naar het Ik, als geestelijk centrum, dat zowel in de modale orde participeert als 
erboven staat. Ook wordt ‘zin’ (dan wel ‘betekenis’, de eerdere Gegenstands-
sfeer) nu ontologisch neergezet, waardoor het geen realistisch opgevatte kosmos 
meer nodig heeft. Dit houdt ook in dat Dooyeweerd de termen ‘begrip en idee’ 
herijkt en daardoor afstand neemt van de eerdere scholastieke betekenis. Maar, 
anders dan Vollenhoven (die de term ‘idee’ geheel laat vallen), blijkt Dooyeweerd 
de term te herijken tot ‘transcendentaal limietbegrip’. Nu wordt het moeilijk 
begrip en idee, in de nieuwe betekenis bij Dooyeweerd, te onderscheiden van het 
neokantiaanse gebruik, waartegen Vollenhoven in 1921 al gewaarschuwd heeft.
Hoofdstuk vier gaat geheel in op Vollenhovens ‘initial definitive position’ (tussen 
1925 en 1930), hoewel er ook naar latere wendingen gekeken wordt. Feitelijk 
wordt in dit hoofdstuk een meer ruime duiding van Vollenhovens programma 
(hoofdstuk 1) nauwkeuriger besproken, verwijzend naar de relevante (deels 
archief-) teksten van de aangegeven periode.
 Eerst wordt nagegaan wat Vollenhovens kritiek is op het theïsme als 
epistemisch ideaal. Dit is vooral kritiek op Vollenhovens eigen vroege denken. 
Hier komt het ‘grensprobleem’ naar voren. Dit grensprobleem wordt vervolgens 
uitgediept, vanuit de correlatie van grens en wet. Hier blijkt in het bijzonder de 
behoefte aan een dualiteit van zijn, namelijk van soeverein zijn en onderworpen 
zijn. Aangezien soevereiniteit zich als wet uitdrukt, wordt hiermee wet en subjèct-
zijn in realistische geest neergezet, als een ontologisch verschil. Dit houdt in dat 
er altijd ‘ruimte’ is voor een mate waarin het subjèct aan de wet beantwoordt. 
Met ander woorden, de wet is niet determinerend maar normerend.
  Deze grensopvatting geeft de mogelijkheid in het ontologische verschil 
een nadere morele bepaling te betrekken, en zelfs een factor van leiding. Het 
blijkt dat de grens in drievoud bestaat, van wet, gebod en leiding. Vollenhoven 
koppelt ook hier de opvatting van het godsbestaan aan vast, maar met de nodige 
wijziging vergeleken met zijn vroegere denken. Feitelijk hanteert hij ook hier een 
‘theïsme’, zonder echter deze term nu te gebruiken, om vooral geen verwarring 
te stichten met het vroegere gebruik als epistemisch ideaal, dat hij afwijst.
 Gaan we dit ‘theïsme’ na, dan blijkt het werk van de Geest, dat leiding 
effectueert, het minst duidelijk omschreven. Het heeft in elk geval niets meer 
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met de subjectieve orde van rationaliteit te maken. De Logos, eerder de waarborg 
voor de scholastieke harmonie, uit zich nu vooral in het liefdegebod. Dit heeft 
met kennis in zoverre iets te maken, dat kennis ten goede gebruikt en ingezet 
dient te worden. De afstemming van norm/wet en de feitelijke structuur van de 
dingen is nu het thema van waarheid geworden, wat dus niet (meer) samenvalt 
met het werk van de Logos, maar een rol van de logische wetskring (als 
‘geschapen logos’) inschakelt. Dan is er ook een grote wijziging in de opvatting 
van het werk van de Schepper. ‘Hij schiep de kosmos en stelde hem zijn wet.’ 
Aan dat scheppen kan de mens niet komen, wat het scholastieke denken vanuit 
realistisch opgevatte ‘ideeën’ wel meent te kunnen. Maar dat hij hem zijn wet 
stelt is mede merkbaar vanuit de kosmos, als subjèct-zijn. Vandaar dat dit 
‘stellen van de wet’ ook een openbaringsmoment heeft (van de Logos), dat aan 
de geschapen dingen een waarde geeft en waardoor zij te kennen zijn. Kennen 
ressorteert onder het zijn. Dan blijken de geschapen dingen ook opgenomen te 
zijn in een algemene ontwikkeling, die onder leiding staat van de Geest. Deze 
opvatting van de kosmos wordt verder uitgediept vanuit de negatieve kritiek 
op het metafysisch ‘substantie-phaenomena’ schema (van Vollenhovens eigen 
eerdere monadologie) en de afwijzing van een ziel als substantie bij de mens.
 De kern van Vollenhovens denken is gelegen in de kosmologie. De 
hoofdlijnen hiervan worden beschreven vanuit de twee basale bepaaldheden: 
die van de modale bepaaldheid (van verschillen en verbanden tussen modale 
wetskringen) en individuele bepaaldheid (van verschillen en verbanden tussen 
individuen, c.q. individuele dingen). De overal voorkomende ‘doorsnede’ 
van wetskring en individu is hier het basisprincipe. Dan wordt ook nog stil 
gestaan, in een afrondende bespreking, bij de ietwat latere vernieuwing van de 
antropologie en de vervanging van de correlatie van God en kosmos, door de 
correlatie van wet en kosmos, beide te onderscheiden van de Godheid.
 In een addendum wordt nog nagegaan hoe de oudere Vollenhoven 
terugkeek op zijn vroege denken. Terwijl veel van wat hij zegt, goed te plaatsen 
en te beamen is, blijkt dit minder goed te lukken bij zijn karakterisering 
van zijn dissertatie. Hij gebruikt hierbij de terminologie van zijn latere 
probleemhistorische methode. Wij menen dat er voldoende bewijs is om 
Vollenhovens vroege werk, gelet op zijn eigen probleemhistorische categorieën, 
op een andere wijze te typeren. Maar dat hij een mogelijke invloed van zijn 
eigen vroege denken op Dooyeweerd vermoedt, een invloed die hij overigens 
betreurt, is terug te vinden in Vollenhovens vroege gebruik van de concrete 
intuïtie en de context van het zelfbewustzijn bij de ‘modalisering van de tijd’. 
Al in 1926 had het zelfbewustzijn deze rol bij Vollenhoven verloren. We moeten 
dus constateren dat vanaf het begin van het definitieve calvinistische denken er 
een diepgaand verschil van inzicht was en bleef: Vollenhoven tenderend naar een 
realistisch opgevatte wet en kosmos, en Dooyeweerd tenderend naar het Ego in 
betrokkenheid op zin. Het verschil tussen beiden blijkt dieper te zijn dan tot nu 
toe werd vermoed, nu Vollenhovens eigen vroege denken erbij betrokken is.
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